Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe

Past Developments, Current Status and Future Potentials

Edited by Michael Bommes, Heinz Fassmann & Wiebke Sievers

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Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe
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Michael Bommes (†), Heinz Fassmann & Wiebke Sievers

IMISCOE Research
Amsterdam University Press
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Preface

Michael Bommes passed away on 26 December 2010, after a long and debilitating illness which he bore with patience and great discipline. His interest in issues arising from the field of migration and integration research continued throughout, as did his endeavours to bring the numerous projects and research efforts to a satisfactory end. Sadly, he was not able to witness the completion of the publication presented here, which marks the conclusion of the research project ‘Migration as Opportunity and Danger’ funded by the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

This project regarded the MENA region (including Turkey) as a possible region of origin for a quantitatively significant migration to Western Europe, and placed it at the focal point of the analysis. To facilitate further in-depth work on the project, Michael Bommes established a working group. The members of this group developed the research question and research concept and went on to jointly discuss the preliminary results in a series of working-group sessions. In addition to Michael Bommes, the working group consisted of Tanja El-Cherkeh, Heinz Fassmann, Simon Fellmer, Franz Nuscheler, Ralf Ulrich and Friederike Zigmann. Invited guests, such as Steffen Angenendt, Sigrid Faath, Ahmet İçduygu, Andrew Geddes, Hein de Haas, Hanspeter Mattes, Carmella Pfaffenbach, Andreas Pott and Ayman Zohry participated in selected sessions and contributed their expertise with regard to specific issues and topics. The working group officially concluded its work in 2010 with a preliminary final report, which was to form the foundation for a proposed publication under the joint editorship of Michael Bommes and Heinz Fassmann.

The editors of the now-completed publication felt a moral obligation to publish the final report posthumously, as it includes many ideas conceived by Michael Bommes. The contributions were carefully selected, the authors were provided with an opportunity to update their work and some of the texts were subsequently translated into English. A topic such as this is clearly of interest not only to the German-speaking world, but also to an international audience. The editors and authors also made some adjustments to the contributions to ensure that they would provide readers with a comprehensive insight into a multidisciplinary research question. This joint research question may best be summarised as follows: How will migration between the MENA region and Europe develop in the future, what are the possible causes of future migration from the MENA region to Europe and how reliable are such projections when viewed against the background of a political transition process attended by numerous uncertainties?
Prefaces are always textual depositories of gratitude. Gratitude is due, in the first instance, to Viola Breuer, project manager at the Robert Bosch Stiftung, who accompanied us along the lengthy path from conception of the project all the way to its publication – a generous, at times critical, but always highly committed travel companion. In addition, we would like to thank her colleague, Hannes Schammann, who took over from Viola Breuer when she left the Robert Bosch Stiftung shortly before the completion of this publication. Sincere thanks are also due to the contributing authors, who provided us with their work and remained patient, despite repeated requests by the editors for amendments to the manuscripts. Some of the manuscripts were translated into English by John Smith and Karen Meehan, with subsequent final editing carried out by the team of editors and, in particular, by Wiebke Sievers. Jenny Money proofread the book with great care. Our heartfelt gratitude goes out to everyone who contributed to making this publication possible.

Heinz Fassmann and Wiebke Sievers
Vienna, July 2013
All member states of the European Union will be in need of labour in the near future. Three factors are decisive for this development: low fertility rates, extended life expectancy and, in most EU countries, a baby-boom generation in their late 50s and early 60s that will slowly be reaching retirement age over the coming decades. It is highly probable that, after a period of moderate growth in the present decade, the EU population will stagnate until 2030, decline after that date and age significantly in the whole period until 2050. This decline will particularly affect the workforce when the baby-boom cohort leaves the labour market and is replaced by a smaller cohort. As a consequence, EU countries will enter a phase of significant labour shortage and will be confronted with tremendous problems in financing their social-welfare systems. While such a situation may seem unimaginable at a time when the EU is experiencing a deep economic crisis, when moderate growth and employment levels of almost 11 per cent are projected for the coming years (European Commission 2012: 1), it is clear that the EU faces a serious reproduction problem with its workforce in the long run.

The United Nations Population Division (UNPD 2011) projects that the EU-27 will gain about 11.3 million inhabitants over the coming four decades (medium variant). However, due to the current age structure, this general growth will be accompanied by a significant decline in the labour-force population aged 15-64. This age group will decrease by 47.9 million (or 14.2 per cent) from 337.6 million in 2010 to 289.7 million in 2050. At the end of this transitional phase, the retired baby-boom generation will rely on a relatively narrow working-age population. These developments will affect all countries in the EU-27, but the decline of the population of working age will be much more dramatic in those countries that experienced a sharp fertility decline, from high to very low, in the past. In Germany, for example, the population aged between 15 and 64 will decline by one quarter by 2030 if current demographic developments persist over the coming two decades.

Many European states have been trying to increase the fertility of their populations by introducing measures supporting families and

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1 This book project was completed before the EU-27 became the EU-28, when Croatia joined on 1 July 2013.
increasing the number of child-care facilities. States could also implement further measures to reduce labour-force shortages, such as increasing the numbers of women and immigrants participating in the labour force, increasing the factual retirement age, shortening the time spent in tertiary education and finally re-qualifying the unemployed with a view to reintegrating them into the labour market. However, such measures cannot change the root cause responsible for the decline of the labour force. It therefore seems clear that states in the EU-27 will need some immigration to balance the tremendous changes they will be confronted with in the coming decades, and immigration seems to be an appropriate instrument with which to break this ageing process. It will offer the economy the labour force which is needed. While the Replacement Study of the UN Population Division (United Nations 2001) shows that immigration cannot extinguish the consequences of ageing baby-boom cohorts, it can mitigate this process and help to develop sustainable policy measures in the meantime.

The EU has partially recognised the significant changes in the demographic development that will take place over the coming decades. At the 1999 Tampere Council, the Commission clearly expressed the need to implement an immigration policy in order to close the gaps in the labour force. The main objective of this common policy is to better manage migration flows through a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and demographic situation of the EU. The approach agreed in Tampere was confirmed in 2004 with the adoption of the Hague Programme (2004-2009). In addition to developing a policy plan for economic migration, this programme highlighted the importance of cooperating with third countries.

But where is future migration to the EU to come from? Migration from Eastern Europe, a traditional source of labour migration to Western Europe that has come to be of major importance again since the fall of the Iron Curtain, will not be able to fill these gaps in the long run for three reasons: most of the states in this region are now EU member states, their economies have been catching up with Western Europe, in some cases with remarkable speed and, last but not least, their populations, like those in Western Europe, are decreasing due to falling birth rates and emigration. Hence, in the long run, Eastern Europe will be confronted with the same question which Western Europe is already facing: where to find the labour force no longer guaranteed by reproduction.

The situation is very different in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, bordering Europe to the south and south-east, where the
labour markets cannot offer adequate employment to young, growing and well-educated populations. Indeed, Fargues (2008: 3) described the MENA region as ‘an ideal demographic match’ for Europe: ‘The former has a large supply of young active workers, and the latter has a shortage of the youthful skilled or unskilled labour it needs to sustain its economic competitiveness.’ Gubert and Nordman (2008: 3) reach a similar conclusion in their in-depth study of migration from MENA to OECD countries: ‘Increased labour mobility from the MENA Region could compensate for demographic trends in European labour markets in the next two decades, while constituting a response to the lack of employment in the home countries.’ And Gubert and Nordman’s study, amongst others, led the World Bank (2009: xv) to conclude: ‘Both industrial and developing countries stand to benefit from better-organized migration schemes, more opportunities for labor migration, and better matching between skill demand and skill supply. This is very much the case for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Europe, where important migration links exist’.

Assessing migration potential from the MENA region

Such observations were the point of departure for this book, which analyses the MENA region, in particular Morocco, Egypt and Turkey, as a possible source of future migration to the European Union. Established experts from various disciplines discuss this issue from the point of view of migration studies, political sciences and demography. The first three chapters present the migration histories of the three countries under discussion, to assess future emigration as well as the impacts of migration on the sending and the receiving countries. Chapters 4 to 6 approach the topic from two political perspectives: EU migration policy – which mainly served to prevent migration from the MENA region in the past – and political conflicts in the MENA region that have triggered migration. The final section presents forecasts of demographic growth and future migration potential as well as possible scenarios for migration from Turkey, Egypt and Morocco under varying economic circumstances.

2 The abbreviation MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa, but the geographical definitions of this region differ. The countries commonly included are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. Other countries sometimes discussed as part of the MENA region include Turkey and Sudan.
The overarching aim of this publication is to assess whether the MENA region is, indeed, an ideal demographic match for the EU. In other words, will the high demand for labour immigration to be expected in Europe in the near future meet with a similarly high emigration potential in the MENA region? While the individual chapters use different theoretical and methodological approaches according to their field of expertise, the book as a whole tries to answer this question within the general framework of the push-pull approach. First developed by Lee (1966), the push-pull approach explains migration by a combination of factors pushing people to leave their home countries and factors attracting them to specific other countries and regions. As explained above, we regard the demand for labour in EU countries as the main pull factor for future migration from the MENA region. A second major pull factor which we take into account is the existing migration links. More recent migration theories have shown that such links lead to the establishment of networks that bring about new migration (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1993: 448-449). This particular factor partly explains the choice of countries which we discuss in more detail in our publication. Compared to other MENA states, the flows of emigrants from Egypt, Morocco and Turkey to the EU-27 are particularly high – either in numbers or in proportions of their populations (Docquier & Marchiori 2011: 245). Morocco and Turkey have long-standing migration links with selected member states of the European Union, as Hein de Haas and Ahmet İçduygu show in chapters 1 and 3 of this volume. The large majority of their emigrants settle in Europe. By contrast, most Egyptian emigrants move to the Gulf States, as Ayman Zohry shows in chapter 2 of this volume. However, as de Haas suggests, there seems to have been a certain reorientation of Egyptian migration towards Europe over the past decade.

While these pull factors are discussed in more detail in the first three chapters, the book mostly concentrates on an in-depth analysis of the main push factors for migration from the MENA region. A particular focus is on the growing populations of working age in the MENA region and their limited chances of finding adequate or any employment at all due to limited economic growth in many countries in the region. These are the factors that Ralf E. Ulrich (chapter 7), Heinz Fassmann (chapter 8) and Michael Bommes, Simon Fellmer and Friederike Zigmann (chapter 9) use in their detailed calculations of migration potential in part 3 of our book. At the same time, we are aware of the fact that growing populations and weak economies are not the only factors pushing people to leave their home countries. At least equally important, in particular in the MENA region, are conflicts brought
about by political instability and environmental conditions. However, these are not as easy to predict as demographic growth, especially at a time of radical political changes, such as those brought about by the Arab Uprising, when predictions change almost by the day. Moreover, such predictions are also more subjective, since views on the possible future impact of such changes differ, as becomes apparent from the contradictory views presented by Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes in chapter 5 and by Franz Nuscheler in chapter 6 in this volume. Under such circumstances of political instability, political stability in the EU is an important pull factor for migration. However, EU policies towards migration – still conceived as a danger to be controlled, as Andrew Geddes shows in chapter 4 of this volume – may have the opposite effect of discouraging highly skilled migrants in particular from moving to the EU.

Moving beyond the push-pull approach towards a systems approach to migration, our publication also considers the impact of migration on sending countries. A recent study has shown that the EU would greatly benefit from growing migration flows from the MENA region to the EU – tax rates would decrease and per capita Gross National Income (GNI) would increase – while the MENA region would mainly suffer from growing emigration, with the most productive workers leaving and tax rates increasing (Docquier & Marchiori 2011). Such observations have been the main motivation for the inclusion of in-depth analyses of the past effects of emigration on Egypt and Turkey, not only from an economic point of view, but also from wider social and political perspectives. These analyses of the past may serve as a point of departure for what the World Bank (2009: xv) called ‘better-organized migration schemes’ that also benefit the sending region. Several EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (CEC 2003) and the Global Approach to Migration (CEC 2011) have tried to address this issue. But criticism of these policies as confirming power asymmetries (Browning & Joenniemi 2008) and focusing on push factors of migration only (Collett 2010), shows that there is still ample space for development.

Migration histories and futures: Patterns and effects

Migration patterns from the MENA region to the EU not only differ greatly across countries and times, but are also closely linked to migration flows to other regions, in particular the Gulf States, as de Haas shows in this volume in his comparative overview of Euro-Mediterranean migration
futures, exemplified by the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. Migration from the MENA region to Europe started with post-colonial migration from Morocco to France, which was followed by guest-worker migration from Morocco and Turkey to several Western European destinations up until the oil crisis in 1973 that led to a recruitment stop in European countries. This date also marked the beginning of growing labour migration, in particular from Egypt, to the Arab Gulf countries up until the 1991 Gulf War that led to massive repatriations from this region. Migration from Morocco and, especially, from Turkey, to Europe has continued both as family and as asylum migration, and destinations have diversified – in particular for Moroccans, who have increasingly also moved to Southern Europe. In addition, Turkish emigration has also been directed to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since the 1990s. However, in general Turkish emigration has been declining over the last two decades.

De Haas regards three factors as decisive for migration patterns: political and economic developments, such as the 1973 oil crisis or the 1991 Gulf War, differentials in economic and social opportunities between sending and receiving countries, and path dependence in the sense that emigrants tend to follow the routes laid out by pioneers. Based on these assumptions, de Haas argues that emigration from Turkey is likely to decline further in the future if political stability and economic growth there persist. Migration from Morocco is likely to remain substantial, at least in the short term, since income differentials between Morocco and Europe remain relatively high and the political situation in Morocco will not change. Only Egypt, a large country characterised by demographic growth and few economic prospects, may become a main source country for longer-term future migration to the EU.

Ayman Zohry’s in depth-analysis of Egyptian emigration largely confirms de Haas’ projections. In addition, Zohry points out that the Egyptian government has long regarded emigration as a tool for development. When it first authorised emigration in the 1970s, this was mainly a strategy to ease pressure on the Egyptian labour market. But, since then, Egypt has also come to regard emigrants as a potential source of remittances, which are among Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency along with Suez Canal receipts and tourism. However, it has also been shown that only a small amount of this money is invested into activities with multiplier effects in terms of income and employment creation. While brain drain may have been a problem for the Egyptian labour market in the first emigration phase, Zohry argues that this is no longer the case, since the Egyptian labour market cannot absorb the large number of well-educated young people. This is also the main reason for emigration from Egypt to continue
in the future, with another being the possibility of growing conflicts in the
wake of the Arab Uprising that has brought to light the deep political and
religious divisions within Egyptian society.

In the third chapter, devoted to Turkey, Ahmet İçduygu comes to similar
conclusions regarding the links between migration and development in
Turkey in the past. Like Egypt, Turkey has regarded emigration as a means
of alleviating unemployment, which certainly also worked in practice. At the
same time, there is some indication that the loss of skilled workers may have
had a growth-slowing effect on Turkey, while skills acquired by the workers
abroad were often not in demand in Turkey and therefore did not contribute
to development. Remittances, on the other hand, have made an important
contribution to the Turkish economy – often in need of foreign currency.
However, as in Egypt and in many other emigration countries, this money
rarely flows into productive investments generating employment, even
though the Turkish state has initiated several projects to guide the flows of
capital in this direction. Apart from the economic impact, emigration has
also been an important source of social change in Turkey, since settlement
abroad exposed not only the emigrants but also their families at home to
modern economic, social and political processes. One of the most important
changes concerns the role of women, who have become more emancipated
through migration. At the same time, there have also been cultural-revivalist
tendencies, such as the growth of Muslim fundamentalism or the reinforce-
ment of ethnic allegiance among the Kurdish minority, both of which may
have contributed to recent political developments in Turkey. Apart from
the consequences for the home country, İçduygu also briefly analyses the
impact of migration on the receiving states. Turks in Europe seem to be in
a particularly disadvantaged position: their education is generally lower
than that of other migrants in the receiving societies and they are more
often affected by unemployment. The problems both of utilising migration
for development in the countries of origin and of including immigrants and
their descendants in the receiving countries will have to be addressed in any
future migration strategy to be developed by the European Union, together
with possible countries of origin for future migration.

Policies and conflicts: Two incalculable factors influencing
migration

The second part of the book addresses two issues which affect migration
from the MENA region to Europe but which cannot be included in any
calculation of migration potential: first, European Union migration policies and, second, conflicts in the region that may trigger refugee movements. Andrew Geddes, in the fourth chapter of this book, argues that the EU perceives migration from the MENA region primarily as a threat to be guarded against, as became obvious again in the reactions of EU states to the migration inflows in the wake of the Arab Uprising. As a consequence, EU migration policy towards the MENA region has mainly aimed to stem unwanted migration flows. The EU has tried to involve MENA countries in this process by offering them limited migration opportunities in return for better migration management on their part, in particular by combating irregular migration and trafficking, facilitating return and fighting trans-border organised crime. This approach is not new. In fact, all major capitalist countries use comparable strategies based on similar conceptualisations of migration as a danger to be guarded against and a risk to be managed. However, the EU is the first supranational entity to develop such an approach, and new problems have emerged from this particular construction. For instance, it has been difficult for the EU to fulfil its part of these agreements, since labour-migration rules are a national competence. However, these rules will have to change in the near future when the EU will again need labour. A major point in these labour-migration rules will have to be that the source region also benefits from these agreements, which has not necessarily been the case in the past.

The following two chapters focus on political conflicts within the MENA region that may also trigger refugee flows to the EU, and Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes describe their long history. The most well-known among these are the Middle-East conflict that started with the foundation of Israel in 1948 and is still ongoing, the two Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 that have resulted in internal conflicts, and the conflicts surrounding the Arab Uprising. However, these are only the conflicts that have received the most international attention. Far more important were the many fights for sovereignty and lost territory following the end of colonisation. In addition, the MENA region was also involved in the Cold-War conflict. While post-colonial and East-West conflicts have been losing importance in the region for obvious reasons, internal conflicts concerning ethnic and religious minorities will most probably continue to be important in the future. Faath and Mattes predict that there will be three major causes of future conflict in the MENA region: the fight for resources, in particular for water, domestic conflicts over the role of Islam in society (a conflict going back to the 1990s) and the fair distribution of government resources. However, they also make clear that, as in the past, the refugee movements resulting from these conflicts
mostly affect the surrounding countries – only a minority has ever reached Europe.

Franz Nuscheler, in his chapter entitled ‘The uncertainties involved in calculating migration’, is far more cautious regarding such predictions of conflicts and thereby also regarding any calculations of migration potential as they are carried out in the last three chapters of the book. Nuscheler argues that conflicts could arise anywhere in the region, even in countries such as Turkey, that are regarded as more or less economically and politically stable. However, this may change at any time, due not only to the ongoing conflict regarding recognition of the Kurdish minority, but also to the ongoing conflict between secular Kemalists and the traditional Islamic party in government and the volatility of economic growth. The unexpected uprising in summer 2013 initiated by the protest against the building of a shopping mall in the Gezi park in inner-city Istanbul provides ample proof for Nuscheler’s conclusion, written long before these events.

Nuscheler’s projections of future conflicts differ markedly from those made by Faath and Mattes. Apart from the Middle-East conflict, he regards a possible disintegration of Iraq as a major source of future conflict in the MENA region. In addition, he highlights the dangers of climate change only marginally taken into account by Faath and Mattes. While climate change will mostly affect sub-Saharan countries, the migration following from it will be directed towards the North. This will put more pressure on those North African countries which have agreements with the EU to aid the latter in controlling migration. While these agreements have been problematic from their inception because basic human-rights standards were often ignored in the course of their implementation, in particular in Libya, it is also unclear whether and how these will continue in the wake of the Arab Uprising and in particular after the fall of Gaddafi. If they were to be discontinued in the future, this would certainly have an effect on migration to the EU.

Migration potential: Figures and scenarios

The third part of the book is devoted to defining the frame of possible future migration from the MENA region. Ralf Ulrich provides an overview of demographic developments there compared to the EU-27. The MENA region grew 4.4 times between 1950 and 2010, when it had 454.5 million inhabitants. However, population growth has already slowed down over the last 60 years from a growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the 1950s to 1.7 per cent today. Of the inhabitants of the MENA region, 41 per cent live in the three
countries under discussion in this volume: Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. However, only in Egypt has the population growth been about the same as in the whole MENA region, while it has been lower in Turkey and Morocco. Ulrich shows that the MENA region will continue to grow. By 2030, the population in the region will have reached 594 million inhabitants. This is mainly due to the fact that the present generation of children is larger than that of their parents and, even if fewer children are born to each set of parents, the greater number of parents in the future will still guarantee that the population will continue to rise. Ulrich expects that this growing population will increase conflicts regarding the scarce water and food resources. Moreover, a large share of the young men entering the labour markets in the near future will not be able to find employment. For some parts of the still-growing young population, migration to Europe or to the Gulf states, where labour migrants are needed, could be an alternative.

Heinz Fassmann fine-tunes Ulrich’s observation that the MENA region is an ideal demographic match for the EU by calculating emigration potential based on age-specific emigration rates. Since Fassmann is interested in the rather abstract question of whether the migration potential in the MENA region can meet the need for labour in the EU, he tries to exclude, as far as possible, any effects of migration control by using age-specific emigration rates from Slovakia, Poland and Austria, following their accession to the EU, as a basis for his calculations – Slovakia as an example of low emigration, Poland of medium emigration and Austria of high emigration. The medium variant results in a potential 1.3 million emigrants in 2015 – i.e., around 1 per cent of the working-age population of the three countries under discussion here. If most of them enter the EU, the resulting immigration would amount to about 70 per cent of all present immigration into the EU-27. While this may seem a high emigration potential, it is much lower than that resulting from recent opinion polls, which identify a migration potential of 16 per cent in the current MENA population – i.e., 20.8 million people in Turkey, Morocco and Egypt.

The final chapter, written by Michael Bommes, Simon Fellmer and Friederike Zigmann, takes Fassmann’s model a step further by combining his emigration potential with various projections of future economic developments in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, based on the assumption that emigration will increase if the differential between the EU and the MENA region increases and vice versa. In addition, the three authors take into account that the large majority of the large emigration potential from Egypt will most probably not move to the EU but to the Gulf states, due to existing migration networks there. Bommes, Fellmer and Zigmann clearly show that economic growth, combined with growing employment, may
markedly reduce emigration potential. For example, if Turkey continues to reform, maintains its current economic performance and joins the EU, the emigration potential would fall to a meagre 102,677 people by 2030, while the opposite developments would increase the emigration potential from 673,771 in 2015 to 806,542 in 2025. Nevertheless, the authors conclude by confirming the extreme importance of demographics for determining emigration potential, mainly due to the large economic gap between the MENA region and the EU – which further increases even if the EU only grows moderately.

In sum, the present volume clearly illustrates that the MENA is a possible source region for future immigration to the EU. The populations in the MENA states will continue to grow, while their economies will be unable to absorb the large number of young people entering their labour markets over the coming decades. However, the articles also highlight the insecurities involved in such calculations, in particular because it is difficult to foresee any developments in such a volatile region, either economically or politically. Moreover, they identify large differences between the three countries discussed in more detail in this volume. Turkey may lose any importance as a country of origin for immigration to the EU over the coming two decades if reforms continue and economic development remains stable, while emigration from Morocco will continue at its current rate if there are no major economic or political changes. Egypt will not only have the greatest emigration potential by far, but this potential will most probably also grow over the coming decades. Hence, Egypt would also be able to fulfil labour needs in the EU over a longer period of time. However, Egyptian migration has traditionally been directed to the Gulf countries. The EU would therefore need to take a pro-active stance on immigration in order to attract Egyptians to their labour markets. This not only implies moving away from the prevailing perception of immigration as a danger that strongly governs EU migration policy at present. It also means introducing more attractive integration policies in the individual member states that would prevent a permanent location of immigrants in the lower social strata, as has happened with Turkish immigrants in many European countries. Last but not least, the EU, together with the source countries of migration, could also try to develop strategies guaranteeing that they, too, profit from emigration, in particular regarding a more productive use of remittances, but also with respect to the possible use of acquired skills after return. Hence, the growing need for labour in the EU may turn the currently largely asymmetric migration dialogues between the EU and selected MENA countries into real dialogues benefiting both the sending and the receiving countries.
References

Part I
Country profiles
Euro-Mediterranean migration futures: The cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey

Hein de Haas

1.1 Introduction

Over the past 50 years, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean regions have evolved into the main providers of labour migrants to the European Union. In the early stages of the post-war economic boom in North-West Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, most workers were recruited in Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece. However, since the mid-1960s, the place of these countries has been rapidly taken over by Turkey, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and Tunisia, while the recruitment of workers has shifted from governments to companies, mainly from Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Although the stay of these ‘guest workers’ was expected to be temporary, many migrants ended up settling, a process which was accompanied by large-scale family reunification and, later, by family-formation migration as a consequence of new marriages.

Due to an unprecedented economic boom, a rapid demographic transition in some countries and the southward expansion of the European Union, most Southern European countries have gone through migration transitions, thereby transforming from net emigration to net immigration countries. Spain, Italy and Greece, in particular, have now evolved into major immigration countries. In the meantime, Turkey, Morocco and other Maghreb countries have maintained their position as major source countries of EU immigration. While family and other network-facilitated migration perpetuated flows to the traditional destination countries of North-Western Europe, new labour migration has occurred from the Maghreb to Southern European countries.1

While the Maghreb countries and Turkey have been fully integrated into Euro-Mediterranean migration systems over the past half century, migration from poorer Mediterranean countries south of Turkey, and from

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1 In Southern Europe, only Albania, most former Yugoslav republics and, to a certain extent, Portugal, have not (yet) evolved into major immigration countries.
Egypt, has mainly been oriented towards the oil-rich Gulf countries and, to a lesser extent, Libya. As a consequence of the consistent southward expansion of Europe’s economic heartland, the Euro-Mediterranean ‘migration frontier’ – the imaginary line separating immigration and emigration countries (Skeldon 1997) – has also shifted steadily southward. In this process, the place of North African and Middle Eastern countries in the global migration order seems to be changing. This is mainly exemplified by increasing transit migration and even settlement migration from Western and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. This poses the challenging question of whether these latest developments are heralding further southward and eastward shifts of the Euro-Mediterranean migration frontier and whether the current emigration countries in North Africa and the Middle East might increasingly evolve into areas of immigration and settlement.

In popular perception, countries in the Middle East and North Africa tend to be seen as a ‘migration liability’, linked to the image that galloping population growth, economic misery and political oppression will fuel an ever-mounting ‘migration pressure’ from this region. However, besides revealing a clearly xenophobic undertone, a closer look at factual trends shows that such representations are fundamentally flawed. Not only do they deny the huge demographic, economic and political changes that have taken place in the region in past decades, but they also obscure the huge diversity between countries within the region.

For instance, the popular perception that the region will remain an almost infinite pool of young, unemployed migrants ready to move to Europe as soon as they are presented with the opportunity ignores the fact that all countries have achieved dramatic declines in fertility over past decades. In some cases, such as in Turkey, this is combined with steady economic growth and increasing political freedom. In such cases, it cannot be taken for granted that the emigration potential will remain invariably high in the near future. However, a combination of economic stagnation, political unfreedom and rising aspirations due to increased access to education and media may well increase emigration potential from other countries. This chapter analyses how migration patterns from, within and to the Middle East and North Africa may evolve in the next few decades. In order to capture the variety in migration history and patterns, as well as the diverging economic and political trends in the region, this

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2 Along with the expansion of the EU there has been an eastward shift of this migration frontier into Eastern European countries.
study will focus on the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. What these countries have in common is their position as the region’s major emigration countries.

It is of crucial importance to ground our analysis in a sound theoretical understanding of migration determinants. As a more powerful alternative to simplistic ‘push-pull’ frameworks, I start by outlining a theoretical framework combining the concepts of migration systems and migration transitions, in order to understand the often-counterintuitive linkages between social and economic development and migration.

Subsequently, I analyse the recent migration histories of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey and show how they are related to underlying political and economic factors. It is important to relate current migration patterns to historical trends by analysing continuities and discontinuities. Recognising the continuity between current migration paths and those of the past helps to identify areas of discontinuity and their structural causes. This will also facilitate our analysis of future migration patterns. Based on this understanding, the chapter analyses long-term demographic trends and the evolution of a range of social, economic and political development indicators. A number of hypotheses will then be developed about possible trends in the near and more distant future.

1.2 Beyond ‘push-pull’ frameworks: Migration systems and transitions

Our conceptualisation of migration determinants is of crucial importance to the outcomes of this analysis. Most analyses of migration determinants are set within ‘push-pull’ frameworks. This is unfortunate, because the push-pull framework is generally unable to explain actual migration patterns. Besides their fundamentally ahistorical nature, push-pull frameworks are based on a simplistic equilibrium model which assumes that migrants move from the poorest to the wealthiest societies. Another assumption of push-pull frameworks is that development will lead to less migration.

However, this is fundamentally at odds with theoretical and empirical evidence showing that the relationship between relative levels of social and economic development and propensities to emigrate is anything but linear or inversely proportional. This chapter combines the two concepts of migration systems and migration transitions to provide a more realistic theoretical framework for understanding actual migration patterns and
how they tend to change over time as a consequence of broader development trends and the internal social and economic dynamics of migration processes.

The fundamental assumption of migration-systems theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends – that is, the entire developmental space within which migration processes operate. Mabogunje (1970), the founder of migration-systems theory, defined a migration system as a set of places, linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places.

Where Mabogunje focused on rural-urban migration within the African continent, Portes and Böröcz (1987) and Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik (1992) extended this to international migration. International migration systems consist of countries – or rather places within different countries – that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterised by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, areas and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas and information (Fawcett 1989; Gurak & Caces 1992; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1998).

Mabogunje (1970) stressed the role of feedback mechanisms through which information about the migrants’ reception and situation at the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin, thus facilitating subsequent movements and leading to almost-organised migratory flows between particular places, regions and countries. While pioneer migrants are often among the relatively well-off, this diffusion process tends to make international migration more accessible to other groups. Money sent back to families in migrant-sending communities may also increase the feeling of relative deprivation among non-migrants. This may subsequently increase aspirations to migrate as a way to achieve upward socio-economic mobility (de Haas 2003; Quinn 2006). Besides this motivational effect, remittances may also be directly used to finance the migration of other family and community members (Van Dalen, Groenewold & Fokkema 2005).

In the same vein, Levitt (1998) stressed the importance of local-level, migration-driven forms of cultural diffusion. This flow back of ‘social remittances’, consisting of ideas, behaviours and identities, affects the perceptions and aspirations of people, and is also likely to stimulate subsequent migration patterns along established pathways. This may lead to
the emergence of a ‘culture of migration’, in which migration becomes a social norm or a modern *rite de passage* (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1993). Due to this complex of social, cultural and economic dynamics internal to the migration process itself, migration tends to generate more migration. Migration systems link people over space in what, today, are often referred to as transnational communities (Vertovec 2004). The selective and spatially clustered flows of information and social remittances result in a ‘rather neat geographical structuring and clustering of migration flows, which is far from “random state”. The end result is a set of relatively stable exchanges [...] yielding an identifiable geographical structure that persists across space and time’ (Mabogunje 1970: 12).

Thus, migration systems tend to be multi-layered and hierarchical – transcontinental migration systems may contain various sub-systems of international and internal migration. For instance, the imminent danger of conceiving ‘the’ Euro-Mediterranean migration system would therefore be to assume a false degree of regional unity and the communality of national migration experiences. Due to geographical, colonial and more recent political factors, the specific migration experiences of Mediterranean countries reveal striking differences. It is necessary to get below the surface of dominant international migration flows in order to understand the multiple, often hierarchical, layers of migration which make up the overall patterns of movement. It is perhaps more appropriate to conceive of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa as regions in which countries are connected to two major transcontinental migration systems and one intra-regional migration system to varying degrees. At the most general level, we can make a distinction between the core Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and Turkey – which have been predominantly incorporated into Euro-Mediterranean or EU-Mediterranean migration systems – and Egypt, which is predominantly connected to the Gulf migration system and other Arab countries such as Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. Nevertheless, there has also been migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to Arab oil-producing countries and, over the past decade, there does seem to have been a certain reorientation of Egyptian migration towards Europe.

This also points to the necessity of conceptualising and explaining change in established migration systems. The main weakness of migration-systems theory is that it is caught in a circular logic in which migration leads to more migration. Conceptually, it is unable to explain why migration systems often break down and migration movements cease,
and why we see such huge geographical and intertemporal variety in the rise and fall of particular migration systems. The policies of both sending and receiving states have played a crucial role in shaping initial migration patterns. Although such initial patterns tended to develop their own momentum through the self-perpetuating dynamics of migrant networks, irrespective of migration policies (Castles 2004; Massey 1989), *forces majeures* such as political and economic shocks, warfare and structural transformations at the global level (e.g. oil crises, EU enlargement, the successive Gulf wars or the Arab Spring) have a distinct influence on the slowing-down of certain migration movements and the shaping of new migration itineraries.

Another important source of change is the general process of social and economic development itself. This brings us to transitional-migration theory (de Haas 2007a, b). It is tempting to explain large-scale migration from Turkey and North Africa by large spatial economic inequalities. However, because migration involves relatively high costs and risks and requires the necessary aspirations and social and human capital, most international migration tends not to occur from the poorest communities and countries.

The migration transition is the notion that societies and countries, in parallel with economic restructuring and the concomitant social change and demographic transitions, tend to go through a sequence of initially increasing emigration, via the coexistence of significant but diminishing emigration and increasing immigration, to eventually become net immigration countries (Martin & Taylor 1996; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971; see also Figure 1.1). In contrast to popular views of migration as the result of poverty, there is ample evidence that the relation between development and migration is neither linear nor inversely proportional (de Haas 2007b; Martin & Taylor 1996; Olesen 2002).

This is linked to the notion of the ‘migration hump’, as proposed by Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996), who argued that a temporary increase in migration – a migration hump – has been a usual part of the process of economic development, since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating.

I would like to stress that we should extend the notion of development beyond income indicators to a broader notion, as devised by Sen (1999), of development as the expansion of the real freedom people enjoy to lead the lives they have reason to value. Sen argued that the litmus test for development theorists should not be income growth itself, but the question of whether the capabilities of people to control their own lives have
expanded. This ‘capabilities approach’ contrasts with narrower views of
development that are largely restricted to income indicators (e.g., gross
national product per head).

The crucial issue here is that the non-economic dimensions of capa-
bilities-enhancing development also tend to increase not only people’s
capabilities, but also their aspirations to migrate as a means to improve
their lives. In particular, improved education and access to information
not only give people enhanced capabilities (for instance, to migrate), but
are also likely to increase young people’s socio-economic life aspirations.
As long as these aspirations are not matched by growing employment
and economic opportunities in origin countries, this will probably result
in increasing aspirations to migrate. So, initially, development tends to
stimulate emigration because, firstly, of its capabilities and, secondly, of its
aspiration-enhancing effects. Therefore, development in the form of increas-
ing incomes, improved transport and communication infrastructure, and
education tends to give people the capabilities and aspirations to migrate:
initially predominantly internally (assuming that internal migration is
usually cheaper and easier); in later stages increasingly internationally
(de Haas 2005).

In their analysis of European mass emigration between 1850 and 1913,
Hatton and Williamson (1998) showed that emigration usually increased
as wage rates in source and destination countries converged, because
decreasing wage differentials initially tend to be outweighed by the mass
arrival of cohorts of young workers (as a result of past fertility) on the labour
market. Simultaneously, the growth of emigrant populations leads to the
accumulation of social capital in the form of migrant networks, which
promoted substantial chain migration irrespective of the declining wage
gap (Massey 2000). Only in the longer term, after sustained growth and
significantly decreasing wage and other opportunity gaps with destination
countries – often, but not necessarily, coinciding with demographic transi-
tions (Zelinsky 1971) – long-distance (generally ‘South-North’) emigration
tends to decrease and immigration to increase. In this way, countries tend
to gradually transform from net emigration into net immigration countries
(Martin & Taylor 1996; Rotte, Vogler & Zimmermann 1997). It has been
argued that this transition occurs first for internal migration, then for
international unskilled migration, and finally for the migration of the highly
skilled (Fischer & Straubhaar 1996).

The end result is that economic growth, infrastructure, improved educa-
tion and exposure to information tend rather to have a J-curve or inverted
U-curve effect on net emigration (even if opportunity differentials with
destination countries decrease), steeply increasing in the initial phases of
development and only later gradually decreasing. This quite adequately
reflects past (Hatton & Williamson 1998; Massey 1991) and contemporary
(Olesen 2002) migration patterns. In recent decades, countries such as Spain,
Italy, Greece and Ireland, in Europe, and Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea,
in Asia, completed their migration transition. The result of the complex
interplay of demographic, social and economic forces embodied in the term
‘development’ is a ‘stylized emigration curve characterized by an introd-
tory phase of slow development, a growth phase of rapidly accelerating
emigration, a saturation phase during which emigration approaches a peak
and levels off, and a regression phase when rates of emigration rapidly fall’

In line with this transitional migration theory, it is striking that the
countries with the lowest GNP and the highest population growth gener-
ally do not exhibit the highest rates of (transcontinental) migration to the
Western world (Olesen 2002).3 Instead, the world’s main labour exporters are
typically upper-lower- to lower-middle-income countries (such as Mexico,
North African countries and the Philippines), which are generally located in
a zone that Skeldon (1997) has conceptualised as the global ‘labour frontier’.
Labour-frontier countries generally experience falling birth rates but a

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3 It should be noted that there is significant ‘South-South’ mobility of labour migrants and
refugees. It is, instead, the more costly and risky transcontinental migration to wealthy countries
that is generally more limited from the poorest countries.
high growth of their working-age populations, at least moderate economic growth, urbanisation and de-agrarisation. From the poorest countries (less than US$1,500 per capita in terms of purchasing power parity, or PPP) we see comparatively limited South-North migration and, if substantial transcontinental migration occurs, it often concerns refugee movements (Olesen 2002).

The exact duration of such migration transitions cannot be predicted since this crucially depends on many external factors, notably the pace and character of economic growth. In any case, the period between the migration take-off and the in-out migration break-even point is likely to last several decades (Russell & Teitelbaum 1992; Weintraub & Díaz-Briquets 1994). It is also important to note that the relation between development and migration is not unidirectional, because a decreasing development level relative to other countries may also transform an immigration country into an emigration one. Moreover, the right tail of the migration hump (decreasing emigration, increasing immigration) is by no means inevitable: poor infrastructure and public services, political instability, warfare and the failure of public policies may severely impede development. Under such unfavourable conditions, a trade-induced migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent ‘migration plateau’ of sustained out-migration which may last decades or even centuries (de Haas 2007b; Martin & Taylor 1996).

Previous analyses have suggested that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to 4:1 or 5:1, provided that the emigration country is growing fast and offering hope and opportunity (Martin & Taylor 1996). Others have determined that this migration turning-point occurs at income differentials of 3:1 to 4.5:1 (Böhning 1994; Olesen 2002). It is not entirely clear whether this pertains to income gaps based on absolute income or income adjusted to purchasing power. Instead of using relative income gaps, some studies in the mid-1990s suggested an average real per capita income threshold of around US$4,000 at which migration transitions would occur (Stalker 2002).

Combining the spatial notion of migration systems with the temporal notion of migration transition, we can hypothesise that the transformation of Southern European countries has coincided with the southward shift of the European ‘labour frontier’, a development which has offered renewed and reinforced labour-migration opportunities for North African countries and Turkey. The challenging question here is whether the increasing migration towards and through Turkey and North Africa is heralding these countries’ further integration into the expanding European migration system and their future transition into immigration countries, as theory would predict.
In the following sections, I try to answer this question by closely examining recent migration trends and a range of economic, political and demographic development indicators.

1.3 Migration histories: Morocco, Egypt and Turkey

1.3.1 Post-colonial and post-imperial migration

In Morocco, modernisation and colonial intrusion occurring as of the early twentieth century triggered processes of urbanisation and substantial rural-to-urban migration.\(^4\) This process started with the movement of Moroccan workers to Algeria, which became a French colony in 1830. Labour recruitment in Morocco started during World War I, when an urgent lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of tens of thousands of men for the army, industry and mines (Muus 1995). In World War II, labour shortages again led to the recruitment of Moroccan workers and soldiers (Bidwell 1973). Most of these workers returned. After Morocco became independent from France in 1956, ‘colonial’ migration patterns largely persisted. Because France stopped recruiting Algerian workers during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), the migration of factory- and mine-workers from Morocco was boosted (de Haas 2007a).

In Egypt, which came under English control in 1882, modernisation policies – pursued as of the second half of the nineteenth century, and symbolised by the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 – intensified traditional patterns of internal migration towards Cairo and, to a lesser extent, Alexandria and the Suez Canal zone. Until the 1950s, few Egyptians – except for students – migrated abroad and, in fact, more foreigners from Arab and other countries migrated to Egypt (Sell 1988; Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). Egypt regained full independence from the UK in 1953 and, after the 1956 Suez Crisis, President Nasser came out of the war as an Arab hero, which reinforced Egypt’s position as leader of the Arab world. Except for policies to promote the education of Egyptian students abroad in the 1960s, the Egyptian state actively discouraged labour emigration, mainly through ‘exit-visa’ requirements (Choucri 1977; Sell 1988). Under Nasserist socialism, migration was seen as endangering national development as a consequence of an alleged ‘brain drain’.

In contrast to Morocco and Egypt, Turkey was never colonised by Western powers. The Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish Republic, had

\(^4\) The French protectorate over Morocco was formally established in 1912.
a long history of emigration, immigration and forced migration. The gradual contraction of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of new states from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries led to the wide-scale displacement of Armenians, Greeks, Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Tatars and Turks from the Balkans (Kirişci 2003). In the events around the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), over 1 million Greeks left Turkey and almost half a million Muslims and Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. Between the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the early 1960s, Turkey was predominantly an immigration country. The government of the Turkish Republic established an immigration programme encouraging Muslims and Turks from the Balkans to settle in Turkey, as part and parcel of the Turkish nation-building exercise (Avcı & Kirişci 2006).

1.3.2 The Turkish and Moroccan guest-worker boom (1961-1972)

The 1960s were characterised by a huge increase in labour migration to North-West Europe from Morocco and Turkey, which would develop into two main source countries of labour and family immigrants from outside the EU in the decades to follow. Rapid post-war economic growth in North-West Europe had created a demand for unskilled labour in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction and agriculture from the 1950s. This triggered an increasing emigration of ‘guest workers’ from poorer countries around the Mediterranean. Until the early 1960s, most were recruited in Southern European countries.

When this migration stagnated, attention shifted towards Southern Mediterranean countries. The agreement which the Turkish and West German governments signed in 1961 for the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ would trigger an unprecedented migration from Turkey to West Germany. Similar agreements were signed with the governments of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Sweden (Avcı & Kirişci 2006). The Moroccan government also signed agreements on the recruitment of workers with the governments of West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969). This was the onset of a spatial diversification of Moroccan migration to Europe, which used to be exclusively directed towards France, although the latter would remain the dominant destination until the 1990s. Migration from Morocco and Turkey peaked in the early 1970s (Avcı & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a). The influence of formal recruitment by specialised agencies was only important in the initial years of labour migration and in setting the stage for subsequent chain migration. Already, in the 1960s, spontaneous settlement and informal recruitment
through migrant networks by companies was far more important numerically. Administrative obstacles, long waiting-lists and the accompanying bribery incited people to circumvent official channels and to migrate as ‘tourists’, subsequently ‘overstaying’ (Reniers 1999).

This emigration was actively stimulated by the Turkish and Moroccan governments, since they expected that the ‘guest workers’ would return and that their skills, knowledge and money would help to modernise the economy and trigger economic growth (Heinemeijer, van Amersfoort, Ettema, De Mas & van der Wusten 1977; Kirişci 2003). Certainly, in the Moroccan case, emigration was considered as a political safety valve, as migration and the counter-flow of remittances were expected to reduce poverty and political discontent. Quite in contrast, Egypt maintained its policy to largely discourage migration during this period and to foster the autonomous growth of its economy. Unlike in Turkey and Morocco, much of the emigration that did occur was of the highly skilled.

1.3.3 The 1973 Oil Crisis turning-point

The shock of the 1973 Six-Day War, the Oil Crisis and the ensuing economic recession in Western Europe and economic boom in the Gulf region would reshape the Euro-Mediterranean migration landscape. For Turkey and Morocco (and also Tunisia), it meant the end of the recruitment phase and the onset of increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by European states, a trend that has persisted until the present day.

Quite to the contrary, the events of 1973 marked the beginning of massive labour recruitment for the Arab oil countries. Europe’s recession coincided with an economic boom in the Gulf countries and Libya. The 1973 Arab oil embargo against the US and a number of its Western allies (the ‘Oil Crisis’) led to a quadrupling in oil prices and revenues, which was followed by ambitious development programmes in the Arab oil-producing countries, leading to a huge increase in the demand for labourers. This triggered unprecedented migration from oil-poor countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

This particularly affected Egypt, where the number of registered emigrants increased from 70,000 in 1970 to a reported 1.4 million in 1976 and to 2.3 million in 1986 (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). This was directly linked to the remarkable reversal of relative economic conditions (Sell 1988: 93) between Egypt and its eastern (Gulf) and western (Libyan) neighbours. But it also coincided with a striking turnaround in Egyptian economic and foreign policies when Sadat came to power in 1970. Sadat’s *infitah* or open-door policy
meant a reorientation away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States, and a move from a centralised-plan economy towards economic liberalisation and the increasing opening of the Egyptian economy to foreign investment. Temporary migration came to be seen as a means to alleviate demographic pressures and stimulate economic growth. In 1971, all legal barriers to migration were lifted; government workers were allowed to emigrate while maintaining the right to return to their jobs (IOM 2005). The foreign demand for Egyptian labour peaked in 1983, when 3.3 million Egyptians were estimated to be working abroad (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003: 27-31).

The majority of Arab and Turkish migrants moved to Saudi Arabia, although all other Arab oil countries received their share of Egyptian migrants. Both skilled and unskilled workers migrated to the Arab oil countries, although most skilled migrants preferred the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq, in particular, became a popular destination for unskilled Egyptian migrants, because of its liberal immigration policies towards Arabs, and its need for foreign labour as a result of the 1980-1988 war with Iran. Libya attracted many North African and Turkish migrants. Egyptians were the largest nationality present in Libya; they worked predominantly in agriculture and education (Hamood 2006: 17). Most migrants to the Arab oil countries were temporary workers, typically men. The longer-term migration of skilled workers to the Gulf countries, such as that which occurred from Egypt, remained relatively modest.

Although the economic boom in the Arab oil countries generated significant migration flows of workers from Morocco and Turkey, in contrast to Egypt, migration from these countries remained predominantly oriented towards North-West Europe. The European economic downturn provided the mirror image of the boom of the Arab oil economies. In Europe, the 1973 Oil Crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in rising structural unemployment and a lower demand for unskilled labourers. However, contrary to expectations, after a first wave of return it became clear that large numbers of Turkish, Moroccan and other Mediterranean immigrants decided not to return, and ended up staying permanently. Policies by sending and receiving states to encourage the return of their migrants typically failed, primarily due to economic crises

---

5 Restrictions on labour migration were already relatively eased after the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent economic downturn, which heralded the start of more long-term emigration, whereas students abroad tended to stay abroad (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003).

and political instability in Morocco and Turkey (Avcı & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a; Entzinger 1985).

Moreover, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies and, in particular, the introduction of visa restrictions, had the paradoxical effect of pushing migrants into permanent settlement rather than the reverse (Entzinger 1985; Fargues 2004). Subsequent massive family reunification heralded the shift from circular to more permanent migration. This phenomenon mainly explains why Moroccan and Turkish migrant populations kept on increasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the official immigration stop.

1.3.4 The 1991 Gulf War turning-point

After a period of relatively steady labour migration from Egypt and other MENA countries to the Gulf countries and Libya, and besides family migration from the Maghreb to Europe, a series of political upheavals (the Gulf War, the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War and the UN embargo on Libya) occurring in 1991-1992 played a major role in setting a number of new migration trends.

Already, from 1983, the Iran-Iraq War, falling oil prices, and policies to replace foreign labour with nationals, started to cause a certain decline in the demand for Egyptian, North African and Turkish workers in GCC countries. It was particularly the 1991 Gulf War that led to the massive forced repatriation of migrants from GCC countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 28). These events reinforced the already existing tendency in Gulf countries to rely increasingly on Asian immigrants. This went together with efforts to ‘indigenise’ the labour force of the Gulf countries to decrease their dependency on migrants (IOM 2005).

Another major development which would impinge on regional migration processes was the impact of the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council between 1992 and 2000. Disappointed by the perceived lack of support from his fellow Arab countries, Gaddafi embarked upon a radical reorientation of Libyan foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African countries (Hamood 2006), positioning himself as an African leader by developing a policy of creating alliances with and offering substantial development aid to them. In this context of pan-African foreign policy, Libya started to encourage sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya (Hamood 2006; Pliez 2002). In the early 1990s, most migrants came from Libya’s neighbours, Sudan, Chad and Niger, which subsequently developed into transit countries for migrants from a much wider array of sub-Saharan countries (Bredeloup & Pliez 2005).
Despite a certain slowdown, migration from Egypt and other MENA countries to the Gulf and Libya has been more persistent and permanent than the policies intended. It has proven notoriously difficult to implement the indigenisation policy while semi-legal migrants continue to enter through intricate systems of visa-trading (IOM 2005) or through making the hadj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, after the Gulf War, migration rates quickly returned to pre-War levels (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). The recent surge in oil prices due to the war in Iraq and the lifting of the UN embargo on Libya seem to have reversed the economic decline in the Arab oil countries, which is likely to increase future demand for migrant labour. A qualitative change did occur, however, in the strongly segmented labour markets of GCC countries and Libya. Although an economic downturn in the 1980s and 1990s led to calls to indigenise the workforce, native workers might have partially taken over the high-level positions in the labour market, but they have continued to shun the heavy, lower-level jobs in the poorly paid private sector (Baldwin-Edwards 2005; Hamood 2006). While Asian and, in the case of Libya, sub-Saharan immigrants have increasingly filled manual jobs in the unskilled segments of the labour market, migrants from MENA countries to the Gulf have increasingly tended to occupy the middle segments of the labour markets.

1.3.5 Diversification of migration and the Arab Spring

Although migration from Egypt to the Arab oil countries has continued, Moroccan and Turkish migration to these countries slowed down over the 1990s. Migration from Turkey and Morocco to the classic destination of Europe continued predominantly because of family reunification and family formation – mainly as the result of the transnational marriages of Turks and Moroccans with the children of migrants.

Although Moroccan and Turkish ‘guest-worker’ migration to Europe shares many features in character, scope and timing, there are a number of important differences. First, Turkish migrants tend to be relatively better-educated, which primarily reflects the more developed state of the education system in Turkey in comparison to Morocco (Reniers 1999). Second, while the number of Moroccan asylum applicants is negligible, since the mid-1980s and mid-1990s the migration of (predominantly Kurdish) asylum seekers has been an important additional source of Turkish migration to Europe. Between 1983 and 2003, approximately 1 million Turkish nationals sought asylum from Western European countries (Avcı & Kirişci 2006). Third, Turkish migration is overwhelmingly concentrated on Germany, whereas Moroccan migration has shown a relatively higher degree of diversification.
beyond France. Over the 1990s and early 2000s, a new, large-scale movement of Moroccan migration has occurred to the new immigration countries of Southern Europe, mainly Spain and Italy, where the demand for cheap migrant labour boomed (de Haas 2007a). Although many of these migrants were irregular, many succeeded in obtaining residency status due to recent regularisations. Between 1980 and 2004, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in Spain and Italy increased from about 20,000 to 650,000 (de Haas 2007a).

While Southern Europe has developed into the dominant destination for new Moroccan migrants, it is striking that Turkish migrants did not explore new destinations in Southern Europe, and have rarely migrated to Greece, Italy or Spain. An interesting hypothesis to explore is whether this may be related to a relatively higher level of development in Turkey and declining emigration potential (see İçduygu, in this volume).

A recent migration trend which both countries have in common is the increasing outmigration of high-skilled Turkish and Moroccan migrants to Europe, the US, Canada (mainly for Moroccans) and the former Soviet republics forming the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS, for Turks (Avcı & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a). On the basis of an extensive data analysis, a report on Mediterranean migration (Fargues 2005) identified a striking pattern in which Europe attracts the lesser-educated while the US and Canada succeed in attracting the more highly skilled migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Interestingly, Egypt seems to have gone through the opposite development. Until the 1990s, most Egyptian migration to Europe and North America used to consist of students and other highly skilled migrants. In more recent years, there has been an increase of often-irregular migrants from Egypt heading to Southern Europe to work in low-skilled jobs in agriculture, construction and services, thereby following the more established migration patterns of Moroccans and other Maghrebi migrants. This is linked to a more structural change in the regional-migration landscape, in which the Maghreb countries and Libya have increasingly developed into a destination and transit zone for migrants coming from sub-Saharan countries. In particular, the anti-immigrant backlash occurring in Libya since 2000 has encouraged increasing numbers of Egyptian and sub-Saharan migrants working there to join the flow of Maghrebis who had already started migrating illegally to Southern Europe in the early 1990s.

This also coincided with a striking diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes, with Algeria and Morocco experiencing more and more immigration from sub-Saharan migrants. Rather than a reduction in
migration, increasing border controls in Southern Spain and Italy caused a diversification of attempted sea-crossing points, with migrants now crossing from the Eastern Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Libyan and even West African coasts to the European islands of Malta, Sicily, Lampedusa, Sardinia and Crete and, in recent years, the Canary Islands (de Haas 2007c; de Haas & Sigona 2012).

The wave of political unrest that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab world caused the death of thousands of people, while more than 2 million others had been forced to leave their homes by mid-2012. While the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt remained relatively peaceful, the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria generated large flows of refugees, most of whom went to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt in the case of Libyans, and Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and even Libya for Syrians (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

In early 2011, the violence in Libya led to large-scale outflows of Libyan citizens and migrant workers. The hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan and other migrant workers stranded in Libya who sought refuge across the Egyptian and Tunisian borders suddenly exposed to the global public the scale of intra-African migration. Overall, migrant workers from more than 120 countries were displaced during the conflict. The most vulnerable group were African migrants who were not able to return because they often lacked the resources and connections. This coincided with an upsurge in racist violence against African migrant workers – some of whom were accused of having fought in Gaddafi’s militias. Many Africans thus got trapped inside Libya.

In the wake of the revolution, European politicians sowed panic that these people would cross the Mediterranean en masse to land on European shores. The Italian government warned of an exodus of ‘biblical proportions’. This panic had no basis, as most migrants wanted to return home. Only 4 per cent of all people fleeing Libya (27,465 persons out of 790,000) ended up in Italy or Malta (Aghazarm, Quesada & Tishler 2012). The large majority of them found refuge in neighbouring Egypt and, particularly, Tunisia. After the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, most Libyans returned and migrant workers started to come back, although African migrants, in particular, continued to experience racist violence.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and Syria, and there has been no major increase of emigration from other North African or Middle Eastern countries. The increase in Tunisian emigration to Lampedusa, an Italian island 113 km off the Tunisian
coast, was stimulated by reduced policing during the revolution, but was part of a long-standing tradition of irregular boat migration to Europe that has existed since Southern European countries introduced visas for North Africans in around 1991 (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

1.3.6 Immigration and settlement

Although Morocco, Egypt and Turkey are known as typical emigration countries, all three are also destinations for migrants from other regions. This is especially the case for Turkey, which has experienced substantial immigration, mainly of ethnic Turks, over the past century. From the establishment of Turkey in 1923, more than 1.6 million immigrants had settled in Turkey by 1997 (Kirişci 2003).

Since the early 1990s, however, Turkey has witnessed a new form of (often irregular) migration, mainly involving transit migrants and immigrants. Many are involved in small-scale trade; others overstay their visas and find jobs in informal sectors working as domestics, labourers in construction, tourism or other services (Kirişci 2003). Over the last decade, major incoming migration movements have been from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Significant numbers have also arrived from Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Georgia (İçduygu 2006). Although many migrants aim to use Turkey as a transit country to get to Europe, a significant proportion settles down, at least temporarily, and finds work with relative ease in Turkey’s large informal sectors, especially in the less desired jobs generated by informalisation (İçduygu 2006). The total number of irregular immigrants is estimated at between 150,000 and 1 million. Turkey also has a significant immigration of asylum seekers. In addition, an estimated 100,000-120,000 European retirees have recently settled in Turkey and their numbers are increasing (Kirişci 2003). Growing immigration and decreasing emigration rates, apparently combined with increasing return migration from Europe by migrants who are attracted by the improved conditions in Turkey, would indicate that Turkey has already entered the last phase of its migration transition.

Historically, Egypt has attracted migrants from the Middle East and the parts of the Upper Nile located in what is nowadays Sudan. Despite quite considerable emigration to the Gulf countries and elsewhere, Egypt has continued to receive significant numbers of labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in the post-independence era. Cairo hosts one of the largest urban-refugee populations in the world – mainly Sudanese but also Palestinians, Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans. In addition, since the 1970s
many Sudanese workers have migrated to Egypt. The current refugee and immigrant population in Egypt (mainly Cairo) is estimated to be anywhere between 0.5 and 3 million (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). Most of these refugees and immigrants have de facto settled and found work in marginal jobs in construction and informal services, while women often find work as domestic servants (Ahmed 2003; Arbaoui 2006; Grabska 2005). In Cairo, the labour market for domestic workers seems to be increasingly feminising and globalising. Refugee women and men from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea work as domestics in Cairo. In addition, agencies appear to be active in recruiting Nigerian, Filipino, Malaysian and Indonesian workers (Arbaoui 2006).

While Morocco has received limited numbers of student migrants and highly skilled workers from sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, immigration remained very limited in the post-independence era. This changed after the mid-1990s, when more and more trans-Saharan migrants started to move to Morocco in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean (Lahlou & Escoffier 2002). A substantial proportion of migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe preferred to settle in Morocco on a longer-term basis rather than return to their more unstable and substantially poorer home countries (de Haas 2005). Although lacking residency status and therefore vulnerable to exploitation, they sometimes find jobs in specific niches in the informal service sector, tourism, petty trade, construction, agriculture, etc. An increasing number of sub-Saharan students pursue their studies in Morocco, sometimes as a means to gain residency status (Alioua 2005; Berriane 2007). Alioua (2005) estimated the number of sub-Saharan migrants and refugees living in Morocco at several tens of thousands.

1.3.7 Migration determinants

The above description has exemplified that the specific migration patterns occurring from the three case-study countries show remarkable similarities and striking differences.

– Political and economic forces majeures, such as colonisation, the Oil Crisis, warfare, economic decline and the restructuring and segmentation of regional labour markets have exerted a significant influence on shaping contemporary migration patterns. Such structural political-economic forces have often been more important in determining migration than migration policies per se. The only exception is labour recruitment, which has played an important role in establishing new migration patterns by linking specific origin countries and regions to particular destinations. Rather than standing alone, migration policies are often a function of
more general political-economic processes. If migration policies do not match economic realities, the usual result is irregular migration.

- The existence of substantial differentials in economic and social opportunities between sending and receiving countries seems to be a *conditio sine qua non* for large-scale migration to occur. When such differentials decrease substantially, migration is likely to decrease, and the other way around. However, such factors cannot explain the actual migration patterns we see, with highly specialised flows between, for instance, the Emirdag region of Turkey and Belgium, or the Rif area of Northern Morocco and the Netherlands.

- The preponderance of Turkey and Morocco in European immigration confirms the hypothesis derived from transitional-migration theory that very little ‘South-North’ migration occurs from the least-developed countries, as well as the fact that geographical proximity probably plays an important role too.  

- The evolution of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Western Europe, and Egyptian migration to the Gulf region and Libya, demonstrates that, once migration systems are established, migration movements gain their own momentum, partially or even largely independent of their immediate causes. Initial migration patterns tend to be reproduced, partly because of the internal social and economic dynamics inherent to the migration process itself, giving rise to migration systems that link places in countries of origin and destination through relatively stable exchanges of people, goods, capital (remittances), ideas and information. In particular, migrant networks tend to facilitate continuing labour, family and undocumented migration over formally closed borders (Massey et al. 1998). Because of these self-reinforcing dynamics, migration tends to follow historical migration patterns. Thus, current migration patterns cannot be explained without taking into account the regional political-economic *forces majeures* of the past, the initial patterns of labour recruitment or initial journeys of ‘spontaneous’ pioneer migrants, who still leave their ‘footprint’ on actual migration patterns through the functioning of migrant networks.

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6 In fact, geographical proximity to Europe and levels of socio-economic development seem to be correlated, and it is likely that both factors are reciprocally related.
1.4 Recent migration trends

1.4.1 Migrant population data

Figure 1.2 reveals that Morocco and Turkey are dominant source countries for migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to the EU. The data reveal that France has been the dominant destination for Moroccan migrants over past decades, while Germany occupies a similar position for Turkish migrants. What these data also show, however, is that the degree of diversification of migration to Europe is much higher for Moroccans than for Turks. As we will see, this partly reflects the new ‘primary’ labour migration that occurred from Morocco to Spain and Italy, while Turkish emigration has slowed down and predominantly consists of family migration to Germany and a few other traditional destinations. Egypt shows a very different picture, with the lion’s share of its unskilled and skilled workers migrating to the Gulf and Libya, and most elite migrants and students going to North America and Australia. At least until recently, migration from Egypt to Europe has remained very limited.

Figure 1.2 Emigrant stocks according to destination

![Graph showing emigrant stocks by destination](image)

Sources: Various sending-country sources cited in Fargues (2005)

Although the estimated number of Moroccan citizens living abroad (3.1 million) is almost equal to that of Turkey (3.6 million), Table 1.1 shows that they represent a much higher share of the total population (10.1 per cent) than is the case for Turkey (4.9 per cent) and Egypt (3.6 per cent). While 8.6 per cent of all Moroccan citizens and 4.2 per cent of all Turkish citizens
live in Europe, this is the case for only 0.6 per cent of all Egyptian citizens. In comparison with other North African countries, Morocco also has the highest share of its population living abroad.

Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 provide a detailed breakdown of the countries of residence of Moroccan, Turkish and Egyptian citizens living abroad. They confirm that migration from Morocco is more diverse in terms of destination than Turkish migration. Nevertheless, similar North-Western-European countries – France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium – appear among the predominant destinations for Turkish and Moroccan emigration. This largely reflects the ‘guest worker’ migration of the 1960s and 1970s and the ensuing chain migration in more recent decades. Turks are relatively numerous in Scandinavia compared to Moroccans. The most striking feature of Moroccan emigration is the recent flow to Spain and Italy. Spain, in particular,

Table 1.1 Citizens abroad as percentage of population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Emigrants in Europe</th>
<th>Population (2006)</th>
<th>Emigrants as % population</th>
<th>% emigrants in Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (2004)</td>
<td>3,089,090</td>
<td>2,616,871</td>
<td>30,496,553</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (2003)</td>
<td>1,072,246</td>
<td>991,796</td>
<td>33,347,948</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (2003)</td>
<td>843,204</td>
<td>695,765</td>
<td>10,132,252</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (2000)</td>
<td>2,736,729</td>
<td>436,000</td>
<td>75,396,909</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (2002)</td>
<td>3,581,000</td>
<td>3,078,000</td>
<td>72,935,323</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Fargues (2005) and World Development Indicators; author’s calculations

Table 1.2 Moroccan citizens residing abroad (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,113,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>300,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>293,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>423,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>298,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>20,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,616,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consular data in Fargues (2005: 231–232)
has evolved into the second country of residence and the main country of destination for Moroccans, while few Turkish migrants have moved to Southern Europe over recent decades. Recent limited increases in Egyptian migration to Europe have mainly concentrated on Greece and, particularly, Italy.

These tables draw on official statistics from countries of origin, which tend to include naturalised migrants (those who retain citizenship of their origin countries and thereby become dual citizens) and the children and even grandchildren of migrants – who are technically not migrants. Therefore, estimates of the migrant population of destination countries tend to be lower. Figure 1.3 shows the significant differences between sending and receiving countries' estimates, although overall patterns remain the same.

The difference is particularly large for Moroccans and much smaller for Turks, probably reflecting the fact that Moroccans had relatively easy access to citizenship in the main destination countries of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In contrast, until the reform of the citizenship law in 2000, this tended to be difficult for Turkish migrants in Germany. Another factor is that relinquishing Moroccan citizenship is very difficult, if not almost impossible (de Haas 2007d). The gap is also large for Egyptians, linked, seemingly, to the serious undercounting of Egyptian and other immigrants in the Gulf countries and Libya, which generally lack transparent migration statistics. For all sending countries, the differences also partly reflect the fact that consulates abroad often register migrants irrespective of their residence status, so that these figures might include a significant share of irregular migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,999,000</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>326,000</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,067,000</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Directorate of Services for the Workers Abroad, Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2002) in Fargues (2005: 359)
Table 1.4  Egyptian citizens residing abroad (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Temporary’ migration</th>
<th>‘Permanent’ migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>65,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>226,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>190,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>332,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>923,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,912,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1.3  Comparison between numbers of migrants counted by origin and destination countries

Source: Fargues (2005)

1.4.2  The evolution of migrant populations

Figure 1.4 displays the evolution of the total number of Turkish, Egyptian and Moroccan nationals living abroad, irrespective of destination country. It shows a quite steady increase for Turks and Moroccans, and a somewhat more erratic increase for the Egyptians, following the unstable immigration
policies of the Arab oil countries. Currently, at least 8.7 million nationals of these three countries live abroad. This is a remarkable increase in the light of earlier expectations that this migration would decrease after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In fact, between 1973 and 2003, the combined Moroccan and Turkish expatriate population increased from 1.4 to 6.2 million. Besides natural increase, this mainly reflects the effects of family and asylum migration (for Turks) and new labour migration (for Moroccans) to Southern Europe. While the increase in the Moroccan emigrant stock has accelerated since the late 1990s, that of the Turkish emigrant stock has stagnated in recent years. Whereas, in 1973, the number of Moroccans abroad represented 42 per cent of the Turkish migrant stock, this percentage stood at 85 per cent in 2003.

Figure 1.4  Turkish, Egyptian and Moroccan nationals living abroad


1.4.3  Migration-flow data

So far, we have used migrant-stock data as a proxy to study migration flows. However, since migrant-stock data include non-migrants (members of the so-called second and third generations retaining the citizenship of their origin countries) it is better to look at flow data, that is, to compare the immigration rates of Moroccans, Turks and Egyptian nationals into the main European receiving countries. The main problem here is that reliable, long-term time series exist only for a few destination countries. Moreover, with a few exceptions, official flow data do not include irregular migrants, who are more likely to show up in migrant-stock data through
the registration of irregular migrants by origin countries’ governments or after migrant regularisations.

We only had access to complete flow data from the main European destination countries over the period 1994–2003, as displayed in Figure 1.5. Despite limited data reliability (due to irregular migration and the poor quality of statistics in Southern European countries), the figure shows a clear trend, confirming the hypothesis that migration from Turkey has been stagnating and even slowing down, and that, since the 1990s, Moroccan migration has undergone a dramatic increase, reaching similar levels to Turkish immigration at around 85,000 per year. Although Egyptian immigration is at far lower levels – below 15,000 per year – there has been a clear increase. Real figures are likely to be much higher, because a considerable number of Egyptians migrate irregularly to Greece, where data are unavailable, and Italy – where data quality is generally poor. Comparatively, the quality of Spanish data, the prime destination of recent Moroccan labour migrants, is good and the data even include irregular immigrants.

Total Moroccan migration into OECD countries was estimated at 96,000 in 2000 and 128,000 in 2005, consolidating its position as the prime origin country for migrants from outside the EU. Over the same period, net Turkish migration decreased from 79,000 to 66,000, although Turkey is still non-EU origin-country number 3 after Morocco and the Ukraine (OECD 2007: 38). With about 60,000 students living in OECD countries, Morocco has also

Figure 1.5 Immigration of Turkish, Moroccan and Egyptian nationals to Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Spain and Italy, 1994–2003

Sources: OECD immigration database, Eurostat, National Statistical Services
become the fourth principal non-OECD source country for students, after China (close to 340,000 students), India (almost 125,000) and Korea (95,000) (OECD 2007). In view of its much smaller population size, this means that, in relative terms, the largest non-OECD immigrant population residing in OECD countries is of Moroccan origin.

These overall trends are replicated at the country level, where we sometimes have immigration figures covering much longer periods. Figure 1.6 compares immigration trends from Morocco, Egypt and Turkey to Germany. Because Turkish immigration is much larger in absolute terms, and in order to facilitate comparison, immigration has been plotted with the 1970s serving as the reference year (= 100). The figure shows a declining trend for Turkish migration, in particular, after 1980, whereas Moroccan and, particularly, Egyptian migration showed a post-1983 increase, peaking in the early 1990s. Since then, immigration has stagnated at lower levels. While Turkish immigration is now about one quarter of its 1970s level, current Moroccan and Egyptian migration is about half as high as in 1970.

Migration to Sweden has followed largely similar patterns, with a relative increase in Moroccan and Egyptian migration since 1980, and a peak in the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s (Figure 1.7). In contrast, Turkish immigration decreased in the early 1990s to stagnate at levels just above 50 per cent of those in 1980.

Turkish and Moroccan migration to the Netherlands is of similar magnitude and Figure 1.8 displays immigration figures going back to 1965. Turkish

Figure 1.6  Immigration of Turkish, Moroccan and Egyptian nationals to Germany, 1970–2004

Source: German statistical office
and Moroccan immigration shows a high degree of correlation, suggesting that the two nationalities react to similar economic and policy trends in the Netherlands. While, in the 1970s, Turkish immigration clearly exceeded Moroccan, immigration rates have been largely similar. There has been a major decrease in immigration, to levels of 2,000 and 3,000 in 2005 for Moroccans and Turks, respectively – about one fifth of immigration levels in 1990. It has been argued that this was largely due to the decline of family migration after the introduction of more-restrictive family-reunification measures (OECD 2007).

Turkish and Moroccan immigration to Belgium was at almost equal levels in 1985 (see Figure 1.9). Since then, while following similarities in ups and downs, Moroccan migration has far exceeded Turkish immigration and is now at almost double the level, although there has been a decrease since 2002.

Moroccan immigration into France is much more important than Turkish and Egyptian immigration. At least 1.1 million Moroccan nationals live there, and Moroccans have even overtaken Algerians as the largest immigrant group. However, since 1996, relative immigration trends have been remarkably similar and increasing for Moroccans, Turks and Egyptians alike (see Figure 1.10). In particular, Turkish migration to France is striking and goes against the overall trend of stagnating or declining Turkish immigration to other EU countries. With at least 326,000 Turkish nationals living in France, this country has overtaken the Netherlands as the second most
important destination country in Europe after Germany, with its Turkish expatriate community comprising about 2 million individuals.

Figures 1.11 and 1.12 show recent immigration trends to Spain and Italy and, if anything, the preponderance of Moroccan immigration. The recent surge in Moroccan migration to Spain has been phenomenal, and is one of the most remarkable migratory phenomena of the early 2000s. Although these figures partly reflect recent Spanish regularisations, there has undoubtedly been a major surge in Moroccan immigration. Benefiting from geographical proximity, this upsurge has largely been a consequence of the strong demand
for immigrant labour in agriculture, construction and the informal service sector. Spain is now a more important destination country than France. After the guest-worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s to North-Western Europe, Morocco witnessed a remarkable second wave of primary labour migration to Southern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s – this in stark contrast to Turkey.
The sharp fluctuations in Moroccan migration to Italy largely reflect measurement problems as well as the effect of regularisations, but show an increasing trend. Italy has evolved into the second destination country of new Moroccan labour migrants. While the level of Turkish immigration in Italy is as negligible as it is in Spain, Egyptian immigration – although at much lower levels – seems relatively important in comparison with other countries. In fact, Italy has the highest level of legal immigration of Egyptians – about 59,000 were officially residing in Italy in 2005, making it by far the largest Egyptian immigrant community in Europe, compared to the 25,000 in the UK (de Haas 2007c). It is likely that the real numbers are significantly higher, due to substantial irregular immigration. A growing number of Egyptians – who traditionally migrated to Libya to work – make the crossing to Italy via Libya (Hamood 2006).

1.5 Development trends and migration futures

1.5.1 The real question: Where will future migrants come from?

It is not difficult to understand why Western European countries have continued to attract migrants. This cannot exclusively be explained by family or chain migration. Persistent economic growth, the changing structure of the labour market and growing female labour participation (which led to an increasing demand for personnel in cleaning, care and other services)
have generated a greater demand for low- and high-skilled migrant labour in specific sectors. This not only pertains to high-skilled jobs, but also to a whole range of un- and semi-skilled (often irregular) jobs in agriculture, construction, catering, cleaning, domestic and other formal and informal services. In fact, the correlation between family migration (e.g., of Turks and Moroccans to North-Western Europe after 1973) and economic growth suggests the limited usefulness of migration categories, which primarily reflect legal categories rather than the real, complex and generally mixed motivations of migrants.

Assuming future economic growth and political stability, EU member states will in all likelihood continue to attract migrants in the coming decades. Although the idea that migration can ‘solve’ population ageing is fundamentally flawed, it is likely that population ageing will increase labour demand in specific sectors, in particular in care and other high- and low-skilled services. The demand for migrant labour is likely to increase even in scenarios of a somewhat drastic increase in labour participation (de Jong, Nicolaas & Sprangers 2001; Entzinger 2000; Fargues 2004).

Therefore, the real question for the future is not whether immigration will continue, but where these migrants will come from. Why has the number of Turks migrating to EU countries been constantly decreasing over recent years, while Moroccan migration to Southern Europe has recently seen a resurgence? Why has Egyptian migration to Europe remained so limited, and is the recently increasing Egyptian migration to Italy possibly heralding a future major increase in Egyptian migration to Europe? Assuming future demand for migrant labour in the EU, we therefore now turn to studying trends of demographic, economic and political development in our case-study countries, and analyse how these might be connected to the different migration trends described above. On that basis, we develop some ideas about the future migration potential of the countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

1.5.2 Demographic trends: A world running out of children

It is often thought that fertility decline and ageing are phenomena that uniquely affect Western societies. It is less known that, globally, almost all countries have entered their fertility transition phase, as testified by rapidly falling fertility levels around the world. In our case-study countries, this process started in the 1950s and 1960s. While Turkish fertility rates declined earlier and have now achieved replacement levels (around 2.1), Morocco and Egypt have also achieved spectacular reductions in fertility (see Figure 1.13). The decline
has been the most spectacular in Morocco, with a reduction from around 7.1 in 1965 (just at the onset of the great guest-worker migration to Europe) to 2.5 at the turn of the century. The decline has been slower in Egypt, with current fertility levels around 3.0. Medium-variant forecasts by the UNPD suggest that the long-term trend is towards convergence with European countries.

Figure 1.14 shows how reductions in fertility have resulted in a slowing down of yearly natural population growth (birth minus death rates, irrespective of migration). Again, the decline has been the fastest in Turkey, with current natural growth at around 1.3 per cent, against 1.5 per cent for Morocco and 1.9 per cent for Egypt. Although this is still much higher than the minimal or even negative natural population growth rates in many Western and Eastern European countries, the times of galloping population growth in Mediterranean countries are clearly over.

Although there is often an indirect link between demographic and migration transition, it would be treacherous to suggest that high population growth is a direct cause of emigration. For instance, high natural population growth in the Arab Gulf countries has not coincided with increased emigration – quite the contrary. In fact, if there is a relationship, it can at most be an indirect one. Current developing countries have experienced extraordinarily high peaks in population growth because their demographic transition is evolving much faster than was the case in Northern Europe (Kirk 1996). In many countries, this seems to go along with a temporarily decreased capacity for economic and employment growth to keep up with galloping population growth.
These factors might explain why international outmigration persists in relatively advanced stages of the demographic transition, as we have perhaps seen in countries like Turkey and Morocco. Furthermore, the growth of the working-age population seems to be a more essential factor than fertility or gross population growth. The pressure on the Moroccan and Egyptian labour markets – unlike in Turkey – is not expected to decrease significantly in the short term. However, Morocco has almost reached the point where the dramatic reductions in fertility since 1972 will begin to entail the reduction of the number of people attaining working age in 2010, and will reach full momentum in the period 2015-2020 (Courbage 1996; Fargues 2004). The next generation entering the labour market will theoretically face less competition and also bear an exceptionally light demographic burden compared to past and future generations (Fargues 2004).

This delayed, positive effect of past declines in fertility is clearly visible in Figure 1.15. Dependency ratios in Turkey, Morocco and Egypt reached a peak around the 1970s, after which they started to decline with fertility rates. In the next few decades, dependency levels will further decline while population ageing in European countries will result in the exactly opposite trend of dramatic increases in dependency levels. Population ageing will start to affect our case-study countries only from 2040 onwards. Until then, these countries will be offered a unique demographic window of opportunity of exceptionally low dependency ratios and decreasing new entries into the labour market.

This positive, delayed effect of fertility decline on the rate of domestic (labour-market) absorption may eventually contribute to declining inter-
national migration, as transitional-migration models predict. However, we need to stress that this is an indirect relationship. Whether, to what extent and when this will really happen crucially depends on other factors such as economic growth, job creation, education, political stability, freedom and trust in government institutions.

1.5.3 Income and quality of life

Turkey, Morocco and Egypt have achieved remarkable improvements in human development, as testified, for instance, by considerable increases in life expectancy to about 70 years nowadays and by the fact that gaps with European countries consistently narrowed between 1955 and 2005 (see Figure 1.16). All three countries are classified as middle-income countries, although Turkey is considerably wealthier than the other two. Between 1970 and 2006, Egyptian and Moroccan per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was 38 per cent and 52 per cent of Turkish per capita GDP, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.17. In recent years, per capita GDP growth in Turkey has greatly accelerated, doubling from US$2,626 in 2002 to US$5,307 in 2006. This has widened the gap with Morocco and, particularly, Egypt, where per capita GDP was only 28 per cent of Turkey’s in 2006.

More relevant for the analysis of migration from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to EU countries is the comparison between countries of GDP per capita corrected for PPP. The data depicted in Figure 1.18 show

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**Figure 1.15  Dependency ratio, 1955–2050**

![Dependency ratio graph](image)

Note: The total dependency ratio is the ratio of the sum of the population aged 0–14 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 15–64.

Source: UNPD, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (medium variant)
that the income gap between Turkey and Germany decreased from 1:4.2 in 1980 to 1:3.4 in 2006. These are precisely the critical values of the migration turning-points identified by Martin and Taylor (1996), who hypothesised that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to figures between 1:4 and 1:5 (between 1:3 and 1:4.5 according to others – Böhning 1994; Olesen 2002). The Turkish case also reflects the hypothesis that migration transitions would occur at levels of per capita income of around US$4,000 (Stalker 2002).

Over the same period (1980-2006), the income gap between Turkey and Spain slightly decreased from 1:3.1 to 1:2.8. This is higher than hypothesised migration turning-point threshold values. In other words, the income gap between Turkey and Spain, as well as other European countries, seems too low to compensate for the financial, social and psychological costs and risks of migration for an increasing number of Turks. Income gaps between Morocco and Egypt with Germany have remained high, from values of around 1:6 and 1:7, respectively, in the 1980s to 1:5.5 and 1:6 in recent years. Income gaps between Morocco and Spain have actually increased from values of around 1:4.2 in the early 1980s to about 1:5 in recent years. Rapid economic growth in Spain might, indeed, have generated a higher demand for migrant labour from nearby Morocco. For Egypt, the gap with Spain has increased from approximately 1:5 in the mid-1980s to 1:5.9 in recent years. These values still lie well below the migration-turning values. The global economic crisis has not closed these gaps, although rapidly increasing unemployment in countries like Spain has caused significant out-migration (Castles, de Haas & Miller 2014).
1.5.4 Freedom and democracy

When Martin and Taylor (1996: 58) hypothesised that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to figures between 1:4 and 1:5, they emphatically added...
‘[…] provided that the emigration country is growing fast and offering hope and opportunity’. Turkey certainly meets the ‘growing fast’ condition, and this might also be the case for Morocco, albeit to a much lower extent. The second ‘offering hope and opportunity’ condition extends beyond the economic realm, and also includes economic and political freedom. This fits well into a freedom and capabilities understanding of development as devised by Sen (1999). Although capabilities have an important intrinsic value in enhancing people’s freedom, they also tend to be positively correlated to economic performance (Easterly 2006; Sen 1999).

In order to compare the level of democratic values across countries, Figure 1.19 depicts country scores on the POLITY 2 Index developed by the Polity IV Project of the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University. The data clearly indicate that, over the past twenty years, after a period of political instability and coups d’état, Turkey has consolidated its position as a country with strong democratic institutions and freedom for its citizens. The contrast with Morocco and Egypt is stark. Although Morocco has recently witnessed substantial increases in civic freedom, it is classified at similar levels as Spain under Franco. According to this index, Egypt made very little progress until the mid-2000s.

Obviously the ‘Arab Spring’ has quite drastically changed the outlook for Arab countries, although the extent to which the uprisings have led to real democratisation and increased civil liberties varies across countries. While Tunisia has turned from one of the most repressive regimes to a nascent democracy and one of the freest societies in a very short period, progress has

![Figure 1.19 Level of democracy and autocracy (Polity 2 Index)](image)

Source: Polity IV Project
been slower, and more erratic and uncertain in Egypt. Morocco remained invariably authoritarian as the king enacted constitutional reform although his cling to a central position of power has remained largely unaffected. It is very difficult to predict future developments, but the coming-of-age of a new, well-educated and aspiring generation is likely to generate continuous pressure for reform.

1.6 Conclusion

The recent migration histories of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey illustrate the diversity of country- and region-specific migration patterns on the one hand but, on the other, also reveal certain regularities. In particular, the comparison between Morocco and Turkey is instructive. Both countries have followed quite similar trajectories as the main origin countries of the guest workers moving to North-Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a phase of large-scale family reunification. This led to the establishment and permanent settlement of the largest immigrant groups from outside the EU. Since the early 1990s, Morocco's and Turkey's paths have clearly diverged. While Turkish family migration to Europe gradually decreased and the country witnessed more and more immigration, Morocco experienced a second, new wave of primary-labour emigration to Italy and, particularly, Spain, while emigration to North-Western Europe has also remained relatively high in comparison with Turkish migration. This can, at least partly, be explained by the fact that income differentials have remained relatively high despite recent economic growth in Morocco and that political and other freedom has remained relatively low.

Although family formation is still fuelling substantial Turkish migration to North-Western Europe, very few Turks have migrated to Southern Europe recently. In fact, due to increasing return migration and immigration from CIS countries, Asia and Europe, Turkey has entered the third phase of its migration transition by passing the in-out migration break-even point, thereby becoming a country of net immigration. This can be explained not only by the extraordinarily high levels of economic growth in the recent past, but also by the many structural institutional reforms and macro-economic stabilisation which recent Turkish governments have established. This has created a more general climate of optimism and hope for the future, which seems to be increasingly luring Turkish migrants back from Europe to Turkey.

Egypt’s migration story is entirely different. While it is the poorest and apparently least stable country in our three case-studies, Egyptians did not
participate in the ‘guest-worker’ migrations of the late 1960s and 1970s. This
might partly be explained by its geographical position, which complicated
the ‘spontaneous’ migration occurring from Morocco and Turkey, and by
pan-Arab socialist policies. As a poor and populous country squeezed in
between Libya and the Gulf countries, it was a logical candidate for mass
migration to those countries after the 1973 Oil Crisis. Yet the proximity
factor cannot explain why there are more Egyptian migrants living in North
America and Australia than in Europe. However, the majority of these are
relatively highly skilled migrants. In the absence of labour recruitment
agreements, which played an important role in triggering Turkish and Mo-
roccan migration, labour migration to Europe was probably simply beyond
the capabilities and imagination of most Egyptians. However, the recent
increase in the irregular migration of Egyptians to Italy and elsewhere
might herald an increase in Egyptian labour migration to Europe.

It is very difficult to predict future migration trends, as they critically
depend on sustained economic growth, stability and increasing freedom,
which will determine the extent to which the middle-income countries to
the south and east of Europe will offer trust and life perspectives to their
citizens. In that sense, the future EU membership of Turkey seems the best
long-term guarantee of creating such trust in and hope for the future in ways
similar to those for Portugal, Spain and Greece in the past (Kirişci 2003).
Although such membership and the freedom of movement this implies
might create an upsurge in largely temporary labour migration, as is cur-
rently occurring from countries such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria,
this is less likely to create a large, new, permanent immigrant population in
Europe because of the high economic growth and trust which (the prospect
of) membership is likely to create.

While the migration potential from Turkey is likely to further decline
given the possible future political stability and sustained economic growth,
the migration potential from Morocco is likely to remain substantial, at least
in the short term. First, recent labour migration to Spain and Italy has laid
the foundation for new Moroccan migrant communities, whose numbers
are likely to increase due to the same processes of family migration that
led to a huge increase in Moroccan and Turkish migrant communities in
North-Western Europe in the two decades after the Oil Crisis. Moroccans are
therefore likely to overtake the Turks as the largest resident immigrant group
in Europe. While it seems to be at the peak of its ‘migration hump’, Morocco’s
migration potential for the more medium term fundamentally depends on the
extent to which recent substantial increases in civic liberties are sustained and
real democratisation occurs. If the current trend persists, and the Moroccan
economy continues to grow, the unique ‘window of opportunity’ offered to the next generations entering the labour market, bearing an exceptionally light demographic burden, may well result in a rapidly decreasing emigration potential, as Morocco seems quite close to the origin-destination income-gap threshold levels at which emigration seems to decline. This is likely to coincide with increasing immigration and settlement from sub-Saharan Africa, a process which has already been set in motion (de Haas 2007a). However, if recent reforms are not sustained and economic growth remains sluggish, Morocco’s migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent ‘migration plateau’ of sustained out-migration. Although this primarily depends on domestic political factors, the implementation and effects of Morocco’s association agreement with the EU will play a fundamental role, too.

Assuming a steadily declining emigration potential of Eastern European countries, Turkey and perhaps even the Maghreb countries (such as Tunisia), in the more-medium term, the challenging question then becomes where future immigrant workers will come from.

Perhaps this will bring Egypt onto the agenda, as it is a comparatively poor middle-income country with relatively few economic prospects and little political freedom bordering the ‘migration frontier’ of the expanding European migration system. Perhaps the current increases in the regular and irregular migration of Egyptian labourers to Italy (often via Libya), and even Greece, will create new bridgeheads in the form of new migrant communities which may facilitate more migration. While income gaps with the EU seem ideal for generating ‘take-off’ migration, Europe seems to be an increasingly attractive destination compared to the low salaries and poor working conditions which Arab countries can offer, in particular to the lower-skilled. This may lead Egyptian workers to increasingly shun the Arab countries in the same way that Maghrebi and Turkish workers have done.

So far, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. It also seems naïve to think that successful political and economic reform will lead to rapidly decreasing emigration. The same processes that created the conditions for revolutionary change are also conducive to emigration. The coming-of-age of a new, educated and aspiring generation, frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rule and corruption, has increased both the emigration and the revolutionary potential of Arab societies. So the idea that emigration will stop is as unlikely as the idea of a ‘mass exodus’ towards Europe (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

Nevertheless, as recent migration trends in Turkey and the migration transitions of Southern European countries have clearly shown, we cannot simply take for granted that current migration trends will persist. In addi-
tion, the data presented above undermine any assumption that the EU is surrounded by countries where there is an almost infinite source of cheap labour ready to migrate as soon as the opportunity presents itself. This assumption – which underlies popular perceptions of mounting ‘migration pressure’ (often ignoring labour demand in Europe and disregarding rapidly decreasing fertility levels in origin countries) and which fuels fears of migrants swamping the European continent – is fundamentally flawed.

First, this assumption is based on the erroneous belief that absolute poverty is the root cause of migration, ignoring the fact that the relation between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear. The above analysis has largely confirmed the transitional-migration theory proposed in the second section of this chapter. The most important emigration countries are middle-income ones located at the periphery of the expanding core of the European migration system.

Second, this assumption overlooks the significant social, demographic, economic and political transformations that countries bordering the EU to the south have experienced. These transformations, embodied in the term development, are likely to affect future emigration and immigration potential in somewhat unexpected ways.

Much depends on future economic growth in Europe, which has been the main driver of rising labour demand attracting immigrants. The economic crisis in Europe has significantly reduced inflows. Since 2010, many Southern European countries have become emigration countries. However, if, in the longer term, the core of the European migration system – consisting of net immigration countries – keeps on expanding, future migrants may increasingly come from more distant countries located in, for instance, West and Central Africa. Although it is notoriously difficult to make long-term predictions, in the more distant future the global demand for skilled and unskilled labour may increase due to the now global and universal decline in fertility. As more and more countries are turning into net receivers of migrants, this raises the question of where all these migrants will come from; even if there are workers interested in migrating with the eagerness people assume, it is unclear whether they want to migrate to Europe right now. The future question for European policymakers might no longer be ‘How to keep them out?’ but ‘How to attract them?’? This turnaround in policy views is already happening for high-skilled migrants, as testified by the growing European appetite for Green Card-like point systems to attract high-skilled migrants, and the boom in student immigration. Pressing and growing labour-demand-specific sectors of EU labour markets may perhaps also lead to a similar turnaround concerning low-skilled migrants.
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2 Migration and development in Egypt

Ayman Zohry

2.1 Introduction

‘The role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin, as well as the contribution they make towards the prosperity of destination countries, should be recognized and reinforced’ (GCIM 2005: 23). This is exactly what this chapter will try to do by looking at the example of Egypt. Emigration from Egypt started in the late 1960s, mainly for economic but also for political reasons, with the large majority of the emigrants going to the Gulf states. As early as the 1970s, the Egyptian state regarded emigration as a means of easing pressure on the labour market. From the 1980s onwards, migration also became a tool for development. The state further eased migration procedures to increase the remittances necessary to supply payment deficits – a strategy that was successful. Remittances are among Egypt’s largest source of foreign currency.

Remittances have long been the focus of attention of studies dealing with the relationship between migration and development, both theoretically and empirically. Such flows of wealth are important not only to the sending country, but also to the families of migrants (Caldwell 1969). However, research is divided regarding the effects of remittances. A study by de Haas (2003) on migration and development in Southern Morocco indicates the importance of migration in enabling livelihood diversification among households through the remittances of Moroccan labourers who work in other Moroccan cities or abroad. But there is also some evidence that remittances have little effect on the structural development in sending countries. Moreover, migration also has an impact on the socio-cultural development of sending countries – an aspect less studied in the literature in general (see, for example, Brink 1991; Brinks & Sinclair 1980; Levitt 1998; Sørensen 2007) and also with regard to Egypt. This lack of available material on other aspects of migration-related development explains the focus on remittances in my elaborations on development related to migration in Egypt.

In what follows, I first look at the factors that led to emigration from Egypt from the late 1960s onwards. Subsequently, I briefly describe Egypt’s migration history and the Egyptian emigrant population. With this knowledge in mind, I look at the impact of migration on development in Egypt, focusing, in particular, on the size and impact of remittances, but also taking into
account the effects on the Egyptian labour market, including brain drain, and the changes in society and culture brought about by migration, as far as this is possible based on existing research.

### 2.2 Demography, the labour market and the political situation

The push factors of Egyptian emigration were economic difficulties, high rates of population growth in Egypt and the political climate in the second half of the twentieth century. Rapid population growth is one of the crucial problems that have hindered development efforts in Egypt. While the country’s population doubled from 9.7 million to 19 million in 50 years (between 1897 and 1947), the next doubling to 38 million people took less than 30 years (from 1947 to 1976). Since then, the population has almost doubled again, totalling 76 million in 2006. This observation can be explained by a considerable increase in life expectancy at birth from 49.3 to 72.3 years and a decrease in infant mortality from 154.7 to 25.9 (per 1,000 live births) between 1970 and 2010. The annual population growth rate has increased from 1.5 per cent at the beginning of the twentieth century to a maximum of 2.8 per cent between 1975 and 1985. However, from 1970 to 2010, the fertility rate fell from 6.2 to 2.85 live births per woman, pushing the growth rate down to around 1.8 per cent in the period 2000-2010 (Table 2.1).

Egypt’s rapid population growth is further complicated by the fact that its cultivable land is extremely scarce relative to the size of its population. Over 95 per cent of Egypt’s population is concentrated on the narrow ribbon of land which follows the course of the Nile River and represents only around 5 per cent of the total land area of 1 million square kilometres.

Associated with rapid population growth is a high level of unemployment. The 1986 census reported that 12 per cent of the labour force were unemployed (up from 7.7 per cent in 1976). Even if the unemployment rate

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**Table 2.1** Egyptian population growth, 1980–2010

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-year population (millions)</td>
<td>35.90</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>56.80</td>
<td>67.70</td>
<td>81.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (annual %)</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility rate (live births per woman)</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>49.30</td>
<td>54.70</td>
<td>60.50</td>
<td>67.40</td>
<td>72.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>154.70</td>
<td>119.10</td>
<td>84.60</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>25.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2012)
fell to less than 9 per cent of the labour force between 1997 and 1999, the total number of unemployed did not decrease accordingly due to overall population growth (CAPMAS 1999). In absolute numbers, unemployment has increased from less than 1 million in the 1980s to consistently over 2 million in recent years, according to various reports from Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics or CAPMAS (Table 2.2). In addition, there remains the statistically unmeasured phenomenon of under- or disguised unemployment, which is widely recognised to prevail in the governmental and public sector.

Table 2.2 Unemployment in Egypt, 2000–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total unemployment ('000)</th>
<th>Rate (% total labour force)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CAPMAS (2012)

Providing Egypt’s youth with job opportunities is undoubtedly one of the major challenges faced today by the Egyptian government. High rates of population growth have resulted in large numbers of young people entering the labour force in recent years, contributing to the growing unemployment. According to CAPMAS, unemployment rates are reversely associated with educational attainment; while less than 3 per cent among the less-educated population were unemployed in 2010, the rate of unemployment among the holders of secondary education and university degrees was between 12.3 and 18.8 per cent (Table 2.3).

Poverty is another push factor of migration from Egypt. The *Egyptian Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey* (HIECS) indicates that the poverty rate increased from 21.6 per cent in 2008/09 to 25.2 per cent in 2010/11 (CAPMAS 2013).

Apart from population growth, unemployment and poverty, the political climate has also been an important push factor for emigration. This mainly concerned members of the Muslim Brotherhood repressed under the Mubarak regime. While this form of emigration ceased with the Arab Uprising, Coptic emigration has increased since the fall of Mubarak’s regime (see Faath & Mattes in this volume). But the political instability and the lack of security in Egypt right after the revolution are not only new push factors for emigration in themselves; they have also had detrimental effects on Egypt’s economy by
deterring investors and entrepreneurs operating in Egypt (Abdelfattah 2011) as well as tourists. In 2010, Egypt’s revenue from the tourist industry, one of the main pillars of its economy, amounted to US$13.6 billion; by 2011, this amount had fallen by 35 per cent to only US$9 billion (Fargues & Fandrich 2012). These developments will, of course, have an effect on unemployment and poverty. A study conducted in Egypt after the revolution in September 2012 found that 8 per cent of the respondents wished to leave the country permanently, with 42 per cent of these having developed this desire after the revolution (Girgis & Osman 2013). At the same time, the Arab Uprising has also led to return migration, especially after the revolt in Libya in February 2011, as will be further explained below (Zohry 2011).

**Table 2.3 Unemployment by educational level, Egypt, 2010 (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational status</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read and write</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than secondary</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than secondary</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CAPMAS (2012)

### 2.3 Egyptian emigration

#### 2.3.1 Emigration history

Different migration phases can be distinguished in the Egyptian migration evolution. These are defined by changing international conditions, events and labour-market needs, particularly in the Arab region, and also by different economic factors and policy decisions at the national level. In the first phase, prior to 1974, the government of Egypt was motivated to bear the burden by providing job opportunities. However, increasing population growth, along with the lack of growth in the economic and technological sectors, diminished the state’s ability to provide jobs. The state authorised permanent and temporary migration in 1971 and lifted restrictions on labour migration in 1974. Large numbers of temporary migrants began to work in the Arab Gulf countries, where oil revenues had quadrupled in 1973 due to the oil embargo. Graduate students’ permanent migration had already
commenced after the end of the war of 1967. Between 1970 and 1974, an estimated 300,000 people migrated, compared to a migrant stock of 70,000 in 1970 (Choukri 1999).

This first phase was followed by an expansion phase (1974-1984). The increased oil prices fuelled ambitious development programmes in the Arab oil-producing countries, increasing, in turn, the demand for foreign labour. To resolve unemployment problems and use remittances to supply payment deficits and finance private projects, the Egyptian government further eased migration procedures and created the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs (1981), which sponsored Egyptian migrants and drew up an overall migration strategy. The number of Egyptian emigrants increased to about 2 million by 1980. Iraq became a favoured destination for unskilled labour, while cheaper Asian and South-Asian labour began to migrate to the Arab countries (Choukri 1999; Zohry 2003).

The contraction phase (1984-1987) began after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, which depressed oil revenues and temporarily pushed down the number of Egyptian emigrants to about 1.4 million (1985). In addition, Egyptian migrant labour had to face a number of new problems from the second half of the 1980s such as, first, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, which entailed the return of Iraqi soldiers to their civilian jobs to replace Egyptians in the Iraqi labour market; second, falling oil prices; third, the declining demand for construction workers in Arab countries; and fourth, the policy of replacing foreign with national labour in the Arab Gulf states.

Towards the end of the 1980s, Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries comprised a much smaller proportion of the foreign workforce than in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, Egyptian workers represented 40 per cent of the total foreign labour in Saudi Arabia. A smaller workforce was in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the same period, the number of workers from South-East Asia increased (Shah 2004).

The following phase (1988-1992) was characterised by the stagnation of the number of Egyptian emigrants, with a significant flow of return migrants from the Gulf region to Egypt and a considerable decline in the number of contracts granted to new emigrants. The 1990 Gulf War in particular forced about 1 million Egyptian migrants in Iraq and Kuwait to return home. However, the situation changed with the end of the Gulf War. By 1992, the number of Egyptian emigrants exceeded 2.2 million. This increase may be attributed, in part, to the liberation of Kuwait and the return of Egyptian workers to the Gulf (Zohry 2003). In recent years, the number of Egyptians abroad increased from 2.7 million in 2000 to 4.7 million in 2006, and then to 6.5 million lately.
With respect to the distribution of Egyptian migrants by destination in Arab countries, one can notice that an increasing share of the migrants going to Arab countries went to Libya over the last two decades (Table 2.4). The percentage of Egyptian migrants going to Libya increased from 3 per cent in 1990 to 17.4 per cent in 2000 and then to 41.8 per cent in 2009. Moreover, the number of migrants going to Libya may have been much higher, since Egyptian nationals, until March 2007, were not obliged to obtain visas or work contracts to enter Libya. However, it is important to mention here that, after the revolution in Libya in February 2011, about 800,000 Egyptians returned to Egypt, though many have returned to Libya since the fall of the Gaddafi Regime (Hafez & Ghaly 2012; Zohry 2011). This number is not reflected in the data provided in Table 2.4. On the other hand, the share of Egyptian migrants going to Iraq decreased sharply from 44.1 per cent in 1990 to 3.4 per cent in 2000 and then to 0.3 per cent in 2009 – mainly attributed to political instability in Iraq. The share of Egyptian migrants going to Saudi Arabia increased from 29.3 per cent in 1990 to 48.3 per cent in 2000, and then decreased to 27.1 per cent in 2009.

Table 2.4 Distribution of Egyptians by (Arab) country of destination, 1990–2009 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While dependence on migrant workers has increased over the last 30 years in the Arab Gulf states, the share of immigrants from Arab countries among all expatriates decreased sharply between 1975 and 2006, plummeting from 72 per cent to 23 per cent. Table 2.5 shows the considerable, though uneven, decline in all six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Table 2.5 Arab nationals in the expatriate population of Arab Gulf countries, 1975–2006 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A major reason for this phenomenon has been the mounting competition from immigrant workers from Asia. Indeed, workers from countries east of the Gulf region (Pakistan, and South- and South-East-Asian countries) started to arrive in the 1980s, offering even lower expectations of salaries and work conditions, though the cultural and linguistic bonds confer the Egyptian workforce some competitive advantage. As shown with the example of Kuwait in Table 2.6, this pressure has resulted in a quasi-inversion of the respective foreign labour-force shares of Arab and Asian nationals. While Arab workers represented over 60 per cent of the total immigrant population in 1989, by 2009 their share had fallen to 41.6 per cent. By contrast, the Asian share rose from 32.9 to 55.9 per cent over the same period.

Table 2.6 Expatriate population of Kuwait, 1989–2009 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ('000)</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zohry & Debnath (2010)

Apart from migration to the Arab world, there was also a considerable flow of Egyptian migrants legally entering Europe over the period 1971-2000. In absolute numbers, Italy attracted the largest share of this migration, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom. Moreover, many of the Egyptians emigrating to Europe do not appear in any statistics of the receiving countries due to the increase in illegal migration in the face of
the tightened policy adopted by the European Union (EU), especially after
the Schengen Agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty (imposing visas,
strict border surveillance and a selective ceiling for work permits). The
current stream of Egyptian irregular migration to Europe started on the
eve of the twenty-first century, with fresh graduates and poorly educated
unemployed youth engaged in irregular migration to Europe, either across
the Mediterranean Sea via Libya or by over-staying Schengen tourist visas.
The main reasons behind this new type of migration are the high unemploy-
ment rates among Egyptian youth and the difficulty for Egyptian youth
to find employment opportunities in the Arab Gulf countries due to the
competition they face there. Coupled to this are the geographical proximity
of Egypt and Europe and the ease of travelling to Libya, where most of the
boat journeys to Europe originate (Zohry 2007). Due to the clandestine
nature of this phenomenon, it is quite difficult to quantify this migration
stream or even to give an approximate number of Egyptian youth who
follow this route.

2.3.2 The Egyptian population abroad

The number of Egyptians abroad was estimated to be 6.5 million in 2009
(Table 2.7). According to the latest estimates, the total number of Egyptian
migrants in the Gulf countries – at 2.2 million – accounts for one third of
the total Egyptian emigrant population. Saudi Arabia hosts almost 60 per
cent of the Egyptians in the Gulf (1.3 million), followed by Kuwait with 22
per cent and the other four destination countries (UAE, Qatar, Oman and
Bahrain) with less than 20 per cent. Other Arab countries host about 2.6
million Egyptians, with 2 million of these residing in Libya. Due to the
developments in Libya, about 0.8 million Egyptians were forced to return
to Egypt. However, returnees started to go back to Libya after the end of
the Gaddafi Regime. Other destinations of Egyptians in the Arab region are
Jordan (about 0.5 million), Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, with a few thousand
Egyptians who managed to join the labour market in these countries.

Egyptians in the West comprise about 25 per cent of Egyptians abroad.
The main destinations are North America (the US and Canada) with about
0.8 million, followed by the UK (250,000), Italy (190,000), France (160,000),
Australia, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria.
Table 2.7 Egyptian migration by receiving country, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving country</th>
<th>Number of migrants</th>
<th>Distribution by destination for Arab and non-Arab countries (%)</th>
<th>Overall distribution (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>88,500</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Arab countries</td>
<td>4,789,359</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA and Canada</td>
<td>780,841</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Arab countries</td>
<td>22,317</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-Arab countries</td>
<td>1,686,158</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all countries</td>
<td>6,475,517</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (2012), author’s calculations

Egyptian emigrants constitute about 8 per cent of the total population of Egypt. Survey results published in 2000 show that this group was younger than those not leaving the country. The average age of return migrants was about five years below that of non-migrants (29.8 versus 35.0 years) at the time. While almost 75 per cent of the migrant interviewees were younger than 35 years, this applied to only half (53.1 per cent) of the non-migrant sample (Table 2.8).
Table 2.8  Distribution of Egyptian migrants and non-migrants by age (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Non-migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–24</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of individuals</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>3,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age (years)</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat (2000)

Those leaving the country were also more educated than those staying behind, according to the survey results: the majority of migrants had completed at least secondary school (53.9 per cent), and only 34.1 per cent of migrants had less than a full primary education. This relationship is inverted in the case of non-migrants: 56.2 per cent had no formal or only an incomplete primary education, while only 30.2 per cent had secondary or university education (Eurostat 2000). This was confirmed by a study carried out by Zohry in 2006 to investigate attitudes of Egyptian youth towards migration to Europe (Table 2.9).

Egyptian emigrants also differ by region of destination. According to the ‘grey literature’ (non-scientific reports, the media and newspapers), Egyptian migration to the West is family-natured as opposed to the mainly male Arab migration. Egyptians in the West are more educated than their co-ethnics in the Arab Gulf countries and usually have better jobs. However, with the expansion of irregular migration, especially to Italy and other European countries, a balance in the skill composition could be achieved within this decade, since most of the migrants to these destinations are less-educated or unskilled young men who escape poverty and (primary) unemployment in Egypt.

Egyptian migration to Arab countries, on the other hand, is male-dominated, involving both skilled and unskilled men. At least 90 per cent of migrant workers to the oil-rich Arab countries since 1970 have been males (Zohry 2003), including all professions, ranging from scientists and technicians to labourers. While most workers were employed in construction during the earlier phases of massive labour migration in the mid-1970s, the proportion of scientists and technicians increased from the mid-1980s (Table 2.10). Due to competition from new streams of cheap labour from
South-East Asia, the share of labourers declined from 43 per cent in 1985 to 26.2 per cent of all registered emigrants in 2005. Scientists and technicians, who represented 20.4 per cent of the migrant contracts in 1985, made up 40.2 per cent and 39 per cent in 1990 and 2002 respectively and then decreased sharply in 2005 to 21.3 per cent – mainly due to the fact that Egyptians going to Jordan were now required to have a contract before working there. Most of the Egyptian migrants to Jordan were unskilled labourers who worked in agriculture or the informal sector of the Jordanian economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Non-migrants</th>
<th>Return migrants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary/preparatory</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (general)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (tech.)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University+</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.10 Distribution of Egyptians’ contracts to work in Arab countries by occupation, 1985–2005 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientists and technicians</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and services</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production workers</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * From 1 July 2004 to 30 July 2005
Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (2005)
2.4 Migration and development

The Egyptian state used migration as a tool for development from the very start, even though not all measures foreseen to increase migration have, as yet, been implemented. In the following section, I set out how the Egyptian government tried to increase migration and filter the resulting funds into the development of Egypt. Subsequently, and within the limits of the data available, I discuss how far this strategy has been successful, with regard not only to remittances, but also to its effects on the Egyptian labour market, including brain drain, and the impact on Egyptian society and culture.

2.4.1 Development as a policy strategy

The Egyptian state has long tried to use migration as a strategy for development. Initially, this mainly concerned using migration as a means of easing pressure on the Egyptian labour market – the reason why the state authorised permanent and temporary migration in 1971 and lifted restrictions on labour migration in 1974. However, in 1981, when the Egyptian government further eased migration procedures, the aim was no longer only to resolve unemployment problems, but also to increase the remittances necessary to eradicate payment deficits.

These two aims were also combined in the Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law no. 111 of 1983, which is regarded as the main migration law in Egypt. However, this law goes even further by providing facilities for migrants before their departure and in their host countries. The law consists of five chapters that cover the general provisions applicable to all migrants, the duration of their stay abroad and the rights (temporary versus permanent stay abroad) and privileges of migrants and return migrants. In particular, the law indicates that migrants’ capital utilised in investment projects in Egypt is to be granted the same advantages as those granted to foreign capital.

In general, the Egyptian Emigration Law has two objectives:
1. To arrange both permanent and temporary emigration systems; the law secures, in fact, the right of any individual to emigrate in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. It also outlines the rules and procedures which emigrants should follow.
2. To outline the provisions dealing with the necessary care and extension of facilities to Egyptian emigrants before their actual departure from Egypt or after their arrival in host countries, as well as to those who decide to return. The goal is to maintain strong ties with Egyptians abroad.
The Egyptian Emigration Law is perceived as the practical formulation of the Egyptian government’s tendency to liberalise people’s movement, associated with the implementation of the ‘open-door’ economic policy. However, the articles related to investment in Egypt and to attracting established Egyptian migrants abroad and return migrants to invest in Egypt need to be reinforced. Moreover, pre-departure orientation (language and culture) and skills training for migrants do not exist, even though they are stated clearly in Article 5 of the migration law.

The latter was to be implemented by the Higher Committee for Migration (HCM), formed by Resolution no. 2000 of 1997 based on Article 4 of the migration law. Membership of the HCM includes representatives of the ministries and entities concerned with migration. Its competences include consideration of the establishment of professional training centres for potential migrants, the organisation of specialised courses for the purpose of qualifying potential migrants, and suggestions for the facilities to be granted to migrants, whether before their departure, during their stay abroad, or after temporarily or permanently returning to their homeland. The HCM should convene once every three months at least, upon the request of its chairman (the Minister of Manpower and Emigration). However, the HCM does not convene regularly and most of its assigned tasks were never implemented, particularly the establishment of professional training centres for potential migrants.

Another important actor in implementing the emigration law was the Minister of State for Emigration Affairs and Egyptians Abroad, created in 1981, whose responsibilities were subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Manpower and Employment (currently the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration) in 1996.

The current strategy of the emigration sector focuses on promoting Egyptian migration, especially among young people, in order to decrease the unemployment rate and resulting pressures on the local labour market and to increase migrants’ remittances to Egypt. In addition, the emigration sector has continued to combat illegal migration through the dissemination of information that aims to re-direct potential migrants to legal migration channels. Last, but not least, the emigration sector has been trying to establish an Egyptian migration observatory and to update the already existing Egyptian migration database that includes job opportunities abroad as well as numbers and statistics, and a computerised system available through the Internet to link Egyptians abroad to their homeland.
2.4.2 The impact of remittances on the Egyptian economy

In economic and financial terms, the most important aspect of migration for the sending country is remitted money (usually cash transfers) and goods, the so-called remittances that migrant workers send back to family or friends at home. Such flows of wealth are important to both the families of migrants and to the economy of sending countries (Caldwell 1969). Almost all remittances are sent by individual migrants (individual remittances), yet a fraction is sent by groups of migrant workers through their associations (collective remittances). Formal remittances (sent through banks, post offices, exchange houses and transfer companies) are the only form that can be accurately measured. Their size and frequency are determined by factors such as the number of migrant workers, wage rates, exchange rates, political risk, economic activity in the host and sending countries, the existence of appropriate transfer facilities, the level of education of the migrant, the number of people accompanying the migrant, the number of years since migration, and the difference in interest rates between sending and receiving countries.

Figure 2.1 Remittances to Egypt by Egyptians abroad, 1990–2011, million US$

Remittances of Egyptians working abroad peaked in the early 1990s due to the substantial return of Egyptian migrants from the Arab Gulf countries after the Gulf War who remitted their savings in host-country banks before return (see Figure 2.1). Between 1993 and 2003, the level of remittances stabilised at around US$3 billion. In recent years, however, remittances
have soared again to over US$14 billion. This may be attributed, in part, to the increase in the number of Egyptians abroad from fewer than 3 million in 2000 to about 6.5 billion in 2009. The increase in remittances may also be due to the expansion of the services of money-transfer companies such as Western Union and Money Gram, as well as to the more widespread use of the banking system among Egyptians and the tendency to utilise formal instead of informal channels to remit money to their home country.

The origin of remittances
The most recent available data on remittances by origin refer to 2006. Out of the US$5.3 billion sent home by Egyptian migrants in 2006, the largest amount (US$1.7 billion) came from the US, with a share of 32.0 per cent of the total volume of remittances. Kuwait ranked second at US$982.7 million (18.4 per cent), followed by the UAE (US$823.8 million or 15.5 per cent) and then Saudi Arabia (US$785 million or 14.7 per cent). Remittances from these four countries together comprised 80.6 per cent of all remittances to Egypt. Those from Western Europe represent 12.6 per cent of the total amount (US$675.1 million), with Germany, the UK and Switzerland being the biggest contributors (see Table 2.11).

Remittances transferred through informal channels or brought back by travellers and return migrants are unlikely to be captured in official records, although they may represent a substantial addition to remittances sent through official channels (World Bank 2006). Hence, one should not ignore informal and in-kind remittances made by Egyptian migrants, not only from Arab countries but also from European countries such as Italy. In-kind remittances that are sent or brought back by migrants mainly include clothes and electronic equipment (Brink 1991; Eurostat 2000; Zohry 2005). In addition, a significant proportion of remittances transferred by Egyptian migrants from the Arab Gulf and Libya are channelled through informal paths, either by sending money to the family in Egypt through colleagues and relatives when they return for holidays to Egypt, or by bringing the money on their own return. Libya, in particular, is an example of the prevalence of informal remittances, since most Egyptian migrants are engaged in the informal sector of the Libyan economy, with no fixed salaries or bank accounts (Zohry 2005). Remittances through formal channels are only available for those who have formal work contracts with the Libyan government or large companies there. Indeed, one can conclude that migrants in these countries send back several hundred to several thousands of dollars to Egypt, depending on the numerous factors stated above and,
in particular, on the number of family members left behind in the home country.

Table 2.11  Egyptian remittances by country of emigration, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total in million US$</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>1,703.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>982.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>823.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>785.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>215.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>167.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>142.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>184.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,329.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bank of Egypt (2007)

Concerning the exceptionally high flow of remittances per Egyptian migrant in Switzerland (US$7,530), it must be assumed that this high figure is biased either by the real number of Egyptian emigrants in the country or by the existence in Switzerland of the bank accounts of affluent Egyptians. Nevertheless, the numbers indicate clearly that the return to migration is very different for the home economy, depending on whether Egyptian workers move to the US, to selected countries in Europe or in the Gulf, or whether they work abroad in Saudi Arabia or Libya. This difference can probably be further explained by the educational level of and jobs occupied by Egyptians in their respective host countries.
The impact of remittances
Remittances are among Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency, along with Suez Canal receipts and tourism. As early as 1979, these remittances amounted to US$2 billion, a sum equivalent to the country’s combined earnings from cotton exports, Suez Canal transit fees and tourism (Nassar 2005). As shown in Table 2.12, between 1990 and 2011, workers’ remittances accounted for an average of 6 per cent of annual GDP. Even if their contribution to GDP declined from 14.6 per cent in 1992 to 3 per cent in 2010, remittances remain, for the Egyptian economy, an important capital flow that is not correlated to GDP growth.

Table 2.12  Trends in remittances of Egyptian migrants, 1990–2011 (current US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances in billion US$</th>
<th>Remittances as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Remittances also help to develop the financial sector through increasing the aggregate level of deposits or credits intermediated by the local banking sector. In addition to banks, specialised transfer institutions such as Western Union and MoneyGram handle the transfer of migrants’ remittances.
The impact of remittances on poverty alleviation in Egypt is not entirely clear. Research on the use of remittances has shown that 75 per cent of these funds are used for daily household expenses such as food, clothing and health care (Zohry 2005), while expenditure on the construction of new houses and on education come in second and third place in remittance utilisation. This confirms other findings according to which remittances are also spent on building or improving housing, buying land or cattle, and buying durable consumer goods (Zohry 2002). A more recent study carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2010) using a sample of 414 households in four Egyptian governorates indicates that spending preferences have remained the same: households still mainly use the remitted money for meeting their daily living/essential expenses (29 per cent of all respondents), funding education (16 per cent) and paying for health care (12 per cent). The distribution of uses indicates, in any case, the importance of migration and remittances in poverty alleviation.

At the same time, research has also revealed that, once abroad, migrant households spend a smaller share on consumption than non-migrant households, while returnees from migration invest up to 50 per cent of their savings into housing (Nassar 1991, 2005: 21). These results confirm that the impact of remittances upon the national economy and development cannot be ignored. Generally speaking, only a small percentage of remittances are used for savings and productive investments, i.e. for activities with multiplier effects in terms of income and employment creation (Brink 1991; Eurostat 2000; Zohry 2005). However, the entrepreneurial activities of return migrants contribute to the Egyptian economy. According to Nassar (2005), about 10 per cent of returnees invest in economic projects. They put more capital into their businesses, engage more in service activities and the formal sector and create 1.4 more jobs per establishment than non-migrants. Finally, McCormick and Wahba (2003) find that the volume of savings going back to urban areas is more than three times that going to rural areas, most investments being made in Cairo.

In addition, remittances help families to establish family-based and -managed small projects such as raising cattle, opening a mini-market, or buying and operating a taxi, especially in rural areas. Many taxi-drivers in Cairo and other governorates bought their car upon their return, and operate it themselves or through hired taxi-drivers as their main source of income. However, attempts to attract businessmen among the Egyptian diaspora to invest in Egypt seem not to have had the expected success. One of the main reasons for the foundation of the former Ministry of Emigration and Egyptians Abroad and for the promulgation of the Egyptian Migration Law
was to attract Egyptians abroad to maintain links with their origins and to invest in Egypt. But government bureaucracy and suspicion from many Egyptians abroad have been obstacles to a significant flow of investments into the country (Zohry & Debnath 2010).

2.4.3 The impact of labour emigration on the Egyptian labour market

In recent years, more than 2 million Egyptians or approximately 10 per cent of the labour force have been officially seeking employment in Egypt, in addition to all those who have not declared their under- or unemployment. Most of them are primarily unemployed, fresh graduates of a stagnant educational system who are not equipped to compete in either local, regional or international markets. Moreover, there are approximately 6.5 million Egyptian migrants, even if not all of them actually have a job abroad. Under the hypothesis that 75 per cent of the migrant population form part of their host countries’ labour force, roughly 2.25 million workers, who would otherwise be un- or underemployed and pushing the unemployment rate up to 20 per cent, are currently withheld from the Egyptian labour market.

On the other hand, the permanent migration of Egyptians to the West is the main source of ‘brain drain’, as it has always been the migration of the better-educated citizens. Some 77 per cent of Egyptian migrants in the US have completed tertiary education. Many Egyptian migrants in other OECD countries are also highly educated professionals – mainly doctors, engineers and teachers (Nassar 2005). One could say that migration is responsible for this loss of highly skilled citizens to developed countries, in addition to the significant number of semi-skilled workers lost to developing (mainly Arab) countries.

Does Egypt, however, suffer a shortage of those highly skilled workers needed by the national economy, a shortage that would substantiate the brain-drain hypothesis? No quantitative studies have assessed this problem. However, I argue that, at the beginning of the migration era (1975-1980), Egypt suffered a severe shortage of highly qualified and skilled workers who temporarily migrated to the Arab Gulf countries. The Egyptian cinema has documented this loss of necessary people in many social movies. Nowadays, and talking about the migration of highly skilled professionals to the Arab Gulf and the West, migration should not be regarded as brain drain, given the fact that the Egyptian bureaucratic government with its current institutional and organisational structure cannot, in any way, absorb these highly qualified professionals and offer them suitable salaries and work conditions. Despite the fact that salaries in the private sector are higher
than in the government and public sectors, the absorption capacity of this sector is below the labour-supply level (Zohry & Debnath 2010).

2.4.4 The socio-cultural impact of migration

Migrants remit money, goods and commodities, as well as ideas and behaviours, that affect sending countries, either positively or negatively. Levitt calls these ‘social remittances’: ‘Social remittances are the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-communities’ (Levitt 1998: 927). She further identifies three types of social remittance – normative structures (ideas, values and beliefs), systems of practice (actions shaped by normative structures), and social capital.

Since most temporary Egyptian migrants are males who leave their families behind, other family members take over migrants’ responsibilities, such as agricultural work, in the country of origin. The husbands’ absence forces women to manage alone, which brings about the empowerment of women (Brink 1991; Zohry 2002). It also increases young women’s participation in the labour market (Binzel & Assaad 2011). And remittances have been shown to have a positive effect on the education of girls – their chances of ever being enrolled in school increase with remittances (Elbadawy & Assaad 2010). At the same time, migration to the origins of Wahhabism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example, affected Egyptian society and reproduced a new version of social and theological behaviour which might have increased the tendency to fatalism and fundamentalism, as well as the marginalisation of women in society (Zohry & Debnath 2010).

Finally, one should not ignore the interaction between migration and globalisation. Globalisation, made possible by new communication and information technologies and increased mobility, has spread new and different types of consumption pattern. In remote villages in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt, we notice the increasing number of satellite dishes attached to television sets, bringing international channels to these households and influencing their behaviour and perception of migration.

2.5 Conclusion

An attempt was made in this study to explore migration and development interrelationships in Egypt. Egyptian migration is a response to unemployment, a failure of economic policies, and limited opportunities in the country of origin.
Saudi Arabia is the main destination for Egyptians in the Arab region, with almost 1 million working there. The US, Canada and Italy are the main Western destinations for Egyptian migration. Data on Egyptian migration flows are not reliable, but a slight shift in the direction of Egyptian migration in favour of Western countries is noticeable due to the competition that Egyptian migration faces in the Arab Gulf countries. In addition, and despite the unstable transitional period in Libya, Egyptians have also started to return to Libya.

Migrants’ remittances are the most important aspect of migration for sending countries. Egypt is one of the major remittance-receiving countries. Over the last three decades, Egyptian migrants abroad remitted about US$50 billion to Egypt, contributing to the economic development of the country at the macro-economic level (as a source of hard currency), as well as at the micro-economic level (through poverty eradication and as a source of household income).

Studies on the relationships between migration and development in Egypt tend to quantify this relation by focusing on the economic aspects of remittances and their effect at the macro- and micro-economic levels. Few studies have investigated the socio-cultural effects of migration and their societal impact; future studies should shed some light on such issues.

The Arab Uprising had an immediate impact on international migration in the Middle East and North Africa, as reflected in the return migration from Libya to Egypt, border crossings from Syria to Turkey and other neighbouring countries, and the slight rise in illegal migration from Tunisia right after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. These migrations were reactions to the fall of the regimes and the disruption of the economic and political systems of these countries. The expected changes in political and economic orientations in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, and the changing regional mosaic, will have a long-term impact on the overall configuration of political and economic relations within the region on the one hand, and between the region and other regions that form the migration system from and to the region on the other.

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3 Turkish emigration and its implications for the sending and receiving countries

Ahmet İçduygu

3.1 Introduction

Social researchers have dealt with the effect of international migration at three different levels: sending countries, receiving countries and migrants. Generally speaking, the tendency has been to address this issue from a rather limited perspective, focusing largely on the receiving countries, sometimes on the sending countries, and occasionally on the migrants themselves, but only rarely on these three actors of migratory flows together. Some refocusing would therefore seem to be in order. We need to know more than we do about the consequences of migration on the individual countries (both sending and receiving) and on migratory systems in general. This current study is an effort of this type, although it also focuses on a single country case – Turkey – but locates it in the wider context of a migration system that relates to the European migratory regime.

Several studies have shown that a negative perception of immigration, or even emigration, prevails in public opinion and governments in most countries (Burns & Gimpel 2000; Fitzgerald, Amber Curtis & Corliss 2012; Lahav 2004). It is argued that, caused by economic or political hardship or unrest in countries of origin, migration would threaten well-being and identity in countries of destination, and sometimes endanger political security. At the same time, social scientists recognise that, being a part of global circulation and integration, human mobility bears a tremendous potential for human progress (de Haas 2005; Levitt 1998; Özden & Schiff 2006). This view is increasingly shared by scholars and policymakers, who argue that adequate policies could make migration a genuine instrument for economic and social development. Therefore, we have to study the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, migration can transform individual benefits into an aggregated profit for the wider society. From this perspective, Turkey, as a country of emigration, provides us with an interesting case study; firstly because of its high rate of emigration over time; secondly because the country has already gone through the migration cycle; thirdly, because Turkey is an important player in the totality of the European international migration regime; and fourthly because this migration cycle
reflects, both explicitly and implicitly, some gains and occasionally losses, both for the country and for its people, migrants and non-migrants.

Table 3.1 Turkish citizens abroad in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mid-1980s</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mid-1990s</th>
<th></th>
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<td>%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>79.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Europe</td>
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<td>Other countries</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>245.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>350.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,359.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,308.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,304.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various OECD and Eurostat sources and updated by the author in 2012

It has been exactly 50 years since the start of large-scale emigration from Turkey to other parts of the world. Throughout that time, many changes have taken place in Turkey, and the country is now quite different from what it was twenty or 30 years ago. There is no doubt that some of these changes are linked to the dynamics and mechanisms of these established emigration flows. Although the country had experienced a series of outflows of people since the late-eighteenth century, they were mostly limited to persons with a non-Turkish or non-Islamic background. Therefore, Turkish emigration, in its ethnic or national term, is a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike the British, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Chinese or Indians, for example, the Turks had no particular history of large-scale emigration in modern times, up until the signing of the bilateral Turkish-West German Agreement (31 October 1961), which initially permitted Turkish individuals to enter West Germany on temporary one- or two-year work contracts and was later expanded to permit the entry of families. In half a century, then, Turkish men and women have emigrated in their hundreds of thousands. The great majority of these emigrants went to Western Europe;
some also went to Australia and, later, in larger numbers, to the Arab countries of both North Africa and the Persian Gulf. Finally, and more recently, they went to the new countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The evolution of this movement was impressive. Starting with the outflow of a few Turkish migrants in late 1961, there were, by 2010, when the population of Turkey itself was some 73 million, more than 2.5 million Turkish citizens in Europe, around 100,000 Turkish workers in the Arab countries, 60,000 settlers in Australia, and over 75,000 workers in the CIS countries (see Table 3.1). There were also more than 0.25 million Turkish migrants in Canada and the United States. Thus, at any one time during these years, some 6 per cent of the Turkish population was abroad. And when we consider that 30-40 per cent of the early emigrants returned permanently to Turkey, it would appear that a sizeable minority of the present Turkish population has had direct experience of emigration, and an even larger proportion has had – through the emigration of a close relative or friend – an indirect experience.

There is no doubt that the potential influence of this movement on Turkey is more than a function of numbers; it is also a function of contacts. From the beginning, Turkish emigrants have appeared to keep in touch with family and friends in the homeland. Many of them have visited Turkey from time to time on holiday, to attend weddings and funerals, or to visit sick relatives. They have sent remittances, bought homes and land and made investments. Some of them have returned for good. At the very least, one could expect this combination of massive emigration and the maintenance of a high level of contact with the homeland to be an important factor of change in Turkey’s economic and social life. Naturally, return migration and remittances were highly central to this change.

There has been a great deal of research on the various aspects of Turkish emigration, but relatively little is known about its consequences for the country. This chapter provides a broad overview of the literature on some of the consequences of international migration for Turkey. The focus therefore is diverse – highlighting similarities and differences within economic and social spheres, and emphasising mixed research findings, given the fact that what is found for one area is often counterbalanced by an opposite finding in another area. As an exploratory background, the following section provides a brief history of Turkish migration to Europe since the early 1960s. The third section analyses the main characteristics of the consequences of emigration for the country. The fourth section of the chapter refers to the position of Turkish emigrants in the receiving countries of Europe, touching upon the general question of the integration of Turkish immigrants there.
The final section outlines what has been learned from previous studies with regard to the general implications of Turkish emigration on the country.

3.2 A historical account of Turkish emigration and its implications

One of the ways in which to analyse the consequences of historical and contemporary patterns of emigration from Turkey is to examine the so-called ‘migration cycle’ – i.e., how the emigration process and its impact on Turkish emigrants, their families and Turkey, and sending communities in the country, evolve over time. This level of analysis, well-elaborated in recent OECD studies (Katseli, Lucas & Xenogiani 2006; Xenogiani 2006), draws attention to the changing nature of the impact of emigration on the likelihood of further emigration flows and economic transformations (growth, productivity). In consideration of the need to understand these changes and their effects, it is obviously crucial to look at the historical development of the dynamics and mechanisms of emigration from Turkey.

3.2.1 Labour migration to Europe

Emigration from Turkey remained limited until the early 1960s, except for the mass outflow of its non-Muslim population since the early 1920s, which was part of the nation-building process in the country. Turkey began to send workers abroad only after the negotiation of an official agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 and, by 1970, it had become one of the largest suppliers of workers among the various labour-importing countries (İçduygu 1991; Paine 1974). Prior to the agreement with Germany, the Western European labour market had already started to draw a number of workers from the labour pool in Turkey. However, the size of this frontier movement was small, sporadic and relatively unknown, because workers often migrated illegally due to the difficulty of obtaining passports, visas, and residence and work permits (Abadan-Unat 1976; Akgündüz 2008; Lieberman & Gitmez 1979).

During the early 1960s, the post-war reconstruction of Europe was still in process, and the economies of many Western European countries were in need of labour. However, within the European migratory regimes of the time, structurally organised emigration from Turkey was not possible without the negotiation of an official agreement between governments. In Turkey, succeeding the making of the 1961 constitution, the first Five-Year Development Plan (1962-1967) delineated the ‘export of surplus labour
power’ as an ingredient of development policy concerning the prospective flows of remittances and reduction in unemployment. The signing of the bilateral labour-recruitment agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 aimed to promote this policy. Similar bilateral agreements, specifying the general conditions of recruitment, employment and wages, were signed with other governments: in 1964 with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, in 1965 with France and, in 1967, with Sweden and Australia. Less comprehensive agreements were signed with the UK in 1961, Switzerland in 1971, Denmark in 1973 and Norway in 1981 (Franz 1994). The initial stages of migratory flow were shaped to a great extent by these agreements; however, starting with the early 1970s, migratory flows from Turkey gained their own dynamics and mechanisms, which were quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration agreements.

Figure 3.1  Turkish emigration flows by destination, 1961–2005

![Graph showing emigration flows by destination, 1961–2005]

Note: The data include labour migration, family reunion, student migration and asylum.
Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006), based on various official sources in Turkey

These agreements marked the beginning of the Turkish migration cycle in the European context in the early 1960s. The later stages of this cycle involved the departure of migrants in significant numbers. The emergence of mass emigration from Turkey in the early 1960s was prompted to a large degree by economic factors. Accordingly, as a consequence of changes in the European migration market, the movement of migrant workers over the period 1961-1975 fluctuated (see Figure 3.1). The number of workers going to Europe increased immediately after 1961, and peaked at 66,000 departures in 1964. The recession of 1966-1967 then caused a rapid decline in these numbers. In 1967, only 9,000 workers were sent by the Turkish Employment Service (TES), while over 900,000 were on the waiting list to go abroad (İçduygu 1991).
In the aftermath of the recession, the number of emigrants again increased sharply. This was a period of mass emigration: more than 100,000 workers left Turkey annually. This was the period when the second stage of the migration cycle began, the adjustment stage, in which emigration continues and both the economy and the people start to adjust to its effects. It is at this stage that the information and transaction costs are reduced as a result of the improved information flow created by continued migration. This encourages family members to accompany initial migrants. The characteristics of this stage are continuing labour migration combined with family reunion, as well as an increase in the amount and significance of remittances in the sending-country economy. Throughout this period, which started in the late 1960s and drastically came to an end in the mid-1970s, emigration increasingly turned into a family strategy in Turkey: family reunification gained momentum rapidly. According to official records in Turkey, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe through the TES between 1961 and 1974 (İçduygu 1991, 2006). Of these workers, 649,000 (81 per cent) went to Germany, 56,000 (7 per cent) to France, 37,000 (5 per cent) to Austria, 25,000 (3 per cent) to the Netherlands, and the remainder to other countries.

3.2.2 Migratory flows to Australia and the MENA region

In 1974, Western European governments stopped the entry of workers because of economic stagnation. Consequently, there was a dramatic decline in the number of labour emigrants, dropping down to a total of just 17,000. The year 1975 marked the end of large-scale Turkish labour migration to Europe. It also marked the beginning of a new stage in the Turkish migration cycle: the consolidation stage. This stage involved a sharp decrease in labour emigration, while family reunification and family migration continued. It is important to note, however, that, in the Turkish case, it was mostly the political initiative of the European governments which led to this decrease, not the stabilisation of labour-market disparities. So this date did not mark the end of emigration from Turkey, but the beginning of a transitional period in which the direction of Turkish emigration either shifted to other labour markets – Australia and the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1) – or took other forms, as mentioned above, such as family reunion, refugee movement and clandestine labour migration (Böcker 1995; İçduygu 1996a).

In the late 1960s, while the doors of Europe were being closed to immigrant workers under the pressure of the unemployment problem, the
Turkish government quickly began to seek a new market to sustain labour migration. These were the circumstances in which Turkish emigration to Australia and to the Arab countries started. The timing of the bilateral labour-recruitment agreement with Australia in 1967 reflected the efforts of the Turkish emigration strategy of ‘falling back on another country if one showed signs of saturation and diminished absorption ability’ (Bahadır 1979: 106). There was, of course, a significant contrast at that time between the migration policies of Turkey and of Australia. While Australian immigration policy was based upon the expectation that immigrants would permanently settle, Turkish emigration policy was guest-worker-oriented. The signing of a migration agreement with Australia was a new step, undertaken to maintain the continuity of emigration. In the period 1968-1974, more than 5,000 Turkish workers arrived in Australia (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1). Overall, nearly 12,000 Turkish workers and their dependants arrived in the country between 1967 and 1975 (İçduygu 1991). Today, the size of Turkish emigration to Australia is measured in a few hundred new emigrants arriving each year, in addition to more than a couple of hundred people migrating to Australia from Turkey annually through family reunification and marriage-migration flows. Australia, together with the USA and Canada, has also been an attractive destination for highly skilled migrants from Turkey. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the number of Turkish migrants going to Australia constitutes only a very small fraction (approximately 1 per cent) of total emigration from Turkey.

The 1980s witnessed a high level of male labour emigration from Turkey to the Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq (İçduygu & Sirkeci 1998). There was a correspondence between Turkey’s search for new receiving countries and the demand for labour in these countries. As stated by Appleyard (1995), the dramatic upsurge of oil prices after 1973, and the accompanying increase in the income levels of the oil-exporting Arab states with very small populations, boosted this demand for labour. The result was a large influx of contract workers from other developing countries. This was the broader context in which migration from Turkey to the Arab countries occurred. In the period between 1975 and 1980, about 74,000 workers went to the oil-exporting countries. By 1980, this number had reached almost 0.5 million. The total number of migrant workers who had experience of selling their labour power in the Arab countries was over 700,000 from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s (see Table 3.2). However, by the mid-1990s, the number of Turkish workers in Arab countries began to decline as a result of the completion of large-scale infrastructural projects in the oil-exporting countries and also of the unfavourable circumstances
caused by the Gulf crisis. Whereas 250,000 Turkish citizens were residing in the Arab countries in the late 1980s, this figure fell by more than 100,000 to 140,000 in the early 1990s and to 120,000 by the end of the decade. The 2000s have been the revival period for Turkish contract labour-migration to the Middle East and North Africa both in its scale (i.e., there are increasing numbers of Turkish emigrants entering into the labour market of the Middle East and North Africa) and scope (i.e., the destination countries have again become more diversified, now including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the UAE). Two factors can be cited for this trend. First, it can be argued that national politics, the fact that Turkey has been continuously under Islamic-oriented governments since 2002, created an inclination towards closer relations with countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Secondly, regional events like the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and consequent developments in this country have had a definite effect on migratory flows in the region (İçduygu & Sert 2011).

3.2.3 Labour migration to the CIS countries

Flows of relatively small groups of workers to the CIS countries marked the beginning of the last phase of Turkish emigration (see Figure 3.1). As emphasised by Gökdere (1994), after the collapse of the former Soviet Union some of the newly emerging states in the region launched reconstruction programmes. There was an active involvement of various Turkish firms in these programmes, which attracted a crucial level of project-tied and job-specific migration. The foremost significance of emigration to the CIS countries was in terms of its impact on the continuity of emigration from Turkey: following the Gulf Crisis, in a period when there was a downturn in migratory flows to the labour-receiving Arab countries, migratory movement to the CIS countries began to signify a remedy for the emigration pressure in Turkey. Turkish labour migration to these states showed a steady increase in the initial years: from 8,000 workers in 1992 to over 20,000 in 1993, and later to over 40,000 in 1994, but this declined to 26,000 in 1996. In 2005, there were more than 70,000 Turkish workers employed in the CIS countries. Overall, in the period 1991-2000, over 65,000 workers left Turkey for the CIS countries; the corresponding figure for 2001-2010 was over 175,000. These were circular migrants who usually worked for the turnkey projects of the Turkish companies operating in the region.
Table 3.2  Turkish labour migration flows by destination, 1961–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>790,017</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>13,426</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>74,181</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>423,208</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5,806</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS countries</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,235</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14,792</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4,875</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>810,499</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>105,046</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>433,173</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006), based on various official sources in Turkey and updated by the author in 2012

Table 3.3  Number of workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Office, 2000–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving countries</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union countries</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>3,912</td>
<td>4,299</td>
<td>2,783</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>8,249</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>1,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA countries</td>
<td>2,507</td>
<td>5,156</td>
<td>8,057</td>
<td>10,189</td>
<td>9,774</td>
<td>24,798</td>
<td>39,823</td>
<td>23,263</td>
<td>25,257</td>
<td>32,546</td>
<td>33,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Canada, USA</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>3,917</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td>4,594</td>
<td>4,497</td>
<td>2,635</td>
<td>4,868</td>
<td>7,619</td>
<td>5,628</td>
<td>4,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,645</td>
<td>20,242</td>
<td>26,921</td>
<td>34,151</td>
<td>40,198</td>
<td>60,355</td>
<td>81,379</td>
<td>75,268</td>
<td>57,652</td>
<td>59,479</td>
<td>54,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In recent years, contract-dependent labour migration has constituted a large part of Turkish emigration. In 2000, 13,645 workers obtained employment abroad through the Turkish Employment Organisation or TEO (see Table 3.3). This figure leapt to over 26,000 in 2002, 40,000 in 2004, and 81,000 in 2006; although there was a somewhat declining trend in these figures in the second half of the 2000s, there were still over 50,000 workers sent abroad by the TEO in 2010. This migration was primarily a contract-dependent labour migration, where workers are hired for a period of between 3 and 24 months by Turkish or foreign contracting firms operating mainly in the CIS and MENA countries. In 2000, over half (52 per cent) of these workers went to the CIS and 18 per cent to MENA countries, 17 per cent to EU countries, and 10 per cent to Israel. In that year the Russian Federation, Germany, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan were the top five receiving countries of Turkish workers. In 2003, the top ranking was the Russian Federation (31 per cent), Saudi Arabia (17 per cent), Germany (10 per cent), Libya (7 per cent) and Turkmenistan (4 per cent). It appeared that, in 2004, while one third of these migrants went to the Russian Federation, more than 12 per cent moved to Iraq and 10 per cent to Kazakhstan. In 2005, the top three destination countries were still the same: the Russian Federation (32 per cent), Iraq (12 per cent) and Kazakhstan (9 per cent). In 2010, over 29 per cent of the workers went to Libya, 15 per cent to the Russian Federation, 11 per cent to Saudi Arabia and 10 per cent to Iraq.

3.2.4 The continuation of migration flows and the formation of migrant communities

As noted earlier, the suspension of organised labour immigration to Western Europe in the mid-1970s did not curtail overall emigration from Turkey. Europe remained a long-standing receiving area for an increasing number of newcomers from Turkey, although there were new destination areas attracting thousands of emigrants from the country. The number of Turkish people residing in Europe continued to increase from 600,000 in 1972 to almost 2 million in the early 1980s, and to 2.9 million by the mid-1990s. In the mid-2000s, the total number was over 2.5 million. It should be noted here that the decline in the total number of Turkish citizens abroad is mainly due to the declining trends of emigration from Turkey in addition to these citizens acquiring another citizenship.
### Table 3.4 Turkish asylum seekers by destination, 1981–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>231,417</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>141,226</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>107,534</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>178,076</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>144,272</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>144,272</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various OECD and Eurostat sources and updated by the author in 2012
Certainly, migration from Turkey to Western European countries reached unexpected levels during the 1980s and 1990s, when some 1.8 million Turks entered Western Europe, almost doubling the Turkish immigrant population of 1980 in the region. In addition to continuing family reunification flows, many of the Turkish immigrants arrived in the receiving countries by way of marrying someone who already lived there: marriage migration became a new form of family reunification. The high number of these marriages was mostly due to emerging transnational networks; 1980 appears to mark the beginning of the networking stage of the Turkish migration cycle. It is also at this stage that the number of second- and third-generation offspring of migrants reached significant levels.

During this period, there was also another form of migration flow to Europe: asylum-seeking. Since the 1980s, more than two-fifths of the people moving from Turkey to Europe (nearly 700,000) were seeking asylum (see Table 3.4). In the case of asylum seekers, as noted elsewhere (İçduygü 1996a), it is tempting to look for further evidence to prove who is a genuine refugee and who is an economic migrant. Indeed, these asylum seekers were often viewed with suspicion by the receiving countries, and considered as part of a mass attempt by Turks to illegally enter into their societies in search of employment and social benefits. However, as realised by many European countries, the outbreak of the ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey provided an obvious environment in which most asylum claims could be considered to genuinely require quite serious assessment and, consequently, some assistance and protection. In the period 1980-1995, around 400,000 asylum seekers went from Turkey to Western Europe. In addition to the rocketing increase in the year of the 1980 military coup, the number of asylum seekers increased quite sharply in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the annual average number of Turkish citizens officially registered as asylum seekers in Western European countries increased from about 15,000 in the early 1980s to nearly 45,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 3.4). Recent evidence has shown that, although there has been a considerable decline, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey still reached high levels in the late 1990s, with an annual figure of 25,000. However, in recent years, the figure has declined significantly to annual figures of less than 7,000 in the period 2006-2010.

In addition to the flows of people on asylum and family grounds, there existed a clandestine movement from Turkey in which a migrant might be undocumented in terms of not having a valid passport before leaving the country, having entered the receiving country illegally, or having entered legally on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Estimation of the volume and conditions of clandestine migration is difficult and the existing figures
should be viewed with some scepticism. For this reason, no figures are cited here.

In sum, there are three main reasons for the growing population size of Turkish communities in Europe. Firstly, Turkish workers were staying for longer periods than originally planned, and were bringing in their spouses and children. Secondly, there had been an increasing flow of asylum seekers from Turkey since the early 1980s. Thirdly, as more spouses were reunited, the birth rate of the Turkish population rose. Indeed, evidence shows that, while there was a relatively small increase in the actual number of Turkish workers in Europe in the period between 1985 and 1995, the increase in the number of their dependants was considerable.

The ten destination countries in Europe which attracted the vast majority (more than 95 per cent) of emigration from Turkey in the course of the 1980s and 1990s were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Among these ten countries, Norway and the UK were new immigration countries for Turkish migrants – mostly for the asylum seekers – while the remaining eight countries had been receiving migrant workers since the early 1960s. During the first half of this period, in the 1980s, there was a huge increase in the average population flow, rising from an annual figure of 50,000 in the early 1980s to 100,000 in the early 1990s. Although there was a relatively steady decline observed in the last half of this period, some 50,000 emigrants still left for Europe in the second half of the 1990s. In addition to asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, the majority of these migrants were spouses or future spouses, arriving through family-formation migration. In this recent period, those who might be considered as 'new labour migrants' and 'student migrants' did not constitute a sizeable flow. The 2000s appears to be a new era characterised by a considerable slowdown in emigration and asylum flows from Turkey to Europe.

It appears that the emerging economic boom and increasing life satisfaction lowered the push factors that encouraged emigration in the 1960s and 1980s in Turkey. It was not, however, only the economic situation that created promising life conditions in the country. The relative political stability that emerged in the 2000s, the economic and political liberalisation that took place from the 1990s onwards and, in general, the dynamics of contemporary globalisation, all contributed to a migration transition in Turkey in which the country was transformed into a country of immigration and transit: in short, these developments over the last decade help to dispel stereotypes about Turkey as just a source country for migrant workers to other countries (İçduygu & Kirişci 2009).

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a continuous decline in the volume of emigration from Turkey to Europe, and some rising trends are observed
in the case of other destination areas, such as the Arab and CIS countries (see Figure 3.1). The decline in emigration to Europe is partly due to the restrictive immigration policies of the European receiving countries. In addition, the positive economic, social and political developments, mostly as a consequence of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and the start of accession negotiations with the EU, have to a certain extent led to a lessening of pro-emigration attitudes within certain segments of society. Finally, there was also an increasing diversification of destination countries for Turkish emigrants. Besides the flows of sub-contracted labour to the Arab and CIS countries, as noted earlier, the already established sporadic migratory movements of thousands of Turkish citizens to more than 30 countries around the world have grown.

When it comes to the return migration of Turkish citizens, for the most part our knowledge is very limited due to the lack of data. Since emigration from Turkey originally started under the so-called ‘guest-worker’ scheme, return migration was an inevitable result of the whole process. Indeed, many early migrants stayed abroad to be a ‘guest’, just worked for a limited term of contract work (usually for two to four years), and then returned home. The others stayed. Return migration increased after the oil-price shock of 1973, when many Western European countries stopped recruiting migrant workers and began to encourage return migration. According to Gitmez (1983), some 190,000 returned between 1974 and 1977 and another 200,000 between 1978 and 1983. Gitmez (1983) also provided some estimates of annual return figures: between 1967 and 1974, there were some 30,000, during 1975 and 1976 this number ranged between 55,000 and 60,000 and, from 1976 to 1980, the estimated annual number of returnees was 15,000 to 20,000. The return movement, however, gained new momentum in the early 1980s, exceeding 70,000 persons annually. Another study (Martin 1991) indicates that about 1 million Turkish emigrants returned home between 1960 and 1990.

From the beginning of the 1980s, return migration was often a dynamic element of the whole migration picture, despite the fact that the patterns of migration and settlement of Turkish immigrants in Western European countries had changed from a temporary stay to unintended settlement. It seems that, in the early 1980s, the return acts and bonuses of the host governments encouraged substantial return migration to Turkey (Ayhan, Ergöçmen, Hancioğlu, İçduygu, Koç, Toros, Türkyılmaz, Ünalan, Üner & Yiğit 2000). For instance, in the period 1983-1985 there were approximately 310,000 returnees from Germany and, between 1985 and 1986, roughly 10,000 returnees from the Netherlands. However, in the late 1980s, the levels of return migration from Germany declined sharply to 37,000 persons annually and from the Netherlands to 3,000 persons. Figures
from Germany and the Netherlands suggest that there has been a steady level of returning migrants over the last ten years. For instance, in the first half of the 1990s, there were 40,000 to 45,000 returnees from Germany annually, and around 2,000 returnees per year from the Netherlands. The estimated annual number of returnees was around 100,000 in the early 1980s, stabilising at 40,000-50,000 in recent years (İçduygu 2012).

In fact, this is mostly the movement of a floating population of emigrants between the host countries and their home country. Many Turkish emigrants who had previously settled in different European countries are returning to Turkey, though not all of them permanently. Many of the first generation who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later retired have started spending six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. They prefer to retain the host-country health services and pension systems, and often do not wish to give up their houses; they also try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad. Meanwhile, the children of migrants who were born in Europe or who grew up there sometimes return to Turkey in search of their roots. These are the indicators of the last stage in the Turkish migration cycle – the repatriation, immigration or circulation stage. Certainly, as well as the circular movements and the return migration flows which are explained above, there seems to be a growing number of immigrants moving to Turkey for a variety of other reasons (İçduygu & Kirişci 2009).

Today it is relatively easy to find, in almost all Western European settlements with a high density of migrants, communities originating from Turkey which tend to establish their own enclaves – socially, economically and culturally distinct entities. Although each of these communities in each of the receiving countries has its own peculiar characteristics, there are also various commonalities between these communities.

– The main factor that shaped the nature of Turkish migrant communities in Europe from the 1960s to the 2000s was the transformation of the settlement process from a temporary stay to permanent settlement (Abadan-Unat 2002).

– Migratory flows from Turkey began as a process of labour movement in the 1960s which was later complemented by family reunification in the 1970s, and then coupled with asylum and irregular migratory flows in the 1980s and 1990s.

– In the early period of migration, the majority of Turkish emigrants arrived in Germany, France and the Netherlands, though some went to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland; in the late period, Norway and the UK were added to these destination countries.
Initially the overwhelming majority of migrants from Turkey were employed in manufacturing industries, construction services and mining but, in recent decades, more and more migrants found employment in service sectors.

In the early stages of migratory flows, although there were some migrants who were skilled workers, the majority were generally village-born, young married men and women with small children, limited formal education and little experience of working in an industrial setting.

Emigration itself directly affected the employment status of Turkish migrants in the receiving countries and upon their return to Turkey. It particularly affected the status of women, mostly taking them from the agricultural sector to manufacturing and service sectors, or enabling them, for the first time in their lives, to participate in the labour force. Increased economic well-being as a consequence of this change in employment status raised the emigrants’ social status, removed their burden of debt, or opened up opportunities for schooling, training or entrepreneurship.

Nowadays, migrants from Turkey and their children are perceived as having serious difficulties integrating into the social, political, economic or cultural lives of their European settlement countries; for instance, in Germany, where nearly 1.9 million Turkish citizens live, the unemployment rate of these citizens (over 20 per cent) was continuously well above the rate of the total labour force (around 10 per cent) in the 2000s. In the Netherlands, where there is a sizable Turkish migrant community, the level of the migrants’ education is significantly lower than that of the native Dutch population – almost 40 per cent of Turkish adult migrants aged 15-64 have only completed primary education compared to only 9 per cent of native Dutch adults (Avcı 2006).

However, there are also indicators which reveal some degree of integration of Turkish migrants in Europe: from the early 1990s to the early 2010s, nearly 1.4 million Turkish migrants and their children became citizens of the European countries where they resided (see Table 3.5); in the late 2000s, there were more than 68,000 businessmen of Turkish origin in Germany, providing jobs to over 338,000 persons (Şen, Ulusoy & Şentürk 2008).

While, to a certain extent, emigration flows from Turkey to Europe still continue, there has also been some return migration, mostly in the form of a floating population of former emigrants between their host countries and their homeland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. ‘000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. ‘000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. ‘000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>288.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>220.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>39.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>479.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>450.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various OECD and Eurostat sources and updated by the author in 2012
3.3 The economic, social and political consequences of emigration for Turkey

A careful examination of the consequences of international migration for Turkey prompts the following three pivotal questions: first, what are the main consequences of emigration; second, how do these manifest themselves; and third, by what means were they brought about? Answers to these questions are not easily known. Most of the research concerning these consequences has elaborated on the economic aspects – as could be anticipated from both the unquestioned importance of these conditions and the relative ease with which they can be measured. Nevertheless, both the results of this research and the conclusions to be drawn from it are extremely variable. For instance, there are still complicated answers offered by research on whether the economies of the various regions in Turkey are better, stronger or more efficient as a consequence of emigration. The research findings on the social consequences of migration for the whole country are similarly varied. Some of this variety and inconclusiveness can be traced back to the fact that the consequences differ for each individual actor involved in the process, as the needs and perspectives of individuals and of the family members of migrants, their communities and their countries of origin and destination can hardly be expected always to coincide with one another. Some of the variety is occasioned by differences in the theorising used: the ‘equilibrium’ model versus the ‘conflict’ model (Day 1985). Theorising based on the equilibrium model, for instance, either presupposes that the relief of pressure on the job market involves no loss of production, as those who leave are partially or entirely unemployed, or assumes that social harmony is maintained through the emigration of possibly disruptive elements, such as political or religious dissenters. By contrast, theorising based on the conflict model emphasises that emigration includes the loss of a labour supply in which substantial quantities of human capital have been invested; it also highlights the depopulation of the rural areas.

As a result of this variance in points of view in research findings, there is a need to refocus in order to make a comprehensive assessment of the economic, political and social consequences of emigration for Turkey. We need to know more than we do about the consequences for the sending countries of migration that is specifically international in character; and we need to know about these consequences at the individual and group levels, not solely at the level of the nation as a whole.

As has been the case in other migrant-sending countries, the results of emigration from Turkey have been analysed as a mixture of benefits and
costs. Most of these can be related in one way or another to the economic and social consequences that migratory flows generate in the country. Accordingly, drawing on evidence from Turkish emigration to Europe in particular, the following part of the chapter investigates the economic and social consequences of emigration for Turkey.

3.3.1 Economic consequences

The economic consequences of emigration are examined by two basic approaches at the macro level: the ‘balanced-growth’ and the ‘asymmetric-growth’ models (Keleş 1985: 54; Martin 1991: 8). The balanced-growth approach assumes a positive impact upon the national balance of trade, an increase in domestic investment and, consequently, an accelerated economic growth. For instance, Martin (1991) asserts that emigration can reduce economic differences because the transfer of labour helps the emigration area to catch up economically with the immigration region. This optimistic model is based on two assumptions: first, that there is relief of pressure on the job market without any loss of production, since it is supposedly the case that unemployed workers migrate, and, second, that there is a contribution to the development of the homeland through the returned migrants’ industrial training and experience acquired abroad. On the other hand, the asymmetric-growth model posits that emigration from developing countries results in a widening gap between underdevelopment in the sending country and development in the receiving country. Within this pessimistic model, it is thought that both the displacement of labour from underdeveloped to industrialised countries and the transfer of human capital from agriculture to industry cement the asymmetric relationship between the migrant-receiving core regions and the migrant-sending peripheries. Briefly, studies departing from this hypothesis consider emigration with disfavour, since it allegedly distorts and perhaps slows down the development in the migrants’ areas of origin (Abadan-Unat, Keleş, Penninx, van Renselaar, van Velzen & Yenisey 1976; Penninx 1982; Schiller 1975).

Furthermore, besides the macro-level impact of emigration on a migrant-sending economy, there are also various micro-level effects of emigration flows on emigrant households and communities. For instance, evidence from many emigration studies shows that, despite the poverty reduction resulting from remittances, the latter may also induce income inequality to rise. Moreover, a significant proportion of the related literature indicates that remittances are used for mixed reasons, such as consumption, housing, purchasing of land, financial saving and productive investment. However, it
is argued that remittances, even when not invested, can have an important multiplier effect: initially they stimulate retail sales, then further demands for goods and services, which then stimulate employment and output (Straubhaar & Vadean 2005).

Departing from these macro and micro approaches, one can directly refer to the economic benefits and disadvantages of emigration for Turkey. The basic economic benefits resulting from emigration include a lessening of tension arising from unemployment and underemployment, and the acquisition of skills in the foreign countries. Indeed, since the very early period of emigration, the Turkish government has viewed emigratory flows as contributors to the reduction of unemployment levels, while skilled workers were meant to be encouraged to remain at home, at least at the time when emigration began – a policy not fully successful. For instance, Turkey’s first Five-Year Plan in 1963 reported that ‘the export of excess, unskilled labour to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment’ (Abadan-Unat 1986: 330). It is generally agreed that, since the early 1960s, around 10 per cent of the workforce in Turkey has been unemployed and another 15 per cent underemployed. These figures persist over the whole of the last 50 years. Thus, reducing un- and underemployment is of paramount importance. Emigration has obviously helped to reduce unemployment pressures in Turkey, but it is not easy to quantify the effects of emigration on unemployment since both are difficult to measure precisely. On the other hand, several studies point out that the emigration of skilled workers has had growth-slowing effects in Turkey (Penninx 1982: 793).

Another expectation of emigratory flows was that the emigrants would acquire new skills and training from their work experience abroad. It was believed that migration would have a favourable impact on the migrants’ local community in the form of new investments, the transfer of technology and machinery, and new enterprises, when the emigrants returned. Therefore, another way to identify the likely impact of international migration is to look at the process of return migration (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 167; Keleş 1985: 63; Martin 1991: 38). Based on a very rough estimate, we can assume that more than 1.5 million Turkish workers and their family members have returned home since the beginning of emigration in 1961. Return migration has had a clear impact on the Turkish labour market. Some of the return migrants may directly become employment seekers but, since they return with skills and work experience for which the labour market in Turkey has limited demand, the overall outcome of this process for Turkey has been frustration on two counts. For the state, there has been the realisation that skills acquired abroad have often failed to make an impact on Turkey’s need
for human resources. For the individual, the same mismatch engenders personal disillusionment. Beyond the issue of brain gain due to return migration, in assessing the skill-accumulation impact of emigration one should also consider the possibilities of increased incentives to acquire education when the prospect of skilled migration is higher. For instance, studies confirm that acquiring education can be seen as an element of migration strategies, as it implies an increased likelihood of emigration for skilled labour (Ayhan et al. 2000; Frank 1970).

Whereas the emigrants from Turkey who returned in the 1970s were young male migrants who had been abroad alone, motivated to return by their expired work contracts, the migrants who returned during the 1980s and early 1990s were more likely to be ageing workers and their families pushed to return for mostly socio-psychological reasons, such as long-established homesickness. Therefore, in the period of the former group, although there was a question of how to incorporate the returnees into the workforce of the country again, in the case of the latter group, the main question concerned their permanent investment in Turkey. It has often been observed that return workers of various periods usually do not return to the sending area or do return but use remittances non-productively; there is a widespread assumption in the literature that most returned Turkish workers buy a taxi or delivery truck, build rental housing, or set up a small business and become part of the service economy, and that such service-sector investments have few employment multipliers. It is hard to determine where, exactly, the migrants settle after they return, but it is generally agreed that they often prefer urban centres to their rural homes. In fact, many settle in the metropolitan areas (Eraydın 1981: 245; Gitmez 1984: 116; Wilbert 1984: 107). One hypothesis is that this process contributes to rural-urban imbalances and regional disparities. The other side of the same process is the direction of workers’ investments: funds transferred by the migrants are often invested in urban areas that are already developed to a certain extent.

Many studies have also noted the beneficial effects of incoming workers’ remittances as the other main consequence of labour emigration for sending countries. As stated by Martin (1991: 33), Turkey, as a developing country, faces perennial shortages of foreign currency to pay for imported goods and services and often needs external capital to support development projects. From this perspective, the workers’ remittances make a significant contribution to the country’s economy. Although it is argued that the amount of emigrant remittances Turkey has been receiving is somehow insignificant in comparison with the total saving potential of these migrants, the scale of remittances attributable to labour migration
to Europe is large enough, and has been the most important source of foreign-exchange earnings (Köksal & Liebig 2005; Kumcu 1989). Over US$75 billion has been remitted in Turkey since the early 1960s, giving the average annual figure of US$1.9 billion (İçduygu 2005; and see Table 3.6). Workers' remittances increased from a modest US$93 million in 1967 to a peak of US$1.4 billion in 1974 and then declined to US$893 million in 1978. Turkey had a more-or-less-consistent level of annual-remittance receipts of around US$1.5-2.0 billion between 1979 and 1988. In this period, almost a quarter of Turkey’s annual total import bill was financed by remittance receipts. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country had annual remittance receipts of about US$3.0 billion, which increased to US$3.4 billion in 1995, and then peaked at over US$5.0 billion in 1998. In the 1990s, remittances were the equivalent of more than one third of the trade deficit. The percentage declined in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but still averages close to 20 per cent. While the declining trend of remittances to Turkey since 1999 is very obvious, they have been falling particularly since 2002, but the nature of this recent decline is not so clear: it is due partly to the rising tendency towards permanent settlement in the host countries, partly to increasing informal channels of remittances, and partly to the changing calculations of remittances in the accounting of the national budget.

Table 3.6 Remittance inflows, exports and imports in the Turkish economy, 1964–2010 (million US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Remittances as % of trade deficit</th>
<th>Remittances as % GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>53.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>109.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>153.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>3,777</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,401</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5,129</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>5,797</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When discussing the impact of remittances, we also need to consider the different types of investment made by the migrants at various levels: the individual/household level, the local/community/regional level, and the national level. It appears that money coming from abroad often finds its way into the maintenance of the family left behind or is spent as an investment in equipment, building, car or, possibly, as part of migrants’ attempts to set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Remittances as % trade deficit</th>
<th>Remittances as % GNP</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006) based on various official sources in Turkey and updated by the author in 2012
themselves up in trade or other new enterprises (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 170). Indeed, much of the incoming money goes directly into the migrant’s family or local community, often to maintain dependants left in Turkey. According to Koç and Onan (2004), remittances have a positive impact on household welfare, as shown by the fact that households receiving remittances are found to be better off than those not receiving any. Despite a considerable proportion of the related literature arguing that remittances are mostly not spent on ‘productive investments’ that would contribute to long-term development, it is possible to claim that improvements in living conditions, such as access to better nutrition or the allocation of more resources to education, are also forms of productive investment. In many cases, where migrants abroad do not return to their point of origin in Turkey, much of the remitted money is spent on consumables for the new home. It seems that remittances do not help to reduce imbalances between regions in the country, though there are clearly specific improvements made possible by remittances (Keleş 1985: 74). Certainly, even though the remittances of the workers have played an important role in coping with the perennial foreign-exchange crisis of the Turkish economy (Köksal & Liebig 2005: 103; Martin 1991: 33; Sayarı 1986: 92), the contribution of emigration to any type of large-scale production venture has been rather limited (Gökdere 1978: 256).

In the 1970s, Turkish officials tried to channel remittance savings into employment-generating activities in order to maximise economic growth. Actually, there were three unique development programmes linked to emigration (Keleş 1985: 65; Martin 1991: 35). Firstly, starting from the early period of emigration, the Turkish authorities supported the establishment of workers’ joint-stock companies which would invest in the less-developed regions of the country in order to channel the funds to these areas rather than the developed ones. It was believed that the investments of these companies would provide job opportunities to returning migrants and, at the same time, would serve as a device for the economical use of migrants’ savings. This was regarded as an efficient way of industrialising the regions of origin. More than 600 workers’ companies have thus been created, with varying capital and numbers of shareholders. Although the workers’ companies aim at achieving a certain social goal by developing the backward regions in general, they cannot ignore economic considerations as far as the productive operation of the enterprises is concerned. Workers’ companies have run into various problems such as project identification, financial and technical planning and management, and inadequate communication. Hence, their role in fostering the development of less-developed regions has been quite minimal.
A second aspect of the official policy of reintegrating the return migrants’ savings into the local economies was to support the creation of Village Development Cooperatives. However, because many of them sought to secure jobs for their members rather than to realise productive investments in the villages through remittances, most of the cooperatives were really used as a vehicle to facilitate more migration. A third method for attracting the savings of the migrants was the establishment of the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank in 1975. The bank advocated mixed enterprises organised by the state and private capital, including workers’ remittances. However, this effort was not successful, either for overall enterprises or for channelling the investment resources into the less-developed regions. Here it is important to indicate that, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was no stock-exchange market in Turkey. Stock exchange became an option for investment only after the 1980s, when some Turkish migrant workers in Europe started putting in their savings.

3.3.2 Social and political consequences

As noted by Manderson and Inglis (1985: 194), ‘Migration is a process which is frequently seen as having considerable potential for producing social change because of the disruption it produces in the established patterns of social life’. In other words, migration can have a powerful effect on social change. Although there are some mixed conclusions drawn from previous studies on the role played by international migration in fostering or retarding social change in societies of origin, it is generally agreed that emigration from developing to developed countries often results in moving the countries of origin from a more to a less ‘traditional’ place. From this perspective, migration to Western Europe has, indeed, become an important source for social change in Turkey. Settlement and employment abroad have exposed large numbers of Turks to modern economic, social and political processes. Certainly, migrants’ own lives have been deeply influenced by the migratory movements. Likewise, this movement affected their family members, relatives, friends and local communities in Turkey.

One of the clear observations on the social level was that Turkish workers often return home with changed attitudes and behaviours. The label Almanyalı – which literally means ‘Turk from Germany’, as the local non-migrant people call the Turkish migrants in Europe – is a product of these perceived changed attitudes and behaviours (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 169). There are also changes in generation and gender relationships within the migrants’ more immediate personal-social environment. The most impor-
tant are perhaps related to the changing status of women (Abadan-Unat 1977: 35; Kadioğlu 1994: 533) and the rising value of children (Kağıtçıbaşı 1988: 11). The role of women has changed through emigration in several ways: urbanisation, the adoption of a nuclear-family pattern, entry into the labour market, and increasing media exposure have brought about changes in lifestyles and emancipation. Many rural women, in particular, joined their husbands abroad and found jobs there. For thousands of women from Turkey, emigration has been the real cause behind their growing labour-force participation. It seems that, upon their return to Turkey, many migrant women have wanted to settle in urban areas, and have tended to acquire more authority within the family. For the men, traditional status symbols based more directly on age, kinship, devoutness or ownership of land were replaced by modern indicators such as income, qualifications and skills and, perhaps, knowledge of a Western European language. It is felt that the roles and relationships of parents and children also changed as a result of migration: parents – fathers, in particular – tended to have negative opinions about the changing roles and relationships between parents and children. This may be due to the fact that parents started to lose their traditional authority over children. Briefly, it has been observed that emigration speeded up the process of dissolution of the extended family and traditional familial relationships.

Another result of emigration was an improvement in the migrants’ quality of life (Sayarı 1986: 95). The basis for this improvement was greater wealth, as well as living in a more modern environment which enabled migrants to acquire greater knowledge about the world and provide advanced education for their children. This implied upward social mobility by the migrants in their home society. While in Europe, Turkish workers are generally accorded a very low social status; however, their social standing in Turkey improves markedly, and the signs of their upward social mobility are visible in both rural and urban society. The literature confirms that emigration afforded individual migrants and their families’ upward mobility: returnees were usually among the wealthiest people in their villages of origin, or emigration facilitated the relocation of return migrants in urban areas. In relation to another aspect of the improvement of the migrants’ quality of life, as noted earlier, remittances were most often spent on building modern houses, buying land and farm machinery, and purchasing urban apartments, cars and trucks, or electrical appliances. The examples of motor vehicles and appliances suggest that, in many ways, emigration provided the remittances and perhaps the desire for goods which simply speeded up changes that would have occurred in any event. Indeed, return migrants in villages, with
cars and appliances, noted frequently that their non-migrant neighbours also made such purchases during the 1970s and 1980s, but the returned migrants were often among the first with new consumer goods and usually had more of them. Abadan-Unat (1986: 364) emphasises the conspicuous consumption of returnees, noting that some displayed electrical appliances as a symbol of their affluence even before their village had received electricity. Along with this, emigratory flows appear to have a negative effect on social and economic inequalities: for instance, some studies (Day & İçduygu 1997, 1998, 1999) indicate that, in comparison to their migrant counterparts, the socio-economic status of non-migrant households gets worse.

Emigration also had some socio-political consequences: for instance, some studies have emphasised that returned migrants talked about socio-political changes such as more respect for human rights and democracy (Martin 1991: 61). Having been granted dual-citizenship rights, many Turkish citizens could also enjoy these rights in their host countries (İçduygu 1996b: 252; and see Table 3.5). Another issue is the changing status of military service for emigrants: while one cannot imagine any attempt to shorten the nearly-two-year military duty in Turkey, now, as a consequence of emigration, there is a programme which permits Turks residing abroad – by paying a fee in foreign currency – to shorten their compulsory military service.

There were also numerous unintended and unanticipated consequences of emigration for the country. The emergence of cultural-revivalist tendencies among Turkish migrants abroad, and problems related to return migration and second-generation ‘returnees’ (Sayarı 1986: 95) are among these consequences. The cultural-revivalist trends are somehow associated with the growth of Muslim fundamentalism, as well as the troubles with Kurdish nationalism. Once abroad, many Turkish emigrants tend to adopt a discernibly more Islamic orientation, while Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin tend to reinforce their ethnic allegiance. This phenomenon is mainly based on two factors: the defence mechanisms of emigrants in a foreign environment, and the social, political and cultural climates of the host countries which encourage these religious and ethnic revivals. As a consequence of emigration, extreme ethno-politics based on ethnic or religious identity, particularly in the case of complex migratory networks, prepares the ground for radical political actions, such as the movement toward establishing a Federal Islamic Republic in Turkey or the realisation of Kurdish separatist demands (Abadan-Unat 1997: 247).

The unforeseen social consequences of emigration also include the reintegration of return migrants and their families in Turkey. The return and integration question was not critical for those who returned in the
1960s and 1970s, since they were engaged in temporary labour migration and most anticipated their eventual return to Turkey and acted accordingly. Whereas these early returned migrants were mainly men who had been alone abroad, returning migrants in the 1980s and 1990s were more likely to be families with adolescent children. Fearing that they might not be able to come back to Europe at a later time, many of these returning migrants left a younger member of their family behind in Europe to retain a link with that country. They were in a state of ambivalence about deciding on permanent settlement in the host country and resettlement in Turkey. These difficulties in migrants’ decision-making on return migration, together with the adjustment difficulties of their children who had already spent their early socialisation period abroad, resulted in a difficult reintegration process. In particular, the children of returnees had serious problems in adapting to the very different social and educational environment of Turkey.

In the area of demography, various social consequences of emigration can be observed as well. The fact that, since the early 1960s, emigration from Turkey has almost invariably exceeded immigration, has had a certain impact. The population has grown more slowly than it would otherwise have done. On the other hand, at the initial period of emigration (in particular, the exit, adjustment and consolidation stages of the migration cycle) the flows caused a slowdown effect on the rush to the cities in Turkey from rural areas. But, in the following periods (i.e., the networking and repatriation stages of the migration cycle), these flows, together with the construction of a modern infrastructure in the country, seemed to accelerate east-to-west and rural-to-urban migration.

From a wider perspective, inclusive of all its consequences for those in the receiving society, for both migrants and those of their kin and friends who remain in Turkey, emigration holds out the possibility of encountering a variety of social-change-producing forces (Day & İçduygu 1997). These forces include the separation of spouses and of parents and children, the loss of friends, extensive contact with another culture, the absence of reinforcements for one's prior heritage as well as encounters with constraints on behaviour associated with that heritage, notable increases in wealth and income, more material possessions, the experience of coping with the unfamiliar and of doing so in the absence of prior social support, and the formation of competing social networks and emotional ties. In short, the experience of emigration holds out – especially for the migrant, but also for those of the migrant’s close network who remain behind – the possibility of simultaneously coming into contact with new ways and losing supports for old ways; of undertaking new roles and abandoning old roles; of acquiring new skills, new interests and new aspirations. And the social
changes associated with such experiences are naturally observed in marked
differences in income, status, culture, race or religion between the migrants
and those in the receiving area.

3.4 The position of Turkish emigrants in Europe

The guest-worker schemes of the 1960s in Europe had initially aimed at
temporary labour migration from Turkey to the continent; however, as
migration theory tells us, temporary migration could easily be transformed
into permanent settlement, which is what happened in the case of the ‘Euro-
Turks’, who live in many countries in Europe (Kaya & Kentel 2005). This
transformation from temporary migration to permanent settlement raised
the question of whether the migratory phenomenon from Turkey to Europe
has been a success or a failure (Toktaş 2012). The prevailing view in Europe
is that the majority of Turkish immigrants have failed to integrate into their
host communities. This is evaluated as a factor that has exacerbated anti-
immigrant feelings in a number of European countries and fuels concerns
about further immigration. At the same time, it has also been recognised
that many Turkish nationals have actually integrated well. For instance, over
1 million Turkish immigrants in Europe have become citizens of their host
countries, thousands have become entrepreneurs who provide considerable
numbers of new jobs in the countries where they reside, and some have
even joined the ranks of elected politicians at the local, national and EU
levels. Nevertheless, there are still complaints about an important section
of the Turkish immigrant community not integrating well into their host
societies. Among the complaints are the high levels of unemployment, the
poor educational performance of the children of migrants, alienation from
the larger society, the poor social and economic status of women, forced
marriages and honour killings – often attributed to Muslim religious beliefs.

Manço (n.d.), for instance, states that Turkish immigrants in Europe differ
from other Muslim immigrant groups, primarily from North Africa and
from the Balkans, in: ‘[their initial arrival being] a later phenomenon; rural
origins; geographical concentration, family-based structure; preservation
of the native language; lack of economic qualifications; and the creation
of community organizations’. According to Manço (n.d.), the structural
factors facilitating the development of strong community ties among the
Turkish immigrant group are economic exclusion, cultural marginality
(which is asserted notably by the persistence of ethnic family traditions,
such as the code of honour and finding a spouse from one’s parents’ village),
the widespread lack of mastery of the host-country’s language, and the clustering in underprivileged neighbourhoods that are highly ethnically structured (shops, cafés, associations, mosques, etc.).

It seems that the labour-market position of many Turkish immigrant workers in Europe is extremely weak, mainly because of their low educational level and lack of language skills. For example, the unemployment rate for Turkish-born people in the Netherlands is almost three times as high as the Dutch average; at the same time, only 8 per cent of Dutch citizens of Turkish origin are unemployed. In Germany, unemployment among the Turkish-born is twice as high as among natives, but about 18 per cent of German citizens of Turkish origin are unemployed (Avci 2006: 74). As far as the area of education is concerned, there are two notable problems affecting the Turkish communities in Europe: a high rate of school drop-outs from secondary-level schooling (together with a low level of participation in higher education) and a lack of language proficiency. Avci (2006: 76) notes that nearly a quarter of Turkish pupils go to the Hauptschule in Germany (the lowest track of secondary education), compared to only 13 per cent of all German pupils; the situation is the opposite with respect to the Gymnasium – a quarter of the latter attend this most advanced school type, whereas only 6 per cent of Turkish students do so. Findings of a recent study on the children of immigrants from Turkey in Sweden show that, as far as the educational and occupational statuses are concerned, the descendants of immigrants seem not to be in the process of downward assimilation – that is, social exclusion and therefore the formation of a distinct ‘underclass’ in Sweden: it is argued that the concept of ‘subordinate inclusion’ is a more appropriate description of the experiences of these children in this context (Behtoui 2012).

A vast majority of the immigrants continue to speak Turkish at home. They follow television broadcasts from Turkey. Immigrant offspring born in the new country of residence generally do not speak Turkish as well as the language of their country of birth, but they are in touch with the language and use it actively. Manço (n.d.) reports that ‘Using a dish antenna, it is possible to pick up 12 Turkish TV stations, 8 of them private, as well as FM radio stations, and in addition to them, three major national dailies began to be distributed in Europe in the early ‘70s and six national dailies are currently available in Europe’s major cities’. Thus Turkish immigrants keep their attachment to many aspects of their culture in Turkey. Furthermore, one can address the relevant significance of a ‘true web of immigrant associations’ created, ‘from local associations and local mosques to Europe-wide federations’. Again Manço (n.d.) refers to the visibility of Islamist migrant organisations in terms of organisation and size:
Turkish immigrant organizations play an undeniable role in the formation of identities and opinions, as well as in setting up the more or less stringent social control that reigns in this community. These associations seem at first glance to limit the process of the emancipation of its components, especially young people and women. Actually, in a considerable number of cases they prevent isolation, excessive marginality, and juvenile delinquency. They channel social discontent and the fear of cultural assimilation towards ideological or religious certainties, thereby meeting the search for identity and a positive self-image, the need for appreciation and recognition that is expressed by this population.

Many Turkish immigrants have lived in these states for several decades, paid taxes and been affected by political decisions, but have never had full political rights, since they do not, or cannot, become citizens of the country where they now reside. In fact, before 1981, it was extremely rare to see Turkish emigrants anywhere in the world being given the citizenship of their receiving country. Even if this were the case, it was not possible for a Turkish emigrant to naturalise in another country without surrendering his or her original Turkish citizenship. In short, before 1981, Turkish citizens could not hold dual or multiple citizenships. In April 1981, the regulations were changed, allowing dual citizenship for the first time. The effect of this has now become apparent in the figures for Turkish emigrants acquiring the citizenship of their countries of residence. For instance, official statistics indicate that 126,000 Turkish citizens had been granted German citizenship by 1996, while, between 1996 and 2000, another 280,000 Turks were naturalised, bringing the total number of naturalised Turkish citizens in Germany to almost 400,000.1 From 2000 to 2010, nearly 500,000 Turkish citizens acquired German citizenship. During the 1990s and 2000s, the

1 Unlike in Turkey, German laws promote the principle of a single nationality. Taking into consideration the German position, Turkey introduced a special application under the said law in order both to tackle the concerns and potential problems which Turks living in Germany may face or experience with regard to the German authorities insisting on a single nationality, and to facilitate their adaptation to the German legal system. Thus, under Law 4112, those who give up their Turkish citizenship upon receiving permission to do so are issued with a certificate – the Blue Card – which reserves their rights stemming from Turkish nationality except for the political rights to vote or be elected. The holders of these cards – i.e., those who are naturalised upon birth but later obtain the permission of the Cabinet to give up Turkish nationality and become nationals of another country – and their legal inheritors, continue to benefit from the rights available to Turkish citizens such as the right to reside, travel, work, invest, start a business, make purchases and acquire or rent movable or immovable property in Turkey.
annual number of naturalisations of Turkish emigrants in Europe ranged from 60,000 to more than 80,000.

As noted by Toktaş (2012), despite their differences in ethnic background, language, faith, gender, age or town of origin, the members of Euro-Turkish communities have experienced integration in their new homelands to varying degrees. More than first-generation migrants, their second-, third- and even fourth-generation offspring today represent a unique profile of denizens or citizens in the emerging cosmopolitan environment of new multicultural Europe.

Finally, it should be noted here that the position of Euro-Turkish communities is hotly debated within the context of membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Debates about migration involve a variety of issues – many politicians in Europe, for instance, frequently speak of the ‘invasion’ of migrants from Turkey, when they publicly debate Turkish EU membership (Lagro 2008). Moreover, the commonly accepted view is that Turkish immigrants who are already in Europe and who face integration difficulties, together with intensifying Islamophobia on the continent, have made Turkey-related migration issues a topic of critical debate in European circles (Erzan & Kirişçi 2006; Kaya & Kentel 2005). However, proponents of Turkey’s EU membership argue that it would be in the EU’s interest because it would reduce demographic pressures on the labour market by bringing workers into the Union (Behar 2006; Münz 2006). As these examples demonstrate, migration-related issues in the context of Turkey’s prospective EU membership have attained growing salience in public, policy and academic debates in the EU, because they have unique and multi-faceted implications for its economic, social, political and demographic structures and processes.

3.5 Conclusion

Turkey is one of the world’s leading migrant-sending countries, with about 6 per cent of its population abroad. While the issues of emigration and its impact on economic and social developments are regaining their importance on international agendas, the Turkish case provides us with a unique setting mainly for three reasons: firstly, Turkey, as a country of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ emigration, keeps its significant position in the ongoing regimes of international migration in Europe; secondly, the country has had its own way of dealing with the various social and economic consequences of emigration over the last five decades, with the related policies and practices which are often reactive rather than proactive, ad hoc rather than planned, partial rather
than comprehensive, and ignorant rather than concerned (İçduygu 2012); and, thirdly, although Turkey’s official concerns on emigration-related issues seem to have receded somewhat, it again started to become very conscious about it, though only since the early 2000s, and mostly because of its EU affairs.

Today it is very clear that neither emigration itself nor remittances as its by-product are seen by officials in Turkey as a way of overcoming economic difficulties and promoting development in various parts of the country, ‘a reversal of 1960s hopes that emigration would lead to development’ (Escobar, Hailbronner, Martin & Meza 2006: 711). Although the country is still experiencing difficulties in the creation of jobs for its citizens, the option of emigration does not seem to be a feasible solution, as the possibilities of finding new destination areas are not that high and incentives to emigrate are even weaker. On the other hand, as the country has started negotiating its accession to the EU, it is hoped that new windows of opportunity will be opened up by the expected flows of foreign direct investment and the creation of new jobs.

Based on a review of the literature, this chapter has addressed some of the economic and social consequences of emigration for the country. Despite the plethora of studies on Turkish international migration, few focus specifically on the effect of this migratory movement on the country. The challenge is to extract and synthesise into a coherent body of knowledge the generalisable consequences of emigration for the country.

On the whole, international migration of the type engaged in by emigrants from Turkey over the last few decades has tended to improve the economic position in the home country of both the returned migrants and, through remittances, those in their close networks. Whether this economic betterment proves to be of lasting benefit either to the migrants and their networks or to the society from which they come is, at the least, a debatable point, the resolution of which depends essentially on the length of time under consideration and the criteria employed. One thinks, for example, of Yemen, an overwhelmingly agricultural country, being forced to import a large proportion of its food because of the emigration of so many men out of agriculture and into the oil fields of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia (Swanson 1979). And at a more individual level, there are the three-quarters of the 81 respondents in a recent study in Turkey who had not themselves migrated but who said that, because of the migration of a close relative, they had bought things they would not otherwise have been able to buy and that these purchases had produced friction between themselves and their neighbours, friends or relatives (Day & İçduygu 1997). Of course, emigration can also have non-economic consequences: personal frustration, sorrow and discontent, as well as, on occasion, hope, joy and happiness. But what of rather more
social consequences? As could be anticipated on the basis of modernisation theory, the findings from many related studies show that emigration results in turning the country from a more to a less ‘traditional’ place.

So far, on the economic and social consequences of emigration from Turkey for the country itself, we can be certain only about the conclusions at a high level of generality. We can safely conclude that the consequences of emigration for Turkey fall unequally upon different sectors within the sending population, and upon different persons and families within these sectors. We can be certain, too, that, against various criteria of ethics and value, the consequences of emigration are mixed: neither altogether good nor altogether bad. Some aspects of this paradoxical picture are attributable to the complex nature of the migratory process – to difficulties of measurement, or to the reliance, because of these difficulties, on proxy measures of possibly doubtful suitability. Some are simply attributable to the fact that so little specific research is done. Some may be attributable to inadequate research designs.

Closely related to an evaluation of the consequences of international migration for Turkey are the reflections in various studies which explicitly or implicitly refer to the topic over time. Taking these studies into consideration, one can easily distinguish three periods in which the nature of the discussion on the issue varies. While the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a lively discussion on the likely contribution of emigration flows to the economy of the country at both the macro and the micro levels, the 1980s and 1990s were covered by a sluggish debate mostly on the negative social and cultural consequences of emigration, such as the adaptation problems of the children of return migrants or the revival of ethnic Kurdish nationalism and religious fundamentalism among Turkish emigrants in Europe. It was only in the late 1990s and early 2000s that, again, a dynamic debate started to emerge on the consequences of emigration, but this was still far from being a thorough evaluation of the issue. Only recently, in 2011, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Labour Recruitment Agreement between Germany and Turkey, has there been a revival of interest from circles of scholars and policymakers in the consequences of emigration for the country.²

If there is any one thing that can thus far be said with certainty about the research findings on the consequences of emigration for Turkey, it is that there are few, if any, generalisations. What is found for one area is frequently counterbalanced by its opposite for another. If remittances have reduced inequalities of wealth here, they have increased them there; if economic development

² See, for instance, the special issue of the journal Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 17 (2).
has been advanced here, it has been retarded there, and so on. Compare, for instance, Yozgat and Denizli, three traditional emigration areas since the early 1960s — although, at the most macro and general level, the positive economic and social impact of emigration is obvious, differences also exist. There is evidence of a positive relationship between emigration and development for Denizli, but not for Yozgat; remittances led mostly to an increase in small and medium-sized business start-ups in Denizli, but they mainly contributed to an agricultural expansion in Yozgat; remittances reduced inequality in Denizli, but increased it in Yozgat; emigration and remittances have substantial effects on poverty reduction and investment in both Yozgat and Denizli, but a strong development impact for Denizli, and a moderate one for Yozgat.

As emphasised by Abadan-Unat (1986: 365), emigration has been one of most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey, but a lack of foresight and adequate planning has, to a certain extent, led to a waste of human and financial resources. Probably, this evaluation is true for the whole period of emigration flows from the country. However, one should not underestimate the ongoing importance, and probably the positive contribution, of emigration for the country: one can only imagine what would have happened to Turkey if remittances had not financed two-thirds of the country's trade deficit in the 1990s; or what would happen to the unemployment problem in the country if the 3 million expatriate Turkish citizens were suddenly to return home; or even what would happen to the relationship between European countries and Turkey, in the context of the country's possible membership ties to the EU, if the bridging or breaching role of Turkish immigrant communities there did not exist (Kaya & Kentel 2005).

References


3 Based on the findings of several studies conducted in these provinces over time; see, for instance, Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Ayhan et al. (2000); Day & İçduygu (1997, 1998, 1999); Penninx (1982).


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Part II
Arena of political regulation and conflicts
4 The European Union’s international-migration relations towards Middle Eastern and North African countries

Andrew Geddes

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the impact of European Union (EU) migration policies on Mediterranean ‘partner countries’. This involves relations between the EU and its 28 member states and the ten Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries that have entered into an agreement with the EU within what is known as the European Neighbourhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia). The chapter develops its analysis in what has recently been described as a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ (CEC 2011a). This ‘partnership’ was developed by the EU in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and its highly uncertain effects for reform in MENA partner countries.

The chapter provides analysis and examples of the past role played by migration within this proposed partnership and explores the underlying conceptualisation of migration both as a ‘danger’ to be guarded against and as a ‘risk’ to be managed. The EU’s plans to create ‘mobility partnerships’ are seen as central to this approach, although there is still a high level of ambiguity about the meaning of mobility within these agreements.

Hollifield (2004) has shown how debates about immigration as ‘danger’ and ‘risk’ have tended to unfold within what he calls the ‘migration state’. This observation about the centrality of the state is now questioned in the contemporary European context by assessing the development of Europe’s international migration relations, which see international migration become part of the relations between the EU as a supranational governance system and non-member states (Geddes 2005). Its member states still play a key role in these international migration relations, but the EU is a complex system of power-sharing between member states and across governance levels. International-migration relations are assessed according to what have been characterised in the context of US-Mexico relations as strategies of ‘boundary build-up’. The chapter considers how this relationship between risk and danger has been affected by the perceived and actual migration
effects of the Arab Uprisings since 2010 and in the broader context of migration within EU external relations (Lavenex 2004, 2006). It argues that there is no simple dichotomy between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. Instead, these are the classic dilemmas of migration policy in destination countries that must decide on criteria for admission and thus guard against some migration flows and manage others. Constructions of risk and danger are two sides of the same coin rather than different approaches to migration management.

This chapter analyses the external dimension of EU action on migration (Lavenex 2004, 2006). What this means is the ways in which EU action on migration has an impact on surrounding states and regions, both within what the EU calls its ‘neighbourhood’, and beyond. This means a focus on non-EU member states, migration flows from and across them, and the relationship between these and EU approaches to migration, development and security. The various aspects of EU policy dealing with both the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ aspects of policy are now encompassed within what the EU calls its Global Approach to Migration and Mobility or GAMM (CEC 2011b).

The result of these developments is the emergence of new forms of ‘international-migration relations’ that centre on the EU as a regional organisation with 28 member states which has migration relations with a large number of non-EU states. Some of these non-EU states may become EU member states, particularly in South-Eastern Europe, but the important point regarding partner countries in the MENA region is that they are extremely unlikely to ever become EU member states. This contrasts with the situation of Turkey, which is fast becoming a destination country in its own right. This chapter does not focus on developments in Turkey and the long saga, dating back to the early 1960s, of its quest for membership. However, Turkey is and will remain a key player in Europe’s neighbourhood and an important country in terms of the international-migration relations that link Europe with its neighbours and beyond. The situation is different from that of Turkey for countries with little prospect of becoming EU members, which changes the nature of the political game in the sense that incentive structures differ depending on whether or not there is a membership perspective. If a country is able to join the EU (such as non-member states in South-Eastern Europe), then this alters the dynamics of relations with the EU and gives the EU more leverage (Taylor, Geddes & Lees 2012). If a state does not have any membership prospects then what kind of incentives and leverage exist within this migration relationship? The answer to this, so far as can be seen from current action, is the creation of a ‘migration dialogue’. As will be seen later in this chapter, these dialogues attempt to add a political element to international-migration relations by promoting channels
of communication and discussion on migration between EU and non-EU states. They also seek to extend what are called ‘mobility partnerships’ to MENA countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco that link the facilitation of some migration to the EU with stricter controls on irregular migration. By 2012, the EU had agreed mobility partnerships with only four countries: Cape Verde, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia (CEC 2009). None of these four is a particularly large origin country for migrants to the EU. The development of mobility partnerships for MENA countries can be understood as an example of the EU trying to deal with the ‘risk’ of migration by forms of political engagement that are to be managed. However, it is still unclear within these arrangements what ‘mobility’ actually means. The EU seems interested in only very circumscribed forms of mobility such as, for example, that of the highly skilled, while also keeping a strong focus on border controls and security. This focus on ‘immobility first’, as it could be put, through measures to increase border-control capacity, was very evident in the response by EU member states to migration flows from MENA countries in the wake of the Arab uprisings.

The analysis is divided into five sections. The next section explores the EU as a political system in its own right and some of the key features of regionalised, supranational governance in the EU. This is followed by a section that specifies the conceptual foundations of the EU’s international-migration relations. A subsequent section then outlines the development of this approach and some of its key features. Following this, the chapter assesses issue linkages between migration and other policy areas that fall under the broad heading of ‘migration and development’. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions about the emergence of new forms of international-migration relations centred on the EU and their implications for conceptualisations of migration as a danger and migration as a risk.

4.2 The EU as a political system

The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed discussion of the EU's political system or the development of its external-relations policy. Rather, it is to assess the ways in which an ‘internal’ issue such as immigration has now become a component of the external dimension of the EU. The chapter shows that the debate about ‘the migration state’, within which analysts such as Hollifield (2004) have seen debates about immigration and integration unfolding, now has a significant supranational EU-level dimension. There are, of course, long-standing interdependencies between European states, made
evident at various epochs within Europe’s migration history (Bade 2003); what is new is the way in which the EU now patterns and shapes aspects of both the internal and external dimensions of European migration policy (Boswell & Geddes 2011; Geddes 2008; Lavenex 2006). This makes things more complicated in analytical terms because the EU is not a state. However, it has acquired some state-like features as its policy role has grown and as it has developed its own political system. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, migration and asylum have become ‘normalised’ policy areas. This means that member states share power with EU institutions such that the European Parliament is a co-decision-maker with the Council of Ministers (that uses a qualified majority voting system) while the Court of Justice (CJEU) can now issue rulings on preliminary references from lower courts in the member states seeking clarification of the relationship between EU and national law (Acosta Arcarazo & Geddes 2013). These EU competencies do not cover all aspects of migration and asylum policy. They tend to focus on stemming ‘unwanted’ migration flows, such as those of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The EU has no competence to determine the number of migrants to be admitted; this remains a matter for the member states.

The EU is a highly developed political system in its own right and cannot be reduced to a discussion of its member states as though it were simply acting as an agent of the member states. The EU has its own separate and independent institutions operating at supranational level, such as the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the European Council and the Central Bank. These institutions operate within a unique system of supranational governance: unique in the sense that there is no other international organisation that possesses law-making powers, which the EU does; supranational in the sense that it exists ‘above’ the member states and is separate from them; governance in the sense that it is a complex, multi-level system and cannot be analysed by relying entirely upon the familiar reference points of comparative political analysis or international relations. This multi-level governance in the EU challenges a vocabulary of political analysis that takes the state as its point of reference. Schmitter (1996: 132) notes that:

Our language for discussing politics – especially stable, iterative, ‘normal’ politics – is indelibly impregnated with assumptions about the state. Whenever we refer to the number, location, authority, status, membership, capacity, identity, type or significance of political units we employ concepts that implicitly refer to a universe featuring sovereign states.
This is not to say that these states have disappeared or become redundant. It is to say that the context within which they operate has changed.

When we apply this more specifically to migration relations with MENA states, what we find is that there are significant processes of what Purcell and Nevins (2005) have called ‘boundary build-up’ at the EU’s territorial, organisational and conceptual borders. Nevins analysed the US-Mexico border, but his findings have resonance for Europe and the EU, too. It has been argued that ‘boundary build-up’ imparts a spatial dimension to debates about borders and to the relationship between various types of flow across those borders because concerns about the ‘thinning-out’ of place as a result of global flows have led to

[complex interchanges between state actors and groups of citizens [and] produced a set of deep concerns about the ethno-cultural, socio-economic, and bio-physical security of the nation, all of which are inherently geographical given their inextricable relationship to a particular territory. Boundary build-up is thus a territorial strategy to achieve that security and assuage those concerns (Purcell & Nevins 2005: 213).

When we move on to look in more detail at EU migration relations with MENA states then what we find is that ‘boundary build-up’ can be equated to migration as a politics of danger to be guarded against. For example, the immediate reaction to the Arab uprisings was for countries such as Italy to express concern about increased levels of immigration and for these to be represented in overblown terms as potential ‘floods’ of migrants.

A rationale for these processes of boundary build-up in Europe can be found in a body of work on the ‘securitisation’ of migration within which security is understood as

a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security discourse is characterised by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority [...]. ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, not a question of measuring the seriousness of various threats and deciding when they ‘really’ are dangerous to some object. [...]. It is self-referential because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue. What we can study is the practice that makes this issue into a security issue (Wæver 1996: 106-107).

The strong security rationale that underpins EU immigration and asylum policy arose in part from established patterns of internal security cooperation, such as the Trevi Group of EC interior ministers and officials, set up
in 1975. In post-Cold War Europe, the distinction between external and internal security was becoming blurred. The ‘securitisation’ of migration emphasises the links between market relations embodied within the free movement framework and the control of population. Of particular importance are the modern technologies of surveillance, with attention directed towards the practices of security agencies and the implementation and effects of new technologies of population control. From this perspective, securitisation and the control of population are the foundation-stones of EU liberalisation.

The ‘targeting’ of population acquired an EU dimension through the development of the Justice and Home Affairs ‘pillar’ after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the designation of the EU as an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ after the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). These contributed to an intensification of cooperation between security specialists and other officials and a European-level representation of threats. In the multi-level EU field, the implication is that relationships within and between states and between states and non-state actors are better viewed as heterarchical rather than hierarchical (Walker 2004). The Lisbon Treaty confirmed this pattern with its consolidation of EU migration competencies, as discussed more fully below.

EU migration policy is reflective of this blurring of the distinction between internal and external security and also of the complex relations between freedom and security within the neo-liberal space created by the EU’s single market. Migrants tend to be valued on the basis of their putative economic contribution. If there is a perceived economic contribution then certain types of migration, such as that into higher-skilled employment, are facilitated while, if migration is seen as a danger in terms of its potentially corrosive effects on labour markets or welfare states, then it is a danger to be guarded against. This is more complex than the simple idea of a ‘fortress Europe’, but exactly reflects the dilemma exposed by Zolberg (1989), who wrote that the key dilemma for the major capitalist economies is how high to build the walls and how wide to open the small doors in those walls for certain types of privileged migration flow.

We now briefly survey the evolution of this external approach and some of its key features in relation to migration as a security issue and to discussion of migration dialogue. In 2005, the member states issued a strategy for the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs policy in the context of terrorist attacks, organised crime and global migration flows. Such attacks and threats also provide institutional opportunities and impel cooperation and integration, but ‘security policy is never compelled by external events’ (Walker 2004: 11). A security ‘frame’ is well-established at EU-level and was
a key driver of cooperation well before the terror attacks of the 2000s. The EU strategy has also used enlargement to align objectives. Indeed, one of the key features of the EU has been its rapid growth from fifteen members in 2003 to 28 members in 2013. New member states were required to adapt to the EU acquis or, more precisely, Chapter 24 of this acquis, which is highly specific about the migration and border-security dimension.

It would seem that the counterpoint to migration as a danger exemplified by the ‘securitisation’ approach would be migration as a risk to be managed. Migration as risk has been the basis for the development of dialogue. Migration dialogues look to build relations with non-EU member states that seek to facilitate some forms of migration while requiring partner countries to control their borders and to curtail irregular flows towards the EU. The most-developed statement of the principles underlying migration partnership can be found in the Cotonou Agreement between 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific states and the EU in June 2000. Article 13 specifies that the migration partnership involves in-depth dialogue consonant with commitments in international law to respect human rights and eliminate all forms of discrimination based particularly on origin, sex, race, language and religion. The EU approach to building migration dialogue has three main elements. First, residence and employment, including the fair treatment of third-country nationals (TCNs), an integration policy that grants rights and obligations comparable to those of citizens, the enhancement of non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and the development of measures against racism and xenophobia. In employment, the treatment by each member state of legally employed workers shall be free from discrimination based on nationality as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, relative to its own nationals. The June and November 2000 directives on anti-discrimination and the November 2003 directive on the rights of long-term residents who are TCNs covered most of these areas, but labour migration rules remain a national competence and EU action to shape migration opportunities for nationals of non-member states remains very limited. Second, addressing what are called ‘root causes’, which include efforts to ‘normalise’ migration flows through strategies aimed at poverty reduction, improved living and working conditions, the creation of employment and the development of training. Partnership should also include provision for training and education, such as schemes to facilitate access to higher education. Third, the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ through return and readmission policies, with bilateral agreements governing specific obligations for readmission and return, with countries such as Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Macao and Albania.
It would, of course, be wrong to conceive of migration as a simple process of people leaving one country and moving to another. Europe and its ‘neighbourhood’ are much more complex areas of migration than such linear perspectives would suggest. There are, in fact, intense and highly diverse patterns of movement for different purposes and for different periods of time. At the risk of simplifying, it is possible to note that international-migration relations between MENA states and the EU have three main components. First, MENA and EU countries are sending, transit and receiving states. Migrants move from MENA countries to EU member states (and vice versa, albeit to a lesser extent) in search of economic opportunities, to study, to join family members or to seek refuge. Migrants move across MENA, non-EU and EU countries en route to EU member states. Morocco and Tunisia, for example, are stop-off points for migrants from West Africa, while Turkey is a transit country for people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. It also needs to be noted that migrants move to MENA countries in search of new opportunities or because onward travel possibilities may be frustrated by controls in EU member states. This diversion effect of EU action is important because, if the EU is to seek to coopt MENA states as part of this migration-control framework, then this can lead to travel options being limited for people who may find that their final country of destination is not an EU state, as they intended, but a country bordering the EU, such as Morocco. This then places strain on the capacity and resources of countries such as Morocco to deal with this new migration. Countries can also acquire leverage because of their centrality to the external dimension of migration policy. This has been demonstrated in the cases of both Libya under Gaddafi (Paoletti 2010) and Morocco (White 2011), where EU concern about border security was used to secure funds for border controls, as well as for other infrastructural projects.

4.3 Europe’s international migration relations

This section analyses the ways in which international migration has become part of the structured and less formal relations between the EU and non-member states, labelled as Europe’s international-migration relations. International migration is a key issue in international politics because it lies along what Rosenau (1997: 4) called the ‘domestic-foreign frontier’, by which he means that place where
The dilemmas of international-migration relations are made evident at the borders of states because it is these borders that give meaning to international migration as a distinct social process.

The construction of notions of danger and risk, and consequently of policy dilemmas, lies indisputably at the land and sea borders that separate these states and regions. These borders can be seen as points of demarcation, but they also possess a more symbolic quality as they go very much to the heart of debates about the meaning of Europe, as both an economic bloc and some kind of community defining itself in relation to the ‘other’. The result is that the debate about the borders of Europe is far more than a discussion of border security. It is also a debate about how European countries organise and understand themselves and then how these understandings inform international-migration relations. This is not to say that this organisational and conceptual base is clearly defined. There is, of course, tremendous diversity within the EU. The point is that migration goes straight to the very core of a set of questions that concern the identity of the EU and its member states, how they organise themselves, how they understand themselves and how organisations and understandings change.

The centrality of borders is, therefore, more than just a debate about border security – although that is, of course, important. It is also a debate about the identity of the EU and its member states and how they relate to other states. European integration changes the location of borders, their meaning and associated notions of territoriality, territorial management and population control. Rosenau characterises the domestic/foreign frontier as an arena where domestic and foreign issues ‘converge, intermesh or otherwise become indistinguishable within a seamless web’ (Rosenau 1997: 4). This insight is particularly relevant because it helps us to understand how responses to international migration necessarily involve both domestic and international politics or, as Heisler (1992) puts it, they need to be understood simultaneously as societal and international issues with linkages made across these levels.
The external dimension of EU migration policy focuses on relations with third countries and measures to tackle the root causes of migration. Here we see clear evidence of the external dimension of EU action on migration, as well as the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security. This is now labelled as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility or GAMM (CEC 2011b). The implication of this blurring is that the location of responsibility for migration within national and EU political systems also becomes more complex. If we take the EU as an example, the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Freedom, Security and Justice held lead responsibility, but was divided in 2010 into two units. A new DG for Home Affairs was established which holds responsibility for issues such as migration, asylum, border security and immigrant integration. A new DG Justice was created to deal with rights-based issues, although with only minimal involvement in migration policy. A range of foreign-policy actors – such as the European External Action Service created by the Lisbon Treaty and with other interested DGs, such as those dealing with social policy, employment and development – have also developed an interest in aspects of migration policy.

As far back as 1994, the Commission’s communication on immigration had registered the need for cooperation with non-EU states and hence recognised the growing ‘foreign-policy’ dimension (CEC 1994). This external dimension raised what are known in EU jargon as ‘cross-pillar issues’, as they bridge ‘external’ and ‘internal’ security and render visible both the domestic and the international politics of migration, as well as links between them (Geddes 2005).

The shift to EU responsibilities in this area has also induced a depoliticisation of migration in the sense that issues are now regularly dealt with in secretive European-level forums, usually comprising officials with specialist expertise and within agency-like structures that often possess a strong bias towards security concerns. While this form of EU politics may not correspond with more usual understandings of politics as open contests over policy alternatives, these EU-level developments do constitute a very particular form of social and political action centred on the mobilisation of expertise. This could be seen to accord with what Schmidt (2006) calls ‘policy without politics’ – i.e., that the EU now holds policy responsibilities without much, if any, political debate. The national-level counterpoint to this is ‘politics without policy’, as debate may occur but policy responsibilities have relocated to the EU level. A simple time-line can be used to identify the key elements of EU migration policy (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1  Key developments in EU migration and asylum policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td><em>Schengen Agreement:</em> Initially an agreement between five states (Benelux countries, France and Germany) to move towards full application of the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome (1957). It became a testing ground for the development of measures to underpin free movement with internal security controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td><em>Single European Act:</em> Aimed to create a frontier-free Europe within which people, services, goods and capital could move freely. Compensating immigration and asylum measures were dealt with outside the formal treaty framework in informal patterns of intergovernmental cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Maastricht Treaty:</em> Created an intergovernmental pillar of the EU dealing with Justice and Home Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td><em>Barcelona Declaration:</em> Launches the Barcelona Process of dialogue between the then 15 EU member states and 14 MENA partner countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td><em>Amsterdam Treaty:</em> Created a new chapter of the main EU Treaty dealing with free movement, migration and asylum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td><em>Tampere Agreement</em> (European Council 1999): Outlines the framework for common policies on migration and asylum with four main elements: Partnership with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, the fair treatment of third-country nationals, and the management of migration flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td><em>Nice Treaty:</em> Created scope for the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td><em>Hague Programme:</em> Developed the second of the EU’s five-year plans for international security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td><em>Lisbon Treaty:</em> ‘Normalised’ immigration policy by making it subject to common institutional rules and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td><em>Stockholm Programme:</em> Mapped the EU’s internal security agenda for the period 2010–2014.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation

4.4  Measures and instruments of EU-MENA migration relations

In this section we move on to assess the more specific aspects of the external dimension to EU migration policy. The EU’s immediate response to migration-related aspects of the Arab uprisings was, first, to develop joint operations with the EU’s border-security agency, Frontex, and, second, to make funds available from the €25 million held by the European Borders Fund and the European Refugee Fund (CEC 2011a). In order to understand the evolution of this response, it is necessary to explore the development of EU instruments since the mid-1990s and to assess the development of Europe’s international-migration relations.
The broader strategic context at regional level for EU-MENA migration relations was provided by two settings. First, the Barcelona Process covering fifteen member states and fourteen Mediterranean partner countries (Bicchi 2007). The Barcelona Process has since evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean. Second, the European neighbourhood policy, including the ten MENA partner countries that are this chapter's focus. The instigation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 placed relations with MENA countries on a sounder footing, with political and financial structures in place that could sustain a broad dialogue about migration. The relationship has matured but its migration-related components have, thus far, tended to reflect EU concerns about migration and asylum flows from and across MENA countries, with an emphasis on the development of enhanced border-control capacity. This could be seen as positive for EU states, at least in the short-term. The benefits for MENA countries are more questionable, although the EU’s ‘partnership’ approach does include a more advanced level of association between MENA partner countries and the EU, albeit with a differentiated approach to reflect the particular circumstances of individual MENA countries.

The evolution of the external dimension of EU action can now be traced in relationship to the more recent focus on mobility partnerships as a key component of the EU’s international-migration relations. Early steps were taken in the late 1990s when the High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Migration and Asylum Management was created as a ‘cross-pillar’ body within the EU. It was cross-pillar, in EU jargon, because it had implications for foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, and trade and development, as well as for the units/departments that must seek to manage these policies. The HLWG arose from a Dutch government initiative. Within the Dutch government the responsibility for international migration and refugee strategies resided with the foreign-affairs ministry rather than the justice ministry that largely shaped international-migration and refugee strategies. The EU approach thus reflected this Dutch attempt to ‘integrate’ the internal and external dimensions of migration policy.

The HLWG produced Action Plans in 1999 for Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka. These sought to coordinate the EU response and bring the interests of security, foreign policy and development to bear on the protection of human rights, democratisation and constitutional governance, social and development policy, the combating of poverty, conflict prevention and resolution, asylum, and irregular migration. The HLWG was composed of mainly Justice and Home Affairs officials with relatively little experience of dealing with third countries or with
development aid. The reports were criticised for reflecting EU priorities about migration control, readmission and return rather than the pursuit of partnerships based on real dialogue (Boswell 2003).

The Morocco Plan attracted some specific criticisms. First, the proposal for the use of MEDA funds (designed to develop EU-Mediterranean relations) to analyse migration patterns and instruments led to tension between the HLWG and Commission officials working in the areas of development and external relations. Second, the Moroccan government was not consulted about the Action Plan and initially refused to discuss the plan with the EU. Third, there was a lack of coordination between Justice and Home Affairs, external relations and development within the EU, although one effect of the HLWG has been to stimulate agenda-setting activity by Commission officials working on development and external relations. Fourth, the HLWG lacked a financial basis, although this has changed, with €15 million allocated for 2003. The HLWG has, for example, funded a programme encouraging Moroccan migrants to set up businesses in Morocco and another project to establish a savings bank for the remittances of Moroccan migrants.

In terms of intergovernmental agreement providing an impetus to policy development, the Tampere conclusions of October 1999 were of great importance. They emphasised, amongst other things, a ‘root-causes’ approach to migration and the importance of migration relations with third countries. The Tampere conclusions outlined components of a ‘common migration and asylum policy’ that would include ‘a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit’. Member states were invited ‘to contribute ... to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned [were regarded] a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development’ (European Council 1999).

There was a clear focus in EU policy on asylum, irregular migration, readmission and return. For example, the Seville European Council Summit (June 2002) conclusions called for a targeted approach using all EU foreign policy instruments:

An integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of irregular immigration must remain the EU’s constant long-term objective [...] closer economic co-operation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of
promoting prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows (European Council 2002: 10).

The Seville Summit concluded that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the EU or the EC concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of irregular immigration’ (European Council 2002: 10). This very clear steer from heads of government at their Seville meeting was then taken forward by the Commission in its communication on relations with third countries (CEC 2003). In response to these conclusions, the Commission produced a Communication that sought to integrate migration into relations with third countries. The Communication outlined four key principles (CEC 2003: 4-5):

1. maintain the coherence of external policies and actions through a comprehensive approach, of which a part is migration and which is differentiated by country;
2. address root causes;
3. include migration within regional and country strategy papers; and
4. extend additional funding to the area of migration policy and border security.

The focus of EU policy was to ‘integrate’ migration issues into EU relations with non-member states. In this context, migration became a major strategic priority for the EU. This strategy was developed through regional and specific country strategy papers for MENA countries. These stressed the importance of including dialogue on migration within current and future cooperation and association agreements. The following priorities were identified: managing migration and combating trafficking; improving national legislation; offering migration-related assistance; and facilitating ‘sustainable return’.

The Council of Ministers developed an approach that focused on a number of areas. The first was facilitating what was called ‘brain circulation’ and encouraging efforts by migrants who want to contribute to their countries of origin. The EU has displayed a strong interest in temporary and circular migration. A key issue is the concern held by migrants that, if they leave the EU, then they will not be able to re-enter. In its 2007 Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships, the Commission raised the possibility of creating routes for migrants to enter, leave and re-enter and of linking this to tougher border-control enforcement in sending states (CEC 2007). This has been taken forward within the GAMM and in relations with
MENA countries. In 2011, the Commission proposed to develop mobility partnerships with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Council also sought to develop approaches that could encourage voluntary return. In addition, there was interest in the more efficient use of remittances channelled towards productive investment. Remittances from migrants far exceed official development aid as a source of funding for developing countries (World Bank 2011). These are private flows and their uses cannot easily be controlled or necessarily channelled towards productive investment. Governments, international organisations and NGOs can encourage remitting behaviour through incentive schemes and improved financial infrastructures, and can also seek to channel remittances towards productive investment.

For those migrants already living in an EU member state, the Council expressed the intention to secure better integration of the legally resident. This would extend rights and obligations, comparable to those of other EU-citizens, and opportunities to participate in education and vocational training, to legally resident non-EU nationals living in EU member states.

Central to the EU approach has been the development of readmission agreements. The member states have urged the Commission to step up the negotiation of readmission agreements and to consider ways in which financial and technical assistance could be used to develop reception capacity and ‘durable solutions’ to asylum and irregular migration in developing countries. This issue of readmission has been right at the top of the EU agenda and has been linked to mobility within mobility partnerships – i.e., a clear link between migration as danger and migration as risk within the EU approach.

4.5 Issue linkages

The discussion so far has demonstrated both the complex multi-level governance of migration in the EU, and also the external dimension of EU action on migration within the GAMM. This necessarily raises what can be called ‘issue linkages’ – i.e., action in one policy area has important implications for action in other areas. A key issue in the discussion of migration as a ‘danger’ to be guarded against and as a ‘risk’ to be managed is the link between migration and development. Research suggests that, if international-migration relations between the EU and MENA states are to contribute to successful poverty-reduction strategies, then a short-to medium-term effect can be an increase in migration as a result of boosting the motives
and resources necessary for movement and creating a ‘migration hump’ (Papademetriou & Martin 1991). Or, put another way, ‘Poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy’ (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002: 40). For sending states, emigration can relieve labour-market and political pressures, provide education and training, generate remittances, and lead to eventual return by successful migrants. The downside can include ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain waste’, the difficulty of establishing voluntary-return programmes, and the relatively unproductive channelling of remittances towards inflation and inequalities-generating consumption.

The current demand for migrant workers in EU member states is fuelled by labour-market and skills shortages and by the effects of population change, low fertility rates and ageing populations. There are, however, major differences in the policies of European states towards labour migration (particularly of the high-skilled), which is largely welcomed, and asylum seeking and irregular migration flows, which generally are not. The EU does not possess competence in relation to the number of migrants to be admitted. However, it has sought to approximate member-state rules on the admission of high-skilled migrants through what is known as the Blue Card. In 2013, the EU was developing a sectoral approach to the approximation of rules governing seasonal workers (agreed in January 2014) and intra-corporate transferees. There is also an increased interest in temporary and circular migration, with the development of mobility partnerships that seek to facilitate some migration in return for non-member states seeking to exercise controls over out-migration.

Within its Strategic Approach to Democracy and Prosperity with MENA partner countries, the Commission emphasised the development of mobility partnerships. Such partnerships are understood to provide a ‘comprehensive framework to ensure that the movement of persons between the EU and a third country is well-managed’ (CEC 2011a: 7). The issues covered include visas and legal migration, legal frameworks for (economic) migration, capacity-building to manage remittances and for the efficient matching of labour demands and needs, return and reintegration programmes, and the upgrading of the asylum systems to EU standards. There is a clear quid pro quo:

In return for increased mobility, partners must be ready to undertake increasing capacity building and provide appropriate financial support for border management, preventing and fighting against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, including through
enhanced maritime surveillance; the return of irregular migrants (return arrangements and readmission agreements) and for enhancing the capacity and abilities of law enforcement authorities to effectively fight trans-border organised crime and corruption (CEC 2011a: 7).

The Commission has proposed to seek mobility partnerships with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in the first instance (see also Fargues & Fandrich 2012). Such partnerships would seek to facilitate and organise legal migration, address irregular migration and focus on the potential development outcomes of migration. Both visa facilitation and readmission agreements were seen as part of these partnerships (CEC 2011a). As a step to their development, the Commission identifies the facilitation of mobility for students, researchers and business people, but sees the building of border-control capacity as also being integral to developments in the shorter-term.

Notions of danger and risk can now be explored in the context of the migration effects (both perceived and actual) of the Arab Spring. The most immediate effect was to significantly increase the focus on border control and security. In the wake of arrivals on the Italian island of Lampedusa, there were polemics in Italy about the absence of EU-wide solidarity. This was followed by a dispute with France when Italy issued permits to migrants – mainly from Tunisia – which were then used to cross the border into France. There was even talk of Schengen provisions being suspended. This, in turn, reflects a general hardening of attitudes to immigration in EU member states that has also involved questioning of the EU free-movement framework. In an inversion of the gap hypothesis developed by Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield (1994) and Cornelius, Martin, Tsuda and Hollifield (2004), we see a gap not between a rhetorical commitment to control and higher levels of immigration, but between the very strong rhetorical commitment to control and relatively low levels of immigration. In their analysis of migration flows after 2010, Fargues and Fandrich (2012) show that, of the 1 million or more people who fled Libya, only around 25,000 moved to Europe. In their analysis of the ongoing Syrian crisis they identify 100,000 displaced people, but put the numbers moving to Europe in the hundreds. They argue that the EU response was to focus on border controls and security.

4.6 Conclusion

At the core of the debate about ‘danger’ and ‘dialogue’ is the tension between the EU’s ‘fight against illegal immigration’ and all the attendant concerns
about border security. This chapter has analysed the development of the EU’s international-migration relations and some of their implications for MENA states. The basis for the analysis has been an evident tension between understandings of migration as a danger and migration as a risk. It was argued that these equate to ‘migration as danger’ leading to security-driven approaches, and ‘migration as risk’ leading to attempts to ‘manage’, create ‘dialogue’ and establish ‘partnerships’. These then lead to different relations to issues that are linked to migration, particularly security and development. However, it was also suggested that this distinction between danger and risk should not be seen as a simple dichotomy. In fact, facilitating some forms of migration while guarding against the supposed danger posed by other forms is a long-standing dilemma for the world’s major capitalist countries when designing and implementing their migration. Migration is not simply either a danger or a risk; it is both of these things at the same time. It is this inter-relationship between notions of risk and of danger that underpins the development and consolidation of Europe’s international migration and that has been evident in EU relations with MENA partner countries.

The chapter has also shown that boundary build-up and boundary shift have been key aspects of recent European integration as border controls have been intensified. The external dimension of migration and asylum policy that has been the focus of this chapter can be seen to represent a new phase in the pursuit of territorially focused strategies to achieve security. This has four implications. First, timing and tempo are key aspects of this chapter’s discussion of policy development. There has been a rapid pace of development and change as the EU and its member states seek to respond to the dilemmas of boundary shift and build-up. This chapter has demonstrated intense activity in these areas within a multi-level polity that changes in important ways the nature and form of migration politics in Europe. It has also shown the vulnerability of these new systems to ‘shocks’ such as the migration effects (both real and imagined) of the Arab Spring. Second, there are significant power asymmetries and imbalances between EU and MENA states that lead to a perception that EU action is driven by the concerns of EU member states to inhibit ‘unwanted’ flows of asylum seekers and ‘illegal’ immigrants rather than to establish genuine dialogue. That said, it has been shown that Libya and Morocco have been able to lever resources from the EU on the basis of their centrality to EU border-control objectives. Third, it may, at first glance, seem that a ‘balancing’ of priorities between control and openness has been difficult to establish. EU efforts have been particularly concentrated on border controls and the ‘export’ of these controls to neighbouring non-member states. This has been at the expense, so far, of
measures to facilitate circular migration, which research suggests could possess significant development potential. However, as has already been noted, the dilemma for EU member states is not whether they pursue a policy of migration as risk or migration as danger. In their policies – linked as they are to states and their borders – migration is understood as both a risk and a danger. States decide through their policies, as Zolberg (1989) put it, how high to build the walls and how widely to open the small doors in those walls. This is a long-standing policy dilemma; the point is that it now plays out at EU level, too. Finally, these issues and debates play out within the EU’s multi-level system of governance, with tensions between ‘danger’ and ‘risk’ evident in member-state policies and EU action. This is no surprise because these are the tensions apparent within the domestic politics of migration in many EU member states. This chapter has attempted to show how, why and with what effects these issues have now acquired an EU resonance, and that analyses of migration and asylum policies in Europe need to factor in the impact of the developing EU migration and asylum framework.

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5 Political conflicts and migration in the MENA states

Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes

5.1 Introduction

The Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states, stretching from Mauretania in the West to Pakistan in the East, are some of the most volatile countries in the world – and, according to the index of the Freedom House 2010, harbour the largest aggregation of dictators anywhere.¹ Changes have occurred since 2011 when, during the so-called Arab Spring, protesters forced four authoritarian rulers to step down: President Ben Ali in Tunisia in January 2011, President Mubarak in Egypt in February 2011 and the Yemenite President Saleh in February 2012. The Libyan leader, Gaddafi, was killed by revolutionary brigades in October 2011 (see the chapter ‘Arab uprisings and their global repercussions’ in Freedom House 2012).

Thus, it is natural to refer to the conflict potential in these states since this serves as justification in many world political organisational models for so-called ‘security interventions’ in this ‘non-integrated gap’ of territory.² The interventions in Afghanistan since October 2001 and in Iraq since 2003 serve as practical examples of such security concepts, although the political and social ramifications thereof (the continuing cementation of existing conflicts and instability, and the trigger for massive migratory movements) were severely misjudged by their perpetrators. No other conflicts in recent times in the MENA states were more indicative of the close connection

¹ Political science sees here a causality with respect to the dictum of ‘democratic peace’: The missing mechanisms of consensus in authoritarian regimes tend to promote violent solutions to political problems.

² Thomas Barnett divides the world up into two regions: The ‘functioning core’ and the ‘non-integrated gap’. According to Barnett (2003), the functioning core comprises the so-called first world and up-and-coming countries such as Russia, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. Characteristic of the functioning core is its intensive role in global networks and its expressed interdependence. In other words, the functioning core is the modern, globalised world, as expressed by prosperity, security and stability; the non-integrated gap, on the other hand, comprises those countries marked by poverty, insecurity and instability which, because of their lesser global intertwinement, represent an overall security risk. The solution to this, Barnett says, is the military control of the countries of the non-integrated gap by those of the functioning core – e.g., in the form of military intervention.
between conflict and migration than the Iraq War that commenced in May 2003 and the Libyan civil war between Gaddafi loyalists and revolutionary forces from March to October 2011. Since 2012, the conflicts have proliferated. The internal conflict in Syria resembles a civil war, producing a stream of refugees to neighbouring countries. In Yemen the conflict between government forces and Islamists, including elements of Al-Qaida, is resulting in internal migration to non-fighting areas. A similar situation has been occurring in Sudan since the spring of 2012, when the conflict over the oil fields, in the frontier area, between the forces of Northern Sudan and those of the newly independent Southern Sudan escalated.

Besides the acute and obvious conflicts – the object of the following discussion – there are also the many conflict situations and structural conditions that lie below the surface and influence the migratory behaviour of the local populations. In particular, the unequal distribution of resources, primarily oil and natural-gas supplies, the respective policies concerning the distribution of income from energy exports, and the unsolved problem of the role of religion in these states, all affect the life quality of the inhabitants and determine, at least in part, whether they seek their livelihood within or outside the MENA states.3

This study of the security issues surrounding the MENA states looks at the present and future conflicts as well as at obvious and less obvious conflict structures, and puts them in perspective related to the possible ensuing migration potential.

5.2 The socio-economic conditions in the MENA states and migration potential

5.2.1 General remarks

The study entitled *Rich and poor states in the Middle East* (Kerr & Yassin 1982) has lost none of its relevance and significance since it was first published in 1982. Today, as 30 years ago, the MENA states are influenced by the disparity of the extreme income differences both between the individual countries and among the individuals of a particular country, the differing productivity

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3 The resulting migration may be only temporary or more long-lasting. Examples for temporary migration are the flight of refugees ahead of fighting (e.g., the ‘summer war’ in Lebanon in 2006) or temporary work-related migration (e.g., from Egypt to the Arab countries of the Gulf region).
of the respective national economies, and the wide gap between the energy and non-energy sectors in the resource-rich countries. This disparity has only increased in recent years due to the dramatic rise in the amount of foreign-currency proceeds from the export of oil and natural gas. Countries such as Morocco or Jordan suffer greatly from having to import their oil needs, whereas other countries of the Gulf region have difficulty absorbing the enormous amounts of foreign cash flowing into the country.

In addition, there are the more-or-less-irreversible structural conditions – in part very conflict-laden – affecting the MENA states, especially in areas other than energy infrastructure (e.g., limited agricultural areas resulting in a high need for imports, considerable freshwater deficits and high ecological impact). Nearly all states in the region still have populations on the increase (and birth-control programmes of little consequence), which contributes to the large present and future challenges facing the governments.

This is true for the ability of resource-poor countries, in particular, to operate globally as well as for the stability of all political systems in the region. The governments of the MENA states have to deal with three sets of problems. First, the direct consequences of the continuing rise in population (space for additional housing, the foundation of businesses and services as part of the long-term city and regional planning, the necessary infrastructure for expanding traffic, water, energy, schools, hospitals and health-facility needs, and jobs).

Second, the reaction to the indirect consequences of population expansion. In light of insufficient infrastructure (government services) and of widespread government mismanagement, resulting in budgetary resources being improperly distributed among the population, existing poverty tends to become cemented and informal political channels and corruption come to be regarded by the citizens as the only feasible way of surviving.

Third, the susceptibility of persons living in poverty and marginalised in their own society to fall prey to ideologies that promise to deliver progress and to overcome the deficiencies of the existing government. After the

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4 From the vantage point of stability and conflict, however, the absolute number of persons is not the major factor; rather – in addition to the rate of growth and thus the development of the individual age groups – a key factor is the distribution of the population in the available area, while considering the other factors of the respective country and the possibilities the government/economy has to create jobs or qualify workers. These aspects greatly influence the scale and social consequences of inordinate population growth.

5 In some MENA countries, parts of that group are susceptible to such ideologies, namely, those groups of the general population that are not poor but are dissatisfied with their own social mobility and their access to resources – or put their hope in other, alternative offers.
(failed) attempts by nationalist and socialist ideologies to gain the upper hand in the 1960s and 1970s (especially in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen and Syria), pursuant to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, there emerged a dominance of Islamic dogmas, propagating the socio-political claim that ‘Islam is the solution’. Against the background of the ever-more-acute impact of globalisation in the MENA states, however, a change is taking place in the tone of new ideologies mobilising the masses. The discussion of purely Islamic societies is now absorbing the anti-globalisation mindset of distancing oneself from ‘the West’ (particularly the hegemonic superpower, the US) and emphasising, in turn, the local identity and, since the Arab Spring, the Islamist identity, which means that Islamists and nationalists have come to the forefront again. A significant example is the new Tunisian leadership since December 2011, composed of President Moncef Marzouki, an Arab nationalist, and Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, secretary general of the Islamist Ennahda party. When Jebali stepped down in February 2013, he was succeeded by Ali Larayedh, also a member of the Ennahda Party and Interior Minister in Jebali’s cabinet.

A look at the development of the population in the MENA countries (in 1950, around 100 million, in 1995, 325 million and, in 2030, 600 million; also see Ulrich in this volume) shows that there are both regional and national differences that may have long-term political repercussions. If we compare the situation in North Africa, the Near East, the Arabian Peninsula/Gulf States and the Middle East, we see that North Africa has the smallest growth at 31 per cent and the Arabian Peninsula the largest at 59 per cent, in both periods from 1995-2010 and from 1995-2025, respectively. The Maghreb area (encompassing Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) turns out to be the region in North Africa that has best been able – thanks to government efforts – to reduce its birth rate the most (1999 in Tunisia: 1.5 per cent). Thus, the demographic pressure will subside somewhat in these countries.

The absolute numbers of inhabitants (including the projected development through to 2015) tells us that there are three demographic heavyweights among the MENA states: Egypt with 88.2 million, Iran with approximately 80 million and Turkey with 82.6 million people. Turkey and Iran together will have over 160 million inhabitants by the year 2015 which, in the light of their specific interests and demographic weight, will surely intensify the regional tensions in both the Near and the Middle East. We can already see some of these developments occurring even now (water shortages, the Kurdish question, Turkey-Israel frictions and ‘anti-Arabic’ cooperation).

Of the MENA countries that called themselves Arabic, Egypt plays a dominating role. It currently has (and, in 2015, will continue to have) double
the population of Algeria (2015: 38.1 million), the second-largest country in the region. But there are a number of smaller population centres as well – Morocco/Algeria with a total of 78 million inhabitants by 2015, Sudan with 44 million and a hotbed of ethnic and religious conflict, Saudi Arabia with 30.8 million people in 2015, bordering on Iraq with some 30 million in the North, and Yemen with 28.5 million in the South-West (2015).

5.2.2 Migration potential

The disparate distribution of income and wealth mentioned above, both within and between the individual MENA countries, has had a clear effect on the migration behaviour of the respective populations. Four phenomena may be observed in the region. First, the ongoing tendency for internal migration into urban regions, leading to a continual ruralisation thereof (see, for example, Grim 2007). Such urbanisation has an effect on security matters, especially the susceptibility to agitatory extremist religious ideologies (Belal 2012; Darif 2010).

Second, the tendency, especially of young adults, to migrate irregularly to Europe or North America. The reasons behind this lie not solely in unemployment or a lack of proper jobs; a recent study of the Algerian Research Institute CREAD showed that 63 per cent of all irregular migrants from Algeria (the so-called haraggas) had, in fact, held a job in Algeria (Sebai 2007).

Third, the emigration of qualified personnel from MENA countries because of the lack of skilled professionals in the countries of other regions. Be they IT engineers, skilled energy workers, doctors or pilots (Amalou 2007) – the classical ‘brain drain’ is a significant migration phenomenon that has a greater effect on the home country, the lower its natural economic dynamics are.

Fourth, the immigration of both legal and illegal workers into the oil-producing countries because of their high need for workers and their ‘Eldorado’ image. These persons stem both from the MENA states (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine etc.) and from neighbouring countries (sub-Saharan Africa, Asia). For the smaller Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, the most important countries of origin are still those in South and South-East Asia.⁶ Open discrimination and even assaults in the destination countries have, to date, not resulted in any reduction in the inflow of migratory workers.

⁶ Despite national campaigns to raise the proportion of local workers, the number of foreign workers is currently still very high (see the chapters by de Haas and by Zohry in this volume). This will probably remain this way for some time to come.
5.3 The conflict situation in the MENA countries

We now take a closer look at the conflicts that have occurred over the last few decades in the MENA countries, in an attempt to categorise them and gain some insight into the future probabilities of such conflicts in the region.7

The many conflicts that have arisen in the region occur, generally speaking, either between sovereign countries or between regions within a country (for overviews, see Gantzel & Meyer-Stamer 1986; Pfetsch 1990, 1996). In addition, there is the special case of the Middle East conflict since 1948 which – because of the nature of the wars between Israel and the neighbouring Arabic countries in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 2006, and the special status which Israel had in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip up to 2006 – contains elements of both types of conflict. The Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, involving a considerable number of countries both within and outside the region, went far beyond the typical bilateral conflict between countries. The Gulf Wars also differed in that they began as struggles between countries, but ended up more as internal conflicts (see Iraq after 2003).

5.3.1 International and transnational conflicts

The international and transnational conflicts that have occurred to date can be put into three categories: conflicts as part of the decolonisation process, conflicts with an ideological background, and conflicts concerning the protection of ‘minorities’. In addition, there are two conflicts that cannot be included in these categories: the Arab-Israel conflict and the Gulf Wars.

Decolonisation conflicts constitute the largest category of all conflicts, the roots of which go back to the decolonisation process and the drawing of territorial boundaries of the new national states in postcolonial times (Drysdale & Blake 1985; Mattes 1995). Since the 1950s, the MENA countries have experienced four very different forms of territorial conflict, exacerbated in part through the Cold War (Chagnollaud & Soulah 2004).

1 Attempts to reinstate one’s sovereignty over national territory or to reclaim such territory. Examples are Tunisia’s actions to win back the Bizerte area controlled by the French (1961), Morocco’s ambitions to establish

7 The basis for these statements is the definition of ‘(armed) conflict’ given by SIPRI (n.d.): ‘An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns the government and/or territory where arms are used and at least one of the actors involved is a representative of the state’s government’.
a larger state of Morocco – i.e., the reintegration of Tarfaya (1958) and Ifni (1969), the annulment of the international status of Tanger (1960), the occupation of the West Sahara since November 1975, and repeated claims over the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan territory. Every demonstrative show of Spanish sovereignty, such as the visit by King Juan Carlos to Ceuta and Melilla in November 2007, is met with massive protests on the part of the Moroccans. That visit also drew the attention of the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaida, which threatened attacks against Spanish, French and American targets in the Maghreb (Anon. 2007; Chambraud 2007). These conflicts may be seen as part of the process of decolonisation which, in the case of Morocco, is still not complete. This is also the background to the demands of Iraq against Kuwait, which led to the Gulf War of 1991. Currently, the Iranian claim to the Tumb Islands in the Persian Gulf, which were occupied by the Iranian army in 1971, seems to be regulated, inasmuch as there is no tendency to give in to the claims of the UAE. The most recent example of new territorial claims took place in August 2007, when the Iranian newspaper Kayhan wrote that ‘Bahrain is an inseparable part of Iran and should be returned to it’ (Mansharof & Rapoport 2007).

2 Conflicts arising because of imprecise or disputed border demarcation stemming from colonial times. This is true, for example, for the southern border between Morocco and Algeria (war of 1963; border agreement of 1972; border demarcation still in progress), the border between Tunisia and Algeria (demarcation completed in December 1993), the border between Libya and Algeria (Libyan territorial claims since 1976), the border between Libya and Chad (occupation of the Aouzou Strip by Libyan troops in 1973; pullback and restitution to Chad on 30 May 1994 following the arbitral verdict of the International Court of 3 February 1994) and the border between Sudan and Egypt, the latter of which, to this day, disputes possession of the so-called Hala’ib Triangle. In all of these cases, economic factors – in particular the presumption of valuable resources in the disputed areas – have played a major role. In the Middle East a number of border disputes are still being or were recently resolved: those between Bahrain and Qatar, solved through the intervention of the International Court in the Hague on 16 March 2000 (Naim 2000), between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen.8

8 The nearly 60-year-old border conflict between the two states was peacefully resolved on 12 June 2000 by a border agreement (Detalle 2000).
Conflicts concerning maritime borders or the exact course of borders for the purpose of offshore utilisation, in particular in the Mediterranean Sea. Disputes surrounding the maritime borders between Tunisia and Libya and between Libya and Malta were resolved by verdicts of the International Court in 1982 and 1985, for the most part in favour of Libya. In 1978, Italy and Tunisia signed their own border agreement. Because of military escalation by the US in 1973 (provocations by the 6th US fleet), the Libyan government decided to unilaterally declare the waterbodies of the Gulf of Sidra south of latitude 32°30′ to be national entities. This demand has yet to be recognised internationally. The Near East has similar unresolved disputes concerning the course of maritime borders (e.g., between Iran and the UAE, between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, and between Syria and Cyprus), as well as examples of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, such as the agreement between Oman and Pakistan of 12 June 2000 concerning the fixation of the maritime border between the two countries. There have been no direct military altercations to solve such problems.

Conflicts arising because of shortages of natural resources such as water or oil. This type of conflict, which has taken on a new dimension in the past decade because of the rising population growth, primarily concerns water rights. They have occurred, for example, between Israel and Jordan (the Jordan River), between Turkey and Iraq (the Euphrates and the Tigris) and between those countries directly bordering the Nile River – concerning the amount of water each country should be allowed to withdraw. Oil disputes arose concerning the amount of oil that can be pumped from fields on or near common borders between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and Morocco and Algeria.

Conflicts with an ideological background were especially prevalent in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s between countries with differing political and ideological orientations, or when the parties were closely aligned with one of the major world powers, which led to a considerable polarisation. One example is the short border war between pro-Soviet Libya and pro-US Egypt in July of 1977. Other examples of such ideologically polarising conflicts were the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), the quarrels between Tunisia and Libya in 1980 as part of the Gafsa conflict, and the confrontation between

Libya and the US (beginning in 1973), which culminated in the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 15 April 1986. The extent of that conflict, however, was the exception.

Conflicts concerning the protection of minorities were, in rare cases, the cause of border disputes between two countries. One example is the Arabic minority in South-West Iran (Khuzistan) whose claim to have been repressed by Saddam Hussein in the early 1980s was instrumentalised in the dispute with Iran (Rubin 2005). Perhaps the best-known example, however, is that of the Kurds, who live in an area spanning Turkey (main area of settlement with 13.7 million inhabitants = 24.1 per cent of all Turkish citizens), Northern Iraq (4.4 million), Iran (6.6 million) and Syria (1.3 million). Even if the main problem is more an internal political one, particularly in Turkey (see below), the development of relations between Turkey and Iraq have been strongly affected by this conflict since 2003. The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 led the Kurds to become more autonomous in Northern Iraq, politically stable and economically strong, feeding the idea of a separate Kurdish state and leading to renewed activities by the Kurdish organisation PKK in Eastern Turkey. This, in turn, caused the Turkish army (in particular since May 2007) to threaten to invade Northern Iraq in order to destroy the logistical bases of the PKK (van Gent 2007). The danger of a war breaking out between Turkey and Iraq is still latent. In fact, the Turkish army continued targeting PKK camps in Iraq in 2011 (Reuters 2011).

The Arab-Israel conflict, also known as the Middle East conflict, arose from the claim laid by two peoples to the same territory – Palestine. This fact has already been treated in quite a few studies (Ferdowsi 2000; Pappe 2004; Tessler 1994) that reveal details on the origin of the conflict, its course over the years, the effects it has had on all sorts of regional subsystems and the international political scene, as well as the military (Hanning 2000), economic (Brynen 2000) and social aspects involved. The conflict took place in several phases – among others, the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian War of 1948/1949, the Six-Day War of 1967, the October War of 1973, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the Intifada from 1987 onward, the peace process of 1991 and thereafter (Oslo I), the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 1993, Oslo II in 1995, the al-Aqsa Intifada from 2000

10 Following a suicide bombing in mid-May 2007 in Ankara, the voices supporting an invasion of Northern Iraq became louder. The Turkish Army already had, at this time, several thousand soldiers and heavy equipment stationed along the Turkey-Iraq border. Yet the parliamentary resolution to march into Iraq was still missing. On 17 October 2007 this resolution permitting military operations across the border with Iraq was accepted by the National Assembly.
onward, the Lebanon War of 2006, the confrontation with Hamas in Gaza, especially since the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections, culminating in the Gaza War 2008/2009, and the negative repercussions of the Arab Spring on Arab-Israeli relations since 2011.

Despite the many analyses, we still, today, do not have a satisfactory answer to why this conflict has been so resistant to a (negotiated) settlement or why there is what some call a ‘structural peacelessness’ (Hubel 1999) in Palestine – or in the whole of the Middle East for that matter (Bickerton 2011; Scott-Baumann 2009).\(^\text{11}\) The reflections in Hubel’s study of 1999 are still valid today and point out the main factors hindering a peace solution:

First of all, a structural analysis of the regional politics of the Middle East could at least determine why peacelessness has been so dominant; then a look at the reigning political norms in the region, influenced as they are by the respective cultures, could contribute to solving this puzzle; finally, an examination of the various different forms of political governance can also help us to reach our goal (Hubel 1999: 552).

Since the end of 2007, the solution to the conflict seems to have receded even further – despite repeated calls for a new Middle East Peace Conference (Roy 2007). On the one hand, the parties in question and their respective interests seem generally too different (Schuster 2007) and not directed enough toward the long-term goal of an overall peace agreement. The situation worsened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the new Islamist wave, especially in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood and the influential Salafist movement, with their new political parties (Freedom and Justice Party; Nour Party), harbour strong anti-Israeli feelings. The lack of acceptance of the state of Israel among the population and important Islamist leaders makes peace negotiations tenuous. And there is the continuous precarious social and economic situation in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, caused by Israel’s isolationist policies (e.g., the refusal to grant the Palestinians a harbour), the tax blockade, the loss of international funds following the victory of Hamas in the elections of January 2006 (Levitt 2006), and the Gaza War between Israeli forces and Hamas in the winter of 2008/2009 (Cordesman 2009).

The three Gulf wars to date had very different causes though, in principle, it was always about who would politically gain the upper hand over the Gulf

\(^\text{11}\) This reality is contradicted only by the great confidence of such politicians as, for example, Avi Primor, Israel’s ex-ambassador to Germany.
region – something that has yet to be determined (and perhaps may never be decided in favour of a single protagonist).

There are several stakeholders striving for hegemony in the Gulf region. Although the main ones are those states directly situated in the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states), there are two other factors to be considered:

– The intervention of external countries in the power play in the Gulf – primarily the US, but also Russia, China and individual EU countries. They influence the situation considerably, since individual countries are weakened or strengthened depending on the role these MENA-external states play in the region.

– The inner conditions and the economic performance of the individual countries play an important role. The relative importance of the MENA countries in the regional power play depends on the type and extent of their internal conflicts,\(^{12}\) and on the economic factors that influence their freedom of action, both positively and negatively.

The First Gulf War (1980-1988) was triggered by the invasion of the Iranian province of Khuzistan by Iraqi forces on 22 September 1980. This so-called First Gulf War, which lasted eight years and ended by ceasefire on 18 July 1988,\(^{13}\) was officially fought over territorial disputes; the real reasons, however, were much more complicated. In particular, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the waves it caused in the region – including the active policy of exporting the Islamic revolution to neighbours (Djalili 1989) – posed a challenge to the primarily secular nationalistic Baath Party and the approximately 60 per cent Shiite population in Iraq of the kind that had to be met with war. The ideological component was thus, besides the strategic considerations and the international implications of that war (Cordesman 1988; Karsh 1989), the cause that was most often studied (Reissner 1987).

The Second Gulf War (1991) had its roots in the territorial disputes between Iraq and the Emirate of Kuwait (Hippler 1991; Schofield 1993). Hardly any other event of the 1990s (except for the Middle East conflict in toto) polarised and influenced political development in the MENA countries as strongly as did this war. The occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops on 2 August 1990 not only led to the deployment of international troops, under the leadership of the US military, to free Kuwait (military operations began on

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12 One example is the internal Sunni-Shiite conflict in Bahrain, which escalated in 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring.

13 The first Gulf War was thus the longest war in this sub-region since World War II.
17 January 1991, ending in a truce after the liberation of Kuwait on 2 March 1991), but also split the Arab world in two along the lines of economic welfare, with the richer, low-population-density oil-exporting countries (= the anti-Iraq fraction) on the one side, and the resource-poor, heavily populated countries with low income levels, such as Yemen, Sudan and Palestine (= the pro-Iraq fraction), on the other. This polarisation extended to those countries whose leaders formally supported the intervention activities for political reasons (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria), and whose peoples tended to voice anti-American sentiments (Faath 2006). In light of the sanctions levied by the UN in March and April of 1991 against Iraq\textsuperscript{14} – which were in effect until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and caused great hardships for the Iraqi people – these affections or disaffections only grew stronger.

An analysis of the Second Gulf War has been done from various vantage points. Besides the broad studies and documentation aimed at reconstructing the military operations and the Iraqi arms plans – ABC weapons (Cordesman & Wagner 1996; Zehrer 1992) – a number of other studies concentrated on the role of the United Nations (1996) and the media (Taylor 1998) in the conflict, the humanitarian repercussions of the UN sanctions (Clark 1996; Cordesman & Hashim 1997) or the developments in the Kurdish territories both during and after the Gulf War (Leizer 1996). Very few analyses, however, tried to put the conflict in a wider context. Ruf (1991) and his contributors viewed the events from an ideological vantage point and saw in the Gulf War an example of how the US flexed its hegemonic muscles and assumed the role of world leader following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union – thereby instrumentalising the UN Security Council for its own purposes – to bring about a new political structure.\textsuperscript{15} Dierke (1996), who assumes a high level of conflict potential in the partial territory of the Middle East, developed a theoretical framework for analysing regional wars there. His main conclu-

\textsuperscript{14} On 3 April 1991, in Resolution 687, the UN Security Council set the conditions for a (lasting) ceasefire as follows: (1) the recognition of Kuwait according to the bilateral protocol of 1963; (2) the renunciation of terrorism; (3) the payment of compensation for war damages; (4) the destruction of all biological and chemical weapons, as well as all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km; (5) the elimination of the respective production plants; and (6) the disclosure and future waiver of the purchase and development of nuclear weapons and of material for their production.

\textsuperscript{15} For this reason Ruf speaks of replacing bipolarity by a new world dis-order characterised by instability.
sion is that wars correlate directly with regional structure and are thus predestined to shape the situation in the Middle East in the future as well.\textsuperscript{16}

The Third Gulf War commenced in March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by the allied forces (primarily from the US, but many other troops as well from the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’). The war ended in December 2011 when the US declared the war over. A majority of the Iraqi people rejected the US occupation of their country and suffered from the many bombing attacks, acts of war and violent crimes. Sunni resistance groups, in particular, supported by Islamic Jihad warriors, agitated against the occupation troops and the newly (re)formed Iraqi troops consisting mainly of Shiites. The insurgents themselves consisted of various infighting groups\textsuperscript{17} that consider as their enemies anyone who does not belong to their religious faction or ethnic group.

The goals of this invasion – from the American point of view a pre-emptive strike – were to topple Saddam Hussein and destroy his stock of atomic and chemical weapons (WMD or weapons of mass destruction), the existence of which had been presumed by Western intelligence services and served to legitimise the military attack, though, as it turned out, they had, in fact, never existed. The primary goal at the outset was the downfall of the Baath regime (and with it any potential danger from its employing WMD), not the establishment of a democracy in Iraq, with its three main zones (Kurds in the North, Shiite region, and Sunni region) added later. From 2003 to 2009, Iraq experienced a more-or-less-continual civil war which caused up to 2.7 million internally displaced persons and up to 2 million refugees abroad (UNHCR 2008).

At present, the entire Gulf region is still in a state of extreme stress. The reasons are many. First, the continuing internal conflict in Iraq between the various political, religious and ethnic factions and its repercussions. Second, the opposition of the US government to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which do not exclude a military option. To counteract such a possibility, the US has launched a massive programme since 2007 to create an Arab front against Iran, in the course of which the Saudi army was outfitted with the newest military hardware (Ottolenghi 2010). Third, the existing religious (Sunni vs Shiite)

\textsuperscript{16} Based on the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 as well as the first and second Gulf Wars he discusses his opinion that these wars were not primarily expressions of long existing conflicts, but rather the attempt of the leading Arab nations to establish a hegemonic order under their leadership.

\textsuperscript{17} To these groups belonged former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and followers of the Iraqi Baath Party, Sunni Arabs and nationalists, Shiites following the clergyman Muqtada al-Sadr, and both local and immigrant extremists who have (in part) joined the terror network al-Qaida.
and ethnic (Arab vs Persian) rivalries between the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran (Fürtig 2006), become manifest in continual allegations that one side was always trying to undermine the other side’s own political interests. The Saudi-Iranian antagonism and the fear of a ‘Shiite crescent’ strain the political development of the entire Gulf region (Faath 2010).

5.3.2 Domestic conflicts

The domestic conflicts, each of which has its own specific cause and background, may be put into one of three groups:

1. conflicts stemming from the postcolonial process of nation-building – the establishment of a central government in the entire territory, and attempts by the dominant political force to establish their doctrines to the detriment of other ethnic or religious minorities (Binder 1999);

2. conflicts occurring as a consequence of ideological or religious differences about the best social-development model to solve existing (or worsening) social problems; and

3. conflicts, especially in 2011/2012 (the Arab Spring), resulting from authoritarian rule since independence and the growing incapacity of the governments to respond to the social, economic and political aspirations of their people.

Well-known examples of the first group are:

– the Berber uprising in Morocco in 1956 and in Algeria in the 1960s and 1980s;
– the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1991), caused by the artificial political supremacy of the Christian Maronites, who had become a minority in their own country;
– the imbalance in Iraq, where the majority group is Shiite, whose powerbase was underrepresented until the demise of Saddam Hussein (conflicts from 1974 onward, uprising 1991);
– the civil war in Yemen (from 1962 onward, at varying levels of intensity), which reflected the difficult process of nation-building in that area. The civil war proceeded against the background of very explicit ideological differences between the Royalist North Yemen (supported by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Great Britain) and the Republican South Yemen (sup-
ported by Egypt/President Nasser). This led to heavy fighting between northern and southern Yemenis in 1994, which ended when the northern Yemenis eventually won by taking Aden on 7 July 1994, forcing a peace treaty and the union of the two states;

– the long and, in part, militant attempts by the people of Balochistan in Western Pakistan to obtain more autonomy or even independence; and

– the civil war in Southern Sudan (1956-1972, 1983-2005) between the Arab-Islamic central power from Northern Sudan and the Black-African ethnic groups, primarily followers of natural religions or Christians, who desired a secular state to protect their rights.

The Sudan conflict ended formally in January 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Six years later, in January 2011, the referendum for self-determination which was stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was held, and resulted in the declaration of independence of Southern Sudan in July 2011. The conflict between North and South Sudan was violent and costly, with some 1.5 to 2 million dead and a vast number of displaced persons. The reasons behind this conflict lie in numerous interconnecting levels of conflict and causes (Daly & Sikainga 1993; Kok 1996).

There were three main components that precipitated the conflict because of Sudan’s particular geopolitical position as a link between the Arab world in the North and Black Africa in the South, and ecologically between the dry Sahel zone in the North and the wetter South: a religious component (Islam vs African natural religions and Christianity), an ethnic-racial component (Arab vs non-Arab populations such as the Dinka, the Nuba or the Fur), and an ecological-economic component – nomadism vs sedentary farmers (Suliman 1997). It was the accumulation and interconnection of these levels of conflict that have made this struggle so resistant to mediation for over 40 years. The separation of Northern and Southern Sudan in 2011 did not eliminate the military confrontation between the two states, as in fact both sides are fighting for control of the oil fields in the border region which is not yet demarcated internationally (United States Institute of Peace and Concordis International 2010).

The second group concerns the majority of the current domestic conflicts in the MENA countries, which are of two particular types: religiously moti-
vated conflicts and conflicts in which ethnic or ethno-linguistic (cultural) rivalries play a major role.

Religiously motivated conflicts are those between the different religious groups (such as Muslims vs Christians, Sunnis vs Shiites, see Denis & Frachon 2007; Planhol 1997) and conflicts surrounding the role of religion in the state and in society in general. The dispute in the Gaza Strip in 2007 between Hamas and al-Fatah is one example of a recent confrontation of this nature.

Among the religiously motivated conflicts in the MENA countries, correlated as they are with the supra-regional effects of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, most are triggered by groups who wish to realise the unity of church and state (Islam) and the postulate ‘Islam is the solution’ (to all social problems) by militant means. The target of their actions is any heretical state whose non-Islamic, secular structures must be overcome by the ‘Islamic social project’. Accordingly, Islamic groups have been able to mobilise the dissatisfaction of large parts of the population with their socio-economic conditions, causing domestic conflicts in Tunisia (from 1986 up to the beginning of the 1990s), Algeria (particularly 1991-1999 and thereafter), Egypt (particularly 1992 to the end of the 1990s), Libya (1992-1996), and Morocco (since 2003). Some incidents, such as the occupation of a large mosque in Mecca (November 1979), the uprising of the Muslim Brothers in Hama (Syria) in 1981-1982, and the armed actions of the Bouiali group in Algeria (1984-1985), predated these conflicts. Although the conflicts toward the end of the 1990s could be formally contained in many countries through the massive use of repression, the fundamental situation of the conflicting social programmes was not relieved in any way. Nevertheless, cells of Islamist combat groups (like al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb; al-Qaida branches in Yemen etc.) continued their fight and are actually reviving under the conditions of the Arab Spring in several countries – for example, Algeria, Libya, the Sahel region, Yemen and Syria.

The internal religious conflicts arising from the checkered religious map of the MENA countries are the most intensive where the greatest religious differences are found. For Christians, this would be Egypt (with its powerful Coptic minority), Sudan (also home to a Coptic minority), Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine (Steinbach 2006). Although there have been repeated clashes between Copts and Muslims in Egypt, especially in the context of rising Islamist political and social influence during the last years, the major area of Christian persecution currently lies in Iraq, where we find the largest
modern persecution of Christians in the world. There is no reason to believe that this tendency will subside.

For the Sunni/Shiite groups, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon are primarily important, though Shiite activities in other Sunni countries such as Morocco and Algeria have been cited, albeit without causing open conflicts. The main Sunni-Shiite conflict is occurring in Iraq, where the minority Sunnis lost their dominant position over the majority Shiite population with the fall of Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, the Sunni Salafists consider the Shiites to be a group that will eventually have to be driven out. There is a similar situation in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia, where the Shiite population in the Eastern provinces feels discriminated against and marginalised (Teitelbaum 2011). In both countries, Shiites started revolting against this situation in 2011.

One of the major ethnic/ethnic-linguistic conflicts in the MENA region concerns the Kurds. In principle, as far as our topic is concerned, the Kurdish problem is an internal Turkish problem (Chrisdoulaki 2011). Since the 1960s, large parts of the Kurd population, especially adolescents and students, have been shaped by socialist thought. The result was the rise of the PKK, an acronym for the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, devoted to the fight against colonialism and the foreign exploitation of natural resources, and demanding the right to cultural self-determination and independence from the Turkish state. Turkey fought these tendencies with all the means at its disposal, including its military might. Its efforts to eliminate the PKK by forceful means picked up from the mid-1990s on (Krech 1999). Following a lull after the year 2000, fighting between the Turkish army and the PKK resumed in 2004/2005 as the result of the consolidation in Northern Iraq – reaching a climax in 2007. The conflict continued, escalating again in 2010/2011. The number of victims of this conflict is now extremely high. Besides the dead and wounded, there are a great many refugees both within the area and in other countries of Europe (particularly Germany) – the conflict led to the displacement of up to 1.2 million persons inside Turkey over the last three decades.

A second ethnic/ethnic-linguistic conflict concerns the berberophone peoples. Berberophone populations (they call themselves Imazighen, singular Amazigh) today live, albeit very scattered, in the North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, as well as in Mauretania and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, as well as in Mauretania and

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20 Between 2003 and 2011, nearly 900,000 Catholics and Orthodox left Iraq, where the number of Christians is estimated at present to be around 500,000.
21 Because of the escalating war, relations with Turkey became strained, as described above, especially with their direct neighbours Iraq, Syria and Iran, since the Turkish government accused these countries of supporting the PKK. The PKK, for their part, used the Kurdish settlements in all these areas as retreats (in addition to their training camps).
the Sahel states, particularly Mali and Niger. The largest berberophone
group is the Tuareg in Southern Algeria (roughly 20,000), in Libya (25,000),
in the neighbouring Sahel states of Niger (1 million) and in Mali (around
700,000). In Algeria and Libya, the Tuareg have been well integrated into the
population and currently harbour no wish for autonomy. Quite the opposite
is true of the Tuareg in the neighbouring Sahel states, where a conflict has
been raging since the 1980s – in part with violent repercussions – with
the central governments, concerning autonomy and self-determination,
rights and development measures in the settlement areas of the Tuareg,
which are regularly hit by droughts. These conflicts and the precarious
conditions under which the Tuareg live (massive refugee problems in the
1980s due to a long-lasting drought) also affected Algeria and Libya, since
these countries served as temporary escapes from both drought and pursuit
by the government because of the Tuaregs’ armed attacks – or as getaways
by criminal groups fleeing the area. This type of repercussion, as well as
the precarious living conditions the Tuareg endure in the Sahel states, will
continue to affect Algeria and Libya (and, to a lesser extent, Mauretania).

The acute conflict with the berberophones in the states of North Africa
– an ethnic-linguistic-cultural conflict – concerns the Imazighen living in
the northern parts of Algeria, Morocco and Libya, who banded together in
the 1980s and 1990s. It is, however, difficult to exactly classify what part of
the population is berberophone: There are no exact definitions available, as
self-perception plays a major role in such a classification, so that estimates
vary considerably. The reason for such uncertainty lies in the historical
development that led to a complete or partial assimilation of the Imazighen
into Arabic society in the cities following the Islamisation and Arabisation of
the autochthon (Berber) population in North Africa. Nor is the self-definition
as an Amazigh necessarily coupled with a particular language competence.

Among the Maghreb states, Morocco has the largest number of berbero-
phones, followed by Algeria and then – with considerably smaller numbers
– Libya, Tunisia and Mauretania.22 Most of the conflicts arising because of
the large numbers of berberophones took place in Algeria and Morocco.
The conflicts arose because of the increase in Arabic components in the
national identity and the sole fostering of the Arabic language and culture,

22 The numbers vary depending on the source. For Morocco, the berberophones make up about
40–60 per cent of the total population (60 per cent = roughly 18 million persons); in Algeria, 25–38
per cent of the population (38 per cent = 12 million persons); in Libya, 3–9 per cent (9 per cent = 550,000 persons); in Tunisia, 1 per cent (100,000 persons), and some 80,000 berberophones are
thought to live in Mauretania.
which came to dominate government policy in the countries of North Africa after independence. Parallel to the re-invigoration of the Arabic-Islamic ‘mono-culture’ and ‘mono-identity’ toward the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s as an official reaction to the strengthening of Islamist groups, the berberophones joined together to establish associations to protect their cultural rights. This movement started in Algeria and then spread to Morocco and more recently to Libya. In Algeria there have been repeated, in part violent, demonstrations on the part of the berberophones to draw attention to their demands. The more violent forms were the result of political and socio-economic factors that were not solely related to the situation of the berberophones. That the identity/ethnic-linguistic demands can be an additional element mobilising the masses may be seen in the violent conflict that broke out in April 2001 in the Algeria/Kabyle region and lasted through to 2004/2005, resulting in the destruction of large stretches of infrastructure in the years 2001-2004 and disrupting both political and economic life considerably. The conflicts surrounding the recognition of the equality of Amazigh identity and the main Berber language, both as a national and an official language, remain to date unsolved and still represent a medium-term element of conflict in both Algeria and Morocco. However, no major migration potential arises from this specific conflict.

Regarding the ethnic/ethnic-linguistic conflicts between the Sudanese Arabic population and the African ethnic groups in Southern, Western (particularly in Darfur) and Eastern Sudan (particularly Beja), we refer to our comments above on the difficult and ongoing process of nation-building in Sudan in general.

A third group of domestic conflicts is related to the so-called Arab Spring. The mass protests which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and other Middle Eastern countries were protests against unemployment, especially the unemployment of younger people, and against a corrupt, repressive, authoritarian leadership which had been in power for decades. The political legitimacy of these leaders was waning, while dissatisfaction was on the rise. The institutional transformation which began after the changes of leadership in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 resulted in political conflicts over power distribution and the future political and societal order (i.e. the relationship between religion and politics in the new constitution) and – especially in Libya – in a conflict over control of the armed forces, which is linked to regional (tribal) rivalry. At the same time, the potential for social protests was high, as the economic and developmental aspirations of the majority of those who engaged in the Arab Spring protests had not been met. This situation aggravated the divide between
the social protesters and the new political leadership interested primarily in consolidating their power and distributing resources to their followers. Political and economic instability, as well as security problems caused by criminal groups, are central features of those MENA states which have been going through a transformation phase since 2011, fuelling domestic conflicts.

5.4 Assessment of the conflicts

If we look at the timeline of the two largest parties engaged in conflict, we note that the major conflicts in this area, which took place mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, today play only a minor role (with exceptions). Following completion of the decolonisation process and the subsequent territorial delimitation, new conflicts arose caused more by the respective internal structural, political or socio-economic backgrounds. The ethnic and religious minorities, in particular (e.g., the Copts/Christians, the Sunnis in Iraq, the Alawites in Syria and the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran; see also the bibliographic section ‘Minderheiten’ (minorities) in Koszinowski & Mattes 1988 onwards), now represent constant political (and thus structural) factors leading to a major latent conflict potential in the many Arabic countries, especially those in the Middle East (Bengio & Dor 1999; Planhol 1997). On the other hand, because of the often incomplete process of nation-building and the existence of authoritarian structures that suppress any open debate about minority problems, one could conclude that Aliboni and Miggiano clearly expressed the situation when they said that:

Minorities are a well-known underlying factor of conflict in the NENA (Near East/North Africa), but what makes this structural factor more intractable than it should be with respect to its size and nature are proximate and systemic factors. This is a conclusion to be noted, particularly in a conflict prevention perspective. In fact, it emphasizes preventive diplomacy and systemic conflict prevention over structural conflict prevention policies. (Aliboni & Miggiano 1999: 4)

The increase in domestic conflicts since the 1990s is rooted in part in the end of the East-West conflict; the disintegration of the Soviet Union weakened

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23 Aliboni and Miggiano (1999: 3) called the year 1992 the ‘starting point of a new wave of conflicts’. This holds true for the disputes with the Islamists, which escalated after this point in time, particularly in Egypt, Algeria and Libya, and for the conflicts between Turkey and the Kurds.
the governments of those countries that had been aligned with the Soviet Union, both internally and externally (Perthes 2000). The slow and difficult progress in the Middle East peace process, as well as its actual standstill since September 2000 because of the al-Aqsa-Intifada, and the repercussions thereof that go beyond the Arab states, had the effect of shifting the entire MENA region – with all its interconnectedness with other conflicts – into a permanent state of emergency.

5.4.1 Fragile statehood as exacerbating factor

The political scientist Thomas Risse (2005) concerned himself with areas of limited statehood. In about two-thirds of all countries worldwide the state monopoly of the use of force exists only to a limited degree. For this reason the danger of failed states is to be regarded as one of the most important problems of world politics. Wherever state power, particularly the state monopoly in the use of force, is limited or missing, ‘power markets’ (the privatisation and commercialisation of power) can develop, as Georg Elwert (2006) showed, and ‘warlords’, terrorists and criminal organisations (or a combination thereof) may provide for ‘order’ and circumvent or replace the state authorities completely.

The Fund for Peace (2011), in its last Failed States Index, did an estimate based on a total of 177 states and found that a number of MENA countries should be deemed ‘critical states’ with respect to their statehood. Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen were ranked as three, seven, nine, twelve and thirteen in the category ‘alert’. It is worth mentioning that the Arab Spring had a strong impact on the ranking of Middle Eastern countries. For example, countries like Libya and Syria, which were ranked 111 (Libya) and 48 (Syria) in the 2011 Index – reflecting the situation in 2010 – set dramatically due to their internal conflicts (civil war). The existing ‘ungoverned territories’ (Rabasa, Boraz, Chalk, Cragin, Karasik, Moroney & O’Brien 2007) and ‘safe-haven’ areas in the Middle East may not generally expand in the medium term; rather, they will be limited to Afghanistan/Pakistan (the northern border area of Afghanistan), parts of Iraq and Yemen, and the border area of the Sahel states to North Africa, particularly Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger (because of the difficulties arising from the massive armed enforcement operations and close cooperation of the countries in question). Nevertheless, the proliferation of Libyan arms and the expanding activities of al-Qaida in Yemen and the Sahel region make it much more difficult to reconquer ungoverned territories and eliminate safe havens.
5.4.2 Conflict-induced migration potential

The conflicts described have triggered migratory effects in many different ways over the last 30 years. Migration that occurred for reasons other than economic ones was unevenly distributed within the regions of North Africa and the Middle East, and was restricted to a few countries or political hotbeds.

– **Algeria**, where, in the 1990s, during the conflict with Islamist groups, политициально motivated migration primarily to Europe occurred in great numbers (ca. 400,000 persons) (Mattes 2000); since the 1990s there has only been a limited migration of younger people due to the lack of prospects, both in social and in economic terms.

– Exactly how many secular or Muslim Egyptians left **Egypt** because of the Islamist threat (the most famous example in Europe being the scientist and publicist Nasr Abu Zaid) is unknown. On the other hand, some members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups left Egypt during the Mubarak era because of harsh political repression. The political transformation in Egypt following the mass protests and the resignation of President Mubarak in February 2011 changed the situation. The Islamists profited from the political liberalisation and won the parliamentary elections at the end of 2011. As a consequence, Islamist emigration stopped, while about 93,000 Copts left Egypt immediately after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 (Khalil 2011). After the deposition of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 by the military, and the escalating violence between security forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, the repression might lead to some Islamists leaving Egypt.

– **Sudan**, where, during the civil war in South Sudan and since 2003 in Darfur, widespread refugee migration, both within Sudan and internationally, was observed. In addition, there was much politically motivated migration among the democratic opposition parties following the takeover by the Islamists in 1989. With the independence of Southern Sudan in July 2011, some Southern Sudanese migrants in Northern Sudan returned to the South. As the Arab Spring has not reached Northern Sudan, the Sudanese refugees in Egypt have not yet returned.

– **Israel/Palestine/Arab states**, i.e., the classic Middle East conflict, which especially led to the forced displacement of Palestinians (for the most

24 That military conflicts with Islamist groups escalated in so many Arab states, particularly at the beginning of the 1990s, is due to the return of the Arab fighters from Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah regime (Faath & Mattes 1996).
part into camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria). Although the last great conflict now lies almost 40 years in the past (the October War of 1973), the subsequent smaller skirmishes with Lebanon (2006) and in the Gaza Strip (2008/2009) were military conflicts that precipitated considerable migratory movements.

– **Lebanon**, which has been a hotspot in two ways: first, because of the connection between constitutional organs and ethnic-religious affiliation, which became outdated by demographic developments in the country and eventually caused distribution problems among Christians and Muslims and between Sunnis and Shiites that remain unsolved even today. Second, through the contiguity to Israel and the increasingly radicalised Palestinians (especially the Islamist faction) (Rougier 2007) as well as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the already precarious internal balance was upset.

– **Iraq**, which, under the authoritarian command of Saddam Hussein (internal suppression of the Kurds and Shiites, elimination of all democratic opposition, war against Iran and attempted takeover of Kuwait), was and – even after his downfall in May 2003 – has remained a hotbed of destabilisation and war (outbreak of civil war, fight between Sunnis and Shiites, bombings of Jihadists against occupational troops, and dissention with Turkey concerning Kurds). The situation calmed down in 2009 and 2010, but terrorist activities have increased since the US troops left Iraqi territory in December 2011. This development not only keeps refugees from returning to their home country, but escalating anti-Christian agitation has also caused many Christian Iraqis to leave Iraq.

– **Afghanistan**, where, after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the war between the Taliban and other rebel groups against the international occupational troops, as well as the Afghan Army of President Karzai, continues to the present day.

– **Pakistan**, where the quarrel between Islamists and the government, on the one hand, and between the (secular) opposition and the government, on the other, led to such an explosive mixture that US analysts in 2007 considered Pakistan to be ‘the most dangerous country in the world’ (Rüb 2007). Even if such an assessment is exaggerated, the situation in Pakistan is one of the most complicated in the region, especially as part of the territory is not under state control and the economic and social problems are huge (Hussain 2007).
The newest example for conflict-induced migration potential is the Arab Spring. The civil war in Libya from March to October 2011 and the escalating military confrontation between opposition and government forces in Syria since the end of 2011 have produced both high internal displacements and refugee movements to neighbouring countries. By July 2011, an estimated number of 346,000 Libyan citizens and foreigners working in Libya had fled to Egypt, 543,000 to Tunisia and around 30,000 into Chad and Sudan. The number of Syrian refugees having left their country by January 2014 totalled 2.5 million; most of them fled to neighbouring Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon; the number of internally displaced persons amounts to around 6.5 million (Migration Policy Centre 2013).

5.5 Future conflict developments and migration potential

A look at the North African and Middle Eastern countries on the list of regions that, according to Barnett (2003), belong to the so-called ‘non-integrated gap’ reveals that this part of the world will remain, in the future, the stage for international and domestic conflicts. Domestic conflicts, in particular, will dominate and determine the amount of migratory activity.

5.5.1 International and transnational conflicts

Of all existing conflicts, the Middle East conflict will remain the easiest to predict because of the still-present problems stemming from the border demarcation of 1948. Other conflicts, except for the case of Iran (possible US and Israeli attack on the nuclear facilities) and Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq, cannot be foreseen. The likelihood of a quick solution to the Middle East conflict is, despite all attempts at negotiating a peace treaty, still poor. With the exception of Israel (which practices Western democracy, at least internally, toward its Jewish citizens), all states and societies of the region have an authoritarian structure. This implies that any hopes of achieving long-lasting peace are illusionary as long as no fundamental changes take place in the political systems. In addition, only when effec-

26 The ‘educational effects’ of the peace process in the Middle East are thus rather limited (see Ahmar 2001).
tive and dependable mechanisms have been established to prevent open conflicts will we have a true perspective for peace (Houben 1996). From the perspective of *realpolitik* and in light of the multipolar power structures in the Middle East, it comes as no surprise when wars erupt, as there is still no dependable mechanism for preventing conflicts. The political transformations in some North African and Middle Eastern countries after the mass protests of 2011 have not yet resulted in the institutionalisation of democratic systems or the creation of effective mechanisms for preventing either domestic conflicts or conflicts between states.

The fight for resources is taking place on two fronts. First, in many cases, there is a conflict between countries – particularly regarding water – in the MENA region,27 for example, the distribution of water from the Nile River between the bordering countries. The fight for oil is transnational insofar as offshore storage facilities are concerned (unclear sea borders) or when large underground fields that lie at or on the borders (e.g., between Iraq and Kuwait) precipitate different opinions about exploration rights. Second – and this will, in the future, have the larger conflict potential – there are internal conflicts28 about who has access to the (limited) resources (water, land, food) of a country. Globally speaking, the amount of farmland *per capita* will sink from 0.25 ha (in 2000) to 0.19 ha (by 2025), the decline in the MENA countries being even more dramatic (Breisinger 2012). Nearly all MENA states have an acute water deficit, especially of drinking water, which thus carries great conflict potential because of the constant degradation of potable-water resources. The MENA countries consist of about 95 per cent desert, are exposed to intensive solar radiation and have few freshwater reserves (Arab Water Council 2009). The yearly rainfall quotas are small, so that agricultural production is highly dependent on the climate (and the danger of drought). The already precarious food-supply situation with a high level of imports (Algeria, Libya, Mauretania, the Gulf countries etc.) is exacerbated by the continual increase in the population and growing en-

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27 The triggers for such conflicts are often (reservoir) dams that stop the flow of water to third countries. Violating water rights alone can cause severe international conflict, whereby force is used or threatened to pressure the other country (or countries) into accepting one’s own water regulations. Syria’s intention to redirect the tributaries of the Jordan in order to thwart an Israeli water project led to a major crisis and was one of the triggers of the war in June 1967. Another example are Turkish dam projects on the Tigris which affect Iraqi water interests.

28 Conflicts concerning access to ever-scarcer food (such as wheat) are still being settled by means of price, which puts countries with few currency reserves at a disadvantage. The resulting famines are then attended to by the UN World Food Programme. For details concerning the problem of food security, see the website of the World Food Programme (www.wfp.org) and of the United Nations (www.un-foodsecurity.org).
environmental problems (Brauch, Liotta, Marquina, Rogers & El-Sayed Selim 2003; Englert, Kalhofer & Mattes 2003; UNDP 2009). The social degradation has been constantly aggravated in recent years and is thus still relevant to the migration problem.

We may expect migration resulting from conflicts in border areas with transnational effects to continue in the future, especially in the Middle East, as three recent examples illustrate. The political conflict in Syria which began in 2011 has led large parts of the population to flee from the combat areas, particularly to Turkey and Lebanon. Another example is Sudan, where the military confrontation between Northern and Southern Sudanese forces in the border area of South Kordofan 2012 has caused the population to flee the area. A recent example is the conflict in North Mali arising from the occupation of the three Northern provinces by Islamist groups, leading to international intervention in January 2013. The Islamist occupation resulted in a migration movement of 300,000 people inside Mali; about 180,000 fled to the neighbouring countries of Mauretania, Algeria and Niger.

5.5.2 Domestic conflicts

Among possible future domestic conflicts will be the controversy in all MENA countries at both state and social levels with Islamist/militant-Islamist groups over the role of Islam in society and in the new constitutions which have been in the process of elaboration in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya since 2012. Inter-confessional conflicts resulting from disputes over the specific role of one confession in the national state may escalate into bloody altercations. Previous examples of such conflicts are the attacks on Christians in Iraq, the attacks by the Sunni extremists on the Yezidi in Iraq, and conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites – particularly in Iraq and Pakistan – due to the Shiites’ new self-confidence (Nasr 2006).

The second most important category of domestic conflict is, and will be, that surrounding the ‘fair’ distribution of government resources, development programmes and economic means among all parts of the population. Should some regions of a country not be allowed by the leading political caste to sufficiently participate in national means, or should whole segments of the population (such as youths or certain ethnic groups) feel shut out of political and socio-economic developments, there may be protests,

29 The Yezidi are a religious minority not recognised by Orthodox Muslims as Muslims. A massive bombing against the Yezidi was carried out on 14 August 2007 in Jazira and Kahtaniya in Northern Iraqi-Kurdish territory.
violent demonstrations and conflicts, even leading, perhaps, to armed resistance. In Algeria, for example, there has been a wave of social protests of young people because of state ‘neglect’ and among the rural population because of a lack of water, butane gas, infrastructure etc. since 2004. Social protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 arose out of overall discontent with government politics and policies and will be reproduced in the future if the root causes persist. The possible migration potential\textsuperscript{30} from domestic conflicts cannot be accurately predicted, but examples from the recent past teach us that conflicts can quickly provoke considerable migration streams of several hundreds of thousands of people.

Politically motivated migration from Algeria (fleeing Islamist violence) at the beginning and in the middle of the 1990s, the massive flight of the non-Arab population because of attacks by the Arabic Janjawid in Darfur since 2003, the large-scale emigration of Iraqis since the civil war began in 2003 or the flight of the population out of Southern Lebanon and Beirut due to the airstrikes of the Israeli military in the war of 2006, are examples of what happens when 200,000 or 400,000 or more persons must suddenly pick up and leave their homes. Even though most of these refugees end up only moving to other places within the country or a neighbouring country due their lack of resources, such migrants do make up a large percentage of those who seek refuge in Europe. This is particularly the case when we are talking about conflicts in countries directly bordering the Mediterranean Sea, and when there are already large settlements of that group in continental Europe.

In coming years, a large number of refugees will flee their home countries because of the deteriorating economic conditions and the worsening environmental pollution and conflicts in North Africa and the entire Middle East. The Scientific Advisory Committee to the German Government ‘Global Environmental Changes’, in its summary report entitled \textit{Security Risk Climate Change} of May 2007, has projected this state of affairs. On the regional hotbed of North Africa it writes:

\begin{quote}
North Africa: political crisis potential and migration pressure will rise because of the combination of increasing droughts and water shortages with continued high population growth, weakening agricultural potentials and dwindling capacity to solve political problems. The
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} Independent thereof is the continual migration of young adults, in particular, who look to find their way to Western countries because of the socio-economic plight, unemployment and lack of prospects in the MENA countries.
densely populated Nile Delta is endangered by the general rise in the sea
level and by the salinisation of fertile agricultural areas (WBGU 2007: 3).

Even if migration for environmental reasons were to remain within the
borders of the respective country, in the medium term, migration from
the countries of North Africa and the Middle East to the EU will continue
to increase as the economic situation in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia,
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon has been deteriorating since 2011. As shown in
chapters 1 to 3 of this volume, a weak economy has always been one of the
major push factors of emigration, with a share of this emigration moving
to the EU.

5.5.3 Complicated circumstances for migration/transit migration

The increase in migration potential that is to be expected in the future does
not necessarily translate into a direct substantial increase in actual migra-
tion. The countries of Europe, as well as the home countries in North Africa
and the Middle East (due to pressure by EU countries), will take measures
to suppress migration (Mattes 2006a; also see Geddes in this volume).

In Europe, this will be effected through a better monitoring of the sea
routes in the Mediterranean Sea and between Morocco/Mauretania and the
Canary Islands as well the south-easterly smuggling route. This is regulated
by the European Agency for Operative Cooperation at the Borders (Frontex),
founded in 2004.31

On the North African side, the measures taken – as, for example, the
establishment of new border-patrol units, or better surveillance of the
southern borders to prevent transit migration from sub-Saharan states
(Mattes 2006b) – have been interrupted by political changes since 2011,
especially in Libya and Tunisia. While there is a general lack of security
structures in post-Gaddafi Libya, the police forces are in a process of re-
construction and are no longer concerned with the control of irregular
migration in Tunisia. Altogether, the clear reluctance on the part of North
African states to play the role of Europe’s policemen will persist and will
limit the effectiveness of this cooperation.

31 This agency coordinates the operative cooperation of the member states in protecting
external borders. It also provides support to the individual member states in training national
border-patrol police and establishes common training norms, prepares risk analyses, monitors
the developments in research concerning border control and monitoring, supports the member
states in situations demanding increased technical and operative assistance on their external
boundaries, and offers the necessary support for the organisation of joint repatriations.
5.6 Final comments

The MENA countries are currently and will remain in the foreseeable future (perspective 2025) one of the most conflict-laden areas on the planet. They will thus also remain a region from which international and domestic conflicts will trigger migration and refugee movements. Even if there are individual MENA countries that, according to the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2013), can be seen as stable and peaceful (e.g., Qatar or the UAE), the majority of the countries in this region will continue to be threatened by the outbreak of new conflicts, as was shown in 2011, 2012 and 2013 by the events of the Arab Spring and its repercussions.

Although the role of the US in the development of specific centres of conflict and threats to peace cannot be denied – take, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan (Nirumand 2007) – there are many other internal factors, primarily the situation surrounding the Islamists, that serve as a central impetus for conflict. They create a constant migration pressure that is then increased, in the case of open disputes, by ad hoc migration movements.

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6 The uncertainties involved in calculating migration

Franz Nuscheler

6.1 Preface: The methodological problem

A few years before the uprisings in the Arab world, the migration researcher Steffen Angenendt wrote the following:

Generally speaking, we should remember that, for methodological reasons, any prognoses about migration potentials are based on so many assumptions as to be severely limited in value [...]. Making predictions about the development of a population is, in both the short- and mid-term, relatively reliable: Most influential factors are well known and stable, whereas many other assumptions on the economic, political and social development in the respective countries remain speculative. This is especially true of countries that experience profound transformational processes [...], and for countries in the midst of latent or even manifest political crises, such as a number of countries in North Africa (Angenendt 2008: 19-20).

This is particularly true of the MENA region. It was the situation before the revolutionary upheavals in the Arab world, and it has not changed since, especially because there is no certain ending to its course. Today, it is still unclear what the ramifications of the profound changes taking place in this region will be for the migration patterns of its citizens. Will the ‘uprising at the doorstep of Europe’ (Scholl-Latour 2011) mean that residents of the MENA region will cross that threshold, as has occurred to a limited extent in Tunisia and Libya? The insurrection in Syria, still of unknown outcome and even more unknown impact on the entire region, has raised the level of tenuousness of all prognoses and predictions.

Today one can observe a growing influence of religious groups on the political developments and reorientation processes in all MENA countries caught up in this transition – but it is still unclear whether or not they will orient themselves towards Turkey as a model of moderate Islam. The regional expert Volker Perthes (2011: 165) expects that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood will move toward becoming a ‘conservative people's
party with a religious imprint like the AKP in Turkey. Initially, there was conflict between various religious and secular groups, whereby the more spontaneous *avant-garde* followers of the Arab Spring were no match for the well-organised members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This development became evident in the first parliamentary elections that took place in Tunisia and Egypt. Behind the scenes, many pre-revolutionary power and social structures, as well as the conflicting interests of the major world powers, were still at work. The developments in the entire region, as well as in the individual countries, were in flux and hardly amenable to serious scientific prognoses.

The construction of any sort of middle-term scenario (say, up to 2025) requires some calculability and foreseeability. The premises employed must not only be theoretically well-founded, but must also not exclude various sequences and results of an if-then nature. The history of migration movements depends on certain variable political and socio-economic parameters in both the home and the destination countries which do not allow statistical projections based on present developments and existing data.

Neither the social sciences in general, conflict research in particular, nor economics as a whole have the ability to prognosticate developments, such as conflicts and crises or economic growth and *per capita* income, as accurately as demographics can project population developments based on calculable trends. Presumed objective projections of economic growth and *per capita* income, which play a major role in Michael Bommes’, Simon Fellmer’s and Friederike Zigmann’s estimates of migration potential in this volume, can become meaningless in the presence of unforeseen events in either the world economy or during crises at the local or regional level.

The Millennium Project (n.d.), organised by the World Federation of UN Associations (WFUNA), summarised the methods, benefits and limits of global exploratory scenarios. Their synopsis of the various models and scenarios developed by think-tanks, institutes and individual researchers to describe global developments is proof of the general usefulness of such procedures — but it also clearly demonstrates how vulnerable they are to uncalculable events. Particularly in conflict-laden areas — and the MENA region surely is one — the socio-economic situation and migration behaviour are dependent on the course of both domestic and cross-border conflicts and, of course, on the vulnerability to economic crises of all sorts of economies that live off natural resources and tourism. Tourism, the great job-creator of the region, is especially sensitive to political unrest. Every major act of terror reported in Europe’s press could, for example,
lead to major disturbances to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s tourist business, to detrimental effects on their foreign currency balances and, in the end, to negative repercussions in their job markets. This was the case following the recent revolutionary upheavals. Such uncertainties make it difficult to make prognoses about domestic conflicts that can eventually cause smaller or larger migratory movements to regions both near and far.

6.1.1 The example of Turkey

Various future scenarios of the development of world politics and world economics (e.g., by Pricewaterhouse Coopers) refer to Turkey – which represents a sort of bridge between the Oriental and Occidental parts of the world – as one country that will belong to the winners in the world economy over the coming decades and will play an important role in both regional and supraregional affairs. These scenarios, which foresee lower migration from Turkey and stimulate return, assume the integration of Turkey in the EU, as well as a stable domestic situation as a result of EU regulatory policies. Yet these policies conflict with many of the doctrines found in Turkey’s political and cultural history (see Bezwan 2008).

Turkey’s full membership of the EU is currently being blocked by forces within the EU that raise both cultural and migration-policy objections. The stabilisation of the domestic situation is hampered not only by ongoing conflict with the Kurds, but also by the struggle between the secular groups (Kemalists) supported by the powerful military and the traditionalist Islamic groups that can win elections. This cultural and political struggle has yet to be decided definitively. Such political uncertainties could disrupt the migration potential proposed by Heinz Fassmann and the migration scenarios proposed by Bommes, Fellmer and Zigman in this volume, which are based on the example of Poland and derive from both demographic and socio-economic developments.

6.1.2 The example of the Mediterranean Union

These uncertainties also affect another project initiated by the EU – the Mediterranean Union – whose institutional organisation, financial endowment and effectivity have become even more unpredictable due to the recent upheavals in the Arab world. The planned trade preferences and public and private investments, which were supposed to revitalise the faltering Barcelona Process, would surely have been able to further both economic and social development in the region and reduce existing migra-
tion pressures by presenting new and better perspectives for the future. What they cannot guarantee, however, is political stability, which does not necessarily ensue as a dividend of growing prosperity (see Zorob 2008). The EU policies concerning the Mediterranean area were criticised for being inconsistent, on the one hand pushing policies against unwanted migration and, on the other, contributing to the social and economic development of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea (see Borchardt 2011).

6.2 Uncertainties in security policy

Scenarios concerning matters of security policy are dependent on many intertwining domestic and international developments, such as changes to domestic government policy or changes in strategy by external actors, which follow no calculable logic. Here are some examples of such political imponderables in the MENA region.

Firstly, one cannot predict with any certainty the future of the fragile state of Iraq. At least 3 million persons have crossed the borders to countries near and far – among these also countries in Europe that have been confronted with a number of problems and controversies related to the granting of preferential asylum to Christians. The even-more-incalculable risks that developed after the withdrawal of US troops in late 2011 are affecting the migration situation in the entire Middle East, for which Europe is a close destination.

The same is true of the destabilisation of Syria; the ramifications of these developments for security and migration policies will be treated further below. Similarly unpredictable is the prospect of achieving a lasting peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict, which involves a number of countries in the region as well as many external actors. Previous peace plans, developed under the hegemonic auspices of the United States and co-financed by the EU, have failed because of the irreconcilable differences between Israel and the political representation of the Palestinians, deeply divided about how to deal with Israel and how to achieve a lasting peace since Hamas won the elections in the Gaza Strip. Nor are the Israelis united in opting for a two-state solution. For this reason, there is great scepticism among experts as to the real chances of achieving a peaceful solution to this major conflict affecting the security situation in the entire region.

Some experts view the ‘Islamist threat’ as the largest risk to security within the MENA region (see Faath & Mattes in this volume). This risk scenario is not calculable, but it would have an immense effect on intraregional
and international migration. The parliamentary elections held in Egypt and Tunisia following the respective change of regimes demonstrated the relative strength of the Islamic groups, not the least because they, unlike the more secular organisations and the ‘Facebook revolutionaries’, commanded a well-organised base. Nevertheless, an ‘Islamist threat’ as such did not emerge.

According to the quantitative data of the *Global Peace Index*, most countries in the MENA region were prone to conflicts, which became manifest in the Arab Spring. In the *Failed States Index* (Fund for Peace 2011), which surveys conditions in 177 countries, several of those from the Middle East – first and foremost Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen – lead the group of ‘critical states’. The fragility of the governments in these ‘failed states’ blocks development, creates considerable legal uncertainty and prompts those ready to migrate to leave.

### 6.3 The ‘Islamist threat’: The main source of conflicts and forced migration?

Researchers such as Nirumand (2007) have provided rather conspiratory interpretations of nearly all conflicts in the Middle East as being motivated by the geostrategic interests of the US and their desire to secure resources. Others, such as Faath and Mattes in this volume, regard internal factors – namely the problems surrounding the Islamists – as the ‘central impetus for conflict’ and as the source of ‘constant migration pressure’ that may even be intensified should open conflicts arise. It is their prognosis – and this is important to the scenario concerning future security interests – ‘that this part of the world will remain, in the future, the stage for international and domestic conflicts. Domestic conflicts, in particular, will dominate and determine the amount of migratory activity’.

Faath and Mattes see – in the strengthening Islamist positions in Egypt – a reason for the possible exodus of Coptic Christians from the country. They admit that the migration potential arising from domestic conflicts is hard to calculate, but they still assign to recent developments a large probability of open conflicts causing massive migration movements that would eventually reach Europe. As in the situation of Christian refugees from Iraq, Europe would then once again be confronted with the difficult matter of whether to use religion as a criterion for selection, a questionable procedure with respect to both international law and human-rights concerns.
These authors’ emphasis on the ‘Islamist threat’ as the primary reason behind, and the major push factor for, migration is not convincing, for several reasons. First, it sweepingly demonises Islamism, with its very different shapes and forms, as an overall extremist and potentially terrorist movement. Lübben (2008: 111), on the other hand, exonerates the Muslim Brotherhood. They do not represent an ‘extremist Islamist power, but are rather an integral part of Egyptian society’ and oriented toward domestic political reform – after all, they were the ones who demanded and forced democratic reforms from an authoritarian regime. These authors may tend to forget that pragmatism was also invoked as protection against repression, but they do contradict the superficial identification of Islamism with a potential terrorist threat.

Second, limiting the conflict potential to the ‘Islamist threat’ largely ignores other endogenous reasons for conflict and migration – for example, distributional conflicts over dwindling resources (land, water, jobs etc.) due to a growing population and climate change, the inability of most MENA countries to provide their still rapidly growing (and thus young) populations with prospects at home, and the repression by autocratic regimes of minorities or opposition groups.

Third, focusing solely on domestic-conflict potential also disregards the influence of external interests in this geopolitically important and resource-rich region – something that has become even more important in the ‘war on terror’. While the Middle East and security expert Perthes (2000) stresses the relative autonomy of regional actors, and thus questions conspiracy theories regarding US hegemony, he does not deny the influence of external actors on the dynamics of conflict. Following the upheavals in the Arab world he again notes:

Western countries had to realise that they could not influence the outbreak of such transitions, and that they could only marginally influence their course. They can help or be in the way, but they cannot determine the outcomes of these radical changes (Perthes 2011: 63).

Research on what causes war has, for decades now, tried to differentiate between the internal and external factors in this conglomerate, proposing, as an alternative to the ‘Islamist threat’ as the sole reason for conflict in the MENA states, the theory of ‘internationalised conflicts’. The high potential for conflict in the regional subsystem called the Middle East – and the resulting migration patterns – correlate with the historically grown
regional order, in which a complex web of factors stand against monocausal explanations.

To summarise the arguments up to now: We have neither serious prognoses concerning the development of regional conflict and the repercussions on migration nor do we possess any solid prognoses about the economic and political developments in the three countries in question – developments which, of course, are dependent on worldwide economic and political events. Hence even probability calculations are subject to uncertainty factors. Deducing migration potential mainly from population developments, as Ralf E. Ulrich does in this volume, or from age-specific migration patterns, as Heinz Fassmann does in this volume, falls short of explaining the phenomena found in the MENA region where the political factors causing both domestic and cross-border conflicts are difficult to calculate. Or, in other words, things could turn out quite differently to the way(s) in which the statistical projections suggest. It is certainly the case that the ‘youth bulge’ in the region is so large that a major portion of the in-part-well-trained young adults cannot be employed within the local job market and will thus produce a strong migration pressure.

6.4 The security risks posed by climate change with subsequent migration

Migration triggered by environmental factors tends to be neglected because of the difficulty of precisely defining this term. But, especially in North Africa, it is not negligible. The sheer scale of political instability and political repression, the continual fight for the distribution of dwindling resources, the still-high birth-rates, as well as the ecological damage already done – all of which hit the weakest and poorest of the population the hardest – increase the pressure to migrate. This pressure can effectively be relieved only by an increase in overall economic growth – and then only if a better system of distributing goods and services were implemented that would improve the living conditions of the majority of the populations and if a development policy oriented towards sustainability protected the life perspectives of the rural population. Neither of these prerequisites are currently fulfilled in either Egypt or Morocco.

The annual report for 2007 issued by the renowned climate, development and conflict researchers of the Scientific Commission of the German Government for Global Environmental Changes, entitled The security risk of climate change, identified – especially in North Africa – a security risk
caused by climate change, resulting in a growing emigration pressure: ‘The combination of increasing droughts and water shortages along with high birth-rates, poor agricultural potentials and underdeveloped political problem-solving abilities increase the potential for political crisis and migration pressure’ (WBGU 2007: 3).

Even if migration due to environmental factors largely occurs only within the respective country and contributes above all to an increase in the tendency toward greater urbanisation, it is clear that these sprawling urban conglomerations can effectively absorb only a very limited number of these migrants; this, in turn, will lead to their becoming merely ‘stopovers’ in the transcontinental migration chain, first and foremost directed towards Europe.

The reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and a number of other international organisations no longer allow the environmentally triggered migration from North Africa to be ignored. A number of studies have also emphasised the security policy dimension evident in environmental crises (see Brauch, Liotta, Marquina, Rogers & El-Sayed Selim 2003). The so-called Stern Review even foresees severe slumps in the world economy within the next few decades as a result of climate change. These economic slumps will hit ecologically vulnerable regions, including the MENA region, the hardest (Stern 2007).

6.5 Hotspots of regional conflict and migration

The uncertainty of the prognoses of migration potential in the MENA region, particularly in its most conflict-laden area of the Middle East (which is surrounded by many hardly-less-conflict-laden countries such as Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan!), is linked to a number of speculative scenarios concerning security policy. Two conflicts in particular could have considerable impact on the intra- and interregional migration, with the latter being directed towards Europe.

6.5.1 The disintegration of Iraq?

While the US and its allies in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ were able to topple the Baath regime relatively quickly and thus achieve their declared primary goal in the Iraq war, which could hardly mask their underlying more important goals of securing access to major oil resources and hegemonic influence in the entire Gulf region, they did not succeed in democratising
and stabilising Iraq – two goals introduced \textit{a posteriori} as justifications for the war activities. The liberal idea of ‘peace-building’ based on a cycle of democratisation, free-market transformation and social pacification, with all three processes reinforcing each other, failed miserably. What happened in Iraq cannot be whitewashed by conjuring up the paradigm of some well-intended ‘liberal imperialism’.

Rather, the occupied country disintegrated into civil-war-like conflicts between the three major zones divided by ethnic and religious differences: the region in the north dominated by the Kurds, organised like a largely autonomous substate; the areas under Shiite control in the south, home to armed militias funded by Shiite Iran, actively fighting the occupying forces as well as both Sunni and Christian minorities; and the so-called Sunnite Triangle, where the remaining forces of Sunni rule from the time of Saddam Hussein and his elite troops (with the help of Arab Jihadists) have set up well-organised and violent resistance. The main enemies – besides the occupying forces – have been those not belonging to the respective ethnic or confessional group. According to the information gathered by the Society for Threatened Peoples, the ‘greatest persecution of Christians today’ is taking place in Iraq, and its victims are migrating, and will continue to migrate, above all, to Europe.

The presence of some 130,000 troops from the US and other NATO countries was only partially able to stem the development of these events bordering on civil war. What it could not stop was the disintegration of the former autocratic political system. The result, according to UNHCR data, was the flight of over 1.5 million refugees to Syria, around 750,000 to Jordan, some 200,000 to the other Gulf states, 100,000 to Egypt and 40,000 to Lebanon, where they still live today under more-than-precarious circumstances. The UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) has warned that Syria and Jordan might collapse under the burden of the Iraqi refugees, who are straining their housing markets, infrastructure, and health and educational facilities – not the least because the countries that instigated the war have offered very little help and taken in only a few refugees (Zorob 2007).

The civil war in Syria dramatically aggravated the situation of the refugees from Iraq and forced hundreds of thousands of them either to flee – along with Syrians – to the refugee camps set up in neighbouring countries or else to return to Iraq, where they had lost everything and could not hope for a safe life – a human tragedy, which was not given much attention in the Western media. The refugees from Iraq were trapped, and only a small number of them were allowed into the EU. The Union took a much more
restrictive attitude compared with the case of the civil-war refugees from the Balkans in the 1990s.

By the end of 2012, only about 5 per cent of the Iraqi refugees (i.e., about 200,000) had reached Europe and other Western countries, which had established high barriers to a possible growing influx of migrants. The preferential treatment of Christians demanded by the Western churches and Christians stands in conflict with the terms of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, which expressly forbids any discrimination (positive or negative) on the basis of religious affiliation.

To date it is unclear whether the present Iraqi government, following the complete withdrawal of US troops, will be able to check the disintegration of the Iraqi state and stop the civil war. Thus, it is also unclear whether the Iraqi refugees will be able to return or whether the pressure to migrate to Europe will continue. The more the overwhelmed neighbour states try to block the influx of new refugees by setting up strict border and immigration controls – and the more they demand the repatriation of refugees to a still-war-torn country – the more Europe must reckon with a continued or increasing inflow of refugees from Iraq in the next few years, particularly as Syria can no longer serve as a regional buffer.

The other Arab states in the region have done little to contribute to an intraregional solution to this refugee problem. Some, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have strictly refused to accept any Iraqi refugees, especially the Shiites and Christians among them, whereas others (such as Egypt) reacted in as reserved a manner as the EU countries and the US. This makes a regionalisation of the problem impossible and exposes Europe to further migration.

The future of Iraq remains an element of uncertainty in the entire conflict and migration situation in this region, which will inevitably spread to Turkey and the rest of Europe. These problems make the construction of scenarios that attempt to consider the various possible realities precarious at the very least.

6.5.2 Syria: The agony of a further dictatorship

While uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were forcing regime changes, Syria seemed to be an anchor of stability in the region. Despite its own considerable problems with infrastructure and supply, it had managed to absorb approximately 1.5 million refugees from Iraq and thus helped to avoid their further exodus to Europe. The violent repression of the local protests against the dictatorial Assad regime, however, not only worsened the conditions of these refugees, but also drove almost 1.8 million Syr-
ians across the border, particularly into neighbouring Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. By July 2013, roughly 600,000 Syrian refugees were stranded in small Lebanon alone, greatly overstretching the capacities of the country (UNHCR 2013a).

Due to the intensifying military conflict between the Assad regime – provided with weapons by Russia and Iran – and the various rebel groups – supplied with money and weapons by several Arab states (mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) and supported with diplomatic and humanitarian assistance from Western countries, the UNHCR (2013a) expects that more than 3 million refugees will have crossed into neighbouring states by the end of 2013, unless a political solution is found and an internationally financed programme for the reconstruction of the destroyed cities is established. Also, according to UNHCR (2013b), there were more than 2.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) seeking refuge and a secure livelihood in ever-worsening circumstances in 2013. Repatriation of the refugees and IDPs will be a huge challenge for the international community.

Syria became the acid test for the ability of the UN to act in accordance with its Charter. In its Security Council, the veto powers blocked each other, as they did during the Cold War, at the expense of the Syrian population suffering from the disintegration of its country. The responsibility to protect that was established in 2005 and obliges the nation states and the international community to protect the civilian population from fear and need thus became a toothless tool.

6.5.3 The Middle East conflict at the centre of the regional conflict and migration

It is not the intention of this chapter to work through the results of the many studies about the origin, course and regional/international implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The endemic ‘structural peacelessness’, as strong today as it ever was, is the result of two peoples laying claim to the same territory of Palestine; of an imbalance of military superiority and inferiority; and of political and economic dominance and dependence.

The state of Israel originated from migration, and the story of its formation is one of the partially voluntary and partially forced exodus of Palestinians from Palestine to the neighbouring Arab states; their right to return to Palestine is the disputed and to-date-unsolved subject of all peace negotiations. Their massive migration to the Gulf states and other parts of the world is one reason why Palestinians in the refugee camps and in the two (divided) settlement zones on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip
have survived so long. The history of Palestine is one of migration and will remain so in the foreseeable future – again, with major consequences for both regular and irregular migration to Europe.

The central question is not how it came to the present plight of ‘structural peacelessness’ of two neighbouring peoples after multitudes of peace initiatives, but how the further development of this unsolved conflict will influence regional conflicts and migration patterns. The election victory of the Iran-supported Hamas Party in the Gaza Strip represents a decisive point in the long history of this conflict because this organisation rejects any peaceful solution and is at odds (sometimes violently) with the competing Fatah group, which has shown more willingness to compromise.

The political, economic and demographic development in the Gaza Strip exacerbates the explosive security situation in the entire region. High fertility rates have led to a veritable population explosion in this narrow and encapsulated territory that offers the young population (despite the high educational standards) low future prospects and where a peaceful conflict solution has been blocked since the election victory of Hamas. The subsequent loss of international subsidies has caused a humanitarian catastrophe. All of this has resulted in armed conflicts between Hamas and Fatah which have the potential to trigger large migration from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, to neighbouring countries and to Europe. The violent removal by Hamas of the border with Egypt following Israel’s shutting of the borders and its refusal to supply this zone with important goods was a desperate act that could take place again at any time.

Still, things could turn out quite differently if the existential hardships (and pressure from its Arab neighbours) were to force Hamas to take up negotiations and enter into a compromise with Israel. Earlier examples of such a development are the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as well as the arrangement negotiated by the US between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), both of which were the result of a general weariness of the parties and their respective comprehension of existential necessities.

Analysts of the conflict in the Middle East are still sceptical about the realistic likelihood of reaching a peaceful and long-lasting solution, but compromise does seem possible in this complicated power struggle, as was the case in past relations between Arabs and Israel. But, and this is an important observation, these solutions are hardly calculable in scenarios. Security policy is determined by how interests are perceived and thus expressly includes irrational behaviour.
6.5.4 Lebanon: Instability factor in the Middle East conflict

Lebanon is ethnically and religiously very heterogeneous, with a Muslim majority ruled by a Christian power elite (Maronites). It has been involved in two wars with Israel and experienced a very destructive civil war (1975-1991) of its own while, at the same time, having to put up with Syrian occupation troops that instrumentalised the independently operating Shiite Hezbollah fighters following their own forced withdrawal. This situation especially upset the wealthy Christians, with their many connections with the rest of the world, and produced a constant and, in part, growing stream of migrants to Europe and other areas of the world. Media attention has remained moderate only because the overall number of migrants has remained moderate.

This small country has been home to large Palestinian refugee camps since the very first war following the establishment of the state of Israel – a constant source of unrest and a never-ending flow of new recruits for terrorist groups. The ensuing political instability in Lebanon has brought about constant insecurity and has become a background for a multitude of civil-war-like conflicts in the region. And in the future this will surely remain a central push factor for migration. At the same time, though small and the child of colonialism, together with Syria (a constant interventional power) it forms an important transit and reception area for migrants from Iraq and other areas of conflict in South Asia.

If the organisations representing the Muslim majority (and enjoying the support of Syria and Iran) succeed in forcing out the Maronitic ruling class from all political offices, a new civil war fought with the support of much external money and arms will surely ensue – which may not only induce Israel to intervene once again, but may also trigger a new and even larger flow of refugees to both near and far. Though small, Lebanon, like Syria, is still a force to be reckoned with in the conflict and migration potential of the Middle East region.

6.5.5 Once upon a time: ‘Bad guy’ Gaddafi as Europe’s accomplice in matters of migration

The repressive regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya served to block irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa – and thus did the ‘dirty work’ for Europe as far as migration is concerned. According to data from the UNHCR, tens of thousands of African refugees were stranded in the poorly supplied refugee camps in Libya; there they were subject to many
indignities, were often simply returned to the desert without regard for their survival, or were recruited as mercenaries or held as house slaves.

All of this occurred under the eyes of European immigration authorities and with complete disregard for all regulations surrounding asylum and human-rights standards. The Italian government under Silvio Berlusconi, for example, made an agreement with the Libyan regime to allow Italian commercial vessels and warships to take any boat refugees swept up in the Mediterranean back to the Libyan shore without initiating asylum procedures. Only after the revolution in Libya did the European Court, in a verdict of 23 February 2012, repeal this agreement, which, of course, contradicts all international laws on the treatment of refugees. In July 2013 it was still unclear how the post-revolutionary rulers in Libya would deal with the migratory pressures emerging from the Sahel zone. A major factor is how much help the EU authorities will extend to a transit country for refugees making their way to Europe. The changes induced by the Libyan revolution could provide them with the opportunity to establish acceptable and humanitarian agreements with the new government, which may expect help as compensation for providing a line of defence against unwanted migrants.

6.6 Uncertain and rather dismal perspectives

A study by the GIGA Institute in Hamburg (Brach 2008) carried out an econometric analysis of economic development in the MENA region and the resultant perspectives for the near future. They concluded that it was not the domestic conflicts and trade barriers that represented the greatest obstacles to the economic development of the region, but rather the lack of technological reform and the dominance of economic institutions guided by rent-seeking. The Arab World Competitiveness Report supported this thesis (World Economic Forum 2007). The GIGA study made the prognosis that, in the medium term, neither the authoritative political structures nor the rent-seeking behaviour would be reformed (Brach 2008: 31). The Arab Spring did cast doubt on the veracity of the political part of this prediction, but it did nothing to improve socio-economic perspectives in the region. One may continue to doubt whether the trade incentives and investment programmes drawing on monies in the coffers of the planned Mediterranean Union will be able to overcome these structural deficits.

Similar scepticism may be found in the study on the Maghreb by the Duisburg Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) – entitled Trends in
security and development – which lent greater importance to the political, social and ecological uncertainties:

The inequality in distribution caused by existing elite structures and authoritarian regimes will continue and indeed be exacerbated in the coming ten to fifteen years because of the ecological erosion, caused amongst others by the expected climate changes in the region, and the consequences of economic liberalisation. The results will be growing migration from rural to urban areas, transnational migration and social unrest, all of which may find expression in radical opposition to repressive political systems (Houdret, Kievelitz & Mumenthaler 2008: 39).

Applied to Morocco, this means political conflicts could shake those scenarios which assume that Morocco will turn from a country of emigration into one of immigration. Political stability could also be greatly strained by uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) waves of migration from sub-Saharan Africa. The EU has invested great sums in enabling Morocco to establish a forward defence against irregular transit migration, but experience shows that stricter control of the long borders with the South, better domestic control of movement and the quick deportation of apprehended migrants (without regard to international human-rights standards) tend to have only a limited effect and may, in fact, raise the spectre of a police state. It also does not harmonise very well with the legal and human-rights postulates otherwise championed by the EU.

6.7 Conclusions

Migration potential stemming from domestic conflicts cannot be predicted with any reasonable level of accuracy, but examples from the recent past do allow us to conclude that migration tends to increase rapidly when open conflicts occur. The probability of migration increases with the conflict potential present in the region. However, these conflicts are not necessarily the product of the ‘Islamist threat’, but rather of a mix of political, socio-economic and cultural factors, at both the domestic and the international levels. The migrations resulting from these very different types of conflict are perceived as a threat more than an opportunity for continued prosperity in Europe – even though Europe needs immigration and the nearby MENA region possesses an excess of workers. Europe’s deep-rooted ‘fear of Islam’ poses an almost insurmountable cultural obstacle to the prevailing of a more utilitarian viewpoint.
References


Part III
Prognosis, scenarios and forecasts
Demographic developments in the MENA region

Ralf E. Ulrich

7.1 Introduction

The EU and the MENA (Middle East and North African) countries' are separated only by the Mediterranean Sea. And yet there could hardly be more demographic and economic differences between two regions. In 2010, the EU had a population of around 500 million persons, while the MENA states had over 455 million inhabitants (UNPD 2011a). After 100 years of demographic transition, the countries of the EU today are characterised by low fertility, a dwindling population and demographic ageing. This demographic predicament will precipitate considerable economic and social problems in the various countries of the EU in the medium and near future. By contrast, families in the MENA have, on average, twice as many children as families in the EU, which has led to a substantial increase in the overall population and a young demographic structure. The great importance of the MENA countries, however, cannot be measured by their demographics, but by the fact that two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located in this region (Eltigani 2000).

In light of these demographic disparities and geographic proximity, it would seem logical to study more closely the potential for future migration from the MENA region to Europe. Future demographic developments in the MENA region will surely influence its migration potential and its economic perspectives. Nevertheless, the relationship between demographic development and migration is not necessarily linear or easy to discern, as the two following chapters will also show.

This chapter analyses, first, the population dynamics of the MENA region, in particular the three countries chosen for this project – Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. It also treats past migration patterns. Then we look at the forecasts for population growth and the effects it will have on future
demographic development. Finally, we take a look at the relevance of the demographic developments we have identified for future migration potential.

7.2 Population dynamics of the MENA region

7.2.1 Demographic dimensions and characteristics

In 2010 the MENA countries had a population that was nearly as large as that of the EU: 454.5 million persons and thus 6.6 per cent of the total world population (UNPD 2011a). The EU-27 had an overall population in 2010 of 500.4 million persons. Egypt, Turkey and Iran are the most populous of the MENA countries, each with over 70 million inhabitants. On the other hand, there are small countries like Qatar, Djibouti and Bahrain with fewer than 2 million persons each.

Populations in the countries of the EU-27 grew by some 30 per cent over the past 60 years, whereas the MENA countries had a much larger population growth (see Table 7.1). The number of citizens in the MENA region grew 4.4 times from 1950 to 2010, but population growth has been slowing down since then. Whereas, in the 1950s, the population of the MENA countries combined grew at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent, today the growth rate has fallen to only 1.7 per cent per year.

Table 7.1 Population size and change in the EU and the MENA countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
<th>Index 2010</th>
<th>Annual increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1950=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>373.3</td>
<td>500.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>104.0</td>
<td>454.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The three countries chosen to be studied in more detail in this project together have a population of about 185 million persons and thus represent 41 per cent

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2 The membership of the European Union (EU-27) has also been used for the historic comparisons in this chapter.
of the population of the entire MENA region. Compared to their MENA neighbours, all three of these countries had a relatively lower than average population increase of around 3.8 times since 1950. The population increase in Morocco and Turkey today even lies below the average for all MENA states. Only Egypt is still growing at about the average rate of the entire MENA region (Yousef 2004).

In its migration activity as well as in many other political and economic respects the MENA region is closely aligned to its southern neighbours. The MENA region has nineteen direct and indirect bordering neighbours with a total population of about the same as the MENA region itself. In the past, the other countries of this region were demographically similar to the MENA countries. Today, however, their annual population growth of 2.5 per cent is still significantly higher than that of the MENA region.

Figure 7.1  Urban population as percentage of total population

![Urban population as percentage of total population](image)

Source: UNPD (2012)

The MENA region is home to some of the oldest cities in human history – including the two megacities of Cairo and Istanbul. At the beginning of the 1950s, most inhabitants of the MENA countries lived in rural areas, with the cities of the region being home to only 28 per cent of the population (see Figure 7.1). In modern Europe, too, urbanisation expanded in the second half of the twentieth century, with 74 per cent of all EU citizens now residing in

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3 In 2010, there was a total of 447 million inhabitants in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Togo.
cities. However, the speed with which urbanisation progressed in the MENA region has been very high, with 63 per cent of the residents currently living in urban areas. In Egypt the situation is less marked. Here most residents still reside in rural areas. Turkey, on the other hand, has apparently adapted to EU standards regarding urbanisation.

7.2.2 Determinants of population dynamics

One reference point for evaluating the demographic dynamic and for comparing two very different regions is the demographic transition model, reflecting the shift from demographic equilibrium with high fertility and high mortality to one with low mortality and low fertility (Münz & Ulrich 2007). By the middle of the twentieth century, the EU countries had already reached the fourth stage of demographic transition in which mortality and fertility were significantly reduced. Many MENA countries were or still are in the third stage of demographic transition, where mortality has receded but fertility is only just beginning to recede. In general, today, fertility and mortality in most countries of the MENA region are the most important factors of population dynamics. Cross-border migration affecting the overall demographic balance plays a major role in only a very few countries.

Table 7.2 Mortality in the EU and the MENA region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality, per 1,000 live births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The last 50 years have seen a considerable convergence between the two regions with respect to their mortality and fertility rates. Whereas the difference in life expectancy in 1950 was more than twenty years, today it lies at around seven years. In 1950 about 20 per cent of all babies died before their first birthday in the MENA region whereas today the figure lies at around 2.6 per cent. In the EU, however, infant mortality decreased more quickly, so that the differential between the two regions has increased.
In 1950, infant mortality in the MENA countries was 3.3 times that of the EU-27 countries – today the figure lies at about five times (see Table 7.2). Within the EU, the decrease in fertility has been dramatic over the last few decades – from 2.5 to 1.6 children per woman. Yet the fall in the MENA states was even more dramatic – in 1950 the women of this region bore an average of seven children, and today that figure lies at 2.6 (see Table 7.3)!

Table 7.3  Total fertility rates (per woman)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The Population Division of the United Nations (UNPD) expects mortality in Europe to continue to slowly decrease, as in past decades, whereas fertility is expected to gradually rise over the years to come. For the countries of the MENA region they expect a continuation of the fall in fertility until 2030. For Turkey, for example, this would mean an overall total fertility rate of 1.7 children per woman, compared to 2.1 children per woman in the MENA states.

7.2.3 Migration and refugees

Figure 7.2 gives aggregate estimates – made by the UNPD based on net migration figures for individual countries – for the migration balance of the EU and the MENA region. If we disregard the fluctuations driven by business cycles and the oil-price-induced recession in the 1970s, there was a steady rise in the number of immigrants coming to the EU up to 2005. The MENA region was an emigration area before the price of oil rose in 1974. The rise of the crude-oil price from US$2 in 1970 to over US$35 in 1980 created a tremendous hiring boom in the building and service industries in the oil-producing (and -exporting) countries. This meant a large demand for workers that could be satisfied only by hiring migrant workers from neighbouring countries, including the populous countries of the region without oil reserves of their own (especially Egypt). In 1970, some 1.1 million foreigners were working in the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and, by 1990, that figure had climbed to 5.2 million persons. Some 2 million Egyptians were working in Iraq alone at the beginning of the 1990s (Roudi-Fahimi & Kent 2007: 12).

**Figure 7.2  Net cross-border migration in the EU and the MENA region (’000)**

![Net cross-border migration graph]

*Note: The figure shows the sum of the national net migration balances.*

*Source: UNPD (2011a)*

In the second half of the 1980s, recruitment from outside the region also increased greatly, particularly from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. From the early 1990s to the turn of the century, the MENA region had again become a net emigration area. In the years 2000-2005, Egypt and Morocco each lost more than 0.5 million persons. Turkey, on the other hand, had a nearly balanced migration score due to returning emigrants (re-migration).

Table 7.4 gives an overview of the magnitude of the stock of international migrants living in the EU-27 and the MENA region according to data from the UNPD. These numbers include migrants entering from other countries of the respective region – e.g., Italian immigrants in Germany. Note that the migration statistics of the MENA countries and of some EU countries are occasionally incomplete.
In the region constituted by the current EU-27 countries, the size of the stock of international migrants has grown constantly since 1960, whereas this process began in the MENA region only in the 1970s, following the oil-price shock. In 2010, some 31.4 million foreign migrants were living in the MENA states, particularly in Saudi Arabia (7.3 million), in the United Arab Emirates (3.3 million), and in Israel and Jordan (each 3 million; including Palestinian refugees).

The three countries chosen for this study – Turkey, Egypt and Morocco – had a total of only 1.7 million foreign migrants, according to UN estimates from 2011, 1.4 million of whom lived in Turkey alone. These countries belong to the group of sending countries of international migration; Turkey, however, is an immigration country as well.

Table 7.5 uses information from the Global Migrant-Origin Database of the Sussex Development Research Centre (DRC) for the EU-27, the MENA
A total of 18 million persons from MENA countries live abroad, 7.1 million of whom live in other MENA countries, 7.4 million in the EU and 3.3 million in other countries outside these two regions. The number of emigrants from EU countries is considerably larger (27.8 million) – even though the overall population of the EU and the MENA region is nearly identical. About 11.4 million EU emigrants live in another EU country, but some 2 million persons still reside in the MENA states and 14.3 million in other countries around the world. The 7.4 million MENA citizens residing in the EU in 2000 were met by 2 million citizens of EU countries residing in the MENA region. Note that some of the latter may be former citizens of MENA countries who returned from the EU after having acquired the citizenship of their EU country of residence.

Of the three sample countries studied, Egypt had the smallest number of citizens living abroad – three-quarters of whom were residing in another MENA country (1 million alone in Saudi Arabia), and only 192,000 in the EU (see also chapter 1, table 1.1 in this volume). In the year 2000, some 41,000 Egyptians were living in Germany. Morocco, on the other hand, a country with only half the population of Egypt, has a considerably larger diaspora: 2.6 million Moroccans or citizens with a Moroccan migration background live abroad. Many of these live in the nearest EU countries, the most important being France with around 760,000 persons from Morocco, followed by Spain with 340,000 and Germany with 294,000. According to the estimates of the DRC, Turkey has the largest diaspora of the three countries (3 million persons), half of whom live in Germany. Other important destination countries are the Netherlands and France.

Being forced to leave one’s country is one of the major reasons for the migratory developments in the MENA region over the past few decades. In 2010, according to UNHCR data, more than 4.5 million persons were refugees, were in refugee-like situations or were internally displaced in the MENA region (see Table 7.6). Of these, 1.3 million alone were internally displaced persons in Iraq, 1 million were refugees in Syria and 1 million in Iran. A proportion of these refugees had come to seek refuge from outside the respective country, e.g., refugees from Afghanistan fleeing to Iran. Worldwide a total of 3 million refugees had fled the MENA region by 2010. Of course, the numbers vary greatly from year to year and reflect both

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4 The Global Migrant-Origin Database of the Development Research Centre (DRC) at the University of Sussex (UK) is a largely consistent source of estimates on the origin of migrants. This database allows us to depict and calculate the residence of citizens from around the world according to country (last data available for 2000).
long-standing conflicts (e.g., in Palestine) and newer conflicts and crises (see Faath & Mattes in this volume).

### Table 7.6 Refugees according to country of asylum and country of origin, end 2010 (‘000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Refugees*</th>
<th>Internally Displaced Persons**</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1,393.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,393.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>3,012.8</td>
<td>1,564.6</td>
<td>4,577.4</td>
<td>2,055.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>146.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Accredited refugees according to UNHCR statute as well as persons in a refugee-like situation; **IDPs protected/assisted by UNHCR, including people in IDP-like situations
Source: UNHCR (2011)

The three sample countries are currently not severely affected by refugee migration. There are, however, 147,000 refugees from Turkey living in other countries (largely Kurds). In the region there have been many examples of large groups of refugees destabilising political situations – e.g., in Lebanon and in Jordan.

### 7.3 Future population dynamics: Potential and limitations

The currently slowing but still high population growth in the MENA region carries with it the potential for future population dynamics. Projections of future population growth allow us to estimate the effects of demographic changes and thus judge the trends already present in today’s structures. The broadest international comparative data for countries around the world stem from the UNPD, which regularly publishes an extensive set of indicators. This publication describes the parameters used in great detail and is recognised internationally for its expertise. The following remarks reflect the results of the latest population projection from the year 2011.
7.3.1 Population scenarios

Population projections usually start from assumptions about the future course of fertility, mortality and migration. The combination of these assumptions results in scenarios that reflect a broad spectrum of possibilities according to the respective hypotheses. The variant chosen by the experts as having the greatest probability is depicted as the medium scenario.

The UNPD calculated a total of eight scenarios in their latest study (see Table 7.7). Five of the scenarios differ in their assumptions about fertility, ranging from constant fertility at the present rate to low-, high- and (from the current vantage point, most likely, scenario) medium-level fertility. A further fertility scenario (instant replacement fertility) shows what would happen if all countries were to have fertility rates at the replacement level (2.1 children per woman). In other scenarios, the current level of mortality is held constant, or alternative assumptions concerning the spread of HIV/AIDS or the availability of an HIV vaccine are taken into consideration. The Population Division extrapolates the data from past migration trends in each country on the basis of expert opinions and presents the insights gathered in seven scenarios. In a further scenario (‘zero migration’), it is assumed that all countries have a balanced net migration in the years 2010-2015.

For the purposes of this study we will use the medium-fertility scenario specified by the UNPD for our further demographic analysis. From the assumptions made for the medium scenario and current population estimates, the UNPD calculated the population size and structure by the year 2100.

Table 7.7 Increase in population through to 2030

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
<th>Index 2030</th>
<th>Yearly increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>500.4</td>
<td>510.9</td>
<td>515.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>454.5</td>
<td>529.5</td>
<td>594.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)
7.3.2 Limits of growth

In this scenario, the EU-27 would experience a slight rise in population and then a decrease. To date, the population of the MENA region has more than quadrupled since 1950 and will continue to rise by a third of its present size by 2030. Thus, whereas the region currently has slightly fewer inhabitants than the EU, by 2030 it will have increased to 15 per cent more than the EU-27.

Of the countries we chose to study more closely, Morocco and Turkey may expect a lower-than-average increase in population than the other MENA countries; Egypt will have about an average increase.

Seen internationally, the MENA region would appear to expect a moderate rate of population increase over the next twenty years, remaining below the values found in countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet it will remain higher than in nineteenth-century Europe. The socioeconomic ramifications of population growth of this magnitude are not the same everywhere or at all times, but rather depend on complementary conditions such as available capital and natural resources.

The Middle East and North Africa are among the regions of the world with the least renewable freshwater supplies. According to the World Bank (2012), of the eight countries with the smallest internal freshwater supply per capita in the year 2011, seven were MENA states (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). In Germany, for the same time period, a total of 1,306 m³ water per capita were available – in contrast to Jordan with 115 m³, Israel with 100 m³ and Syria with 356 m³. Other countries in the region are better off – e.g., Morocco with 917 m³ or Turkey with 3160 m³ water per capita. The availability of freshwater is also a much more complex matter than can be expressed in such statistics. On the one hand, there are cross-border rivers that can be tapped, such as the Nile River for Egypt. On the other hand, unequal supply throughout the year can be a very limiting factor for economic and demographic growth.

Yet some experts already foresee problems in the water resources of the MENA countries in the near future (see Ethelston 1999: 11; Nuscheler in this volume). Ethelston estimates that, in 1950, 14 million persons in this region were confronted with an acute water shortage; in the year 2025, this problem will affect more than 400 million people. At that point, the regional need for freshwater will surpass the resources by four times. Plans for Kenya and Tanzania, in particular, to tap into the Blue and the White Nile for irrigation projects in their own countries and to supply their own citizens with drinking water will certainly have a great effect on Egypt. A similar
situation could ensue because of the Ihsu Dam, which Turkey is planning as part of its South-East Anatolia Project (Great Anatolia Project or GAP), and which could be a source of conflict with Syria and Iraq.

If the population in the region continues to grow, not only will the freshwater supply become more difficult, but the ability of the countries to supply their citizens with food will also suffer. All countries in the MENA region have experienced a loss or stagnation of per capita agricultural area in past decades. In 1975, Turkey had 0.63 hectares available per capita; by 2009, this figure had sunk to 0.3 hectares — similar to the situation in Morocco, where it sank from 0.42 to 0.25 hectares. Intensive agricultural-exploitation methods might provide some respite but, in light of the limited water resources, the need to import food to feed the growing population will certainly be one danger. Financing food imports will be less of a problem for those MENA countries with their own oil supply; for the others it will remain a major stress factor.

In this respect, we should also note the population dynamics of the countries bordering the MENA region to the south. The population of these nineteen countries grew from 102 million in 1950 to 447 million today (i.e., 4.4 times as many). According to the population projections of the UN, it will continue to grow through to 2030 by more than 50 per cent of its present value — even though the yearly rate of increase is, in fact, on the downturn. In some of these countries the national basis for supplying food to the still-quickly increasing population is severely limited. Cultivating the poorer available soils — combined with desertification and other factors — will probably result in further increases in the price of food in these countries.

7.3.3 The changing age structure: Youth bulge and the demographic dividend

The rise in population and the changes taking place in the age structure of the MENA countries are closely related. On the one hand, there is still great momentum in the pyramid-like age structure of these countries, so that population growth will not slow down any time soon. The present generation of children is larger than that of their parents and, even if fewer children were born to each pair of parents, their greater number in ten to twenty years will still guarantee that the population will continue to rise (see Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005; Yousef 2000).

Whereas the EU countries now perceive themselves as quickly becoming aged societies, the percentage of children and adolescents in the MENA region is still relatively high.
Table 7.8  Age group 0–19 years, in millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Index 2030</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>123.8</td>
<td>106.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>179.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The proportion aged 0-19 years in the overall population of the MENA countries is today nearly double (39.5 per cent) that of the EU. By 2030, however, it will be on the downturn there as well. In Turkey the absolute numbers will even be lower: from 25.7 million children and adolescents in 2010 to 23.2 million in 2030. The same is true for Morocco. In all cases this development reflects the delayed effect of the lower fertility of the 1990s.

Table 7.9  Youth dependency ratio, people aged 0–19 per 100 persons aged 20–64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>129.3</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The so-called youth dependency ratio – the number of children and adolescents aged 0-19 years per 100 adults aged 20-64 years – has dropped significantly in the EU in recent years as a result of steadily falling fertility rates. Today there are 35 children and adolescents for every 100 adults aged 20-64. The youth dependency ratio in the MENA states in 1950 was 107 and thus ran parallel to the high fertility of 6.8 children per women (see Table 7.3). Today, the rate lies at 73.9, which is still twice as high as in the EU but, by 2030, it will have dropped to 55.4.

The youthful age structure in the countries of the Near East and sub-Saharan Africa, often referred to as the ‘youth bulge’, has been identified as one reason for violent conflicts or terrorism (e.g., Heinsohn 2008). In fact,
over the next few decades, a rising group of young men will be entering employment age, many of them without finding a job. This is already a serious social problem. Yet, drawing a direct line from the youthful age structure in the MENA region and a specific conflict potential would be premature. These countries are, today, no more conflict-prone than any other region solely because of their distinctive youthfulness – nor will they in the future be more or less vulnerable through changes in their age structure. This becomes obvious in the differences present within the region: MENA states with a higher income from oil production have fewer problems, despite a growing number of young jobless men.

The situation in the EU-27 is completely the reverse. The number of persons of employable age (20-64 years) in the EU-27 is expected to fall moderately over the next few decades – from the current 307.3 million to 287.7 million by 2030 (i.e., 6 per cent). In the MENA region, however, this group of persons will grow by 40 per cent from 253.4 million at present to 355.2 million by 2030 (see Table 7.10). As mentioned above, this demographic development would lead to a considerable overall growth if the complementary production factors of capital and arable/buildable land (including water resources) were sufficiently available. Yet, especially in countries with few natural resources (i.e., oil), this is hardly to be expected.

Table 7.10  **Adult population of employable age (20–64), in millions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Index 2030</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>216.5</td>
<td>307.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>253.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The absolute and relative sizes of the age group 65+ are often the indicators used to determine an ageing population. In the EU, nearly 20 per cent of all inhabitants are 65 and older, whereas in the MENA states the figure today lies at 4.8 per cent – set to grow only to 8.4 per cent by 2030 (see Table 7.11). The number of persons aged 65 and older will grow by 40 per cent in the EU,
and will more than double in the MENA countries. Yet, in absolute terms, nearly a quarter of the EU population will be 65 and older in 2030.

Table 7.11 Age group 65+ (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2010=100</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>230.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>228.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>223.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>227.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

Analogous to the youth dependency ratio, the age dependency ratio provides the relationship between the number of persons aged 65+ and the overall population aged 20-64 years. In the EU countries, this ratio was 15.2 in 1950 and is currently 28.4. According to the UNDP’s projections of the medium scenario, it will reach 42.5 by the year 2030 (see Table 7.12). The increase in the age dependency ratio will be felt in the MENA states much later – by 2030 the age dependency ratio will rise to only 13.9.

Table 7.12 Age dependency ratio, persons aged 65+ per 100 persons aged 20–64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

Finally, we look at the dependency ratio that consists of the sum of the youth dependency and the age dependency ratios and which shows how strongly those aged 20-64 will be burdened by economically dependent children, adolescents and the elderly. In 1950, the MENA countries had a much higher dependency ratio than today’s EU member states: 114.9 to 72.7. These two figures have since converged. And, by 2030, the final year of our projections, the situation will have reversed. The continual rise of the
elderly population in the EU will be accompanied by a decline in the youth dependency ratio in the MENA region. The small rise in seniors in the MENA states will effectively be less than the decline in the youth dependency ratio – a phenomenon sometimes called the demographic dividend of the MENA countries (and of other developing countries).  

Table 7.13 Dependency ratio, persons aged <20 and >65 per 100 persons aged 20–64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011a)

The dependency ratio is a very good indicator of the economic burden a society will experience because of its intergenerational contract. Over the past 50 years, the demographic conditions have been very favourable to OECD countries and considerably more unfavourable for developing countries. Yet the tide will turn. Even so, as in other areas, there is no strict ‘demographic determinism’. Many other social conditions – and, of course, the political will in the respective country – influence how such demographic parameters will, in the end, affect the EU countries and whether the MENA countries will be able to draw true advantages from their demographic dividend.

7.4 The relevance of the uneven demographic development

Migration is an integral part of population dynamics; it influences both the size and the structure of the population. Without immigration, many European countries would have experienced a population decline from the early 1970s to today. Conversely, it is generally expected that the size and structure of a population will influence its potential for voluntary emigr-
tion, but caution is necessary when an uneven demographic development is used to forecast flows of migration.\(^6\)

The ability to move the centre of one's life from one place to another is not equally distributed throughout all stages of life and all age groups. Rather, the decision to migrate to another country occurs when potential migrants have weighed the possible costs and benefits. At a young age, the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, which is why it is easier for young people to decide to pack up and go. If all other conditions influencing individual migration decisions hold constant, it may be expected that the emigration potential of a demographically young society will be higher than that in a society with a relatively greater portion of older persons. Thus, seen over many decades, the migration potential of a society not only depends on the population size, but also on its age- and sex-specific migration rates (see also Fassmann in this volume) and on the demographic and – maybe more important – economic development in the receiving country (see Bommes, Fellmer and Zigmann in this volume). Migrants do not choose a destination country primarily because of its demographic characteristics; they go where the economic level and the social parameters provide them with an individual gain in welfare for themselves and their children. The differential between the welfare level of their own country and that of the destination country is an important criterion for persons willing to migrate. The demographic situation in the destination country, at least in the short term, plays only a subordinate role.

It is often argued that the lower fertility and the demographic ageing of European societies will, in the long run, automatically lead to a need for immigration. Translating demographic forecasts from European countries into one of future immigration requirements remains controversial. European countries, by increasing their productivity, lengthening the working lifetime of their citizens, increasing the overall labour-force participation rate (especially of women) and placing greater emphasis on ways to decrease joblessness, have done a great deal towards creating the potential to thwart the expected demographic situation. In addition, a slowly rising fertility rate would also change the situation considerably.

Clearly, there will be demographic deficits in the labour situation in many European countries over the next decades. Controlled immigration is certainly one important tool for overcoming this situation, but not, of course, the only one available. The problems on the European labour

\(^6\) The following comments do not include persons forced to leave their country and become refugees.
market which can be felt today and which will certainly increase in future years are, however, not only and perhaps not even primarily caused by demographics. Rather, they are based on a misallocation of resources and market malfunctioning. In some German states, for example, it is becoming very difficult to get doctors to move to rural areas to replace their retiring colleagues. At first glance this may seem to be a demographic phenomenon, but there is also unemployment among doctors in other areas and many doctors leave the country to work elsewhere.

Both in the home and in the destination countries the respective demographic development influences both emigration and immigration. Yet in both cases there is no simple linear relationship. Neither emigration from the MENA states nor immigration into Europe can adequately be explained by the demographic-hydraulic theory.

One way to look at the complexity of these factors influencing the individual decision to migrate (or not) is the classical Byerlee/Todaro model, as illustrated in Figure 7.3 (Byerlee 1974; Todaro 1981). The starting-point of any decision process – to stay or to move – is a juxtaposition of the benefits and costs of migrating. Demographic conditions in the home country, in general, influence social security as well as other factors concerning employment and income, or the availability of land and water for a growing rural population. In the destination country, the demographic situation influences overall economic development as well as the job market and the likelihood of an individual getting a job or support through transfer payments if unemployed. Most parts of the model depicted are at least 30 years old. The interesting argument is that Byerlee and Todaro went well beyond the simple push-pull model, emphasising the role of information and networking in reaching such migration decisions. Thus, deciding to emigrate or not is less an individual decision than a family or even a collective one.

### 7.5 Conclusion

The projected demographic development in the MENA countries over the next twenty years will affect the migration potential of the entire region. Although fertility is falling, the increase in overall population will continue for some time to come. The result will be frictions in the job market and an increasing conflict potential arising from the limited water supplies and arable land. For a large part of the still-growing population aged between twenty and 40 this makes emigration a choice to be considered.
The geographical proximity of Europe and the MENA countries has led to the emergence of continuous migration links, amongst others between Turkey and Germany and between the Maghreb and France. Considerable emigration and immigration movements may be found anew every year,
although the net gains or losses are smaller than assumed. In 2008, 3.8 million people moved to and 2.3 million people exited a state of the EU (Eurostat 2012a, b). This example includes migration flows both inside EU states and from or to a non-EU state.

The relevance of migration for demography and the job market of the destination country depends less on the absolute number of immigrants than on the migration balance. Short-term high levels of immigration are often followed by an increase in re-migration back to the home countries. Such re-migration may, in fact, have always been one of the goals of migrants – for example, to earn and save a certain amount of money. Re-migration, of course, can also be an expression of a sort of ‘failure’, on the part of the migrants, to gain a foothold, their expectations being disappointed. Last but not least, there are also schemes in which some people live certain parts of their lives in two or more different countries, creating transnational family situations as well.

If one considers the financial imbalances that led to the recent high levels of youth unemployment in Southern Europe as being of a more long-term nature, it is easy to perceive that the migration link between the EU and MENA might be partly reversed in the future. As young people from Spain are currently looking for employment in Latin America, some MENA countries might attract young labour migrants from Southern Europe in the future. On the other hand, if some of the demand for immigrant labour in the EU has obviously been sparked by excessive money creation and speculation (e.g. the Spanish construction market) this demand might have been of a temporary nature.

References


8 Estimating migration potential: Egypt, Morocco and Turkey

Heinz Fassmann

8.1 Preliminary remarks

It is a well-known fact that population reproduction in the 27 states of the European Union (EU) will, in the long run, depend on immigration. This is mainly the result of fertility rates which lie below reproduction level. Currently, the number of births and deaths is still more or less balanced in many EU countries. However, as soon as the baby-boomers born in the 1950s and 1960s begin to die, the balance of birth- and death-rates will tilt toward the negative. Only then, at the very latest, will immigration become necessary, both to ease the inevitable structural adaptations in welfare systems (including pensions and care) and to close the gaps in labour supply in a simultaneously growing economy. Hence, the question that many EU countries will face is less whether immigration is politically desirable and necessary than from where the large numbers of immigrants needed in the future are supposed to come.

For a long time, Eastern Europe was considered to be one of the major source regions of future immigration to the EU because of the marked economic gap between Eastern and Western Europe. From a demographic point of view, however, this option no longer seems tenable. The demographic development of Eastern Europe's population is now running parallel to that of Western Europe: falling birth rates, an expected reduction in the size of the working population, and an increase in persons age 60 years and older. These changes will hit Eastern Europe slightly later – albeit harder – than Western Europe due to the fact that the fertility rates have begun to fall more recently in Eastern compared to Western Europe. Nevertheless, the demographic developments in the whole of Europe will converge in the long term, precipitating a reduction in potential and actual East-West migration.

The situation in the southern and south-eastern areas bordering the EU is different altogether. In Turkey and North Africa, for instance, the populations have developed along very different paths to those in Europe. Here fertility rates lie considerably above the limits necessary to maintain the present population characterised by a surplus of younger persons. Together these tendencies have resulted in a positive birth balance and an overall
increasing population (see Ralf Ulrich in this volume). In the long term, fertility rates there will fall, too, but the present demographic momentum will continue to result in a growing population for many years to come. In the following, I analyse how massive this population growth will be, discuss how it will affect migration behaviour and assess the migration potential resulting from this population growth. The crucial question I intend to address is: How much immigration could the EU expect from Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco if there were no entry and residence barriers? What would be the migration potential in such a completely liberal migration regime without any border controls?

## 8.2 Methods of estimating migration potential

Migration is one of the most difficult demographic processes to track and to predict, especially over an extended period of time. International migration (from one state to another) generally occurs for economic, but also for social and political, reasons. The search for a better life, a secure livelihood and an escape from hunger and poverty are all important reasons for leaving one’s homeland. Then there are the various political crises, wars and conflicts that drive people out of their accustomed surroundings in pursuit of a safe abode. Yet it is difficult to correctly assess the long-term economic development in the potential countries of both origin and destination. And it is nearly impossible to prognosticate future conflicts and crises in Europe and contiguous regions (see Faath & Mattes, and Nuscheler, in this volume).

Regardless of how difficult it may be to estimate future migration potential, the question is so important and so relevant that it remains the subject of numerous research studies. Such works may be divided into three main groups with respect to their methods and content. The first group is based on macro-analytic model calculations; the second uses micro-analytic approaches and extrapolates survey data to predict future migration behaviour; the third group is concerned with long-term predictions based on demographic parameters (such as predicted population development and estimation of age-specific migration probabilities). Because the present estimation of probable migration is based on this latter method, I will concede more space to a discussion thereof.
8.2.1 Macro-analytic model calculations

The calculations based on econometric models forecast the extent of future migration at a high level of aggregation – normally for entire countries. A number of assumptions are made – for example, that expected migration is dependent on differences in income and job opportunities. Income and employment differentials between regions are presumed to lead to migration from low-income regions with few job offers, to high-income regions with many vacancies. The size of this migration flow (the dependent variable) depends on the differences in income and employment (the independent variables). If these differences become greater, then migration increases and, if they become smaller, migration slows down (Borjas 1999; Harris & Todaro 1970).

The exact relationship between income and employment differentials and spatial mobility used in these forecasts is determined on the basis of existing empirical studies. Such studies have to be carried out in areas that do not impose legal instruments to limit and select migration. One model case that has served to determine the influence of labour-market-related variables in an unrestricted migration space is internal migration within the United States. Walterskirchen and Dietz (1998) compare the change in net migration between the individual US states, with data on their income levels and income developments, in order to calculate the exact relationship between these two factors. Long-term investigations of this kind show that an income differential of 10 per cent triggers a net immigration of 0.05-0.15 per cent of the population of the respective states of origin.

Calculations of this nature generally contain great uncertainties. It is not clear how the source and receiving regions will develop economically or whether income differentials always evoke the same size of migration flow. Furthermore, it is problematic to transfer data from observations in North America to Europe, since such a transfer is based on the implicit assumption that workers in Europe react to income differentials with the same flexibility as North Americans do. However, current data show that this is not the case. The average income in the poorer regions of the EU is, today, often only about half – and sometimes only one third – of the average income in the entire EU, but this has not yet triggered major migration movements from the poorer to the richer areas. Income differentials may thus be seen as only one aspect of any explanation for migration. Existing research tells us that, besides economic reasons, social factors such as personal networks, living conditions in both the source and the destination countries, and even climate and quality of living matter greatly in decisions to migrate.
8.2.2 Survey data

Micro-analytic studies on migration potential ask those directly ‘affected’ for their willingness to migrate, employing standardised, semi-standardised or open interview techniques. They ask whether the person in question would be ready and willing to take on work in another country and leave his or her homeland. The results of such micro-analytic studies are of a similar value as polls on voting intentions – ‘If it were possible to migrate tomorrow and there were no legal barriers, how willing would you be to leave your home and move for a shorter (or longer) period of time to one of the 27 EU states?’.

It is this question that micro-analytic studies are able to answer – without our knowing whether persons who declared their willingness to migrate would actually do so when the time comes or whether those not interested in working in the EU at the time of the interview would in fact move to Germany, Austria or any one of the other EU-27 states when they have the opportunity.

Hence, micro-analytic studies have two major faults – first, the expression of intent is often presumed to be followed by the implementation of such intent, which is not always the case. Second, persons who do not express the intention to leave in a questionnaire or in an interview may, nevertheless, leave later. Furthermore, unlike macro-analytic models, micro-analytic studies cannot determine the expected size of yearly migration flows, but only the number of persons who are, in principle, willing to migrate, but who might implement their wish over a period of several years. Any comparison of the results of these two methods must incorporate assumptions determining how many, per year, of those who expressed an intention to migrate will realise this intention. Nevertheless, such surveys seem to provide more realistic prognoses in the short term than macro-analytic model calculations.

There are generally fewer micro-analytic than macro-analytic studies because they are more complex and costly to realise. The samples have to be large enough to make reliable statements about the number of people willing to leave. In a sample of 100 interviewed people, for example, a 5 per cent migration potential would mean that only five persons have declared the intention to leave. But it is not possible to make valid statistical statements based on a group consisting of five persons. Thus, the sample cannot consist of 100 persons, but has to have thousands of interviews - with the respective research means necessary to carry out such large and costly studies. Moreover, it does not suffice to ask the interviewee whether he or she intends to emigrate. Further questions are necessary to determine whether a person willing to migrate will realise this wish (see Fassmann 2005; IOM 1999; Krieger 2004).
8.2.3 Demography-driven prognoses

The third method of studying migration potential combines long-term demographic prognoses with age-specific emigration tendencies. The advantage of demographic prognoses is that they allow the making of relatively valid projections of future developments for a period of one to two decades. As a major portion of international migration consists of people moving for reasons of work and family, there is a particular interest in the future population of working age when studying migration potential. Such studies usually consider how the working-age groups develop in both the potential source and the destination regions. Clearly, if the working-age group grows in a potential country of origin, while the ability of the local labour market to absorb such workers remains the same, migration potential may be expected to rise.

This method of calculating migration potential is thus, basically, an analysis of population prognoses, primarily for the regions of origin. Migration potential is extrapolated from the development of the working-age group in a given society – without asking these persons for their intentions to leave or considering macro-economic parameters in any detail. Such a calculation will yield a possible migration potential based on certain assumptions concerning the general mobility level in the society; it is necessary to fine-tune this method in order to obtain a higher rate of prognostic accuracy.

One way of doing so is to link the future age structure of the respective population with age-specific migration rates determined on the basis of existing empirical studies or based on normative assumptions. Calculations of this type separate the demographic component from the behavioural. The demographic component results from the development of the age groups, the behavioural component from the probability of members of that age group actually emigrating. Thus, the migration potential at a specific point in time \( t+1 \) consists of the sum of all age groups (between 15 and 60 years of age) at time \( t+1 \) multiplied by the age-specific emigration rates.\(^1\) The emigra-

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\(^1\) Whether this migration potential in fact results in emigration is difficult to determine. For that reason it does not seem legitimate to take the calculated potential into consideration in the demographic model. For instance, if we subtracted the number of potential migrants from the whole population, this would imply that we consider that 100 per cent of the potential would result in real emigration. Furthermore, a higher level of emigration always carries with it a (time-shifted) rise in re-immigration, which would then also have to be taken into account in the model. This example shows that delineating a demographic prognosis model from a behavioural model is advantageous and should be retained.
Estimates of this type are thus based on two factors – the future age structure of the population and future emigration profiles. Determining the former is a relatively easy task with the help of existing population prognoses of relevant institutions such as the United Nations Population Division (UNPD); it is more difficult to build reliable assumptions concerning future emigration profiles. It would appear to be a valid and purposeful approach to simply transfer present observations of age-specific emigration profiles to future constellations and situations, as long as such an approach takes into account the macro-economic and legal conditions. Transferring present observations of age-specific emigration to future situations seems justified since they display a certain regularity, as was shown by Rogers and Castro (1981).

8.3 Future population

Before estimating migration potential, I provide a general insight into population development in the three MENA countries selected as exemplary for the region in this book: Turkey, Egypt and Morocco (for a general overview of population development in the whole MENA region in comparison to the EU-27 and the sub-Saharan countries, see Ulrich in this volume).

Demographic development in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco shows a clear picture: the population in all three countries is growing (see Table 8.1). In 2015, around 199 million people will be living in the three countries; ten years later, the population will have increased to 221 million and, by 2050, 254 million people will be residing in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. The increase will be the most significant in Egypt (+33 per cent for the whole period) and less pronounced in Turkey (+6 per cent) and Morocco (+5 per cent). The main drivers of this increase are the young age structure and

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2 This is a true rate because – both theoretically and statistically – the emigrants are no longer part of the original population. Were that the case, one would instead speak of a quota.

3 Assumptions concerning emigration and immigration are always built into a population prognosis. In order to avoid counting migration twice, potential should be interpreted only as such. If we were to assume that a specific share of this potential does actually leave, then this value would have to be subtracted from the whole population before calculating the age structure of the next period. Empirically speaking, however, this sort of limitation never becomes relevant, since subtracting even the complete migration potential would effectively reduce the population in any one age group by only a few per cent.
the relatively high fertility in all three countries. The median age is 26.0 in Egypt, 28.2 in Morocco and 30.2 in Turkey or, in other words, 50 per cent of the population in Egypt is younger than 26.0 years (or 28.2 and 30.2 in Morocco and Turkey) which is extremely young compared to countries like Germany (46.5) or Austria (43.6). In addition, the total fertility rate is assumed to be 2.46 in Egypt, 2.01 in Morocco and 1.91 in Turkey between 2015 and 2020. Once again, the differences with fifteen old EU member states are significant (see Ulrich in this volume).

Table 8.1 Entire population 2015 to 2050 (’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>77,003</td>
<td>80,753</td>
<td>83,984</td>
<td>86,665</td>
<td>91,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>88,179</td>
<td>94,810</td>
<td>100,909</td>
<td>106,498</td>
<td>123,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>33,570</td>
<td>35,078</td>
<td>36,406</td>
<td>37,502</td>
<td>39,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198,752</td>
<td>210,641</td>
<td>221,299</td>
<td>230,665</td>
<td>254,269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011), medium variant; author’s calculations

In the context of migration potential, the working-age population is of particular interest. A significant growth of the working-age population will increase the inclination to emigrate and vice versa. The medium variant of the UN prognosis demonstrates a clear tendency (see Table 8.2).

The working-age population in the three countries of the MENA region under discussion here is around 125 million and is set to increase because of the age structure and the still relatively high fertility rates. The mid-range variant of the UN prognosis predicts an increase to 146 million persons of working age. In other words, the working-age population in these three MENA countries will increase by 1.3 million every year until 2030, solely on the basis of the demographic development. This increase will be significantly higher in Egypt than in Morocco or Turkey, where birth rates have begun to fall earlier than in Egypt.

A growing economy should be able to absorb such an increase in the working-age population by about 1.5 per cent per year (of the working-age population). The average rate of economic growth in 2009-2011 was 4.2 per cent in Egypt, 4.2 per cent in Turkey and 4.3 per cent in Morocco (CIA 2012). One must take into account, however, that the growth of employment must be less than the overall economic growth so that productivity may rise in line with international competitiveness. Further, the actual increase in those persons willing to work may exceed the increase in the working-age population if the willingness to work and, thus, the actual participation
rate, increases for cultural and social reasons (modernisation effects). Such areas harbour significant additional potential for the domestic labour supply.

Table 8.2 Working-age population aged 15–60 years (’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50,056</td>
<td>52,428</td>
<td>54,160</td>
<td>55,403</td>
<td>53,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>53,621</td>
<td>57,994</td>
<td>62,443</td>
<td>66,736</td>
<td>74,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>21,544</td>
<td>22,271</td>
<td>23,097</td>
<td>23,821</td>
<td>23,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125,222</td>
<td>132,693</td>
<td>139,699</td>
<td>145,960</td>
<td>150,465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011); author’s calculations

Besides looking at the working-age population, it would seem interesting to study the age-specific ‘fringes’ of the working-age population, that is, on the one hand, those aged 15-19 years who have left the school system and are entering the job market and, on the other, the portion of the population aged 55-59 years, who are leaving or are about to leave the job market. The difference between the numbers of people in these two age groups indicates whether the working-age population is increasing or decreasing. This is important in evaluating the absorption capacity of future labour-market development.

Table 8.3 The gap between age-specific ‘fringes’ of the working-age population (the number of those aged 15–19 years minus the number of those aged 55–59) (’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,053</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>–958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4,577</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>4,556</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>–375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,004</td>
<td>7,739</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td>–95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011); author’s calculations

Of course, this is a very general analysis which does not reflect the real number of people entering or leaving the job markets in the respective MENA countries – there are no reliable data available for that purpose. Since we cannot assume that careers in the MENA countries follow a collective and homogeneous pattern of job-market entries and exits, the analysis is a schematic model rather than an empirical description of facts. What this method can provide, however, is insight into the extent of asymmetry in
the age pyramid and the demographic dynamics of potential job-market entries and exits.

The overall increase in the number of working-age persons in the MENA countries already hinted at the fact confirmed in this calculation (see Table 8.3): the number of those aged 15-19 years is greater than that of the 55-59 age group. If we compare only these two relevant age groups, an additional 9 million working-age persons will enter the job market between 2015 and 2020 – that is, around 1.8 million every year. Because of the decrease in births and the general ageing of the population, this asymmetry will be reduced by 2030, by which time the number of additional persons entering the job market will constitute only about 6.5 million over a five-year period, or around 1.3 million per year.

This calculation again demonstrates that the three MENA countries will need continual and strong economic growth if they are to absorb the additional working-age population into their job markets. A crisis or a significant change in the political and economic systems would pose a special challenge to the precarious situation, since any deviation from the path of continual growth would necessarily increase the number of under- and unemployed, and possibly also of those willing to emigrate. This is also confirmed by Fargues in a study of demographic patterns across the Mediterranean and their implications for migration:

Until at least 2030 in MENA, the generation reaching working age will be much larger than that reaching retirement age. Even though the number of new additions to the labor market has stagnated and will even slightly decrease between 2015 and 2025, the size of the total working-age population will continue to rise sharply during the next two decades compared to the EU-27. Europe will be subject to the opposite trend, as its total working-age population will start to shrink in 2010 while the numbers of new entrants to the labor market will steadily decline over the next 20 years due to low fertility in the last decades (Fargues 2008: 5).

Fargues expects an increase in the migratory intensity between MENA and the EU-27 as a consequence of this complementary demographic dynamic.
8.4 Demography-driven calculation of the migration potential

To answer the crucial question raised at the beginning of this chapter – ‘How much immigration could the EU expect from Turkey, Egypt and Morocco if there were no entry and residence barriers?’ – I do not resort to a macro-economic model (for reasons of content) nor do I take a survey (for cost reasons). Rather, I link demographic prognoses with age-specific emigration rates, as described before.

8.4.1 Age-specific emigration profiles

Demography-driven calculations of migration potential draw on information about the age structure of the future population and the age-specific migration. For the age structure, I draw on the prognosis of the UNPD. The crucial question which has to be discussed is which age-specific emigration profile to apply. The current emigration from the MENA countries is not typical and does not obey classic push-pull conditions but is, instead, the result of a very specific legal regulation and thus not amenable to simple extrapolation to some future situation. To postulate that there will be no emigration from Egypt, Morocco or Turkey to the EU-27 states in the future under different legal conditions is erroneous. The present minimal emigration is the product of the legal limitations in the destination countries – not the result of any disinclination on the part of the Egyptian population to emigrate.

If we intend to test whether the MENA countries may be considered potential areas of origin for future migration to Europe, and thus whether the size of emigration from those areas represents an opportunity or a threat to European economies, we have to simulate a situation of unhindered immigration from all three MENA countries to the EU. This does not mean that we assume that border controls will fall any time soon, if ever, between these regions. It means that, for the purpose of this study, we are not interested in the effects of border controls on migration potential, but in the more general question of whether the high demand for labour in the EU expected in the near future meets with a similarly high emigration potential in these three countries. I therefore chose three different age-specific migration profiles from member states of the EU-27. These countries are an integral part of a space of extensively unhindered migration, most migration remains within this common space and therefore the transfer of their emigration profiles makes sense.

The three countries are Austria, Slovakia and Poland. Austria is an example of an older member state with excellent migration statistics where the calculation of age-specific emigration rates is unproblematic. Austria
acceded to the EU in 1995, the first peak of emigration after integration into the EU is over and emigration has since stabilised – i.e., it has reached some kind of maturity but is still intense. The opposite is true for Slovakia. Slovakia is an example of a low-wage country with low migratory interactions. This can be explained by cultural and language factors as well as by the closeness to Austria and the Czech Republic that allows Slovakians to commute rather than to migrate. In addition, the statistical procedure does not adequately grasp emigration. The third country is Poland, with a medium-scale migratory interaction and a strong increase in emigration after accession to the EU in 2004. This example shows what happens when high-wage countries abolish their legal barriers and allow entry from a low-wage country, at least in part. Not all EU countries immediately granted Polish citizens full free-movement rights, though some, such as Sweden, the UK and Ireland, did.

Unfortunately, emigration figures in Poland are as unreliable as in Slovakia. They underestimate the real volume of emigration since they only cover those who de-register voluntarily. However, those who intend to leave their country for a short period of time only in order to work abroad seldom publicly declare their intention of leaving the country. As a consequence, only a small share of those actually leaving the country is recorded in Polish statistics (see Bijak & Koryś 2009). Good, reliable statistics are hard to come by, and the process of increasing the quality and reliability of the statistics is not yet over (see Iglicka 2006).  

A look at the empirical reality shows that the basic situation is similar everywhere. As Figure 8.1 illustrates, the age-specific emigration rates adhere to the same pattern in the different European countries, though there are large variations in the absolute rates. Such differences can be explained by the extent of integration into a common migratory space, by the socio-economic situation in the country of origin and – perhaps the major overall reason – by the quality of the statistical measurement of migration (see Fassmann, Reeger & Sievers 2009). The high quality of migration statistics in Austria and Germany explains why these countries have the highest emigration rates, even though they are affluent countries with a relatively low level of emigration.

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4 To give one example – between 2004 and 2006, Polish official statistics recorded a total of 88,000 emigrants. Over the same period, the British Home Office alone had 361,000 Poles registering in the Worker Registration Scheme to receive access to social services (Home Office 2008) and the British International Passenger Survey reported 221,000 immigrants from the eight countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – which acceded to the EU in 2004 but which were not granted free-movement rights, entering Britain with the expressed intent of staying for at least one year, with most of them originating from Poland.
By combining population prognoses and age-specific profiles, we can assess the number of possible emigration movements only. Anyone who has worked on international migration knows that this is only half the truth; emigration must always be set in relation to immigration, and socially relevant are not only data on emigration and immigration but, rather, the net migration in any one area. Put differently, affluent countries that experience much immigration also undergo great emigration when former immigrants have completed their migration project and returned home. Poorer countries, on the other hand, experience first emigration and later re-immigration. This dynamic is invisible in calculations that only consider the emigration flow.5

Of course, the implications of a ‘one-sided’ consideration of immigration or emigration differ, depending on the socio-economic situation in the particular country and its place in a wider migration system. For example, Austria is a relatively affluent country surrounded not only by other affluent countries, but also by poorer ones. About 130,000 immigrants went to Austria in 2011, while about 95,000 people left the country, including both the re-migration of former immigrants to their countries of origin and emigration to other – as a rule more affluent – countries. Poland, on the other hand, is clearly much poorer than its neighbours if we use the usual indicators of prosperity. As a consequence, emigration outweighs immigration – the
The lack of reliable data makes it necessary to estimate the numbers of yearly emigrations based on the existing data. The estimate departs from the official emigration statistics from the Polish Central Statistical Office for 2004 to 2008, which will be weighted by the ‘Bijak-Koryś factor’, which takes the underestimation into consideration. Bijak and Koryś (2009) compared the 2002 emigration of Poles with immigration into the most important recipient countries, only to find that no more than 17.3 per cent of the Poles recorded as entering their destination countries had been registered as having left Poland. There is good reason to assume that the deficits in registering emigration grew after 2004 when it became easier to leave the country. I will therefore assume that the ‘Bijak-Koryś factor’ has moderately increased to 25 per cent in order to prevent the production of too high a rate of emigration. In order to determine the age-specific emigration rates, the given age distribution of registered emigration will be recalculated and shifted to a higher emigration degree.

The results of these calculations are shown in Figure 8.2, which portrays the recalculated Polish age profile in comparison with the Austrian and the Slovakian ones. Again, the curve with a small pre-labour-force component, the important labour-force component and the decrease of emigration in higher age groups confirms the regularity of the age structure of persons emigrating.

### 8.4.2 Results

In this next section, I connect the two datasets presented above, which are necessary for setting up a model projection of emigration potential – the population prognoses for Egypt, Morocco and Turkey and age-specific emigration profiles for Slovakia, Austria and Poland. I will use the same age-specific emigration rates over the whole period, which is not completely realistic, but is sufficient for this projection.\(^6\)

\(^6\) One can assume that the migration potential would be reduced as a result of the removal of immigration barriers. Initially, the opening of borders and the implementation of freedom of settlement will result in high levels of emigration. Subsequently, emigration will decline to a ‘normal’ level. In the long run, it does not, therefore, make sense to extrapolate the initial high levels into the future, since the migration potential would be quickly exhausted in such a case (see Bommes, Fellmer & Zigmann in this volume for a discussion).
Figure 8.2 Age-specific emigration profiles

![Graph showing age-specific emigration profiles for different countries](image)


In a first projection of emigration potential, I connect the population projections for the three MENA countries under discussion here with the (unweighted) age-specific emigration rates from Slovakia, as an example of a more settled population with low migratory interaction. As Table 8.4 shows, there would, nevertheless, be a certain potential for emigration – a result that was already foreseeable from the demographic analysis. In 2015, potential emigration would amount to about 0.24 million people for all three countries and would increase to 0.29 million by 2050.

Table 8.4 Yearly migration potential ('000), Slovakian emigration profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011), author’s calculations

In a second projection, I use the age-specific emigration rates from Austria (see Table 8.5). The Austrian example is representative of a ‘mature’ migration country with a high level of in- and outmigration, similar to Germany or
Switzerland. This calculation marks the upper limit of emigration potential from the MENA region to the EU. It would not be realistic to assume significantly higher emigration rates for these countries because of limited job opportunities in the potential receiving countries that may decrease the realisation of the desire to migrate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly migration potential (‘000), Austrian emigration profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011), author’s calculations

Connecting the population projections for Turkey, Egypt and Morocco with the Austrian age-specific emigration rates from 2007 – which are similar to those of the previous and subsequent years – leads to a significantly higher potential for emigration compared to the Slovakian case. In total, 2.03 million people from Turkey, Egypt and Morocco would emigrate in 2015 based on the Austrian emigration rates. Due to the age structure and the growth of the population, the emigration potential would increase over the whole period. Only after 2050, when the baby-boom cohort retires, will the emigration potential decrease. Turkey would be the first country with a decreasing potential; Morocco and Egypt would follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly migration potential (‘000), Polish emigration profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNPD (2011), author’s calculations

The third projection is based on the Polish case (see Table 8.6). If emigrants from Turkey, Egypt and Morocco were granted the same rights to enter the EU-27 as the Poles were in 2004, then 1.3 million persons would leave their home countries, assuming that they show the same age-specific probability of emigration. If most of them enter the EU, the resulting immigration would amount to about
70 per cent of all current immigration into the EU-27. Raising immigration by this number would be unusual and – coming on top of current immigration – probably politically difficult to absorb. But of course this is only a hypothetical calculation – the immediate EU accession of Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, with no immigration restrictions, is foreseen neither now nor in the near future.

Because of demographic growth in these three countries the emigration potential would not diminish but in fact rise over the entire model period. If the age-specific emigration rates remain the same, the emigration potential would rise from 1.31 in 2015 to about 1.52 million persons in 2030 and to about 1.55 at the end of the period under observation. Only in the long run and after 2050 would the demography driven migration potential shrink, first in Turkey, then in Morocco and Egypt.

To summarise the results: The application of different age-specific emigration rates shows the variety of possible future emigration potential for the three MENA countries. If Egypt, Morocco and Turkey became integral parts of a common European migration space and if their inhabitants were granted free-movement rights within this migration space, then the emigration potential from these three countries would range from 0.24 million to 2.01 million, with the most realistic figure being 1.31 million. Because of demographic growth in all three countries and over the whole period, the migration potential would increase – from a low level in the Slovakian example and from a high one in the Austrian example. Their demographic growth clearly underlines the importance of the MENA countries as countries of origin for potential migration to the EU.

In the medium variant – i.e., the Polish case – the emigration potential would amount to around 1 per cent of the working-age population of the three countries. In the light of the great differences in wealth, one may view these estimates as under- rather than overstated. If people were asked directly whether they would like to settle in Europe if there were no restrictions on their moving there, then the share of potential migrants would surely be higher. The *Gallup World Poll: The Many Faces of Global Migration*, based on 401,490 interviews with adults in 146 countries, shows that potential migration is the highest in the MENA region. More than one in five adults (21 per cent) in the MENA region said that they would migrate permanently to another country if they had the opportunity, and one in six (16 per cent) said that they were planning to do so over the next twelve months. In absolute numbers, 16 per cent of the working-age population amounts to 20.8 million people in Turkey, Morocco and Egypt who declare that they intend to migrate over the next twelve months – thirteen times more than the more realistic, but maybe underestimated, 1.5 million calculated above (Esipova, Rey & Pugliese 2011).
Further proof for the above results is the differential between the number of youngsters aged 15-19-years entering the job market and the number of people aged 55-59 leaving it. This difference is comparable to the results of the long-term demographic-driven model calculation (see Table 8.3). It implies an increase in the working-age population by 5 million persons in Egypt, 4 million in Turkey and 2.1 million in Morocco per five-year period, or 2.2 million per year for all three countries. This difference does not necessarily result in increased emigration if modernisation processes increases the employment quota in the respective countries.7

8.5 Conclusion

The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and Europe appear to be an ideal demographic match: the former has a large supply of young, active workers, and the latter has a shortage of the youthful, skilled or unskilled labour it needs to sustain its economic competitiveness (Fargues 2008: 3).

Demographic projections show that most European countries will need immigrants in the future in order to fill the gaps resulting from falling birth-rates. Now and then, political actors pose the question as to where these immigrants are supposed to come from. It is not realistic that immigration to the EU-15 or the EU-27 will come from Central and Eastern Europe due to the falling birth-rates and increasing incomes in this region. Even countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine or Russia – where the considerable income differentials may result in emigration to the EU-27 in the short term – will not be able to fulfil the demand of the EU-27 countries in the long run, again due to falling birth-rates. In the vicinity of the EU, only the MENA states comprise a so-called ‘demographic reserve’ for the EU-27 countries – at least for the next few decades, as the present calculations illustrate (see Schimany 2007).

The complementary demographic structure could be a gain for both sending and receiving regions. In the sending region, the temporary or permanent emigration of a certain share of the youth bulge can lower unemployment, decrease the probability of political tensions and crisis and increase the economic gain due to remittances. The young and well-
educated workers facing poor employment conditions at home would profit, in particular, from a stay in the EU-27. In the receiving countries, these young qualified workers would be a welcome supplement to the shrinking labour force, slowing down the ageing process and rejuvenating the population. When concepts of circular migration are realisable and returnees bring capital, knowledge and networks with them, then the vicinity of the MENA region and the EU could be a real win-win situation for both regions.

References


9 Migration scenarios: Turkey, Egypt and Morocco

Michael Bommes, Simon Fellmer and Friederike Zigmann

9.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters in this volume – by Ulrich and by Fassmann – are based on demographic analyses that keep constant all social conditions beyond demographic developments in the populations of the three countries in question. This approach has the advantage that the models employed are easy to manage, and the numbers produced have a certain hardiness to them. Yet they remain rather abstract.

The present chapter reintroduces some of the ‘realities’ not taken into account in these demographic analyses. We enrich the models presented by Ulrich and by Fassmann by introducing further, mainly economic, variables using highly aggregated data. Like Ulrich and Fassmann, we do not take into account the political and socio-cultural developments in the respective countries, as these cannot be meaningfully introduced into the current models.

9.2 Methods

The scenarios presented in this chapter draw on one of the classic tenets of migration theory – growing economic differentials between particular countries or regions lead to increased migration.1 This approach seems to be fruitful, because diverging economic dynamics between the European Union and the MENA countries were observed in the past and can be expected to occur in the future as well. Turkey, for example, has been catching up economically, and thus converging, with the EU, whereas the economic performance of the other MENA states is still very much lower than in the EU (see Figure 9.1).

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1 This idea can be traced back to the nineteenth century, as discussed by Hicks (1932) in his theory of wage differentials, and has been applied to more recent developments by Borjas (1999), amongst others. For a more detailed discussion of such approaches see de Haas in this volume. De Haas’ assumption that the poorest do not migrate may challenge our pure theory of economic differentials as drivers of migration. Nevertheless, we see clear benefits from our approach, the most important one being that we depart from the stable demographic figures presented by Fassmann in this volume and develop them further by adding other important factors.
In order to measure these economic disparities, we concentrate on three central factors: gross domestic product (GDP), income as expressed by the gross national income (GNI) and the labour-force participation rate (LPR).

2 We use the GDP as defined by the International Monetary Fund: ‘gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita’ and data from 2010 or 2012 (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012). GDP is the single factor normally used to depict the overall economic activity of a country. It encompasses the total value of all goods and services produced within a certain period of time within one country. GDP based on purchasing power parity is the most appropriate for calculating economic disparity in cases of permanent migration, where it is important to take into account how many goods effectively can be bought with the money spent in the particular country. The alternative method of comparison would be to use exchange rates. However, this value is more important for commuters than for permanent migrants (Sinn, Flaig, Werding & Hänlein 2000: 32ff).

3 The GNI used here is the ‘gross national income per capita (PPP international US$)’ for 2011, as calculated by the United Nations Statistics Division. GNI corresponds roughly to GDP, but excludes taxes on production and imports as well as compensation of employees and property income due the rest of the world. However, these are taken into account when they are owed by the rest of the world to the respective country.

4 The labour-force participation rate used here is from 2010 and is based on data provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which defines this rate as the proportion of a country’s working-age population that engages actively in the labour market. We use this factor instead of unemployment since there are no reliable data on unemployment in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco because of both the more informal nature of employment and the inadequate gathering of data on formal employment.
in the three MENA countries and put these in relation to the values we find for the EU. GDP expresses economic power, GNI the resultant earnings, and LPR the part of the working population that is actually employed.

We restrict our model scenarios to these three characteristics for methodological reasons. Of course, socio-cultural and other factors such as political stability or instability are of considerable importance, especially in the countries in question. However, they cannot be expressed in figures and are therefore excluded from our calculations. Leaving them out is thus not a statement about their value as such; they are treated in depth in the contributions by Faath and Mattes, and by Nuscheler, in this volume.

The empirical starting-point for modelling our scenarios is the emigration potential calculated by Fassmann in his contribution to this volume. This emigration potential is based on the age-specific migration rates for Poland and the demographic prognoses up to the year 2050, but does not take into account economic disparities between Poland and the MENA countries. Our first step, therefore, is to transfer Fassmann’s age-specific emigration rates to the conditions of the poorer MENA region. We thus calculate the ratio of the value of the Polish GDP, GNI and LPR compared to the GDP, GNI and LPR of Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. The average of these three ratios is our ‘country-specific factor’, with which we weight Fassmann’s emigration potential. As mentioned above, we assume that higher economic divergences produce higher emigration potential. So if the GDP, GNI and LPR of a specific MENA country were to equal the Polish ones, the country-specific factor would be ‘1’ and the emigration potential calculated by Fassmann would apply. As this is generally not the case and the country-specific factors we find are higher than ‘1’, the emigration potential rises. Or, in other words, since GDP, GNI and LPR are generally higher in Poland than in the MENA region, the thus-modified emigration potential for the MENA region also turns out to be exponentially higher.

For instance, the Polish GDP is 1.42 times higher than the Turkish, the GNI 1.25 times higher and the LPR 1.14 times. The average of these ratios is 1.27. If we multiply the emigration potential calculated by Fassmann – e.g., for the year 2015 (503,000 persons) – with this factor, we get a modified emigration potential of 639,224 persons (see Table 9.1).

Subsequently, we use this modified emigration potential to manipulate the figures further. We make assumptions as to how GDP, GNI and LPR will develop in the future in the EU as well as in every single MENA country. For
the EU the following is assumed: that GDP will increase up to 2030 at a linear rate of 1 per cent per annum, and GNI at 0.9 per cent per annum. The LPR will remain constant over this period. These are conservative projections that take into account the effects of the present financial crisis. For the MENA states, we develop three possible future scenarios, with diverging assumptions for each country, and explain why we see GDP, GNI and LPR increase or decrease at certain points in the future. Technically we proceed as follows. Our base year is 2012. In this year we have a certain difference between e.g., the Turkish and the EU GDP. If we now manipulate the development of the Turkish GDP for the future, we get a new difference which is bigger or smaller than the one in the base year and which we show as the percentage quotation compared to the difference of the base year. For instance, if the Turkish GDP grows by 5 per cent by 2015 and that of the EU by 1 per cent, the difference between the two GDPs shrinks from 18,684.05 in 2012 to 18,291.73 in 2015 or to 97.9 per cent of the basic difference. We carry out these manipulations for GNI and LPR as well, and calculate the average percentage difference of these three values (see the twelfth line in Tables 9.1-9.9). We multiply our modified emigration potential with this average value and get a new manipulated emigration potential. If the average difference increases, the emigration potential rises; if the differential decreases, the calculated emigration potential falls. This new, manipulated emigration potential is depicted as a ‘final emigration potential’ in Tables 1-9. This final emigration potential is the emigration potential we would predict for the future, taking into account economic variables in addition to demographic ones.

9.3 Migration scenarios: Turkey

Turkey is the one country in Europe whose emigration potential plays a very important role in public discussion concerning its possible membership in the EU (Independent Commission on Turkey 2004). This is true for the Netherlands, France, Austria and Germany, in particular, the four main receiving states of Turkish migration to the EU, which began as labour migration in the 1960s and 1970s, and was followed by family and marriage migration as well as by asylum migration triggered by the military takeover in 1980 and the growing repression of the Kurdish population (see İçduygu in this volume). Turkish immigrants make up a large share of the immigrant population in some of the countries above (in Germany, one third) and have been the focus of the immigration debate in recent years.
Turkey is characterised by a number of very specific cleavages resulting from its particular history and, especially, from its state-building process (Lewis 2002). The modern Turkish state grew out of the collapsing Ottoman Empire and established itself against competing state-building processes in the neighbouring Balkan states and Greece as well as against the colonial plans of European powers. This process was driven by a reformist military elite educated in the capitals of Europe (especially in Paris), who implemented a legal order of Swiss and French origin. It thus established an official laïcism in Turkey, where the overwhelming majority of the population was Islamic, and combined this with a nationalisation of religion. In addition, the major top-down modernisation process linked to Turkish state-building brought about a new political system, a switch to Latin writing, a modern educational system – including compulsory school attendance – and industrialisation. The resulting tensions were superficially bridged by the mythification of the country’s founder – Kemal Atatürk – and a strong nationalism, and have been reflected in political conflicts up to the present day. After introducing a multiparty system in 1946, the military assumed power three times (in 1960, 1971 and 1980), and the country is still plagued by the question of whether the military is truly ready and willing to relinquish its power and decision-making competences. It also remains to be seen whether Turkey can continue and, indeed, extend the economic and political reforms that began with the economic liberalisations of the 1980s and the growing orientation toward joining the EU since the 1990s (customs union in 1995; membership consultations since 2005).

9.3.1 Conditions for the expected migration: Turkey’s economic situation

Parallel to the many political upheavals, the economic history of Turkey has, up to the present day, been a veritable roller-coaster ride, marked by a number of debt crises and periods of high inflation. Seen from a long-term perspective, however, the Turkish economy has grown continuously at comparatively high average rates (1950s: 6.7 per cent, 1960s: 5.6 per cent, 1970s: 4.1 per cent and an average of 5 per cent per annum since 1980). In the past few years, Turkey’s high rate of economic growth was combined with a strong increase in personal income, a reduction in state debt and low inflation.

Economic sectors, trade and economic policy
Whereas economic policy following the founding of the modern Turkish state in the 1930s and up to the end of the 1970s was characterised by inward-
oriented industrialisation and import substitution policies, from the early 1980s onwards Turkey adopted an export-oriented, open-market policy that has since been expanded as part of its efforts to join the EU and to meet the liberalisation demands of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The reduced role of the state had a number of effects at the time: an increase in unemployment due to the extensive privatisation efforts, a generally lower standard of living, an increase in social inequality and a decline in social security (Aydın 2005: 43-45).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) currently sees Turkey on the road to economic prosperity (OECD 2006a). It describes Turkey as having made substantial progress in macro-economic stabilisation and institutional reform (see also the progress reports prepared by the EU as part of the membership negotiations). A satisfactory level of macro-economic stability has been reached, although the Turkish economy is still viewed as vulnerable. In this context, and in light of the high dependence on exports, any external shock tends to reverberate throughout the entire economy.

Whereas the OECD is still demanding further liberalisation of the Turkish market, other authors see Turkey’s dependency on international capital flows as the major reason behind the crisis of 2001/2002 – something that could occur again at any time (Aydın 2005: 107). After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections in 2002, the country experienced a time of economic recovery: strong economic growth coupled with a tremendous expansion of trade, reduced inflation and state debt (Altug & Filiztekin 2006: 22). Yearly GDP growth rates of at least 5 per cent are projected for Turkey through to 2015 (Bagoglu, Hungermann, Kelkenberg, Klaiber & Schreiber 2005: 5).

The economic sectors contribute to this GDP growth to varying extents. The largest proportion (about 60 per cent) comes from the service sector, in particular from communication, transportation, finance and tourism, an industry that has markedly grown since the 1980s. At the same time, this sector is still plagued by informal employment and informal economic activity. Second place is held by industry, with more than 25 per cent of GDP. Whereas private companies have become more productive and internationally competitive, this is not universally true for state-run firms. The automobile branch, in particular, has been able to attract foreign investors, and automobile exports have caught up with the textile and clothing industries suffering from the strong competition of the Chinese. Recreational and household electronics are also gaining more importance. Agriculture still contributes about 10 per cent to GDP, but with a decreasing tendency. The
building sector is represented by some 5 per cent of GDP and has experienced very dynamic development over the past few years (CIA 2012).

Of growing importance in the tertiary sector are the areas of education, transportation, communication, financial services and tourism (also one of the largest sources of foreign currency) as well as health and social services (Hütteroth 2002: 31; Schrick-Hildebrand 2006). At the same time, the service sector still includes a large number of shoe-polishers, doormen and other lower-level providers, so that it cannot yet be considered comparable to the service sectors present in other countries of Europe (Hütteroth 2002: 26). The agricultural sector still comprises around a third of the entire Turkish working population, many of whom work on small-scale farms with low productivity. Agriculture contributes about 10 per cent to GNP, with a declining trend and an ever-growing level of de-agriculturisation (Altug & Filiztekin 2006: 51). The resulting privatisation and concentration processes are putting great pressure on small farmers, causing unemployment and often forcing them to migrate to the city (Aydın 2005: 175-177). Among the most important agricultural products grown in Turkey are grains, various types of fruit and vegetable, tobacco and olives. Turkey is the most important producer of hazelnuts in the world. In addition, Turkey has a large cotton industry that constitutes the backbone of its internationally competitive textile and clothing industry.

The Turkish economy has profited tremendously from its business and trade relationships with the EU countries, particularly since the customs union came into effect in 1995. In 2005, Turkey did half of its external trade with members of the EU (Bagoglu et al. 2005: 145). Among the 50 largest trading nations of the world, Turkey lies somewhere in the middle, with imports still out-running exports (Martin 2002: 171). This point is of particular importance in light of the high vulnerability of the Turkish economy to turbulences in world economic development. Apart from tourism – mainly responsible for the procurement of foreign currency – and the building industry, exports constitute one of the major growth segments of the Turkish economy, but imports are increasing at about the same level because of the country’s dependence on the importation of raw materials. In 2007, the value of all imports was US$63 billion higher than that of exports. As a consequence of this trade imbalance, Turkey is dependent on high inflows of external capital, which will continue to make it vulnerable to both internal and external economic shocks (Knupp 2008).

Public expenditure, debt accumulation and inflation
Since the crisis of 2001, Turkey has produced a number of fiscal surprises, most of which were achieved through tax increases. While, in 2001, the budget deficit was still 30 per cent of GDP, it was reduced to only 1 per cent
in 2005; the overall national debt was also reduced in that time period from 91 to 56 per cent of GDP (OECD 2006a: 5). Following monetary reforms in 2002, inflation fell below 10 per cent (CIA 2012; Hütteroth 2002; Schrick-Hildebrand 2006). A major role in these developments has been played by the Turkish central bank, which gained independence in 2001 and has since been successful in controlling inflation (OECD 2006a: 3-4).

Companies in Turkey, however, still suffer from a number of problems, particularly because of the inefficiency of the Turkish financial system and the resulting poor availability of loans (OECD 2006a: 6). There is a lack of domestic investors in the private sector, and Turkish industry remains oriented toward the public banking system because of the lack of private credit institutions and foreign capital (Aslancik 1998: 183). Large companies have fewer problems getting loans, but small and middle-sized firms are being squeezed (Tükel, Ücer & Van Rijckegehem 2006: 290-291). In the formal sector, too, the bar is set so high concerning transparency and management that only a few firms can fulfil the criteria (OECD 2006a: 9) and revert to the informal sector to stay alive.

The job market

The job market in Turkey is still characterised by a high level of unemployment (about 10 per cent) and high income inequality. However, the official unemployment statistics do not reflect the true state of affairs, since they do not include all areas of employment; there are also no proper statistics available for the agricultural sector, where relatives often act as ‘helping hands’ (Hütteroth 2002: 26). Moreover, the informal economy is large and produces much informal employment (Hütteroth 2002; Schrick-Hildebrand 2006). Last, but not least, there is a large reservoir of unused labour in Turkey: Nearly two-thirds of all working-age females did not work in 1997, either because they chose not to work or because they could not find suitable employment (Martin 2002: 175).

Still, there is some evidence that the job market changed markedly between 1998 and 2003 because of the general liberalisation and privatisation occurring in the country. The job market opened up to women,6 and the data on participation in the education system show that women born after 1980 are largely better educated than those born earlier and are better

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6 In Turkey, compared to the rest of Europe, a relatively large number of women work in highly qualified professions. This may be traced back to the fact that upper-class women were encouraged by Kemalist policies to actively participate in the new, modernising cadres; on the other hand, women of lower socio-economic status were always available at relatively low wages to take over the work of such academically trained women at home (Wedel 2002: 138).
prepared to enter the job market (Tunali & Baslevent 2006: 97-98). Labour laws in Turkey, however, in the opinion of the OECD, are still among the most rigid of all OECD countries. Companies with more than 50 employees must fulfil a number of additional demands, making it unattractive to hire employees beyond this limit (OECD 2006a: 7). Labour costs are relatively high in some regions, and the OECD (2008) warned, in particular, that payroll taxes should be reduced, and the rise in the minimum wage capped, since it exceeds regional GDP in some regions (OECD 2006a: 7).

Education, welfare and inequality

Establishing and expanding the education system to encompass the entire population was one of the central tenets of Kemalism. His plan to modernise the country, however, was neglected for many years. In 1995, the rate of illiteracy was still 6.9 per cent for men and 23.9 per cent for women (Martin 2002: 174). Recently, Turkey has made great efforts to reform the education system. An eight-year period of compulsory education was introduced, though the quality of schooling still lags behind. Girls increasingly participate in basic education, but there is still space for development in the Eastern part of the country (OECD 2007: 9-10). Turkey has more than 60 universities, albeit with large differences with respect to quality and facilities (Hütteroth 2002: 31). Seen against OECD standards, basic and higher education in Turkey still reach only poor levels on average, whereas the best schools and universities of the country have very high standards. The highly selective education system is oriented toward providing a good education to the best pupils emerging from the competitive and state-controlled selection process. For this reason, one can speak of a certain schism running through the education system between the primary/secondary areas on the one hand, and the tertiary area on the other. According to OECD data, Turkey should place a greater emphasis on publicly financing a broader-based system of general education by raising its financial basis and shifting funds from other areas (OECD 2008). Only then could the higher level of worker education produce a higher level of worker productivity (OECD 2006a: 9-10).

Educational inequality is reflected in income inequality in the country, which corresponds more to that found in Latin America than in Europe.

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7 In the Turkish education system, private financing is used to close the gaps present in primary and secondary education, whereas public funds are used mainly to finance higher education. Thus, the education a child receives is, from the start, dependent on the financial situation of his or her parents, who often run into debt to secure their child's proper education (Duygan & Güner 2006: 84).
And yet the difference has narrowed over the last twenty years. Even if the present situation is still not satisfactory, the average wage in Turkey did rise nearly 80 per cent in the years 2003 to 2007 (Duygan & Güner 2006: 63-64, 71). However, other regional and economic disparities play a large role in Turkey. Economic activities are concentrated in the north-west, in particular in and around metropolitan Istanbul. The Marmara region produces some 40 per cent of total GNP. Other centres of economic power are Ankara and Izmir, the Çukurova region, the cities of Kayseri, Gaziantep and Denizli and the tourist regions near Antalya. On the other hand, broad sections of East Anatolia lag far behind, as does the Black Sea region (Bagoglu et al. 2005: 10-11). In light of the limited agricultural and general economic-development possibilities in the vast expanses of the eastern part of the country, internal migration from Anatolia toward the West, in part a reaction to the continued repressions of the Kurds, remains relevant (Hütteroth 2002: 23).

9.3.2 Three scenarios on the development of the migration potential in Turkey

Below we sketch out three scenarios of the future development of the migration potential in Turkey which seem plausible against the background of our remarks above.

Reform-oriented scenario: Admittance to the EU with strong economic growth and (near) convergence of relevant factors (scenario 1)

In this scenario, Turkey continues its reform efforts in order to gain admittance to the EU and, based on the increasing international investments in the Turkish economy, can maintain its economic performance of previous years. The repercussions caused by the international financial crisis remain moderate, the labour-force participation rate and (formal) employment rise considerably, and the differential with the rest of the EU is reduced. Turkey will invest a higher proportion of the increasing tax revenues in educational efforts, so that the overall educational level rises, producing long-lasting economic benefits.

GDP increases in the years up to 2020 by around 5 per cent annually and GNI by 6.5 per cent; by 2030, Turkey’s GDP/GNI will have achieved near-convergence with the rest of the EU. The labour-force participation rate continues to grow and, by 2025, reaches a level of 52.43 per cent. The rising level of educational expenditure and the overall economic upswing translate into a higher absorption rate of qualified workers, so that it comes closer to the EU rate of 59.62 per cent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP EU</td>
<td>31,959.42</td>
<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Turkey</td>
<td>13,275.37</td>
<td>14,636.10</td>
<td>18,679.78</td>
<td>26,199.36</td>
<td>36,745.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>97.90</td>
<td>85.25</td>
<td>54.45</td>
<td>7.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI EU</td>
<td>32,352.00</td>
<td>33,233.39</td>
<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI Turkey</td>
<td>10,488.00</td>
<td>11,895.75</td>
<td>16,298.21</td>
<td>24,501.66</td>
<td>37,698.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>97.59</td>
<td>84.42</td>
<td>54.18</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR EU</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR Turkey</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>50.38</td>
<td>52.43</td>
<td>55.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>100.00</td>
<td>85.39</td>
<td>66.47</td>
<td>34.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>639,224</td>
<td>669,723</td>
<td>690,056</td>
<td>707,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % differences</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>98.50</td>
<td>85.02</td>
<td>58.37</td>
<td>14.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>629,620</td>
<td>569,403</td>
<td>402,767</td>
<td>102,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
This scenario, set out in Table 9.1, clearly shows that the effects of positive economic development lead, in the long run, to a large reduction in emigration potential to European member states. The gap between Turkish and European economic development is not so massive that it would be impossible to imagine convergence in the next twenty years. In that case, the current high emigration potential would decrease over the coming decade.

**Weak economic development, later reform pressure (scenario 2)**

This scenario – see Table 9.2 – presumes that Turkey feels considerable repercussions from the international financial crisis, and that its economic performance (GDP/GNI) falls by 2 per cent per annum through to 2019. The political pressure to enact reforms in the social security system, in the legal system and, in particular, in matters of private property and contractual law, and to improve the efficiency and reliability of the civil administration, becomes so immense that a radical reform package will be implemented to tackle the necessary steps at one throw. The per capita investments in education will be increased by budgetary realignments, the retirement system will be reformed and the job market extensively liberalised. These actions, however, fail to take hold before the year 2025 and then increase GDP/GNI by only 4 per cent. Only after the year 2024 is there a significant easing in the job market (the labour-force participation rate will rise to 55 per cent up until 2030).

In contrast to scenario 1, the emigration potential will increase in this scenario in the short term and will only decrease in the long run.

**Moderate economic development combined with tentative reforms (scenario 3)**

This scenario (Table 9.3) departs from the assumption that there will be economic development in Turkey (GDP will increase constantly by 3 per cent up to 2022 and by 5 per cent subsequently), but that this development will be hampered by the persistently weak world economy. The Turkish government will support the development by reforms that aim to decrease social-security services, attract direct investments and rationalise state administration. Nevertheless, labour-market absorption will not increase significantly, mainly due to rationalisation and to the lack of reforms in education. As a consequence, employment will only increase moderately up to 2020 (from 48.8 to 49.98 per cent). The GNI will not keep up with the development of the GDP and will only increase by 1 per cent. Only in 2020 will the Turkish government slowly raise its investment in education. The GNI will grow by 2 per cent per year from 2024 onwards and the labour-force participation rate will increase to nearly 52 per cent by 2030 due to
Table 9.2 Turkey: scenario 2

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GDP EU</td>
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<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Turkey</td>
<td>13,275.37</td>
<td>12,494.67</td>
<td>11,294.19</td>
<td>11,294.19</td>
<td>13,741.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>109.36</td>
<td>124.78</td>
<td>134.22</td>
<td>131.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2008 = 100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI EU</td>
<td>32,352.00</td>
<td>33,233.39</td>
<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI Turkey</td>
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<td>9,871.22</td>
<td>8,922.80</td>
<td>8,922.80</td>
<td>10,855.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>106.85</td>
<td>118.15</td>
<td>125.44</td>
<td>124.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2008 = 100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR EU</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR Turkey</td>
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<td>48.80</td>
<td>48.80</td>
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<td>54.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference %</td>
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<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>90.98</td>
<td>43.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2008 = 100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>639,224</td>
<td>669,723</td>
<td>690,056</td>
<td>707,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % differences</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>105.40</td>
<td>114.31</td>
<td>116.88</td>
<td>99.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>673,771</td>
<td>765,562</td>
<td>806,542</td>
<td>704,003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
a cyclical upturn of the world economy and the better-performing labour market. Altogether these developments will lead to a decreasing emigration potential in the long run, especially when the falling birth rates observable now become effective.

9.4 Migration scenarios: Egypt

Egypt, a nation state with a very long history, has always played a major role in political constellations within the so-called Maschrek area. To the present day, Egypt has remained a very centralised country, going back to the time of ‘Arab socialism’. However, this centralised structure also has a material and spatial basis mirrored in Egyptian politics and economics. The most important lifeline of the country is the Nile River, with much fertile land and important cities lining it and forming its delta.

As early as the eighteenth century, Egypt was able to excise itself from the influence of the Ottoman Empire (of which it was formally a part). A modern process of state-building occurred soon after Napoleon’s military intervention and, after the withdrawal of the French, with the establishment of state administrative authorities and modern educational institutes (for the elite) and the promotion of industrialisation. The country’s attempts at territorial expansion and at establishing an empire of its own, stretching over Syria in the one direction and Sudan in the other, failed in the face of European opposition. The export of cotton became of ever-greater economic importance. But the notorious crises of state finances – for example, in the aftermath of the building of the Suez Canal – opened the gate to increased influence by the British and eventually to their occupying the country to secure their geostrategic and economic interests, particularly control of the Suez Canal and cotton production. Following British occupation (until 1922) and constitutional monarchy (with considerable British influence still present), independence was obtained in 1952 and Nasser (1952-1970) called for ‘Arab socialism’ and ‘Pan-Arabism’. Nasser implemented a forced etatistic policy of modernisation emanating from military elites,

8 An area stretching to the east of Egypt that includes – besides Egypt – Israel, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.
9 Pan-Arabism as a movement strived to establish an Arab cultural nation – i.e., the community of all Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, in a single national country in accordance with the model of the Islamic Umma (community). Besides Nasser, the Baath Party in Iraq supported this idea, eventually leading to the founding and short-term existence of the United Arabic Republic (encompassing Syria and Egypt) as well as the Arabic Federation (Jordan and Iraq).
Table 9.3  Turkey: scenario 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP EU</td>
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<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Turkey</td>
<td>13,275.37</td>
<td>14,506.36</td>
<td>16,816.84</td>
<td>20,653.17</td>
<td>26,359.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100.00</td>
<td>98.59</td>
<td>95.22</td>
<td>84.13</td>
<td>63.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI EU</td>
<td>32,352.00</td>
<td>33,233.39</td>
<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI Turkey</td>
<td>10,488.00</td>
<td>10,805.80</td>
<td>11,357.00</td>
<td>12,054.50</td>
<td>13,309.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>107.02</td>
<td>111.11</td>
<td>112.99</td>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR Turkey</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>49.98</td>
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<td>51.81</td>
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<tr>
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<td>95.93</td>
<td>89.06</td>
<td>81.62</td>
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<td>669,723</td>
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</tr>
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<td>97.10</td>
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<td>82.89</td>
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<td>633,047</td>
<td>650,302</td>
<td>636,854</td>
<td>586,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors' calculations
taking his political cue from the Soviet Union. His successors – Sadat and Mubarak – maintained the authoritarian centralistic state, but inched successively toward more-liberal, market-oriented and Western-influenced policies, balanced in relation to both the other states of the Arab League and internal opposition (Büttner & Ḥamzāwī 2007). The oppositional forces were effectively precluded from any political participation, even if the Muslim Brotherhood10 had held up to 20 per cent of the seats in Parliament since 2005. This was the political background for a policy of slow reforms while also maintaining the status quo, with an eye toward the lower socio-economic parts of the population, for example, by retaining costly state-sponsored subventions for staple foods and energy. The regime's problems, as in other neighbouring states, are based on the lack of a mechanism for an orderly transfer of power beyond the continuity of persons. These regimes have always attempted to install a sort of succession, which inevitably failed in the long run (most recently during the Arab Spring uprisings). In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood took over power, but was ousted from government in July 2013 by the Egyptian army after weeks of mass protests against President Mursi and his political party.

This short sketch of Egypt's domestic and foreign policies serves, at the same time, as a backdrop for the country's security situation – terror attacks at regular intervals, particularly in tourist areas, the existence of militant-Islamist movements such as the Islamic Group (al Jamaat al Islamiya) or Al-Jihad – both of which had major economic repercussions when the tourists failed to come or investors were scared away because of a loss of trust in the country.

A further factor is important here. The Arab Republic of Egypt has, to date, not been at the centre of the migration-political focus of the EU. The reason behind this is that, since the 1960s, emigration from Egypt has mainly been directed towards the Gulf states – about two-thirds of all Egyptian emigrants reside in the Gulf states and Libya, some 1 million of whom live alone in Saudi Arabia. This migration was encouraged by the Egyptian emigration authorities. Emigration, particularly of highly qualified migrants, to other regions was concentrated largely toward the United States and Canada and is – in contrast to the circular migration to the Gulf states – as a rule, permanent (see also Zohry in this volume).

In Europe, currently, some 300,000 Egyptians have taken up residence, most of them in the southern parts, in particular in Greece and Italy. Im-

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10 The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the largest and oldest Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Near East. It was founded in 1928 in Egypt, quickly spread throughout the region, and is now present in many Arab countries.
migration data from the recent past show Greece and Italy absorbing the highest rates of Egyptian migration – in Greece, in 2006, there were about 4,800 Egyptian immigrants, and more recent numbers for Italy speak of between 80,000 and 100,000 immigrants. This compares to other countries, such as Germany, where only about 1,500 immigrants from Egypt enter each year, or France, which counts between 800 and 1,000 such immigrants annually (Eurostat). This makes Egypt an interesting case, compared to those of Turkey and Morocco, which have long-standing migration relationships in Europe and, thus, established migration systems. Because of the absence of such an existing ethnic bridgehead in the EU, the migration potential of Egypt will be weighted with a network factor, which reflects the limited likelihood of this group realising their migration projects. We expect the existing Egyptian networks to be only one quarter as strong as the Turkish or Moroccan ones. Thus we reduce the migration potential in Egypt, in the end, to 25 per cent of the originally calculated value.

9.4.1 Conditions for the expected migration: Egypt’s economic situation

The Egyptian economy has expanded over the past few years and, in 2006/2007, grew at a rate of 7 per cent. Because of the worldwide financial crisis and the recent political power struggle in Egypt, this rate would seem exceptionally high, though it could resume its former pace in the near future since the baseline numbers were rather low. In 2010, Egypt still had an annual GDP growth rate of 3.4 per cent. In 2011 and 2012, the numbers went down to 0.1 per cent and 0.5 per cent respectively (World Bank Database) due to the Arab Revolution and ongoing political unrest. But, even with a high rate of growth, the differential between the Egyptian and the EU GDP rates will remain enormous – in 2012, Egyptian GDP per capita was US$3,777, thus considerably below even the average for the MENA region.

Economic sectors, trade and the economic climate

The economic sectors contribute to differing degrees to the GDP. Agriculture, for example, has forfeited much of its earlier importance, its share of GDP falling from about 30 per cent at the beginning of the 1950s to the present-day 14 per cent. Yet this sector still employs around 32 per cent of all employed persons in the country and thus also has a high potential for layoffs. Many of Egypt’s agricultural goods – primarily cotton, rice, wheat, beans and other sorts of vegetable – are produced for export. At the same time, the country’s agriculture is not in a position to produce enough basic
foodstuffs for Egypt’s own population. This, in turn, translates into a high dependency on imported foodstuffs, which rank second only to machinery and electronic and technical equipment (Büttner & Ḥamzāwī 2007; Ibrahim & Ibrahim 2006). In 2011, industry and services contributed 38 and 48 per cent respectively to GDP (CIA 2012). The Egyptian economy mainly rests on three legs – the Suez Canal as a source of foreign exchange, the growing sector of tourism and the export of natural resources, namely oil and gas. Because of this structural dependence on transfer payments, the export of natural resources and tourism, the Egyptian economy is very prone to fluctuations of all kinds – witness, for example, the situation following the terror attacks on 11 September 2001 or the ups and downs occurring on the commodity markets. Tourism, in particular, reacts immediately to any terrorist attacks and the overall security situation in the Middle East. Egypt’s oil reserves are also limited – oil production has been falling for the past ten years, and it is currently assumed that reserves will be exhausted within the next twenty years. Gas reserves make up only about 1 per cent of worldwide reserves, but the country has been a major exporter due to its having developed these resources very early on (Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie 2011).

In recent years, the foreign-trade deficit fluctuated between 3 and 5 per cent. Currency transfers by Egyptians living abroad have been one of the most important sources of foreign currency. In 2011, a total of some US$14 billion was transferred to Egypt from abroad (see Zohry in this volume).

The economic situation in Egypt has improved overall due to a number of reforms that have especially benefited foreign investors. Yet, persistent bureaucracy and corruption, as well as a lack of legal certainty, have remained severe national problems. Adamant structural problems are the high national debt, high inflation and the future of the energy supply when the oil and gas reserves have been depleted. This will further increase the high dependency on imports and the fluctuations in export income – the major weaknesses of the Egyptian economy. Egypt ranks 101st of 169 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2010: 144), and thus lies behind all other North African countries, with the exception of Morocco.

Public expenditure, debt and inflation

The Egyptian economy is, even today, a centralistic one. Only very recently has the Egyptian state seriously begun to privatise state-owned enterprises (such as the Bank of Alexandria) and to improve the investment conditions for foreign companies. This may be traced, in part, back to the Europe-
Mediterranean Agreement of 2001 between the EU and Egypt, which foresaw the eventual elimination of customs barriers. Nevertheless, the state still contributes 40 per cent to the national product.

A further structural problem is the notoriously high level of national debt which, in 2007, exceeded 100 per cent of GDP. The state subsidies for energy (electricity and oil) for businesses and private households also represent a major strain on the national budget. Yet, the existing high level of social inequality prohibits their reduction or elimination.

The job market
The difficult economic situation is reflected in the Egyptian job market. Officially, the rate of unemployment has hovered between 8 and 11 per cent in recent years (see Zohry in this volume), increasing to 13 per cent in 2013 (CAPMAS 2013). This rate, however, owes more to statistical whitewashing than to reality – according to OECD (2005) estimates, the informal sector comprises up to two-thirds of economic performance. In 2013, 48 per cent of the population were officially employed (CAPMAS 2013), apparently a relatively constant value over the past few years (in 2001 it was 45 per cent, according to ILO data). The continuing high rate of population growth of 1.8 per cent (see Ulrich in this volume) and the approximately 600,000 new workers entering the job market every year demand a constant increase in GDP of 6–7 per cent to keep up with the population growth (OECD 2005).

Unemployment affects mostly youths and young adults, particularly those entering the labour market for the first time (in 2005, 34 per cent of those aged 15-24 were unemployed, according to Eurostat data). Particularly affected are those with a secondary-school or university education (ILO data). There is a great discrepancy between the education system and the labour market – for structural reasons, the job market cannot absorb enough qualified workers, and the education system produces qualified personnel who, with the exception of the state apparatus, are not in demand on the open market (World Bank 2008). The number of female workers is also extremely low on the official job market.

Welfare and education
About a third of the total population is illiterate, overproportionally women. The Egyptian education system is in dire need of reform, particularly the primary-school area, which exhibits great regional diversity in school infrastructure. The average schooling in Egypt is currently 5.5 years. Expenditure on education in 2012 represented 4.4 per cent of GNI and has not risen since
Expenditure on research and development also remains at a very low level: 0.21 per cent of GDP in 2009 (The World Bank Database).

The Egyptian state formally guarantees social security through three main measures: first, subventions for staple foods – especially bread, sugar and cooking oil; second, the theoretical coverage of all Egyptians in the social-security system (though, in fact, only about half the population is covered and only a sixth of the workers receives unemployment benefits); third, state pensions for needy families and the elderly. The social systems in place, however, are extremely complex and confusing in nature and factually do not reach large parts of the population – as well as being chronically underfinanced. They do not truly protect from poverty resulting from unemployment, and they generally favour the well-to-do. A fundamental restructuring of the system in the near future is not regarded as imminent because of the overall financial situation of the country (Loewe 2004; Loffredo 2004) and the necessary restructuring of the country in political and economic terms. A precondition for it would be, firstly, a stable domestic situation.

9.4.2 Three scenarios on the development of migration potential in Egypt

Economic growth without structural reform on the job market and in the education system (scenario 1)

This scenario assumes the continuation of the current economic reforms aiming to improve the overall economic situation and the legal stability in the country, and to restrict government regulation. These reforms will increase foreign direct investments in industry and services. Parallel to this development, the inflow of foreign currency will rise through tourism. This will absorb some of the rising costs associated with an increased importation of foodstuffs following a structural crisis in the agricultural sector. Oil production has also been on the decline since 2008 (oil rents as percentage of GDP have fallen from 11.1 per cent in 2008 to 6.3 per cent in 2010) as the reserves dwindle, making higher oil imports also necessary. These, in turn, can be compensated for by increasing gas production and export through the exploitation of new gas fields and the building of new pipelines, as agreed with the states interested in these resources. Thus, overall, GDP and GNI rise markedly.

However, this rise does not lead to an increase in the number of people employed; rather, the positive economic conditions increase productivity through rationalisation, leading to a reduction in formal employment.
This, in turn, causes an increase in the informal sector, which must absorb more workers because of the high competitive pressure being exerted. The structural crisis of agriculture also releases many workers, causing an overall rise in the unemployed and an accelerated fall in the labour-force participation rate – in our model from 49.5 per cent to a low of 44.2 per cent in 2025.

It is our assumption that these effects of economic liberalisation will ensue very quickly and, from 2010 on, simultaneously. Should reforms in the educational sector fail to be enacted, the mismatch between training and the job market would continue. Only in the year 2020 – following a long period of growth with a high level of formal unemployment – would there be any increase in the number of jobs available stemming from the increase in production facilities and general growth in the service industry. This is reflected not only in a long-term growth of GDP and GNI, but also in a rapid increase in the number of persons employed. The labour-force participation rate lies at 47.5 per cent in 2030.

This scenario clearly shows that lingering employment problems, despite positive economic development, lead to an increase in migration potential beyond that expected for demographic reasons. This is due to the fact that Egypt has a relatively low GDP compared to the EU to start with. As a consequence, it will take Egypt a long time to catch up with the EU, even if Egypt has a high level of growth and if we project only a moderate level of growth of 1 per cent in the EU. After twenty years at triple (!) the original GDP, Egypt will succeed in closing the gap by only about 18 per cent – and its GDP will still hover at about 50 per cent of that of the EU. It should come as no surprise that, in light of the employment statistics, this development does not serve to effectively reduce the emigration potential. Only in the year 2030, according to this scenario, would the emigration potential fall slightly below its demographic rate, always, of course, under the assumption of free movement between Egypt and the EU.

**Reforms stagnate, political conflicts continue and the economy slumps**

(*scenario 2*)

This second scenario presumes a long-lasting economic stagnation stemming from the political crisis. This continues through to 2020 and results in only minimal growth or even recession. From 2014 onwards, the oil reserves are on the downturn, and market liberalisation is stopped because of the regime change and the resulting domestic turbulences. The consequences are, first, the stagnation and, later, the shrinking, of foreign investments.
Table 9.4 Egypt: scenario 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP EU</td>
<td>31,959.42</td>
<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Egypt</td>
<td>6,417.28</td>
<td>7,348.52</td>
<td>10,311.49</td>
<td>13,799.10</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI Egypt</td>
<td>2,784.00</td>
<td>3,188.00</td>
<td>4,473.42</td>
<td>5,986.45</td>
<td>8,011.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>102.42</td>
<td>102.69</td>
<td>101.47</td>
</tr>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44.90</td>
<td>44.20</td>
<td>47.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>145.45</td>
<td>152.37</td>
<td>119.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,701,861</td>
<td>1,824,465</td>
<td>1,952,908</td>
<td>2,084,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % differences</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>110.80</td>
<td>114.33</td>
<td>114.48</td>
<td>99.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final emigration potential</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>2,085,927</td>
<td>2,235,658</td>
<td>2,074,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced by network effect</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>471,405</td>
<td>521,482</td>
<td>558,915</td>
<td>518,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
Between 2015 and 2019, not only will the oil reserves be drying up, but Egypt, with its limited gas reserves (which, for the most part, lie offshore), will also no longer be able to compete on the world gas market. Negative growth of GDP between 2019 and 2023 is the result since, apart from internal problems, Egypt will now have to import oil, which will, in turn, exacerbate the need for foreign currency. The reduction of subsidies for energy will lead to a decrease in industrial production. The permanent crisis in agriculture, however, will mean retaining the subsidies for imported grain in order to secure a basic supply of foodstuffs, consequently increasing the national debt. On the job market, these developments cause the labour-force participation rate to fall from 49.5 per cent to 43 per cent in the years 2012 to 2030.

Toward the end of the decade, the World Bank and the IMF intervene and impose a radical programme for structural reforms as a condition for granting Egypt the credit needed to prevent national bankruptcy. This succeeds in stabilising the situation and creating new growth by 2025. But the high level of imports and debt payments causes the GNI to stagnate. On the job market, the low level of employment in the formal sector fails to increase, a result of both the structural reforms and the parallel increase in the working-age population.

This scenario clearly shows that negative dynamics increase the emigration potential up until 2030 to more than 690,000 persons. And if we disregard the network factor, the increase is even higher. Should the EU adopt a liberal stance toward immigration or should it no longer be in a position to control immigration, this would, indeed, cause Egypt to be a very important source of immigration to the EU.

Early reforms despite economic and political setbacks (scenario 3)
The third scenario is based on extending the recent development in growth rates through to 2015. The Egyptian government presses on with the policy of opening up the Egyptian market in order to entice foreign investments. In light of the dwindling supply of natural resources, particularly of crude oil, it will also invest in education by improving the infrastructure and participation rates, in particular of women. In addition, the government will restructure the tertiary level of education and improve training in both technical and scientific courses of study to overcome the existing mismatch between market needs and educational means.

From 2020, the depletion of oil reserves begins to affect the growth rate. Even if Egypt's position on the gas market could be maintained, it would
Table 9.5  Egypt: scenario 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
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<td>GDP EU</td>
<td>31,959.42</td>
<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Egypt</td>
<td>6,417.28</td>
<td>6,546.27</td>
<td>6,474.84</td>
<td>6,062.97</td>
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<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>110.14</td>
<td>118.67%</td>
<td>121.62</td>
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<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI Egypt</td>
<td>2,784.00</td>
<td>3,192.21</td>
<td>3,864.96</td>
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<td>3,785.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>101.60</td>
<td>104.47</td>
<td>109.26</td>
<td>115.76</td>
</tr>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR Egypt</td>
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<td>46.50</td>
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<td>43.00</td>
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<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>Emigration potential</td>
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<td>1,824,465</td>
<td>1,952,908</td>
<td>2,084,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % differences</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>109.86</td>
<td>114.75</td>
<td>127.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final emigration potential</td>
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<td>1,869,438</td>
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<td>2,488,511</td>
<td>2,790,191</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>467,360</td>
<td>523,410</td>
<td>622,128</td>
<td>697,548</td>
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</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors' calculations
not be enough to compensate for the lack of income from oil exports. The growth rate would fall considerably from its earlier 7 per cent and lie at about 1 per cent by 2025, which translates into a decline in the labour-force participation rate from 47.01 to 46.71 per cent.

In the year 2027, however, the market liberalisation policies, together with the long-term educational and qualification efforts, result in a turnaround. Foreign direct investments in the production and service sectors will increase due to the ever-more-well-qualified medium- and upper-level personnel available at comparatively low salaries. This will entail a considerable surge in growth rates along with a very effective increase in formal employment, expressed in a rise of the labour-force participation rate to over 50 per cent.

In this scenario, increasing growth has almost no influence on the demographic emigration potential in 2030 due to the virtually unchanged labour-force participation rate. With the depletion of the oil reserves and the decline in growth and employment between 2015 and 2020, the emigration potential increases slightly between 2020 and 2025, only to fall again by around 3 percent points under the demographic value in 2030, after eight years of continual growth and a resultant increase in employment.

This model clearly shows that, because of the initial large differences between Egypt and the EU and the large numbers of young persons entering the job market in Egypt, only a dynamically increasing and steady growth can lead to a long-term decrease in emigration potential in Egypt. Yet, such a development seems somewhat unlikely, especially in current turbulent times, since it demands long-term policies maintained over a considerable period of time.

9.5 Migration scenarios: Morocco

In contrast to the other countries under consideration here, Morocco is a monarchy. The nationalistic aspirations of this country go back to the 1920s, though they were suppressed by the French colonial power, which declared Morocco a protectorate in 1912. In 1955, Sultan Mohammed V, who was also the religious head of the country, negotiated a contract which provided for a stepwise transition to independence. In 1956, two different agreements were made for independence from France and Spain. The cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the north shore of Morocco remained enclaves of Spain – a situation that has created tensions between the two countries to this day.

Upon achieving independence in 1957, Mohammed V set up a constitutional monarchy and gave himself the title of ‘king’. His successor was his son, Hassan
Table 9.6  Egypt: scenario 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
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<td>GDP EU</td>
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<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
</tr>
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<td>GDP Egypt</td>
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<td>7,567.56</td>
<td>10,613.89</td>
<td>11,155.31</td>
<td>15,188.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>99.29</td>
<td>93.94</td>
<td>98.73</td>
<td>90.20</td>
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<td>GNI EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>101.37</td>
<td>104.92</td>
<td>107.51</td>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<td>50.21</td>
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<td>122.63</td>
<td>124.60</td>
<td>127.57</td>
<td>92.98</td>
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<td>2,084,269</td>
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<tr>
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<td>106.64</td>
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<td>2,156,121</td>
<td>2,019,620</td>
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<td>457,770</td>
<td>486,388</td>
<td>539,030</td>
<td>504,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
II, who survived two military uprisings and took part in the October 1973 war against Israel. In 1976, Morocco took ownership from Spain of areas in the West Sahara which had always been claimed by Morocco. This was also the time when the Polisario protest movement was born in the West Sahara which, to this day, fights for the independence of this area. In 1999, Hassan II's son, Mohammad VI, assumed the throne and partly loosened the autocratic rules laid down by his father. The elections of 2002 were seen by most observers to have been fair and free. Economic, political and social reforms followed, among others a strengthening of women's rights, permission to teach in the Berber language at school, and the release of many political prisoners. Nevertheless, freedom of the press is still limited in Morocco (Krauter 2004; Library of Congress 2006). In 2011, in the course of the Arab Uprising, the King of Morocco enforced a constitutional reform which, for the first time, included basic rights. Furthermore, democratic participation was extended. There is now a coalition government in charge, with a moderate Islamic president. Nevertheless power remains mainly in the hands of the king (World Bank 2013).

Major elements of instability in the country are the Islamistic groups such as Salafiya Jihadiya, who were responsible for the terror attacks in Casablanca11 in 2003. Following these attacks, the government clamped down on these and other groups and eventually became an important ally in the fight of the North Atlantic powers against terrorism (Library of Congress 2006). The strict rejection of extremist attacks is also clearly linked to the country's dependence on international tourism, a very important source of income.

Like Turkey, Morocco has a long history of migration to Europe. France first recruited workers in Morocco for the army, industry and mines during World War I and World War II. However, most of these workers returned to Morocco. Migration from Morocco to France also continued after Moroccan independence, particularly during the time of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). In 1963, France signed an official recruitment agreement with Morocco. Other countries, such as Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany, also recruited in Morocco, albeit to a lesser degree (see de Haas in this volume; also see Berrada 1994; Khachani 2004; Lahlou, Alami M'chichi & Hamdouch 2005). A significant rise in emigration to Spain and Italy took place in the late 1990s. Initially, it was thought that the migration of Moroccan workers to Europe would only be temporary but, after the oil shock of 1973, many migrant workers took up permanent residence there.

11 These consisted of five coordinated suicide bombings directed toward Jewish or Western establishments. A total of 40 people were killed in these attacks.
Currently some 2.7 million registered Moroccans live in Europe, mostly in France (around 1 million) and Spain (about 500,000) (de Haas 2009). However there is another, relatively large, group of Moroccans living illegally in Spain. Moroccans make up the largest group of immigrants in Europe from the African continent and will probably take over from Turkey the position of leading immigrant group sometime in the near future. The emigration of highly skilled workers is directed increasingly toward the United States and Canada (de Haas 2009; Heering & van der Erf 2002). About 10 per cent of the total Moroccan population (around 3 million persons) currently live abroad.

Generally speaking, since achieving independence, the Moroccan government has used emigration as a means of achieving economic development. For this reason, connections to Moroccan communities abroad are nursed and, if necessary, steps are taken to ensure the preservation of Moroccan culture, religion and language among the younger generations (de Haas 2009). At the same time, Morocco has slowly become a transit and immigration country, as illustrated in recent studies (see, for example, de Haas 2005).

9.5.1 Conditions for the expected migration: Morocco’s economic situation

The Moroccan economy has been growing for many years now, though it does have its ups and downs. For the years between 2006 and 2008, average GDP growth was 5.4 per cent; in 2011, it slowed down to 2.7 per cent. The worldwide economic downturn appears to have had less-dramatic effects on Morocco, which continues to profit from decreasing commodity prices due to its lack of resources. Altogether, the country is in a process of opening up its economy, as witnessed by its 2004 trade agreement with the United States and an Advanced Status Agreement with the European Union (CIA 2012).

The per capita GDP in Morocco lies in the lower third of the MENA countries, exceeding that of Egypt, but clearly behind Turkey with US$2,925 (World Bank Database). Its per capita GDP is even below that of Egypt. But here, too, what we saw with Egypt is true – that the difference between Morocco and the EU will continue to increase despite its predicted constant growth.

Economic sectors, trade and the economic climate

After obtaining its independence, the Moroccan state did not immediately change the basic economic structures from colonial times. Following attempts to overthrow the government in the early 1970s, however, a state-run economic policy was instituted. This restructuring led, among other things, to increased subsidies, higher taxes on agriculture and an increase in foreign
debt. High import barriers were also set up. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the economy broke down – the price of phosphate, the most important export commodity, fell which, together with rising state expenditure, nearly bankrupted the country completely in 1983. The IMF therefore set up a programme to install broad economic reforms in Morocco (Richter 2009). Nevertheless, the authoritative power structures of the Moroccan system continued to have a negative impact on the market economy. This was due primarily to the lack of transparency in Morocco’s legal system and the widespread corruption.

Morocco has always suffered from an imbalance of foreign trade, which has worsened since 2008. Only about half of the imports are backed by exports. A fourth of all imports stem from the energy sector (CIA 2012). To date, tourism and remittances, which are among the highest in the world, have been able to make up the difference (Sørensen 2004).

The Moroccan economy is linked to the European economy in almost every regard. As is often the case, the migration links correspond largely with economic links. The most important import and export contacts lie in Europe; France and Spain are the leading partners in both respects (CIA 2012). A further important export sector is the textile industry, which recently came under pressure from competition from Asia. In past decades, Morocco has also tried to expand its supply industries for information technology, automobiles and aviation, but this development is still nascent or dependent on other investment plans (e.g., the new deep-water port, and car factories by Renault-Nissan – the first phase of construction of this latter project was completed in 2010). Yet these areas should provide a better long-term perspective than textiles or agriculture. The industrial sector presently contributes about 30 per cent to GDP, with the service industry providing some 54 per cent (CIA 2012).

One of the weak points in the Moroccan economy is still the high importance of agriculture, which contributes only 16 per cent to GDP but employs nearly 44 per cent of all Moroccan workers. The most important agricultural products are barley, wheat, citrus fruits, wine and olives. Morocco still has to import wheat for its own population. However, for decades the government has had a policy of self-sufficiency in place regarding foodstuffs, resulting in a well-developed food-processing industry that is now one of the major industrial sectors of the country. The government still subsidises food products, but the programme is currently being slowly phased out.

The situation with tourism – which is extremely dependent on the economic situation in Europe – is a very different one. In 2008 there was a dip in tourists coming to Morocco, but numbers have been going up again since (World Bank Database). This is important because tourism produces a
quarter of all foreign-exchange revenue. Previously this sector could boast
a constant increase as expatriate Moroccans made up nearly half of the
country’s tourists (OECD 2006b).

Morocco has virtually no oil or gas reserves of its own, making them the
most important imports. But it does rank as the world’s largest exporter
of phosphate, the price of which has increased considerably in the recent
past. Investments in Morocco have also experienced a positive trend in
the last few years. In 2010, there was a dip in foreign direct investment as
a percentage of GDP but, in 2011, the numbers were back at the same level
as in 2008 – 2.5 per cent. The same tendency is true for the net inflow of
foreign direct investment (World Bank Database).

Public spending quota, debt and inflation
Morocco has begun to privatise previously state-run companies, such
as Maroc Télécom, the largest enterprise in the entire country. The ten
largest companies in Morocco are active in the energy and fuel sector
where, despite restructuring efforts, three remain in public ownership
(the telecommunication, airline and phosphate industries). The external
debt stock as a percentage of GNI lies at 29.4 per cent and has therefore
risen slightly in the years since 2008 (24 per cent).

The job market
The official unemployment rate lies at around 10 per cent. However, if under-
employment and the high number of persons working in the informal market
are taken into consideration, then the number would be considerably higher.
Particularly hard hit by unemployment are the urban regions, specifically
those in the 25-35 age group, corresponding to the number of unemployed
university graduates – 26 per cent of all unemployed have a university degree.
Hence, as in Egypt, there is a mismatch between the education system and the
job market in Morocco, which cannot absorb the large number of highly quali-
fied persons. Adolescents and young adults between the ages of fifteen and
25 are also at considerable risk of unemployment; 34 per cent (FEMISE 2004).

A further weak point in the job market lies in the number of persons
employed in the informal economy – some 40 per cent of non-agriculture
employees and about 20 per cent of all employable persons. This means a
large chunk of the working population enjoys no formal social security and
also fails to profit from the minimum wage introduced in 2004. On the basis
of per capita income (and allowing for purchasing power parity) Morocco
compares poorly to countries with similar per capita values (FEMISE 2004;
Welfare and education

The Human Development Report ranks Morocco at 114, thus putting the country in last place in the list of North African states, far below Tunisia (81), Algeria (84) and even Egypt (101) (UNDP 2010). The deficits may be found in its GDP, the health sector – which is considered inadequate – and in education, one of the country’s major weak points. The adult-literacy rate lies at around 56 per cent; women have an even lower rate of 40 per cent (World Bank 2008). The rate of persons receiving secondary and tertiary education lies far below that of other North African and Arab states. The World Bank has calculated that some 2.5 million children, above all, girls from rural areas, do not attend school at all (Library of Congress 2006; World Bank 2008).

Morocco has a welfare system that provides for employees in old age, when pregnant or when sick; for civil servants there is a separate insurance system. Not included are the self-employed. Social security is funded through the contributions of employees and employers. The National Social Security Fund has been responsible for gathering and distributing the funds since 1961. How many employees actually pay into this fund is unknown but, from the information provided by the fund itself, it would appear that the residents of the regions of Casablanca and of Rabat, in particular, participate in the system (48 and 13 per cent, respectively, of all participating employees nationwide). One could infer from this statistic that higher earners, especially in urban areas, are participating. To take part in the system, one has to earn at least the official minimum wage, which is not the case for vast swathes of the population. Another condition is legal employment (CNSS 2002; Library of Congress 2006; SSPTW 2007). Generally speaking, there is a large social divide in Morocco’s population.

9.5.2 Three scenarios on the development of Morocco’s migration potential

Maintenance of the status quo (scenario 1)

The first scenario assumes that the status quo is more or less continued into the future. It presumes that the price of phosphate remains stable and that the oil price experiences no major ups and downs. For economic development in Morocco, it is also particularly essential that neither the textile nor the tourism industries collapse. Making this assumption for tourism seems realistic, the only caveat being possible terror attacks. In this scenario, GDP rises at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent through to 2023 and of 3 per cent from 2024 to 2030 because of the positive development in the textile industry and the sustainable establishment of the (few) foreign
investment projects. Similar rates are also assumed for the GNI. In this scenario, however, the labour-force participation rate changes little, in the absence of radical changes in the economic or political structures, leading to a very modest 0.1 per cent increase due to the positive impulses coming from the textile industry and foreign investments. The emigration potential thus remains high – and, in fact, increases over time because of the low baseline level and massive differential with respect to the EU.

*Decrease in tourism and the textile sector, and collapse of the price of phosphate (scenario 2)*

Far more negative developments are conceivable. A massive terror attack could damage tourism for many years to come. The textile industry could also lose a considerable share of its market to China. In such a scenario, GDP is presumed to increase at a rate of 0.5 per cent up to 2019 but, from 2020 on, growth stops altogether and, after 2025, the economy even shrinks because of the worldwide decline in phosphate prices.

In order to fulfil its obligations, Morocco would have to raise taxes at the latest in 2020, leaving its citizens with less GNI to live on (a one-time reduction in 2020 by 4 per cent and thereafter, from 2025, a decrease by 2 per cent per annum because of the negative development of GDP). By 2026 at the latest, all these developments would hit the job market. Because the Moroccan government is not in a position to raise its investments in education or to carry out sustainable reforms, the labour-force participation rate would fall yearly by 2 percentage points, beginning in 2027.

The assumptions made above do not seem to be unrealistic nor overly negative in their prognosis about future developments. Rather, they clearly point out that only reforms within a country can, indeed, lead to permanent improvements. The ‘misfortunes’ to be borne by Morocco are, for the most part, beyond the reach of political will (terrorism, development of international commodity prices, rise of China). Yet deep reforms in the education and social systems, as well as a campaign against corruption, would open up new directions for an otherwise mediocre economic situation, for example, by attracting new foreign investments. In the above scenario, however, the results would be very different: The potential 974,537 emigrants by 2030 would represent a greater risk to Moroccan society than to the EU. One might assume that, among this number, a great many highly qualified persons would leave the country, since the job market in Morocco does not offer this group adequate prospects.
### Table 9.7 Morocco: scenario 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
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<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
<td>38,228.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Morocco</td>
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<td>5,841.00</td>
<td>6,673.19</td>
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<td>GNI EU</td>
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<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>38,013.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI Morocco</td>
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<td>3,202.31</td>
<td>3,623.11</td>
<td>4,139.31</td>
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<td>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</td>
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<td>106.24</td>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<td>Average % differences</td>
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<td>Final emigration potential</td>
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Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors' calculations
### Table 9.8 Morocco: scenario 2

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<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>34,607.47</td>
<td>36,372.80</td>
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<td><strong>GDP Morocco</strong></td>
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<td>4,866.25</td>
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<td>103.30</td>
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<td>34,756.05</td>
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<td>38,013.87</td>
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<td><strong>GNI Morocco</strong></td>
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<td>3,093.95</td>
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<td><strong>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</strong></td>
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<td>102.85</td>
<td>107.78</td>
<td>113.65</td>
<td>120.33</td>
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<tr>
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<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<tr>
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<td>49.60</td>
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<td>100.00</td>
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<td>741,767</td>
<td>763,584</td>
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<td><strong>Average % differences</strong></td>
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<td>102.05</td>
<td>105.60</td>
<td>109.73</td>
<td>127.63</td>
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<td><strong>Final emigration potential</strong></td>
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<td>712,445</td>
<td>763,583</td>
<td>813,905</td>
<td>974,537</td>
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Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
### Table 9.9 Morocco: scenario 3

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>GDP Morocco</th>
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<th>GNI EU</th>
<th>GNI Morocco</th>
<th>Difference % (2012 = 100%)</th>
<th>LPR EU</th>
<th>LPR Morocco</th>
<th>LPR Difference % (2012 = 100%)</th>
<th>Migration potential</th>
<th>Average % differences</th>
<th>Final emigration potential</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>100.00</td>
<td>32,352.00</td>
<td>3,048.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td>49.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>32,927.82</td>
<td>5,549.63</td>
<td>100.78</td>
<td>33,233.39</td>
<td>3,528.44</td>
<td>101.37</td>
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<td>101.37</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td>7,600.95</td>
<td>99.41</td>
<td>34,756.05</td>
<td>4,250.82</td>
<td>104.10</td>
<td>59.62</td>
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<td>104.10</td>
<td>723,067</td>
<td>95.48</td>
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<td>2025</td>
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<td>10,912.15</td>
<td>93.72</td>
<td>36,348.48</td>
<td>4,927.87</td>
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<td>107.22</td>
<td>741,767</td>
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<td>2030</td>
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<td>15,811.87</td>
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<td>5,880.76</td>
<td>109.65</td>
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<td>52.87</td>
<td>109.65</td>
<td>763,584</td>
<td>86.51</td>
<td>660,549</td>
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</table>

Source: Fassmann; IMF; UN; ILO; authors’ calculations
Turkey as a model: Foreign investments and economic liberalisation (scenario 3)

In this final scenario the – relatively speaking – positive economic development found in Turkey serves as the model for Morocco’s future. The country succeeds in effectively fighting corruption. As a consequence, it will become attractive to foreign investors (also because of the low wage levels and the relatively high number of well-trained workers available). Scenario 3 assumes an annual rise in GDP of 5 per cent, a similar rate for GNI and an increasing labour-force participation rate, albeit only by a modest 0.5 per cent. From 2013 on, the country will utilise its budget situation to invest in the educational infrastructure. Because of its well-educated pool of available workers, it will be in a position to remain attractive to investors and to secure foreign capital. The result is a veritable boom in subsequent years – after 2017, growth increases by 7.5 per cent, even 8 per cent by 2028. The labour-force participation rate rises only slightly (0.3 per cent) but, by 2030, has reached a relatively high level of 53 per cent. Only the GNI fails to keep up because of the moderate wage increases, and grows by only 3 per cent in the years up to 2026 and by 4 per cent in the years thereafter.

This optimistic scenario 3 highlights one important factor – even GDP growth rates of up to 8 per cent and GNI rates of 4 per cent, and an increase in the labour-force participation rate leading to convergence with the EU, cannot stop Morocco from remaining an emigration country. The economic gap becomes smaller, to be sure, but it is still large enough to trigger potential emigration among the population.

9.6 Conclusion

Empirically speaking, the nine scenarios presented here highlight the extreme importance of demographics. Demographic development remains the decisive factor in determining the emigration potential of these countries. A realistic projection of the economic development does influence the amount of emigration potential, but it cannot significantly change it. Only if we assume very large rates of growth in the MENA states do we get an emigration potential that markedly deviates from that determined in the demographic calculations. Scenario 1 for Turkey, for example, foresees an emigration potential of only 100,000 people by 2030 – but it was based on a tripling of GDP over this time period!

That demographics is of such major significance is also due to the large gap with the EU, as measured by per capita GDP. Even if we assume only very
moderate growth rates of 1 per cent per annum in the EU, the high baseline level effectively causes the gaps to increase in real terms. The image of the hare that runs faster and faster but cannot beat the hedgehog is a fitting one here. The same interest paid on a large amount of money results in more real income than on a smaller amount. A true convergence in this development seems, from our present vantage point, somewhat improbable.

The results of our calculations are positive with regard to demographic and migration policies from a European point of view. If we add up the scenarios with the lowest migration potential for 2020, for instance, we get a total sum of 1,746,159 persons who would be ready and willing to leave their home country if there were no legal barriers – most of these would probably head to the EU. The highest migration potential would be 2,052,555.

These hypothetical thresholds in the migration potential of the three MENA states in question are relevant only if there were no legal barriers to immigrating into the EU and do not represent a threat to the EU. The EU states are confronted with a tremendous reproduction problem because of their general decrease in birth-rates. Already today, the younger generations are no longer able to replace the older ones who leave the job market. This problem also occurs in the main emigration countries for Morocco, Spain and France, which currently suffer from high youth-unemployment rates, especially for the highly educated. Whether this problem will remain and creates rivalry between migrants and non-migrants is hard to tell, since a lot of educated Moroccans fill low-qualified jobs abroad. Immigration will become a necessity in order to keep the workforce constant in light of an ever-more-productive economy and ever-greater exploitation of domestic potentials. This will particularly be the case when the children of the baby-boom years exit the job market. The migration potential calculated here for Morocco, Egypt and Turkey can make an important contribution to this process.

References


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