Beyond Dutch Borders

Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation

Liza Mügge
Beyond Dutch Borders
IMISCOE

*International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe*

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IMISCOE Research

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For Daniel, Kolja and Romy
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<td>Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu</td>
<td>Federations of Alevi Organisations in Europe</td>
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<td>ABOP</td>
<td>Algemene Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelings Partij</td>
<td>General Liberation and Development Party</td>
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<td>ADÜTDF</td>
<td>Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Demekleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Federation of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations in Europe</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı</td>
<td>Organisation of the National Vision in Europe</td>
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<td>ANAF</td>
<td>Avrupa Nizâm-ı Alem Federasyonu</td>
<td>European Federation of World Order</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Anavatan Partisi</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Adalet Partisi</td>
<td>Justice Party</td>
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<td>ARGK</td>
<td>Artêsa Rizgarîya Gelê Kurdistan</td>
<td>Kurdistan National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ATİB</td>
<td>Avrupa Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Birliği</td>
<td>European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations</td>
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<td>BBP</td>
<td>Büyük Birlik Partisi</td>
<td>Great Union Party</td>
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<td>BEP</td>
<td>Broederschap en Eenheid in Politiek</td>
<td>Fraternity and Unity in Politics</td>
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<td>BVD</td>
<td>Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie</td>
<td>Basis Party for Renewing and Democracy</td>
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<td>BKN</td>
<td>Beste van Nederland</td>
<td>Best of the Netherlands</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
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<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<td>CKMP</td>
<td>Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi</td>
<td>Republican Peasant and Farmers Nation Party</td>
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<td>CPN</td>
<td>Communiste Partij Nederland</td>
<td>Dutch Communist Party</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Centrum voor Surinaamse Ontwikkelingsvraagstukken</td>
<td>Centre for Surinamese Development Issues</td>
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<td>DA’91</td>
<td>Democratisch Alternatief ’91</td>
<td>Democratic Alternative ’91</td>
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<td>Demokrasi ve Değişim Partisi</td>
<td>Democracy and Change Party</td>
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<td>DEHAP</td>
<td>Demokratik Halk Partisi</td>
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<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Dev Genç</td>
<td>Devrimci Gençlik</td>
<td>Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey</td>
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<td>Dev Sol</td>
<td>Devrimci Sol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dev Yol</td>
<td>Devrimci Yol</td>
<td>Revolutionary Road</td>
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<td>DHKP/C</td>
<td>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front Associations</td>
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<td>Demokratik İşçi Demekleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations</td>
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<td>DKP</td>
<td>Devrimci Komünist Parti</td>
<td>Revolutionary Communist Party</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid</td>
<td>Party for Democracy and Development through Unity</td>
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<td>Demokratik Sosyal Dernekleri Federasyonu</td>
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<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
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<td>Demokratik Toplum Partisi</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party</td>
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<td>Democratic People’s Front</td>
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<td>DYP</td>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
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<td>EMEP</td>
<td>Emeğin Partisi</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
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<td>ERNK</td>
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<td>Kurdistan National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>FARU</td>
<td>Stichting Fonds Algemene Remigratie Unie</td>
<td>General Return Migration Foundation Fund</td>
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<td>FED-KOM</td>
<td>Federasyona Komelên Kurd Li Holland</td>
<td>Federation of Kurdish Associations in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Fazilet Partisi</td>
<td>Virtue Party</td>
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<td>GL</td>
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<td>People’s Democracy Party</td>
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<td>Hollanda Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Alevi Community in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HAK-PAR</td>
<td>Halk ve Özgürlük Partisi</td>
<td>Rights and Freedoms Party</td>
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<td>Sosyal Demokrat Halk Dernekleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Federation of Social Democratic Organisations</td>
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<td>HDV</td>
<td>Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı</td>
<td>Islamic Foundation Diyanet in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HEP</td>
<td>Halkin Emek Partisi</td>
<td>People’s Work Party</td>
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<td>HPP</td>
<td>Hindoestaanse Progressieve Partij</td>
<td>Progressive Hindustani Party</td>
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<td>HRN</td>
<td>Hindoe Raad Nederland</td>
<td>Hindu Council in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HSFN</td>
<td>Hindoe Studenten Forum Nederland</td>
<td>Hindu Students Forum in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HTDF</td>
<td>Hollanda Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Federation of Turkish Associations in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>Turkish Federation in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HTİB</td>
<td>Hollanda Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği</td>
<td>Association of Turkish Workers</td>
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<td>HTİV</td>
<td>Hollanda Türk-Islam Vafkı</td>
<td>Turkish Islamic Associations in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HTKB</td>
<td>Hollanda Türk Kadınlar Birliği</td>
<td>Turkish Women’s Association in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HTKİB</td>
<td>Hollanda Türk Kuruluşları İslam Birliği</td>
<td>Dutch Union of Turkish Islamic Organisations</td>
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<td>Turkish Council in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>HÜTİD</td>
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<td>Idealist Turkish Workers Association</td>
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<td>HVR</td>
<td>Hindoestaanse Vrouwen Rotterdam</td>
<td>Rotterdam Hindu Women’s Association</td>
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<td>IGMG</td>
<td>İslamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş</td>
<td>Islamic Community-National Vision</td>
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<td>İHD</td>
<td>İnsan Hakları Derneği</td>
<td>Human Rights Association</td>
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<td>IOT</td>
<td>Inspraak Orgaan Turkten</td>
<td>Consultative Council of Turks in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>JOVD</td>
<td>Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
<td>Freedom and Democracy Youth Organisation [independent youth organisation within the VVD]</td>
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<td>KADEK</td>
<td>Kongra Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê</td>
<td>Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan</td>
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<td>KDP</td>
<td>Partiya Demokrata Kurdistanê</td>
<td>Kurdish Democratic Party</td>
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<td>KIC</td>
<td>Koerdish Informatsie Centrum</td>
<td>Kurdish Information Centre</td>
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<td>KLM</td>
<td>Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Airlines</td>
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<td>Kongra Netewîya Kurdistan</td>
<td>Kurdistan National Congress</td>
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<td>Yekîtiya Komelên Kurdistan</td>
<td>Union of Associations from Kurdistan</td>
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<td>Kongra Gelê Kurdistan</td>
<td>People’s Congress Kurdistan</td>
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<td>KON-KURD</td>
<td>Konfederaşyona Komelên Kurd li Ewrûpa</td>
<td>Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe</td>
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<td>KTPi</td>
<td>Kerukanan Tulodo Pranatan Ingit</td>
<td>Party for National Unity and Solidarity</td>
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<td>KVP</td>
<td>Katholieke Volkspartij</td>
<td>Catholic People’s Party</td>
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<td>Koerdische Studenten Vereniging Nederland</td>
<td>Kurdish Student Association in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Demokrat Parti</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>LSP</td>
<td>Liga van Surinaamse Patriotten</td>
<td>League of Surinamese Patriots</td>
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<td>LOM</td>
<td>Landelijk Overleg Minderheden</td>
<td>National Consultation of Minorities</td>
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<td>Landelijke Organisatie van Surinamers in Nederland</td>
<td>National Organisation of Surinamese in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>Pim Fortuyn List</td>
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<td>Landelijk Platform Surinaamse Politici</td>
<td>National Platform of Surinamese Politicians</td>
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<td>MÇP</td>
<td>Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi</td>
<td>Nationalist Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Milli Görûş</td>
<td>National Vision</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</td>
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<td>Milli Görûş Noord Nederland</td>
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<td>Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi</td>
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<td>Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi</td>
<td>Marxist Leninist Communist Party</td>
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<td>MNP</td>
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<td>National Order Party</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Milli Selamet Partisi</td>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
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<td>Multicultural Television in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>Nationale Democratische Partij</td>
<td>Nationalist Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
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<td>Dutch Islamic Federation</td>
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<td>Nationale Militaire Raad</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
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<td>Dutch Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and Democracy</td>
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<td>NVP</td>
<td>Nationale Volkspartij</td>
<td>National People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖDK</td>
<td>Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Koordinasyonu</td>
<td>Freedom and Solidarity Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖDP</td>
<td>Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi</td>
<td>Freedom and Solidarity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHM</td>
<td>Organisatie voor Hindoe Media</td>
<td>Organisation for Hindu Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALU</td>
<td>Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie</td>
<td>Union of Progressive Farmers and Labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Pertıajah Luhur</td>
<td>Full Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKDW</td>
<td>Parliamentoya Kurdistan a li Derveyî Welêt</td>
<td>Kurdish Parliament in Exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkari Kurdistan</td>
<td>Kurdish Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Progressieve Nationale Partij</td>
<td>Progressive National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>Partij Nationalistische Republiek</td>
<td>Nationalist Republic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>English translation or description</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSK</td>
<td>Partîya Sosyalîst a Kurdistana</td>
<td>Kurdistan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSKT</td>
<td>Partîya Sosyalîst a Kurdistana</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSV</td>
<td>Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij</td>
<td>Progressive Surinamese People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBS</td>
<td>Raad voor de Bevrijding van Suriname</td>
<td>Council for the Liberation of Surinam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REBOSON</td>
<td>Revolutionaire Beweging van</td>
<td>Revolutionary Movement of Surinamese</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Ondersteunende Surinaamse</td>
<td>Supporting Organisations in the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organisaties Nederland</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Partisi</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>RVP</td>
<td>Revolutionaire Volkspartij</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDD</td>
<td>Surinaamse Districten Dag</td>
<td>Surinamese Districts Day</td>
</tr>
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<td>SHON</td>
<td>Stichting Hindu Onderwijs Nederland</td>
<td>Foundation of Hindu Education in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Sosyalist Demokrat Halk Partisi</td>
<td>Social Democrat People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siyaset</td>
<td>Siyaset [as in Siyaset.nl]</td>
<td>Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIO</td>
<td>Surinaams Inspraakorgaan</td>
<td>Consultative Council of Surinamese in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOSD</td>
<td>Stichting International Organisation for Social Development</td>
<td>International Organisation for Social Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
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<td>SIV</td>
<td>Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging</td>
<td>Surinamese Islamic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM</td>
<td>Surinaamse Luchtvaart Maatschappij</td>
<td>Surinam Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNLA</td>
<td>Surinaamse National Liberation Army (Jungle Commando)</td>
<td>Surinamese National Liberation Army (Jungle Commando)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Saadet Partisi</td>
<td>Felicity Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>SPA</td>
<td>Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid</td>
<td>Surinamese Labour Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>SPVA</td>
<td>Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik Allochtonen</td>
<td>Social Position and Facilities Usage of Migrants</td>
</tr>
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<td>SSDH</td>
<td>Samenwerking Suriname Den Haag</td>
<td>Cooperation Surinam The Hague</td>
</tr>
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<td>Surinaamse Studenten Vereniging</td>
<td>Surinamese Student Association Leiden</td>
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<td>TAYAD</td>
<td>Tutuklu Hükmüllü Aileri Yardımlaşma DeBMW</td>
<td>Association for the Support of Families of Prisoners</td>
</tr>
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<td>TBKP</td>
<td>Türkiye Birlesik Komünist Partisi</td>
<td>United Communist Party of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDKP</td>
<td>Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi</td>
<td>Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEVGER</td>
<td>Tevgera Rizgariya Kurdistan</td>
<td>Kurdish Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
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<td>THIS</td>
<td>Türk İslam Yardımlasma ve Dayanisma Vafkı</td>
<td>Turkish Islamic Assistance</td>
</tr>
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<td>TIKF</td>
<td>Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu</td>
<td>Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>Turkish Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKP</td>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Parti</td>
<td>Turkish Communist Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>Türkiye Komünist Parti/Marxist-Leninist</td>
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<td>Turkish Radio and Television –</td>
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<td></td>
<td>International</td>
<td>International</td>
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<td>TSIP</td>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>Turkish Socialist Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>UETD</td>
<td>Unie van Progressieve Surinamers</td>
<td>Union of European Turkish Democrats</td>
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<td>Unie van Progressieve Surinamers</td>
<td>Union of Progressive Surinamese</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>English translation or description</td>
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<td>VAHON</td>
<td>Verenging Algemene Hindoe Omroep Nederland</td>
<td>General Association of Hindu Broadcasting in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>VEKSAV</td>
<td>Vardiya Kültür Sanat Vakfı</td>
<td>Foundation for Culture and Art Vardiya</td>
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<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij</td>
<td>Progressive Reform Party</td>
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<td>VNG</td>
<td>Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten</td>
<td>Association of Dutch Municipalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Volkspartij</td>
<td>People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSSA</td>
<td>Vereniging Surinaamse Studenten Amsterdam</td>
<td>Surinamese Student Association Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVN</td>
<td>Vrienden van Nickerie</td>
<td>Friends of Nickerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVR</td>
<td>Vereniging van Reizigers</td>
<td>Association of Travellers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVV</td>
<td>Volksalliantie Voor Vooruitgang</td>
<td>People’s Alliance for Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>Wi Eegi Sani</td>
<td>Our Own Things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>Dünya Türkleri Konseyi</td>
<td>World Turkish Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTP</td>
<td>Yeni Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>New Turkey Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZG</td>
<td>Zeister Zendingsgemeenschap</td>
<td>Moravian Mission Zeist</td>
</tr>
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My deepest gratitude goes to Daniel, my love, best friend and most critical colleague.
1 Introduction

Migrant politics is as old as migration itself. Leaders in receiving societies (and later, nation-states) have generally been sceptical – if not hostile – towards political loyalties and involvements that defied their territorial borders. At present, we witness such host country anxiety over migrants’ ‘integration’ and activities that may contravene its political and security interests.

Regardless of whether such concerns are justified – they are often based on unsystematic and patchy evidence, to say the least – there has been growing scholarly interest in the political involvement of migrants. Again, much of this work has focused on migrants’ political ‘integration’ into receiving societies – for example, on their political awareness, participation and voting patterns. At the same time, it has become clear that at least a sub-group of migrants – including members of the second generation – continue to maintain political ties to their country of origin in a wide range of forms. They engage in what can be called transnational migrant politics.

Despite the growing interest, at least three serious gaps remain in our understanding of transnational migrant politics. First, it is far from clear how migrants’ transnational political activities and ties to the homeland relate to political ‘integration’ in the country of settlement. Is there a trade-off between the two, as is often suggested in popular debate? Do they swing free of each other? Or do they perhaps reinforce each other after all?

Second, there is little systematic knowledge on transnational migrant politics even when viewed apart from political integration. Why are some migrant groups more involved than others? Why do different groups have different organisational structures, within the country of settlement as well as for contacts with the country of origin? In short, there is insufficient knowledge of the individual, social and political factors that shape transnational migrant politics in its diverse manifestations.

Finally, popular debate is pervaded by the amorphous feeling that ‘globalisation’ – in particular, easier cross-border communication – has spurred transnational involvements and loyalties, the internet forums that have sprung up over the past decade to reconnect diasporas being but one manifestation. The sense is that transnational migrant politics is on the rise. At the same time, any such trend may be counterbalanced by the progressive weakening of migrants’ transnational ties as their stay in host countries...
lengthens, and many let go of plans to ‘return’. This is particularly true of migration that followed in the wake of decolonisation and labour migration to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. By now, many migrant families have raised a second generation born in the country of settlement, and it is far from clear whether, in net terms, the passing of time has seen transnational migrant politics increase or decrease.

These three gaps in our knowledge of transnational migrant politics are central in this book and provide its three guiding questions:

- What explains the emergence and development of transnational migrant politics?
- How has transnational political participation evolved over time, particularly in light of globalised communications and the coming to age of a second generation in countries of settlement?
- How does migrants’ political integration in receiving societies impact on political transnationalism and vice versa?

This book ventures to answer these questions through a study of the transnational political participation of migrants from Surinam and Turkey and their descendents in the Netherlands over a period of roughly 50 years.

While the literature on migrant ‘transnationalism’ and ‘diaspora’ has blossomed over the past two decades, there is no agreement among scholars even on the meaning of these terms. Some view transnationalism as a new trend in a globalising world; others think it is a new word for an old phenomenon. Some argue that globalisation is encouraging transnational ties and activities; others claim these will diminish as migrants integrate within receiving societies. This introductory chapter recounts the relevant academic debates and the key terms used in this book that provide an analytical framework to orient the study’s empirical core.

**Transnationalism in migration studies**

Migrant politics relating to the homeland has been a focus of studies on diaspora (Armstrong 1976; Sheffer 1986) and long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992a, 1992b, 1994). Though the diaspora concept was developed around the third century BC to describe Jews living in exile (Marienstras 1989), the term traditionally also referred to other groups expelled from their ‘homeland’ (Braziel & Mannur 2003). More recently, the diaspora concept has been extended to cover groups in exile as well as immigrants, expatriates, guest workers, overseas and ethnic communities (Tölöyan 1991). A new wave of literature has attempted to redefine diaspora and classify its many instances (see among others Safran 1991; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1995, 1996; Laguerre 1999; Koser 2003b; Sheffer 2003; Van Amersfoort 2004), making the concept at once more inclusive.
but analytically less useful (Vertovec & Cohen 1999; Van Amersfoort 2001). This book uses the concept in its limited, political meaning – a group that considers its ‘homeland’ occupied and wants to ‘return’ to establish a state.

Conversely, the concept of long-distance nationalism applies to people who have a state to identify with. It includes groups that have migrated for economic reasons, fled from war or political oppression and continue to have strong feelings towards their place of origin. Such sentiment can be found among Irish nationalist supporters of the IRA living out their lives as ethnic Irish in the United States, as well as among Jamaicans in London, Turks in Berlin and Jews in New York (after the establishment of the state of Israel). Anderson argues that these groups are formed by a new type of nationalist – the ‘long-distance nationalist’ without formal opportunities to participate in homeland politics.

While technically a citizen of the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat – now only fax-time away. But this citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible – our hero will not have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. He is also easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in his Heimat. (Anderson 1992b: 13)

Turkish migrants in the Netherlands who retain Turkish nationality, however, can vote in Turkey. And in the period under study, Surinam and Turkey have experienced only limited periods of conflict; at present, these homelands are safely accessible and not necessarily ‘imagined’. The Heimat becomes real when migrants travel back and forth between home and host countries and engage in numerous daily activities related to homeland politics – discussions with relatives over the telephone, cultural immigrant organisations inviting their hometown mayor for special occasions – that do not fall under the banner of long-distance nationalism.

Migrants’ daily political activities that take place in both home and host countries simultaneously are a form of transnationalism. International relations scholars used the term ‘transnational’ to conceptualise the border-crossing contacts of non-state actors such as NGOs (Nye & Keohane 1971; more recently see Anderson 2002; Tarrow 2005). It was only in the 1990s that the concept of transnationalism became en vogue to explain migrants’ ties with the homeland (for a complete overview of the development of the term see Vertovec & Cohen 1999; Vertovec 2003, 2009; Levitt & Glick Schiller 2006; Khagram & Levitt 2008; Bauböck & Faist 2010). These studies understood transnationalism as ‘the processes by which
immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994: 7).

Transnationalism thus includes those cultural, economic and social relations with the homeland previously researched in studies on return migration (Cerase 1974; Gmelch 1980; Bovenkerk 1982) and chain migration (Price 1963 cited in Van Amersfoort 2001; Massey & Espinosa 1997). It also encompasses economic activities such as remittances and political practices such as the mobilisation of migrants by homeland political parties. Accordingly, transnationalism in migration studies covers a broad spectrum of border-crossing activities. As a subset of these, Østergaard-Nielsen defines transnational political activities as

direct cross-border participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees [...] as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country. (2003d: 762)

For the host state, migrant politics is transnational only when it has a clear homeland or diaspora component. This is the case when homeland actors are directly or indirectly involved and/or the interests refer to homeland issues. For example, the appearance of a book on Turkish ultranationalists, the so-called Grey Wolves, in the Netherlands and their ties to the ultranationalist party MHP in Turkey (Braam & Ülger 1997) raised questions in Dutch parliament about the government’s role in facilitating these ties. Measures followed to monitor the influence of the MHP and other foreign parties on Turkish migrant organisations, some of which then lost their subsidies. In this example, migrant politics became transnational because homeland actors were assumed to be involved. An example of a homeland issue rendering migrant politics transnational is lobbying by Armenian and Lebanese Americans to influence US foreign policy – homeland actors are not necessarily involved. Without any of these homeland components one may speak of immigrant politics.

For the sending state, transnational politics requires a host country component where its former citizens and descendents abroad are directly or indirectly involved and/or the interests refer to an issue in the host country. When Turkish organisations in Germany mobilise support for a political party to compete in Turkish elections, former citizens abroad are involved in transnational politics. Issues involve the host country when, for example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan stated in Germany in 2008 that Turkish migrants should not assimilate. Without these host country components, politics is domestic.

Finally, migrant transnational politics on a supranational level comprise both host country and homeland components, be they actors or issues. An
example is joint lobbying in Brussels by Alevis from Turkey and Turkish Alevis living in Europe to promote their rights in Turkey. If supranational politics has none of these host or homeland components, it may still be transnational in international relations scholarship but not in transnational migration studies.

The debate on the influence of globalisation on transnationalism raises a central question: what’s new about transnationalism? Basch et al. (1994) argue that migrants have created a ‘transnational social field’ between their countries of origin and settlement. Their continuous crossing of borders has ‘deterrioralised’ the nation-state so that a ‘nation’s’ people may live anywhere around the world and still not live outside the state’ (Basch et al. 1994: 269; see also Appadurai 1991). In such a ‘deterrioralised’ setting, immigrants are the vanguard of a new era of post-national or transnational citizenship (Soysal 1994). The emergence of rights backed by supranational institutions – such as human rights by the European Union – is seen by post-nationalists like Soysal as a process limiting the role of states.

More recently, scholars have argued that transnational citizenship often entails ‘dual’ or ‘multiple’ citizenships – but a citizenship still grounded in enforceable rights and clearly bounded memberships (Fox 2005: 194; see also Faist & Kivisto 2007; Kivisto & Faist 2007). Others have argued that while some supranational institutions do champion rights, state actors retain great influence in the international and supranational arenas (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005: 74-106). The present study follows Kearney, who argues that though

> global processes are largely decentred from specific national territories and take place in a global space, transnational processes are anchored in and transcend one or more nation-states. (1995: 548)

Far from being deterrioralised or global, then, transnational processes remain bounded by nation-states.

With the above in mind, the question arises whether processes of globalisation have increased the intensity and scope of transnational activity. Access to air travel, the internet and mobile phones allow migrants to extend and deepen their contacts not only with the ‘home country’ but with members of the community anywhere in the world (see among others Vertovec 2004b). This has produced a global imagination of ‘home’ that affects both migrants and those who stay behind. Globalisation, some scholars argue, has made today’s transnationalism substantially different from transnationalism in the past (see among others Smith 1998; Van der Veer 2002; Vertovec 2004a). Return visits and contact with the country of origin have become routine and regular, while the incidence and scope of transnational activity will only expand because ‘immigrant transnationalism is not driven by ideological reasons but by the very logic of global capitalism’
(Portes 2001: 187; see also Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003). Other scholars claim that while it may have been harder to sustain contacts across oceans in the past, immigrants seldom cut ties and allegiances to those left behind – the ties just became fewer and thinner (Foner 2001: 49).

Yet, scholars have argued that processes of globalisation have facilitated the emergence of transnational communities (see among others Levitt 2001; Mandaville 2001; Pries 2001; Faist 2004). A transnational community, however, is difficult to operationalise – it implies a collective transnational identity shaping migrant behaviour (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) and disappears if analytically divided into its component parts (Carroll & Fennema 2002). Because of the homogeneity it assumes, focusing on transnational communities will likely overlook those activities that are more dispersed, fragmented or less institutionalised (Al-Ali, Black & Koser 2001a; Al-Ali 2002). In other words, the approach implies that transnational activities affect the whole transnational community (migrants in the country of settlement as well as those who stayed in the country of origin); it does not allow for the study of diversity within groups to see who is politically active, and why. The current study relies on the concepts of transnational ties and activities to capture and explain such involvement – which will enable us to gain insight into diversity within migrant groups over time.

In the past decade, researchers have focused on how transnationalism is reproduced among second- and third-generation migrants (Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Levitt & Waters 2002; Smith 2006). Some have argued that the first generation’s attachments to the homeland are likely to be absorbed by their children and grandchildren due to the permanent contact between generations (Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt 2009). Fouron & Glick Schiller (2001) – who argue that ties between emigrants and non-migrants construct transnational identities both at home and abroad – have even called for a redefinition of ‘second generation’ to include all those in the homeland and the country of settlement who have grown up in ‘transnational social fields’ since the beginning of the migration process. Though their empirical evidence is impressive (it covers a period of 30 years in Haiti and the US), the question is whether their conclusion applies to other cases.

Another longitudinal study by Rumbaut (2002) was based on a decade-long survey comparing second-generation transnational attachments among seven migrant groups in San Diego. Fewer than 10 per cent of the second generation appeared to make their parents’ attachments their own. Similarly, a survey (though not longitudinal) on the second generation of five migrant groups in New York found that robust transnational activities were confined to a small minority, and were likely to become less significant over time (Kasinitz, Waters, Mollenkopf & Anil 2002). The impact of this minority, however, should not be underestimated.

The presence of a transnational minority among the second generation probably ensures that structural ties between the home
countries and diaspora communities in New York will endure as the second generation comes to age. Such structural ties will be available to be revitalized when and if historical circumstances dictate. (Kasinitz et al. 2002: 119)

To support their conclusion, the authors refer to a small minority within New York’s Irish community that continued its involvement in Irish nationalism into the fourth and fifth generations. Vague ethnic sentiment turned into material support for the IRA when interest in Ireland among Irish Americans rose during the ‘Troubles’ of the late 1960s and 1970s. A similar pattern could be observed among a small minority of New York Jews with sustained transnational connections; they have played a vital role in mobilising support for Israel since the 1967 war (ibid.).

Kasinitz et al. conclude that the majority of migrants who are not – or are only weakly – attached to the homeland ‘are clearly here to stay’ (2002: 117). This leads to the second discussion related to the time factor. Scholars generally argue that over time, migrants become increasingly likely to integrate or assimilate. The question is how integration affects transnational involvement – or conversely, how transnational involvement influences integration (see also Fibbi & D’Amato, 2008).

In studying the transnational activities of different groups in the US, Guarnizo et al. (2003: 1239) and Portes, Escobar and Radford (2007: 276) found migrants involved in transnational activities to be better-educated, longer-term residents of the host society active in local politics. Likewise, Snel, Engbersen and Leerkes (2006) in their comparative study of individual transnational involvement in the Netherlands found no indication of transnational activity undermining integration:

More highly educated respondents and respondents with jobs engage in just as many transnational activities… as the poorly educated, unemployed respondents on social security. (Snel et al. 2006: 304)

Nevertheless, Koopmans et al. (2005: 142) in a comparative study of migrants in several European countries found that on a collective level, migrant homeland-directed activism often takes violent forms. Strong homeland orientations are therefore, they argue, detrimental to their integration.

Although their findings differ, the above studies have one thing in common. Their understanding of integration above all emphasises migrants’ social, cultural and economic integration in countries of settlement (the general indicators being labour market participation and the acquisition of education and language skills). One of the central questions of this study, however, is how transnational politics affects migrants’ political integration in countries of settlement – and vice versa. In this context, following Bauböck, Kraler, Martiniello and Perchinig (2006), political integration
encompasses access to political status, rights, opportunities and representation for immigrants and to an equalisation of these conditions between native and immigrant populations. But political integration is also about migrants’ activities and participation and their acceptance of the laws and institutional values that ‘integrate’ a political system. The political integration of immigrants can be broken down into four dimensions:

- political rights, identification, norms and values, and participation.

The more rights they enjoy [...] the more they participate and are represented in the political system, the better integrated they are. (Bauböck et al. 2006: 66-67)

The current study focuses on two dimensions of political integration: political rights and political participation. Both are part of the political opportunity structure consisting of laws, policies and discourses that formally include or exclude migrants from full citizenship. Political rights include passive and active electoral rights (voting or running for office). Political participation refers to the more active dimension of citizenship and covers activities such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, etc. These extra-parliamentary forms of political participation ‘generally presuppose the formation of a collective actor characterised by a shared identity and some degree of organisation through a mobilization process’ (Bauböck et al. 2006: 86).

How do national and transnational political participation influence one another? Some studies have shown that transnational political participation goes hand in hand with political participation – and thus political integration – in the host country. Morawska (2003: 161-165), for example, argues that incorporation in local politics in the receiving society often runs parallel to greater political involvement in the country of origin; they can be – and often are – successfully combined (see also Pantoja 2005; Levitt 2007).

Political integration, however, is not restricted to issues relating to the country of residence. There are numerous examples of diaspora groups that in response to homeland political developments have attempted to influence foreign policy in the country of settlement (see among others Weil 1974; Garett 1978; Arthur 1991; Jusdanis 1991; Shain 1999). Not all agree this is a good thing. Huntington (1997), for instance, has argued that American foreign policy has come to be unduly dominated by minority migrant interests. More positively, Mathias (1981) argues that such interests would otherwise be overlooked. Either way, migrant groups being able to work the political system to the point of being able to influence foreign policy is in and of itself a type of political integration; certain types of transnational political activity thus seem to facilitate political integration.
The emergence and evolution of transnational politics

What explains the emergence and evolution of transnational migrant politics? When examining the political dimension of transnationalism, many scholars underline the importance of political opportunity structures in both home and host countries which refer to:

institutional opportunities in the form of chances of access and influence of citizens in the decision-making process (institutional openness versus closure) and material reactions of authorities to challengers (repression or facilitation of mobilization). (Koopmans et al. 2005: 17)

These dimensions of the political environment that encourage or discourage collective action are not necessarily formal, permanent or national. It is, indeed, changes within them that provide openings for resource-poor actors to engage in collective action.

The political opportunity structure of the host country covers its integration policies, in particular, the extent to which they encourage or discourage migrants’ full participation in the political arena. It includes:

national asylum regimes; provisos around visas, citizenship, voting, residency, naturalization, and other aspects of legal status; sources of and access to bodies of information of migrant incorporation…; access to legal representation; labor union membership and activity and the organisation of local ethnic or hometown associations for migrant assistance. (Vertovec 2003: 654)

The political opportunity structure of the host country may or may not allow migrants equal opportunities to participate in local politics. There are different levels of institutionalised consultation with migrant groups; governments also influence community organising by providing or withholding resources, for example, by subsidising specific activities or supporting certain models of community organisation. The more political rights and access to political gatekeepers such as labour unions, political parties and NGOs that migrants enjoy, the more they will channel their activities into the political system of the receiving country (see Soysal 1994; Doomemik 1995). The basic issue is the type of citizenship a country bestows on its migrants (Koopmans & Statham 2003) – citizenship being those practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) that define a person as a competent member of society and thus the flow of resources to persons and social groups (Turner 1993). Citizenship acquisition, free movement and rights for non-citizens (Vink 2002) are thus central issues within migrant transnational politics.
Some scholars argue that open political opportunity structures in receiving countries encourage migrant transnational activity (Faist 2000: 214). Others predict the very opposite: that political opportunity structures open to migrant participation will create fewer occasions for transnational activity (see Koopmans & Statham 2003). For the latter, strong transnational orientations are ‘responses to traditional, exclusionary citizenship regimes that put high barriers to migrants’ access to the political community’ (Koopmans et al. 2005: 143; see also Goldring 1998: 170; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002: 19).

The political opportunity structure in the country of origin refers to political rights that enable the political participation of settled migrants, emigrants and circular and return migrants. Political rights can exist in the form of dual nationality, the right to vote from overseas or the right to run for public office (see also Nyberg Sørensen 1998: 263; Levitt & De la Dehesa 2003: 589-598). In some cases homeland governments have institutionalised attempts to stimulate or weaken emigrants’ economic, social or political input (Freeman & Ögelman 1998; Laguerre 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Mahler 2000; Howard 2003; Koser 2003b; Martínez-Saldaña 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003f; Smith 2008). Institutional provisions may include assistance to migrant communities through ministries and consulates, as well as programmes that go beyond traditional consular services such as literacy training and primary and secondary schooling for adults. Transnational activities can be perceived as threatening in countries of origin as well (see Guarnizo 1997; Bauböck 2003, 2008). Turkey, for example, passed a law prohibiting organisations in Europe from financing Turkish political parties (Amiraux 2003). Nor do attempts to broaden political opportunity structures for present or former citizens abroad always have the intended effect: the prevalence of dual citizenship and overseas voting appear to be universally low (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 223; Rubio-Marín 2006: 146).

Sending countries’ policies towards emigrants and migrant communities in destination countries can span a wide range of areas from political relations and national security to bilateral agreements on pension schemes for retirees (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Levitt and De la Dehesa (2003: 589-598) have distinguished the types of policies states can implement, from those that aim to channel remittances (see also Koser 2003a; Kearney & Besserer 2004; Fitzgerald 2005) to symbolic policies designed to reinforce a sense of enduring national membership. While these measures are directed at individual emigrants or the migrant community in the country of residence, policies can also target emigrants visiting the homeland and returnees, for example, those that try to stimulate a ‘brain gain’ (Baldwin 1963; Zweig 1996; Thomas-Hope 1999; Arowolo 2000; Ley & Kobayashi 2005). Not all instances of the sending state reaching out to the emigrant community are captured in policy. In a less structured way, Turkey has encouraged
migrants in Europe to lobby in favour of Turkish EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003f). Again, measures to shape emigrant behaviour can have unintended effects (Guarnizo, Sánchez & Roach 1999: 390; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 223; Margheritis 2007), a notable example being Mexico’s attempts to regulate emigration to the US and return migration to Mexico (Goldring 1998).

Based on the political opportunities they allow emigrants, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1023-1024) have identified three broad categories of sending states. The first, transnational nation-states, treat their emigrants as long-term, long-distance members. States such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic have become so dependent on remittances that emigrant contributions and participation have become an integral part of national policy. The second and more common type are strategically selective states that encourage certain forms of transnational participation but aim to manage what migrants can and cannot do. On the one hand, they want to maintain homeland involvement among emigrants, who they recognise are unlikely to return. On the other hand, they want to maintain some level of control over emigrants’ homeland ties. Such states, Levitt and Glick Schiller argue, offer partial and changing packages of privileges to migrants, encouraging long-distance membership but never granting the legal rights of citizenship or nationality. Haiti, India and Turkey have all tried to obtain support from populations abroad without granting full participation in internal political activities (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004: 1024). The third type of state is the disinterested and denouncing state. Such states (such as Cuba) treat migrants as if they no longer belong to the homeland.

Any overtures migrants make vis a vis their ancestral home are viewed as suspect because migrants are seen as having abandoned the homeland or even as traitors to its cause. (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004: 1024)

Diplomatic relations relevant to my study are those between labour-exporting and labour-importing countries and those between former imperial powers and their ex-colonies; continued peaceful relations between countries is also obviously important. When two states share an interest in retaining migrants’ ties to their homeland, they may sponsor the activities of sending-country organisations in the country of settlement (Koopmans et al. 2005: 111-113). Diplomatic relations in this way influence political opportunity structures, at least in the country of residence.

Diplomatic relations on a broader level may offer migrants an additional venue – an international political opportunity structure – for collective action. Whereas national political opportunity structures refer to states, the international political opportunity structure is a
One of the main reasons transnational actors turn to the international arena is to influence domestic regimes (Hawkins 2002: 47). Migrants’ claims may be more specific than ‘universal rights’ and may appeal directly to particular paragraphs within UN or EU human rights treaties, for example, Kurdish organisations when appealing for minority rights.

The organisation of migrant civil society in both the homeland and country of settlement can facilitate transnational activity. The density or fragmentation of organisational networks will likely determine the success of collective action. Studies have been conducted in the Netherlands on the network structures of the most important migrant groups, including Turks and Surinamese (Van Heelsum, Tillie & Fennema 1999; Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002). Combined with secondary literature on civil society structures in countries of origin, they enable us to study the impact of such national network structures on the evolution of transnational ties.

In addition to the political opportunity structure and migrant civil society, the overall political climate plays a role. In homelands in conflict, independence movements mobilise support among settled emigrants and refugees in diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 6-8). Intra-ethnic conflicts, foreign occupation, civil war and dictatorships all motivate homeland-directed activities among migrants (see Al-Ali et al. 2001a: 595; Koopmans et al. 2005: 111-113; Collyer 2008; Turner 2008).

The political climate in home and host countries affects migration motives. Migration motives may have an economic or political basis – economic malaise and armed conflicts in the homeland, labour shortages and the political will to accept refugees in the receiving country. Whereas labour migrants more often transfer money back home, political refugees are more often involved in transnational politics (Snel et al. 2006). Many of these exiles are in a continuous struggle to bring about the conditions that will allow their eventual return (Shain 2005 [1989]: xix). Migration motives thus have a great influence on transnational activities; Al-Ali, Black and Koser (2001b) state that forced migration can lead to ‘forced transnationalism’.

Finally, much has already been stated about length of stay. In some cases, however, generation and length of stay are not chronological within the same migrant group (see Eckstein 2002; Eckstein & Barberia 2002). Though migration from Turkey and Surinam to the Netherlands is ongoing, we can nevertheless follow Vermeulen (2006) in distinguishing three general phases of settlement. The first is a period of adjustment and orientation when migrants are often confident about returning home. The second is
that of ‘increased adaptation’: migrants still hope to return one day but their lives are increasingly enmeshed – a second generation has been born and raised – in the host society. In the third phase, adaptation becomes more permanent: the first generation grows older and the second generation reaches maturity. In this phase, Vermeulen (2006: 177) argues, migrant organisations focus more on issues related to their stay in the Netherlands while links with the homeland weaken.

These factors should not be seen in isolation. Diplomatic relations may shape migration motives, migration motives are influenced by political opportunity structures, transnational activities will change with the political climate in host and home countries. Their relative importance will vary from case to case and over time.

**Transnational actors, activities and ties**

The structural determinants of transnational politics remain inadequately understood. Crucially, this is due to a lack of comparative scholarship in the field, which has limited the scope for generalisation and an evaluation of different factors’ relative importance to explain the varying patterns of migrant political transnationalism. To be sure, several quantitative studies have emphasised comparison (Engbersen, Snel, Leerkes & Van San 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Koopmans & Statham 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Snel et al.; Portes et al. 2007). Their analytical focus, however, has been on transnational activities, and not on the ties and social structures that underlie the ‘visible’ side of transnational politics. There are, however, good reasons to believe that a deeper understanding of political transnationalism requires a more thorough analysis of the emergence, development and decline of the ties that individuals and collective actors maintain.

While comparative research on transnational migrant politics is indispensable to gain inferential leverage over the various factors that shape it, the research also clearly benefits from qualitative analysis (see also Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004: 1012-1013). Mapping the transnational political ties of migrants and their organisations requires extensive knowledge of particular histories. Precisely because of the political nature of these activities and ties, migrants may have incentives to be cautious in sharing information, for example, with journalists and government authorities. Political migrant organisations may likewise use the façade of apolitical cultural associations to conceal ties with radical movements in home countries. In short, there may be more to transnational politics and the ties underlying them than initially meets the eye, requiring robust qualitative components within comparative research.
In spite of the increasing attention transnational politics has received over the years, the object of inquiry remains disputed and vague. Different authors have focused on transnational ‘identities’, ‘fields’, ‘spaces’, migrants’ public pronouncements, networks between organisations and a range of other indicators. Only very rarely have different facets of transnational political involvement been distinguished, let alone conceptualised in relation to one another.

This study distinguishes between transnational actors, transnational activities and transnational ties. The underlying hypothesis is that the ties between actors are crucial for channelling and structuring transnational political activity, even if they often remain invisible to the casual observer. In the following sections I clarify the distinctions and relationships between transnational actors, their activities and the ties that exist between the actors. The distinctions are important as an exclusive focus on any one of them generates a skewed picture.

**Transnational actors**

Transnational actors may participate on the individual, collective and state levels (see Penninx 2009). We obviously want a clear picture of who is involved. But apart from some recent comparative quantitative studies (Engbersen et al. 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Koopmans & Statham 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Snel et al. 2006; Portes et al. 2007), most empirical research on migrant transnationalism relies on single qualitative case studies that ‘document in detail the characteristics of the immigrants involved in transnational activities but say little about those who are not’ (Portes, Guarnizo & Haller 2002: 279; see also Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). This creates two biases. First, such studies generally focus on activities that are highly institutionalised; second, they are likely to exaggerate the number of people involved (Mahler 1998; Itzigsohn et al. 1999).

**Individual actors**

Three types of individual actors are involved in transnational political activity: migrants, return migrants and non-migrants. Migrants settled in receiving societies often channel their financial and social capital towards the home country. Among return migrants, I focus on so-called ‘returnees of innovation’ who hope to contribute to the home country’s development by making use of skills acquired during their sojourn (Cerase 1974). Not all returnees return permanently. Some re-emigrate while others return occasionally, seasonally or temporarily (see Gmelch 1980; Duval 2004). Non-migrants who remain in the home country can make or break transnational ties, acting as gatekeepers who determine the success or failure of transnational activities (Nell 2008).
Transnational political participation among individuals cannot be divorced from the organisation of migrant civil society because, as Kriesi (1993) argues, collective structures provide individuals with opportunities for participation.

At any given point in time, overt participation in political campaigns is a rare event in the lives of individual citizens. Most of the time, most of them do not get involved in politics, even if they have a considerable potential to do so. In order to mobilize, one also needs an opportunity to do so. Without an opportunity to mobilize, one’s potential remains latent. A group of citizens may be very concerned about a given situation and they may be ready to act collectively. But if they are unaware of their mutual concern, they will not act accordingly. If there is no one taking the initiative, no collective actor organizing a campaign to articulate their concern, our citizens have no opportunity to get actively involved. (Kriesi 1993: 9)

This underlines the importance of studying individuals’ embeddedness in civil society.

**Collective actors**

Migrant organisations, NGOs and political parties are the main actors at the collective level. They include migrant or ethnic organisations in the country of residence, religious, socio-cultural and political organisations in the country of origin and homeland political parties that fundraise and offer active emigrants administrative or political functions in the country of origin or, in cases of dual nationality, campaign for votes (Glick Schiller & Fouron 1998; Graham 2001; Amiraux 2003; Argun 2003; Levitt & De la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e; Smith & Bakker 2005; Nell 2008c).

Elites in both countries are important actors at the collective level. By ‘elites’ I mean ‘corporate’ elites – those who, by their position as directors of organisations, publicly represent groups (Davis & Greve 1997). While they do not necessarily work in the name of the collectivity, their status can mobilise the rank and file.

**State actors**

The main actors at the state level are governments and state institutions. Sending states are increasingly aware of the economic importance of transnationally active migrants while receiving states are also beginning to appreciate the value of relations with migrants’ countries of origin.

States may react positively or negatively to transnational political activities and thereby shape them. Local governments of receiving states may
provide specific programmes to solve common problems that result from emigration, return and circular migration (Nell 2007), while governments in both sending and receiving countries may implement policies to encourage or hinder transnational activities.

**Transnational activities**

Scholars have attempted to classify transnational activities by differentiating between economic, social-cultural and political activities, and whether these take place in the home or host country (Portes, Guarnizo & Landholt 1999: 222; Al-Ali et al. 2001b: 618-626; Portes 2001: 187). Economic activities include remittances to, and investments in, the homeland as well as donations to migrant organisations with a homeland focus. Transnational social-cultural activities include visiting friends and family, participating in online discussions, and the exchange of theatre groups and museum exhibits. An example of a transnational political activity is participation in homeland elections (see Al-Ali et al. 2001b: 619).

The distinction between economic, socio-cultural and political activities is an analytical one, for in reality they overlap (see Van Amersfoort 2001; Martiniello & Bousetta 2008; Martiniello & LaFleur 2008). Likewise, scholars have shown that transnational religious networks play an important role in political mobilisation (Schiffauer 1999; Levitt 2001; Mandaville 2001; see also Karam 2004; Solari 2006; Levitt 2007, 2008). Thus, migrants may use existing cultural, social and religious resources and institutionalised channels to achieve political goals.

To examine the durability of transnational activities, we need to assess their degree of institutionalisation. Activities are institutionalised when they become predictable, constant and structured (see Beerling 1978 cited in Penninx 1988). Activities are highly institutionalised when they are held on an organised and regular basis – for example, annual festivals and congresses, weekly discussion groups governed by written or unwritten rules and norms of attendance.

Activities can further be distinguished by whether they are initiated and institutionalised from ‘above’ or ‘below’. Institutionalised political initiatives from above include governments allowing migrants to be elected to home country legislatures; initiatives from below include fundraising for hometown civic committees among migrants (Table 1.1).

Transnational activities can take five general directions and one specific direction (Table 1.2). The first type is transplanted homeland politics, where, for example, conflicts between ethnic or political groups in the homeland are transplanted to the immigrant community (Koopmans et al. 2005: 126-127). This happened in the Netherlands in the 1980s when members of leftwing and rightwing Turkish movements violently opposed one another – in the same way and for similar reasons as did their
Table 1.1  Transnational activities and their degree of institutionalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low institutionalisation</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Socio-cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal trade between home and host country</td>
<td>Home town civic communities created by migrants</td>
<td>Amateur sports matches between home and host country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small businesses created by returned migrants</td>
<td>Alliances of immigrant committees with home country political associations</td>
<td>Homeland folk music groups giving presentations at immigrant centres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular international labour migration</td>
<td>Fundraisers for home country electoral candidates</td>
<td>Priests from hometown visit and organise parishioners abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments by multinationals in the homeland mediated by migrants</td>
<td>Consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad</td>
<td>Imams sent by homeland institutions to visit and preach in migrant mosques</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of tourist locations in the homeland by migrants</td>
<td>Dual nationality granted by home country governments</td>
<td>Home country major artists perform in countries where their former co-citizens live</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

High institutionalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Socio-cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home country banks in immigrant centres</td>
<td>Migrants elected to home country legislatures</td>
<td>Regular cultural events organised by home country embassies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted version of ‘different spheres of transnationalism’ in Portes et al. (1999)

Table 1.2  Typology of transnational political activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General type</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transplanted homeland politics</td>
<td>Homeland political conflicts are transplanted to the host country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transplanted immigrant politics</td>
<td>Organisations set up in the host country are transplanted to the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland-directed politics</td>
<td>Host country-based groups support or oppose groups or institutions in the homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora politics</td>
<td>Homeland-directed politics among groups without a homeland or who consider their homeland occupied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of residence-directed transnational politics</td>
<td>Homeland-based actors set up institutions for their former-nationals in the host country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subset</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locally specific</td>
<td>When any of the above are directed to a specific locality, e.g. district, town, village</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
compatriots in Turkey (Penninx 1980). We witness transplanted homeland politics when specific views held by homeland political parties or states enter politics in the country of settlement. The 2006 national elections in the Netherlands provided a clear example: during the campaign, a Labour Party (PvdA) candidate of Turkish origin claimed that the Armenian genocide had never taken place. The official viewpoint of the Turkish state conflicted with the official view of the PvdA; the candidate was eventually forced to withdraw his candidacy but was praised by Turkish officials.

The second type is transplanted immigrant politics, likely to emerge when migrants return to the homeland with skills and ideas acquired in the host country (Nell 2008). For instance, Ivorian elites who had been involved in French student movements used their political experience to create opposition political parties after returning to the Ivory Coast (Ammassari 2004: 147).

The third type is homeland-directed transnational politics when migrants in the country of settlement direct their activities towards the homeland. Homeland-directed politics generally consists of attempts to improve the legal, economic, and political status of particular groups in the homeland. Such support may take place in either the host country or in the country of origin. Migrant organisations may petition the host country government to intervene directly on behalf of group interests in the homeland (Koopmans et al. 2005: 127), or try to influence homeland foreign and domestic policy via the foreign policy of the host country (see Danforth 1994; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Adamson 2002).

The fourth type, diaspora politics, is a subset of homeland-directed transnational politics for groups that do not have a homeland or consider their homeland occupied.

A fifth category is country of residence-directed transnational politics when homeland-based groups mobilise to intervene on behalf of the group’s interests in the country of settlement (Koopmans et al. 2005: 127). When, as the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs, Diyanet sets up Islamic centres in Europe, it does so to strengthen its position in the migrant community. Country of residence-directed politics need not be confined to homeland-based actors. In the ‘cartoon controversies’ of 2006, the Danish government ignored complaints about the publication of a satirical cartoon of the prophet Mohammed in a national newspaper. Activists then took their campaign to countries of origin in the Middle East and Asia, though their goal was to improve the position of migrants in the country of residence.

One further type of transnational activity can be distinguished, a subset of the five types already mentioned. Authors have labelled activities targeting local places trans-local politics (see Portes 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt 2001). The term, however, does not imply transnational activity that cross international borders (for example, it could refer to relations between two
locales within the same country). I therefore use the term ‘locally specific transnational politics’ (Nell 2007). Homeland-directed transnational politics becomes locally specific when initiatives in a city in the host country target a local community in the country of origin. A clear example involved cooperation between Amsterdam Turks and the Municipality of Amsterdam to help victims of the earthquake in Izmit, Turkey in 1999 (Gölpinar & Demirbas 2001).

**Transnational ties**

Both the emergence and institutionalisation of transnational activities are expected to depend on the ties between actors. Alevi lobbying the European Parliament for the recognition of Alevism in Turkey may culminate in a one-day political event, but the decade-old ties between Alevi organisations in the Netherlands and their counterparts in Turkey can be used for other purposes. Transnational ties are expected to be more durable than activities. Whereas activities reveal the process of transnational politics, transnational ties constitute its collective structure.

The existence of transnational ties is expected to be a condition for transnational activities to take place. But not all transnational political activities require ties with homeland actors (for example, lobbying within the host country to influence foreign policy). In such cases, ties between migrant organisations and the host country or supranational institutions are deemed a condition for indirect transnational activities.

Transnational ties can take a variety of forms, and may evolve through kinship, friendship or professional cooperation. Personal ties are usually informal, while professional ties develop through work relations, for instance, when the leaders of migrant organisations pursue joint activities. Ties can also be based on interlocking directorates (when one person is on the administrative board of two or more migrant organisations) or on formal memberships (when an individual is a member of a political party or when local migrant organisations are members of a national federation). According to Granovetter (1973: 1361), the strength of these ties derive from a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services, which characterize the tie. Each of these is somewhat independent of the other, though the set is obviously highly intracorrelated.

Many observers assume transnational ties based on kinship are strongest (DiCarlo 2008; Eve 2008). Being related by blood, however, is no condition for frequent contact. Friendships also have different levels of intimacy (for types of friendship ties see Boissevain 1974). Assuming there to be
little emotional intensity between voluntary organisations and governments, Granovetter would classify such ties as ‘weak’. But for my purposes, I seek to determine the strength not only of interpersonal ties, but ties involving actors on the collective and state levels. Since it is difficult to measure emotional intensity, reciprocity and intimacy between, for example, states and migrant organisations, I consider factors such as frequency of contact and length of relationship.

To see whether activities are institutionalised from above or below, it is necessary to examine the ties between actors. In Putnam’s words, a tie may be horizontal (based on reciprocity and cooperation) or vertical (based on authority and dependence) (1993: 88). Relations between an individual or organisation and government institutions are often vertical ‘patron-client’ relations institutionalised from above.

A further distinction can be drawn between institutionalised and uninstitutionalised ties. The former are written in statutes, and include official individual memberships, the official branches of homeland political parties and representatives of a homeland government institution; their official character makes institutionalised ties visible to the public eye. Uninstitutionalised ties, on the other hand, rely on informal or unspoken agreements and are less visible.

Finally, ties are the building blocks of dense or fragmented networks. Davis and Greve argue that practices will spread more rapidly within dense networks than in thin ones, ‘just as viruses spread faster in urban areas than in rural ones’ (1997: 7). Although the research that led to this volume was not designed to study the density or fragmentation of transnational networks, it does shed light on the embeddedness of transnational ties in

<table>
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<th>Table 1.3 Differentiation between ties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of institutionalisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
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BEYOND DUTCH BORDERS
dense or fragmented national migrant organisational networks. Albeit on a small scale, this may generate insight into the mobilisation capacity and thus the speed in which transnational activities spread.

The existence of transnational actors on various levels in both the home and host countries generates many possible combinations of ties between them. Central in this study are ties between migrants in the Netherlands and actors in their former homeland. While the above ‘bi-national’ (Lucassen 2006) ties do not extend beyond Dutch, Surinamese and Turkish borders, transnational ties may also exist between actors originating from the same country residing in several countries. For example, Turkish and Kurdish labour migrants and refugees are dispersed across Europe and are most numerous in Germany; academics even speak of ‘Euro-Turks’ (Kaya 2004). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003e: 81) argues that German-based federations serve as bridges between political parties in Turkey and organisations in other European countries, while Kurdish political lobbying often relies on cooperation between actors and organisations in different countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2002). Such ties can be termed ‘third-country transnational ties’.

Studies show that ethnicity often forms the basis of transnational cooperation. Kurdish organisations in Europe have cooperated with Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish organisations to establish what came to be referred to as a united Kurdish Parliament in Exile (Van Bruinessen 2000), while some scholars argue that East Indian-Surinamese living in the Netherlands identify more with India than with Surinam (Gowricharn 2003; see also Desai 2004). Such ethnic and third-country transnational ties will only be discussed when the activities channelled through them clearly refer to Turkey or Surinam and contain a political element.

**Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the Netherlands**

While research on activities relating to migrants’ country of origin are gaining ground in international migration studies, much of the scholarship in the Netherlands remains focused on the position of immigrants in Dutch society. This ‘integration perspective’ concentrates on factors that allegedly contribute to, or hinder, integration, such as migrants’ socio-economic position or cultural background. Little is known about migrants’ ties with their country of origin and the role these play for their participation in Dutch society.

The last decade has witnessed the publication of a range of studies on transnationalism in the Netherlands, mostly consisting of individual case studies, amongst which are a literature review on transnationalism and social cohesion (Van Amersfoort 2001), qualitative case studies on transnational citizenship and remittances by Surinamese (Gowricharn & Schüster
2001; Gowricharn 2002), the diaspora activities of Moluccans (Steijlen 2004), Iranian women in exile (Ghorashi 2002) and Ghanaian remittances and social security (Kabki 2007). Transnationalism’s political dimension, however, has not been studied. While it has begun attracting scholarly attention in other European countries, most studies have been restricted to Turks and Kurds in Germany (Wahlbeck 1998; Argun 2003; Ögelman 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e; Amelina & Faist 2008; Sökefeld 2008).

This book examines the transnational political participation of Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish1 migrants and their descendents in the Netherlands. All three groups have a migration history to the Netherlands that reaches back several decades.

The most significant group of Surinamese colonial migrants arriving in the Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s were students with university scholarships (Sedoc-Dahlberg 1971). A small number of skilled labourers, for example, nurses, were also recruited in this period (Cottaar 2003). Broader Surinamese migration began in 1973 when an Afro-Surinamese-dominated government declared its goal of independence within two years, creating fears of race riots as had happened in British Guyana. This triggered a ‘panic emigration’ of ultimately 200,000 Surinamese to the Netherlands (Gowricharn & Schüster 2001: 159). A second peak (1979-1980) was fuelled by disappointment over post-independence developments, coupled with a ‘last chance’ for unrestricted emigration before visas became mandatory in 1980 (Oostindie & Klinkers 2001: 245). After 1980, migration from Surinam comprised political migration in the aftermath of the 1980 coup (1980-1987), economic migration and family reunification.

The colonial heritage is clearly visible in Surinam’s ethnic and religious composition. The current Surinamese population consists of descendents of African slaves (Afro-Surinamese), runaway slaves (Maroons), settlers, planters and administrators from the Netherlands, Jews from Portugal and Brazil, indentured labourers from China, British India (East Indians) and the Netherlands East Indies (Javanese) as well as Chinese and Lebanese traders (Van Lier 1982; Gobardhan-Rambocus 1993; Comité Herdenking 150 jaar Boerenkolonisatie in Suriname 1995; De Bruijne 2006; Oostindie 2006). Surinam’s ethnic and religious diversity is well represented in the Netherlands. As in Surinam, East Indians and Afro-Surinamese are the most prominent, though we do not have exact numbers because ethnic self-identification is not registered.

Significant migration from Turkey began a decade later than from Surinam, being concentrated between 1964 and 1974 when the Dutch and Turkish governments had a labour agreement to fill the vacancies resulting from rapid economic growth in the Netherlands (General Directorate of Turkish Employment Organisation 2003: 90; Lucassen & Penninx 1997: 54-55; for a complete overview of Turkish migration in this period see
Akgündüz 2008). The Turkish government promoted labour migration: it hoped remittances would cushion the impact of high unemployment and economic crisis at home (Sayar 1986: 91-92) and that unskilled rural migrants would later return from Europe with new skills to meet the shortage of skilled labour (Akgündüz 2008: 53). Kurds were under-represented in the first wave of labour migration in the 1960s as recruitment mainly took place in western and central Turkey, though this changed in the early 1970s when labour was increasingly recruited from eastern Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1999). The recruitment of guest workers was always complemented by spontaneous individual immigration, including by refugees after the 1971 coup (Bakker, Vervloet & Gailly 2002). Although official labour recruitment stopped after the first oil crisis in 1973, immigration from Turkey continued through family reunification, political migration after the 1980 coup and, more recently, marriage migration (Hooghiemstra 2003). Recruited Turkish workers as well as those immigrating through family reunification were mostly unskilled and semi-skilled labourers from rural areas (Penninx, Schoorl & Praag 1994; Dagevos, Euwals, Gijsberts & Roodeburg 2006).

Why compare Surinamese, Turks and Kurds? First, migrants from Surinam and Turkey constitute the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands (according to the Dutch Bureau of Social Statistics: 342,016 and 384,64 in 2010, respectively). Both have sizable second generations. This allows studying transnational political involvement across generations, and thus changes over time and the impact of migrants’ length of stay.

Second, although migration motives from both Surinam and Turkey have been (and continue to be) varied, both include politics, marriage and family reunification. The coups d’état that took place in both Surinam and Turkey in 1980 are particularly relevant, for they swelled the number of political refugees in the Netherlands in the same period, including many Kurds from Turkey (Bakker et al. 2002: 162-167). This similarity enables study of the impact of political migration motives and the homeland political climate on transnational politics.

Third, there has been a clear shift among all groups from seeing their stay in the Netherlands as temporary towards acknowledging its permanence. Colonial and post-colonial Surinamese and Turkish (including Kurdish) guest worker migration was initially seen as temporary by governments and migrants alike (Sayari 1986; Böcker 2000; Van Niekerk 2000; Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk 2006; Akgündüz 2008). The first Turkish migrant organisations in the Netherlands almost exclusively focused on the homeland, with the whole Turkish political spectrum from extreme right to left represented in the 1970s (Penninx 1980). While these political orientations remain visible, organisations today increasingly focus on migrants’ lives in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum, Tillie & Fennema 1999). Similarly, the first Surinamese organisations focused on ‘furthering
Surinam’, not on integration in the Netherlands (Van Niekerk 2000: 70). They, too, have gradually shifted their focus towards a more or less permanent stay.

The perception of residence in the Netherlands as permanent has affected migrants’ political participation in the host country. What remains less clear is how this shift has affected their transnational political participation. Here the variation that both cases exhibit over time will allow us to examine the effect of this shift in consciousness. The idea of temporariness also had consequences for the political opportunities that the Netherlands, Surinam and Turkey offered migrants. Policies were initially designed to facilitate migrants’ or emigrants’ return and the maintenance of strong ties with the homeland. Today Dutch policies have shifted towards an emphasis on integration in the Netherlands. This enables us to study the impact of political opportunities provided by the host country and country of origin over several phases of settlement.

Fourth, reflecting the population in the countries of origin, migrants from Surinam and Turkey constitute heterogeneous groups in terms of ethnicity and religion. This allows the study of the diversity of transnational politics and thus who is involved. Research has shown that ethnicity and religion are important organising principles for Surinamese and Turkish migrant organisations and their political mobilisation in the Netherlands (Van Heelsum et al. 1999; Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002). Comparing the transnational ties and activities of migrants from different countries, and from different groups from the same country, can lay bare the influence of ethnicity and religion on transnational political mobilisation.

In addition to these four similarities between Surinamese and Turkish migrants, there are four important differences. First, the large-scale migration waves from Surinam can be characterised as colonial and post-colonial, whereas immigrants from Turkey mostly arrived as guest workers. Most of the early migrants from Surinam belonged to the middle and upper classes, while those from Turkey were from the lower classes. Surinamese migrants were already familiar with the Dutch language and culture; Turks and Kurds were not. Studying these two migrant groups with their different backgrounds allows us to establish the impact of different migration motives and social backgrounds on transnational politics. Are there significant differences between the transnational political involvements of relatively skilled post-colonial migrants and unskilled labour migrants?

Second, diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Surinam versus the Netherlands and Turkey are very different. Due to their colonial ties, relations between the Netherlands and Surinam are emotionally charged, with many tense periods since independence in 1975. This was especially true in the 1980s and 1990s when Desi Bouterse, the commander of the army ran the country. Subsequent relations have remained tense, with Dutch governments criticising the use of development aid sent to
Surinam and the democratic government of Surinam criticising the Netherlands for its ‘patronising’ attitude. In contrast, relations between Turkey and the Netherlands are influenced by Turkey’s aspiration to EU membership, an issue that has mobilised Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands (for Germany see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 3). Two questions follow: how have diplomatic relations impacted upon Surinamese and Turkish policies for emigrants and their descendants? How have they influenced the transnational activities of migrants and their descendants in the Netherlands, as well as of those who stayed behind or returned?

A third and obvious difference is the total emigrant stock of the sending countries. Surinam’s population just exceeds half a million; Turkey’s is over 70 million. Today, Surinamese migrants comprising 66.4 per cent of the total Surinamese population live abroad (mainly in the Netherlands); for Turkey this percentage (spread over several European countries, the Gulf and the US) is ‘only’ 6 per cent. The question is how this influences the responsiveness of homeland-based actors to migrants’ transnational activities. Do actors in Surinam embrace transnational activities more eagerly than those in Turkey because the migrant group in the Netherlands is two-thirds of the population of Surinam and includes many highly skilled people?

Finally, the scholarly literature suggests differences in the structure of Surinamese and Turkish civil society in the Netherlands: Surinamese organisations exist within weak and fragmented networks whereas Turkish networks are strong and dense (Van Heelsum et al. 1999; Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002). At the same time, Surinamese have lower levels of political participation in the Netherlands than Turks – which may suggest migrant organisations foster political participation in the country of residence (Fennema & Tillie 1999). For our purposes, the question is how the quality of migrant networks and their political participation in the Netherlands influences their transnational political activities and the ties they maintain with the homeland. Are Surinamese more concerned with homeland matters because they participate less in Dutch politics? Or is it the other way around, with Surinamese having lower levels of political participation in the Netherlands because they are less involved with homeland politics? Pursuing these questions should shed light on the influence of transnational political involvement on political participation in the country of residence, and vice versa.

This chapter has introduced the phenomenon of transnational migrant politics, discussed broad themes in the literature, presented the factors considered most relevant in explaining transnationalism and advanced a framework for studying transnational migrant politics based on the concepts of transnational actors, activities and ties. Empirical evidence on the evolution of transnational political ties and activities, and how this affects political
integration in the country of residence, however, is thin on the ground. The following empirical chapters aim to address this gap.
2 Individual transnationalists

This chapter provides an overview of the transnational ties and activities of individual Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the Netherlands. Most statistical information on migrants in the Netherlands is collected to measure their social, cultural and economic position in the country and, in one way or another, to examine their integration.1 Issues related to the country of origin are thus poorly reflected in official statistics and our knowledge of the transnational orientations of individual migrants remains limited.2 To address this gap, I designed and supervised a survey carried out by assistants in 2004, the results of which are presented and analysed in this chapter.

The first part of the questionnaire consisted of closed questions meant to gather background information. The second part included semi-open questions and more detailed retrospective questions on concrete transnational activities in which respondents had participated, or were still involved, in both the homeland and the Netherlands. It inquired further into individual motivations to maintain transnational ties and to participate in transnational activities. What forms did such involvement take? How did it affect participation and interest in Dutch politics?

I first present some general background information on the interviewees. Subsequent sections of this chapter address specific dimensions of individual transnational involvement, inter-generational differences and the relation between interest in homeland politics and feelings of inclusion or exclusion in the Dutch political arena.

Respondents’ backgrounds

To gain insight into individual transnational involvement, the project team conducted face-to-face interviews with a total of 40 Turks, 40 Surinamese and 21 Kurds. For information on sampling, non-response, methodology and questionnaire content see Appendix A.

As one of my concerns was how transnational political involvement is reproduced in the second generation, the sample included seventeen Surinamese, twelve Turkish and two Kurdish ‘pairs’ (two individuals from the same family, in most cases of a different generation). In cases when it
was not possible to find such a relative, we interviewed relatives of the same generation. Relatives did not have to belong to the same household but to the same wider family – which I expected to be just as influential (see also Bertraux & Thompson 1993). What mattered was that the two people were related by kinship and maintained regular contact.

As previously mentioned, migrants from Turkey and Surinam are ethnically and religiously diverse. Among Surinamese, I tried to ensure representation of East Indians and Afro-Surinamese – the largest groups in both the Netherlands and Surinam. Roughly a quarter of Surinamese did not identify with a specific ethnic group, but simply as ‘Surinamese’. Most Surinamese respondents were Hindu or Christian, while one-fifth of the Surinamese respondents stated they were non-practising. The majority of Turkish respondents were Muslim (Sunni or of a general Islam; some were Alevi). More than half of the Kurdish respondents stated that they were non-practising.

For all groups, more males were interviewed than females. Female representation was highest among Surinamese and lowest among Turks. The majority of Turkish and Kurdish respondents had retained Turkish nationality, while only two Surinamese had kept Surinamese nationality. Dual citizenship is not formally allowed for Surinamese (Haarmans 1987: 108-113), whereas Turks and Kurds are usually able to maintain their homeland passport alongside Dutch nationality (Fermin & Van der Hijden 2004). On average, Surinamese were older and had been settled in the Netherlands for longer than the Turkish and Kurdish respondents (see Table 2.1).

In addition to the general characteristics outlined in Table 2.1, respondents’ migration motives constitute important background information. Most Surinamese (or their parents) migrated to the Netherlands to improve their economic situation and to pursue higher education. The majority of Turkish respondents migrated to join their (labour migrant) parents, or to reunify with, or marry, their new spouse in the Netherlands. Others left Turkey for economic reasons. A little fewer than half of the Kurdish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Overview of survey respondents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surinam N=40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (male)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd and 1.5 generations</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay 1st and 1.5 generations (average years)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay parents 2nd generation (average years)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual nationality</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality of homeland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education ≥</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respondents left Turkey for political reasons; other motives were similar to the Turkish respondents.

Over half of Turkish first-generation respondents, a third of Kurdish respondents and roughly one in six Surinamese respondents migrated to the Netherlands to reunify with their parents before the age of eighteen. They belong to what Rumbaut and Ima (1988) have called the ‘one and a half generation’ – what I will henceforth call the ‘intermediate generation’ in the text and the ‘1.5 generation’ in the tables. Individuals belonging to the intermediate generation are neither part of the first generation of their parents (adults who spent their formative years in the homeland and made a decision to migrate) nor the second generation (born in the Netherlands). Members of the intermediate generation were born in the homeland but were raised in the Netherlands during the formative years of adolescence and early adulthood (see Rumbaut & Ima 1988: 22). Intermediate-generation respondents thus arrived in the Netherlands before they were fully socialised in the homeland; they were not expected to have clear homeland political identities expressed by, for example, party preference (Tonelli 2000: 63). In this respect, they have more in common with the second generation, with whom they share similar socialisation. Second and intermediate generations are thus viewed together for the purpose of analysis.

**Interest in Dutch and homeland politics**

To what extent are Surinamese, Turks and Kurds living in the Netherlands interested in Dutch and homeland politics? Several forms of such ‘interest’ were examined. To measure general interest in Dutch and homeland news, I first examined consumption of mass media. I also looked for evidence of more active interest in politics: did respondents discuss Dutch or homeland politics with contacts in their country of origin, in third countries and in the Netherlands? And finally, did Kurdish and Surinamese individuals maintain transnational ties on the basis of ethnicity? If so, did this facilitate transnational political activity?

The consumption of mass media is one way to measure political interest (see Fennema & Tillie 1999). I studied the consumption of print media such as daily newspapers and magazines, television and the internet (visiting homeland or ethnic websites). The category of ‘homeland’ newspapers differed for Surinamese, Turks and Kurds. For example, many large Turkish newspapers such as Hürriyet, but also smaller ones such as Evrensel, have editions for the Turkish community in Europe and are often published in Germany. One of the larger Surinamese newspapers, De Ware Tijd, likewise has a Dutch edition. The largest Kurdish newspaper, Özgür Politika, is a diaspora newspaper par excellence: it is not published in Turkey at all. Despite such differences, these dailies were all placed under
the label ‘homeland newspapers’. I witnessed similar variation among magazines; unlike the newspapers, however, the majority of magazines read by Turks and Surinamese were printed in the Netherlands and were not extended editions of homeland (or European) magazines. Kurdish magazines, like the newspaper Özgür Politika, were mainly diaspora publications published in Europe for Kurds living around the world.

There were several subdivisions under the category ‘television’. Via satellite dish Turkish migrants can watch broadcasts from Turkey; we asked Turkish and Kurdish respondents whether they watched TRT-INT—a daughter channel of the Turkish state channel TRT—aimed at Turks abroad. Surinamese do not have such an option. In addition, programmes of the multicultural channel MTNL, aimed at specific migrant groups including Surinamese and Turks, are available in the large Dutch cities. These outlets allow measurement of interest in one’s ethnic group in the Netherlands. The Kurdish case, however, is different. Leading Kurdish television station MED-TV broadcasts from the UK and is a diaspora medium par excellence: while illegal in Turkey, it is watched by Kurds in Europe, and with satellite dishes, by Kurds in eastern Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East (see Hassanpour 1998).

Finally, websites can be hosted from anywhere, at least in theory. The focus in this study was on the national or ethnic audience of websites. As web discussion forums have become important means to exchange news and opinion, they too were included in the survey.

All groups read Dutch newspapers more than homeland newspapers. While first-generation Turks (unlike their children) hardly read Dutch papers, generational differences were negligible for Kurds and Surinamese. Although one might expect first-generation Turks to read homeland newspapers, their number was small. Fewer than a third of Turks read Turkish newspapers and even fewer read ethnic magazines; the magazines they mentioned all targeted Turks living in the Netherlands and were often read for free in libraries, Turkish coffeehouses or while waiting for a haircut at a Turkish salon. Hardly any of the Surinamese respondents consumed Surinamese print media.

Half of the Kurdish interviewees read Kurdish or Turkish newspapers. Eight Kurds read the newspaper Özgür Politika; two maintained it was affiliated to the Kurdish nationalist party Peoples’ Congress Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL, formerly known as the PKK) and read it ‘because there is nothing else left’, referring to the scarce availability of Kurdish newspapers. Five Kurdish interviewees only read Turkish newspapers; around half consumed a broad variety of magazines (seventeen different ones), mostly published in Europe. Some magazines were affiliated with illegal parties or organisations in Turkey, such as KONGRA-GEL or the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK). Interestingly, the majority of magazines focused on a specific
regional or ethnic identity (for the relation between local identities and media usage see Nell 2007).

All Surinamese followed news only on Dutch channels, as was the case for the large majority of Turks. All Kurds but one followed the news on Dutch television, while a large majority also watched the news on the Kurdish channel MED-TV. Roughly half the Kurds also watched TRT-INT, a similar proportion to Turkish respondents.

Although it remains debatable whether surfing the internet counts as consumption of mass media, for my purposes, it served to indicate the extent to which people search for, or exchange information about, the homeland. The websites named by respondents were not purely online entities; most were extensions of offline organisations. Kurds visited more ethnic websites than Turks and Surinamese; Surinamese named only five different websites while Turks named eighteen and Kurds no fewer than 25. The website most mentioned by Surinamese was the Netherlands-based waterkant.net, a website with news on Surinam and Surinamese people. Almost no first-generation Turks surfed online, while over half of the intermediate- and second-generation Turks did so. They mainly visited the websites of big Turkish newspapers, while three respondents visited websites of their region of origin. The websites mentioned by Kurds were more diverse and often related to a specific Kurdish political, regional or ethnic group. Most were hosted in Europe or in the Netherlands, including online extensions of political magazines and political parties illegal in Turkey. Finally, Kurdish respondents mentioned ethnic websites for youths and newsites for all Kurds, including those from Iraq and Syria (for a complete analysis of Turkish-Kurdish web surfing see Van den Bos & Nell 2006).

Kurds consumed more ethnic and homeland media and, at the same time, more Dutch media than Surinamese and Turks. The low Surinamese score on homeland media use can be explained by their having grown up with the Dutch language and the greater choice offered by Dutch media. Among Turks, the first generation, especially, scored low on the use of Dutch media. This cannot be attributed to poor language skills alone since their consumption of Turkish media was not much higher. The fact that Kurds scored higher than Turks and Surinamese can be explained by the previous ban on Kurdish media in Turkey – only lifted very recently – and the existence of Kurdish diaspora newspapers and magazines. Kurdish media is in fact easier to access in Europe than in Turkey. Eagerness to follow homeland news seemed to go together with a hunger for other news as well.

Another way to measure political interest is by examining how often and with whom people discuss Dutch and homeland politics. I sought to know how regularly individuals maintain contact with friends and family in the homeland and in other countries where members of their own national or ethnic group reside. ‘Contact’ refers to actual visits to the
homeland, but also to communication by post, email or telephone. Do respondents discuss Dutch and homeland politics and, if so, which topics? The findings are presented in Table 2.2.

All Turks and the majority of Kurds had visited Turkey at least once between 1999 and 2003, and often more frequently. For Surinamese, trips to the homeland were much less frequent: a little more than half had visited Surinam over the same period. The main explanation for this difference was the monopoly of Dutch airline KLM and Surinamese airline SLM on flights to Surinam, making tickets prohibitively expensive. Most people needed to save for several years to visit friends and family in Surinam.

The large majority of all respondents maintained contact by phone, email or mail with at least five family members and/or friends in the homeland. About three quarters of Turks and Kurds also maintained contact with relatives and sometimes friends in third countries. The majority of their contacts lived in Germany, Belgium and France and, to a lesser extent, in Switzerland, Denmark and the UK. Families met for occasions such as weddings, births, funerals and other rites of passage. A quarter of the Surinamese maintained contact with Surinamese in third countries, mainly relatives. This number is surprisingly high, as the Netherlands is traditionally the main destination for Surinamese emigrants. Their contacts mainly lived in the US, but also in Canada, Australia, Germany, Belgium, India and the Caribbean. Due to distance, Surinamese do not see their third-country contacts as often as Turks and Kurds do. If they see each other, they generally meet up in Surinam.

Around three-quarters of Kurdish and Turkish respondents discussed political themes with their homeland contacts. The most popular topics

<table>
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<th>Table 2.2 Transnational contacts and discussing politics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homeland visit between 1999-2003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with &gt; 5 friends and family members in the homeland ≥ once a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discussions with homeland contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with ≥ 1 friend and family member in third countries ≥ once a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discussion with third-country contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing homeland politics in the Netherlands ≥ once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing Dutch politics in the Netherlands ≥ once a month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
among Kurds were elections, the human rights situation in Turkey and EU membership. Some Kurdish respondents said they do not discuss sensitive political themes such as matters related to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) over the phone. They fear wiretapping: though it would not affect them, it might have consequences for their friends or family. Turks mostly discussed the general socio-economic climate. About half the Surinamese respondents said they discussed politics; most inquired about how their contacts were coping financially. Others said they did not discuss politics over the phone due to the high cost of calling Surinam.

Homeland politics were less frequently discussed with contacts in the Netherlands than with homeland-based contacts. Turks and Surinamese generally discussed homeland politics with people from their own group whereas Kurds also discussed Kurdish politics with Turkish and Dutch people. All respondents discussed homeland politics as much as Dutch politics with their contacts in the Netherlands, while Dutch politics were as much discussed with people from their own national or ethnic group as with Dutch people. The most popular Dutch political topics were daily politics and themes relating to migrants, such as integration.

Homeland politics were least discussed with contacts in third countries, with whom many respondents discussed family matters. A Kurdish second-generation female stated that when she discusses politics with Kurds in other European countries, it mostly relates to daily life in countries of settlement: ‘We often discuss integration issues, how we are living in the country as foreigners, because that’s how they see us, as foreigners.’ Politics is more often discussed with friends than with relatives, especially among refugees, as a Kurdish respondent explained:

I go to Belgium twice, sometimes three times a year to visit my friends. Friends from Germany and even from Australia come over to gather. We just miss each other. If we have time, we visit each other […] and then, yes, we talk about politics. We are all refugees so it’s logical… we also need to recover from the war. We are still suffering, some just can’t make it and it ended worse with others. So politics is part of our daily life and our past… (Kurdish female, first generation)

The data on media use showed that some Kurds also consume media targeting all Kurds, including those from Iraq, Iran and Syria; we asked Kurdish respondents how much they identify with Kurds in different countries. Similarly, we posed the question to Surinamese about whether they felt attached to the country of their ancestors. To see whether such ethnic identification fostered transnational activity, we first asked respondents if they had ever visited these countries. Fewer than half of Surinamese and
more than half of Kurdish respondents said they felt attached to an ancestral country and a broader ethnic group.

Among Surinamese, such identification was especially high among East Indians, of whom the majority (eleven out of fifteen) felt attached to India. More than half (eight) – mainly from the first generation – had visited India, though this identification should not be overestimated. Respondents said they visited India out of a curiosity to see where their ancestors came from; most felt more attached to Surinam. While some authors emphasise the increasing popularity of ‘roots trips’ among first-generation East Indian-Surinamese to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, from where their ancestors emigrated to Surinam (Jones 2004: 81), these are often once-in-a-lifetime visits. For example, in 1999 the Indian government introduced an ID for Persons of Indian Origins (PIO) for people with a father, grandfather of great-grandfather born in India. It lets PIOs enter India without a visa and provides certain social and economic rights without political rights. In 2000, only six PIO cards were requested by East Indian-Surinamese in the Netherlands (Hira 2000: 101).

Two Chinese-Surinamese respondents felt attached to China, and had visited the country at least once. Two Afro-Surinamese felt attached to Ghana, but had never visited the country. Other Afro-Surinamese and respondents who indicated they identified as ‘general Surinamese’ stated that as their ancestors had come from so many continents, how could they possibly identify with one? One Amer-Indian respondent had Portuguese ancestors and had visited Portugal on holiday, but not in search of his roots. Finally, the Kurdish respondents who identified with Kurdish people wherever they lived argued ‘one people, one nation’. Three first-generation respondents had been in Iraq, which had served as a transit destination from where they sought asylum in the Netherlands. Kurds who did not identify with Kurds from other countries stated that their cultures were too different and that a united Kurdistan was an illusion.

The findings on general political interests (as seen by consumption of mass media and discussion of homeland politics) indicate interest in homeland and Dutch politics and that an eagerness to follow homeland and Dutch news go hand-in-hand. Active discussion of homeland politics with contacts in the homeland does not hinder discussion of Dutch politics with native Dutch or members of the national/ethnic group. The factors that seem to determine general interest in homeland politics are political opportunities, length of stay and migration motives. For political opportunities, the availability of homeland or diaspora media in the Netherlands is decisive. Discussing politics with homeland contacts over the phone is limited by cost (Surinamese) and concern for the safety of homeland contacts (Kurds). Finally, migrant groups that contain numerous political refugees, combined with a short length of stay (Kurds), tend to be most interested in homeland politics. Taken together, homeland politics is most often
discussed with friends and relatives residing in the homeland (for whom it is part of daily life) rather than with contacts in third countries or in the Netherlands.

**Societal participation**

General interest or non-interest in homeland news and politics is one thing, but what does this mean for concrete participation in collective action with a homeland goal? What does involvement in collective homeland activities imply for participation in Dutch civil society and in the civil society of one’s national/ethnic group? How does this involvement change with length of stay in the Netherlands? To address these issues, I posed questions on migrants’ past and present membership in ethnic organisations, ethnic organisations with homeland activities and Dutch organisations (see Table 2.3).

Surinamese scored lower on participation in homeland-directed activities than Turks and Kurds. Only seven respondents had participated in at least one activity relating to a homeland social or political theme. Three were active in the 1980s when Surinam was ruled by the military, signing or offering petitions to the Dutch parliament on human rights. One respondent

### Table 2.3 Organisational membership and homeland-directed activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Surinam N=40</th>
<th>Turkey N=40</th>
<th>Kurds N=21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/52</td>
<td>1/52</td>
<td>1/52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in activities for a homeland issue &gt; 1*</td>
<td>5 2</td>
<td>9 15</td>
<td>11 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present membership in an ethnic organisation</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td>4 5</td>
<td>5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present membership in an ethnic organisation with homeland-directed activities</td>
<td>6 3</td>
<td>- 3</td>
<td>4 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past membership in an ethnic organisation</td>
<td>7 3</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>7 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past membership in an ethnic organisation with homeland-directed activities</td>
<td>7 3</td>
<td>1 4</td>
<td>7 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present membership in a Dutch organisation</td>
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*Question G1a was: In the past were you ever occupied with a political or societal theme that has something to do with the homeland? If yes: signing or offering petitions, donations, participation in peaceful demonstrations, contacting the media, contacting politicians, others such as...
participated in annual protests in front of the Surinamese embassy in The Hague (on the anniversary of 8 December 1982, the day the military killed fifteen opponents of the regime).

We were there every year, always trouble… in the middle of the street we started quarrelling with Bouterse [leader of the 1980 revolution] adherents… we wanted to address the issue [the December Murders]. How long did it take before the Dutch government positioned itself? … But we also didn’t want the people of the Surinamese embassy to have a nice and quiet 8 December. We wanted to let them know that we are here and to give to people who have been murdered a voice. (Surinamese female, intermediate generation)

The other three respondents supported social activities directed towards Surinam, including raising funds for an orphanage, a leprosy foundation, a Hindu temple, a football stadium and childcare. Finally, one person visited the districtendagen (‘districts days’) organised in The Hague. On this day

[all Surinamese districts presented themselves, to promote their district and to provide information. An important goal is that people meet, exchange knowledge and capital… and that the development of Surinam enters a take-off phase…. Networks become visible, new networks between the Netherlands and Surinam are created… and this forms a base for societal changes in Surinam. (Surinamese male, first generation)

Compared to Surinamese, Turks were much more actively involved in homeland issues. More than half of the respondents (24) had participated at least once in an activity for a homeland issue; eighteen had donated money and goods via local mosques to the victims of the earthquake that hit the Marmara region in 1999. But that was not all. Three interviewees went to the region to provide medical aid and distribute food packets and other necessities. Another lent out his apartment in Istanbul to acquaintances who had lost their homes.

Other activities included donating money through organisations such as the Sunni Muslim organisation Milli Görüş (National Vision) and signing petitions. None, however, could recall what they had signed for, or for what goal funds had been raised. Only three interviewees had participated in demonstrations of a transnational character. The first marched in 1978 against the release of the movie Midnight Express. According to him, this film about an American man put in a Turkish jail for smuggling hashish portrayed Turkey negatively: ‘it was an incorrect picture’ (Turkish male, first generation). One woman marched regularly between 1980 and 1982
against military rule in Turkey. She also protested and collected signatures in 1993 when Sunni Muslims burnt down a hotel in Sivas, leading to the death of 37 Alevi and non-Alevi intellectuals and artists gathered for a cultural festival. The third interviewee participated in a demonstration against the 1995 instatement of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile in The Hague.

Kurdish respondents were more active in homeland political issues than their Surinamese and Turkish counterparts. Their numerous activities were all political and lasted over longer periods; it was therefore impossible for respondents to name them all. Most respondents told me about their protesting history, thereby giving an indication of their political goals.

Three Kurds were active as early as the 1980s and participated in activities against the junta in Turkey.

During the junta in 1980 we often demonstrated… in front of the Turkish consulate in Amsterdam… The last ten years I have become less active, but before I was very involved. I performed with my saz [kind of guitar] during demonstrations. My lyrics were politically loaded, songs that were illegal in Turkey in those days. (Kurdish male, first generation)

The majority (twelve) were especially active in the 1990s when the war between the Turkish army and the PKK was at its height. For roughly a decade, people joined numerous protests, from signing petitions to contacting the media and politicians and even going on hunger strikes. One respondent, who regularly joined protests organised by the PKK in the Netherlands in this period, recalls:

When I was young… there was a human rights crisis in Turkey. We didn’t protest [in the Netherlands] against the Turks, but against the Turkish state. You could be arrested [in Turkey] for only putting a red, yellow and green pepper together [colours of the Kurdish flag]. I got emotionally involved… and became very active, went to demonstrations all the time. Information about protests spread very fast. (Kurdish female, intermediate generation)

The arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 sparked a great deal of protest. Two respondents participated in a hunger strike; others took to the streets in Amsterdam and The Hague.

When Apo [Öcalan] was arrested, my nationalistic feelings came to the fore. I was devastated, I cried, it felt like the Kurdish people were raped. I didn’t cry about him. I don’t have much sympathy for him, but despite the many mistakes of the PKK, he was the symbol of hope. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)
Marching in demonstrations against Öcalan’s arrest did not necessarily mean commitment to him as a leader. Another interviewee explained:

I often just came along with people, but I didn’t always agree with the goal of the demonstrations. The goal was to demand attention for the Kurdish question, but at the same time one individual [Öcalan] was the central figure. I didn’t like that at all. (Kurdish female, intermediate generation)

Most respondents felt that by the time of interviewing in 2004, the situation in Turkey had improved and protesting was less urgent. Some stated that although the demonstrations in the 1990s had received media attention, goals had not been achieved. Others argued that the media only paid attention to demonstrations that turned violent, while the many peaceful marches did not receive the attention they had hoped for:

I don’t march anymore, because I feel it has no effect. If you truly want attention, then you – unfortunately – have to make trouble. I think the media would pay more attention if Kurds would shoot a bullet through the window of a Turkish restaurant, than to thousands of Kurds who protest again, for the hundredth time. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

Eight respondents were still regularly involved in protests – signing petitions and occasionally attending demonstrations, including those in solidarity with Kurds in Iraq and Syria. As one interviewee clarified:

I feel committed to all Kurds, not only in Turkey… if [Kurdish] people, for example, are arrested or murdered I feel I have to do something. I can’t think of any reason why I shouldn’t demonstrate. (Kurdish male, first generation)

So far, events in the homeland seem to be the leading reason for participation in homeland-directed activities. These events were often of a political nature, such as the 1980 coups in Surinam and Turkey and the arrest of the PKK leader Öcalan, while natural disasters such as the 1999 Marmara earthquake also triggered collective action. Participation thus largely appeared ad hoc.

To examine the extent to which migrants were more structurally involved in homeland activities, and how this participation had changed over time, I examined past and present membership in ethnic organisations that pursued homeland-directed activities. To see how this related to integration within ethnic and Dutch civil society, I compared these memberships with involvement in ethnic and Dutch organisations.
One quarter of Surinamese respondents were members of Surinamese organisations, the majority of which had activities aimed at Surinam. The most frequently mentioned activities were fundraising and collecting goods for schools and orphanages in Surinam. Furthermore, respondents named membership in sports clubs and religious, socio-cultural or interest organisations. In most cases, migrant organisations targeted specific ethnic or religious groups: Afro-Surinamese, East Indian, Hindu, Muslim or Christian.

Socio-cultural organisations were more popular among Surinamese respondents than charities. This stemmed from past membership in socio-cultural organisations during their studies. Student organisations’ activities towards Surinam followed the political climate there. One respondent was a member of a student organisation in the late 1960s, prior to Surinamese independence in 1975. In addition to welcoming newly arrived students, the organisation aimed to increase ‘black awareness’ and Surinamese nationalism – part and parcel of the independence struggle. Another respondent, active in a student organisation during the military regime in the 1980s, illustrated how it tried to influence diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Surinam:

We closely followed political developments in Surinam... we organised discussion evenings, with someone who introduced a theme and presented his opinion. We also tried to inform Dutch politicians about the situation and urged them to do something about it. (Surinamese female, intermediate generation)

In the 1990s, when Surinam had become a post-colonial democracy, another respondent was a member of the Rotterdam Surinamese student organisation Studiname. Instead of trying to influence homeland politics as students in the 1960s and 1980s had done, they invited politicians and people from the private sector to keep them abreast of the latest political and economic developments in Surinam.

Overall, in the past as well as in the present, membership in Dutch organisations was more common among Surinamese than membership in ethnic ones. In 2004, roughly half of the respondents were members of a Dutch organisation, most frequently sports clubs. Respondents also mentioned Dutch professional and student organisations as well as international charities such as UNICEF and Greenpeace.

In 2004, nine Turks were members of Turkish organisations. Sunni and Alevi organisations that, according to the respondents, were not engaged in activities directed towards Turkey were the most popular (five). One respondent was a member of a Turkish organisation catering to Turks living in an Utrecht neighbourhood. Only three were members of Turkish organisations with activities directed towards Turkey. One respondent was an administrator at a local Alevi organisation in The Hague engaged in religious
and social activities. The organisation, however, also involved itself in political activities when it was deemed necessary.

Three times a week, when we hold services in the cem [Alevi place of worship], I prepare meals for the visitors… when something political happens in Turkey [against Alevis] we organise activities because we [Alevis] want to live in freedom. (Turkish female, intermediate generation)

One respondent was a member of a Turkish student organisation that coordinates seminars on Turkish topics and trips to Turkey. Another was a member of a Milli Görüş women’s organisation that, alongside activities to improve members’ knowledge about Dutch society, invites Dutch politicians to speak on Dutch politics and Turkish politicians visiting the Netherlands to keep members up to date on political developments in Turkey.

Fewer respondents (seven) were members of Turkish organisations in the past; these were more often focused on Turkey (five out of seven). Socio-cultural organisations were more popular than religious ones. One respondent in 1986 was a founding member of a Turkish cultural centre linked to the nationalist Turkish Nationalist Action Party (MHP); it promoted integration of Turkish youths in Dutch society.

This organisation organised homework guidance, computer training and Dutch language courses for youths. But Turkish politics was also important. The organisation was linked to a party in Turkey [the MHP]… there were around sixteen or seventeen of these organisations in the Netherlands, the directors maintained contacts with Turkey… you should never forget your own country. You have to pay attention to your own race. (Turkish male, intermediate generation)

This individual left the organisation due to personal conflicts. Other respondents, however, left socio-cultural organisations when the atmosphere became too politicised due to tensions between Kurds and Turks in the mid-1990s.

I used to be a member of this Turkish cultural organisation, just playing Turkish music and folk dancing. But around 1995 I left… yes, because in this period the organisation became politicised… I just wanted to cooperate in joint cultural activities, not Turkish or Kurdish… it really became political… that’s bad. (Turkish male, intermediate generation)
Another respondent elaborated why he never became a member of a Turkish organisation in the Netherlands.

I was about to found a Turkish organisation in Delft with some friends [in the 1990s], but I quit because they went on a Kurdish track… Hey, I mean, I am in the Netherlands! … I am not going to discuss Turkish politics in an association in the Netherlands. Really unnecessary. That’s my point. Turkish politics should be discussed in Turkey… you have no influence anyway… Turkish organisations are very isolated and work on their own. It’s kind of hopeless what they are doing. (Turkish male, second generation)

While Turkish socio-cultural organisations with homeland activities – especially political ones – were on the decline, religious organisations emphasising spiritual development in the Netherlands were growing in popularity. Among the intermediate and second generations, there was a small increase in membership in Dutch organisations, especially sports clubs; others mentioned charity, professional, cultural and student organisations. Not one first-generation Turk I interviewed was ever a member of a Dutch organisation.

In 2004, half of the Kurdish respondents (eleven) were members of a Kurdish organisation, most of which were involved in activities aimed at Turkey or ‘Kurdistan’. These included the Kurdish Information Centre (KIC) and a local chapter of the Kurdish federation FED-KOM. The diversity of organisations, however, was remarkable. Only three respondents were members of an organisation focused on Turkish-Kurds. The other eight were members of either Turkish organisations or Kurdish organisations targeting all Kurds. Finally, one was a founding member of an organisation that emphasised a specific local Turkish-Kurdish identity. The variety in the Kurdish sample shows that Kurds do not form a homogenous group acting separately from Turkish migrants.

Many respondents (six) were members of the Kurdish student association KVSN. The activities of this organisation, one member explained, focused on ‘Kurdistan’.

We organise lectures, debates about actual topics, anything that interests people […] It’s all about meeting other Kurdish students and to remain attached to the Kurdish cause […] Yeah, we just try to keep the Kurdish cause alive […] all our activities are directed to Kurdistan. (Kurdish male, first generation)

Other members appreciated that KVSN was no longer attached to a nationally oriented Kurdish political party such as the Turkish PKK. Instead,
KSVN targeted Kurds from all over ‘Kurdistan’, including Iraq, Iran and Syria.

For me, it is very important that KSVN now has members originating from all over Kurdistan, not only the Turkish part […] everybody knows who has which political colour, but the association is not political anymore. Our association shows that Kurds are able to cooperate. (Kurdish female, intermediate generation)

What I really like is that people from all over Kurdistan gather, normally everybody is separated […]. KSVN is not affiliated to any political party, it’s just fun […] and it’s important to cooperate. If you aim at an independent Kurdistan, you will have to cooperate eventually. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

Another interviewee talked about political fatigue among Kurdish youths:

I am currently working on the founding of a new Kurdish organisation in The Hague […] we want to give Kurdish organisational life a new impulse, no traditional Kurdish stuff, but music, pure culture and no politics, our youths really want this. Last month I organised a party, so many people called to ask who organised it. They actually asked which political party initiated the event. When I told them it was us, they were very happy. They are just tired of politics. (Kurdish female, second generation)

A first-generation respondent hoped to break down the barriers with a new organisation. It focused on a local Dersim identity, which gave room to Zaza-speaking people:

We have founded Stichting Dersim. We said we have to do something with Dersim to create an umbrella, because Dersim is a politicised area. In Dersim, the Turkish left is very strong and all the Kurdish parties are strong, so doing something in Dersim which is bound to political parties […] it won’t work […] we think that Dersim needs to develop its own identity. Dersim shouldn’t be dominated by Kurmancî.⁵ (Kurdish male, first generation)

Another first-generation respondent was not tired of politics at all. Although he was a member of the Turkish-Kurdish workers organisation KOM-KAR, his organisation looked beyond Turkey to Kurdish human rights issues in other countries as well.
The association maintains contacts with the media, with other Kurdish organisations and with Turkish democratic organisations […] with demonstrations we seek attention for the Kurds from Syria and Iraq and the human rights situation in Turkey. We talk with the press, send out press releases and we prepare a dossier for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We don’t talk directly to the minister but with a high-ranked official. (Kurdish male, first generation)

Three respondents were members of the Turkish-Kurdish federation FED-KOM, which mainly has activities for Kurmancî-speaking Kurds from Turkey.

Five Kurdish respondents were not members of specifically Kurdish organisations, but ones catering to all people from Turkey regardless of ethnicity. Examples include the Islamic organisation Millî Görüş and the leftist the Federation of Democratic Workers Associations (DİDF) and Federation of Turkish Workers (HTİB) (see next chapter). The activities of these organisations have no connection to the Kurdish cause. A member of DİDF explained.

For example, we organise information meetings when… our contacts such as trade unions or student organisations in Turkey are put under pressure by the state… Or when someone is arrested unjustly and cannot afford a lawyer, we collect money so he is able to pay his lawyer…. And once this newspaper Evrensel had financial problems and was about to disappear, we organised a party and supported them with the money we raised. (Kurdish male, first generation)

In 2004, seven Kurds were members of Dutch student, professional, charity, anti-racism and cultural organisations.

The general picture – both in the past and in the present – is that Kurds are the most active, and Turks the least, when it comes to ethnic organisations with homeland-directed activities. A remarkable shift, however, was seen among Kurdish youths: many seemed to be tiring of explicitly political activity and were embracing an umbrella Kurdish cultural and political identity independent of political parties and nation-states. In 2004, Surinamese were the most involved in organisations with charitable activities aimed at the homeland (for Afro-Surinamese see Bijnaar 2007).

While Surinamese in the past were more involved in organisations with homeland political activities, this declined after Surinam became a post-colonial democracy in the 1990s. Turkish membership in organisations with homeland activities also declined as individuals tried to avoid Turkish politics and focused on religious activities. Surinamese and Turkish
involvement in Dutch organisations correspondingly increased while Kurdish involvement remained roughly stable.

Taken together, these results on transnational societal participation indicate that the socio-economic and political climate in the country of origin (for example, dictatorships, economic malaise, ethnic struggles and natural disasters) are decisive for participation in homeland activities and membership in ethnic organisations with homeland-directed activities. Once the situation in the homeland stabilises, a clear decline in transnational participation becomes apparent. Political opportunities in the country of origin seem especially important for groups in diaspora (Kurds) who feel excluded from political participation in the homeland. Finally, participation in Dutch civil society increases with length of stay.

**Electoral sympathies**

The previous sections examined general political interest and participation in Dutch and migrant civil society. This section more closely examines specific political interests. Did the first generation sympathise with a particular political party or movement in the country of origin while still living there? Did they continue to sympathise with this party or movement after settling in the Netherlands? Did the second and intermediate generations inherit such sympathies? If given the chance, would respondents vote in homeland and Dutch elections? Would they give advice on voting to their homeland contacts? Which Dutch and homeland parties would they have preferred?

To answer these questions, we first asked respondents about their present and past sympathies for homeland political parties and movements and if they ever attended a homeland party event in the Netherlands (see Table 2.4). We then asked how they expressed this sympathy. Following Kriesi, five types of sympathisers were distinguished: non-voters, voters, adherents, members and activists (1993: 78). Activists constitute the core and non-voters the periphery; voters are those who voted for a party in the past or who say they would vote for it if elections were presently to take place. Adherents do not just vote for a given party but are attached to it, without necessarily being members. Finally, in the innermost circle, are members who have already actively contributed to party activities – the party activists (ibid.).

Given the high scores on indicators of political interest, it is not surprising that Kurds score highest on sympathy with a political stream or party in the past and/or present. More surprising, however, was that almost half of the Surinamese sympathised with a political party in the past, but no longer did so at the time of interviewing in 2004. How can this be explained?
Nineteen Surinamese had sympathised with a homeland political party in the past. First-generation respondents mostly voted for a specific party in Surinam and attended its ‘mass meetings’ during campaigns. Visiting mass meetings, however, did not necessarily mean people were activists or adherents. Mass meetings in Surinam are social events where families and friends get together to eat, drink and have a good time; it is not uncommon to frequent the mass meetings of several parties or alliances (see also Brana-Shute 1990). Three intermediate- and two second-generation respondents had sympathised with a political party in the past because their parents or uncles were active in the party.

In the past, the most popular political parties were the traditional ones: the National Party of Surinam (NPS) and the Progressive Reform Party (VHP). Sympathy followed ethnic lines: Afro-Surinamese sympathised with the NPS and East Indians with the VHP. The nine respondents who used to vote for the VHP all said they were East Indians. Another respondent explained how ethnicity was an incentive to become a member of the NPS, not least as he hoped party membership would facilitate socio-economic mobility.

[The NPS] that’s really the party for black people and I am black, so yes, I felt and still feel committed because they are still doing very well… When I was young, I went to the NPS to become a member… it was kind of an opportunistic move, because I saw other people benefited from party membership… you see, I did sympathise with the party but the main incentive was that I hoped to obtain a scholarship for my studies… in the end it didn’t really get me anywhere, but my own strength did. (Surinamese male, first generation)
In other cases family also played an important role.

Yeah, the fact that I am an Afro-Surinamese and my uncle was active in the NPS made me sympathise with this party. (Surinamese male, second generation)

I was involved in Surinamese politics for twenty years, because my ex-husband was prime minister for the PNP. (Surinamese female, first generation)

My parents were very active in the party [NPS], so you just follow them. That is how it usually goes. (Surinamese male, first generation)

In 2004, only two persons still sympathised with homeland political parties (to keep up to date with developments in Surinam). The large majority stopped sympathising with Surinamese political parties after settling in the Netherlands, reasoning that because they now lived in the Netherlands they are ‘integrated’. None of the interviewees ever visited a meeting of a Surinamese party in the Netherlands.

Roughly half (seventeen) of the Turkish respondents had sympathised with a political party in the past. Some first-generation respondents were active in a leftwing or rightwing youth movement during the 1970s.

Before I came to the Netherlands 25 years ago, there was daily guerrilla war going on in the streets… with Dev Sol and the PKK… I wasn’t really active but I just came along with friends. You had to make a choice: left or right. I chose for the left. (Turkish male, first generation)

Another respondent recounted how the ‘guerrilla style’ was continued in the Netherlands.

In Turkey I was very active within the Grey Wolves… demonstrating, discussing…. When I arrived in the Netherlands I continued… sometimes I ended up in street fights, helping other people out. I don’t like it when ten guys fight against one, so we help that one man. We get other people and also form a group of ten… I am older now, not as active anymore, but still a Grey Wolf… I sometimes go to the Türk İslâm Vakfı [an organisation affiliated with a federation known for sympathy with the Grey Wolves]…. I just go there for fun and sometimes we discuss politics. (Turkish male, first generation)
Two interviewees’ sympathy for a homeland party continued after settlement in the Netherlands. Breaks and conflicts within parties also affected them; in the event, both chose to support a new splinter group of an older party.

I was one of the founding members of the AP [Justice Party] in 1961 […] which now has been succeeded by the DYP [True Path Party] […] my brother has a high position within the party. When I call him I always ask about the DYP and he explains what’s going on. (Turkish male, first generation)

In Turkey I helped the Refah Partisi [Welfare Party, RP] very often […] in many ways. For example, I secretly supported the people who ended up in jail because of the opinions they expressed, like women who were detained because of wearing a headscarf [in public spaces]. Now, I support the AKP [Justice and Development Party] […] because the Refah Partisi is closed and Erbakan [RP leader] is old. Besides, Erdoğan [leader of the AKP] is a pupil of Erbakan. I was very angry when Erbakan distanced himself from Erdoğan. Ever since, I have been supporting Erdoğan. (Turkish male, first generation)

In most cases, sympathy meant respondents voted for the party when they still lived in Turkey. While the Motherland Party (ANAP) was popular, many respondents explained they lost interest in the party after the death of its founding father Turgut Özal.

As in the Surinamese case, the intermediate and second generation stated they previously sympathised with a political party because their parents did.

I felt committed to the CHP [Republican People’s Party] because of my parents… especially because of my mother […]. She watched the news every morning and if something happened she started calling her friends. My parents voted for the CHP, were fanatic, but weren’t active in the party. (Turkish female, intermediate generation)

My father used to work for an office of the Demokrat Parti. At home I used to play with the cordons of the party. It wasn’t a conscious choice, but I knew I was on their side. (Turkish male, intermediate generation)

Once when I visited Turkey I went to two meetings of the ANAP during the [1999] election campaign… candidates came to visit the
people… I went there. Mainly because of my father, he was really into it. (Turkish male, second generation)

Only eight respondents still sympathised with a homeland political party in 2004. Three travelled to Turkey to vote for the AKP in the 2002 elections.

We went on a holiday with 40 people and we all voted for the AKP. We also raised and donated money for the party and assisted the AKP campaign. (Turkish male, first generation)

Another respondent ended up campaigning for the CHP in 2002, partly by chance.

In 2002, we went with a group to a concert of Alevi saz players in Istanbul […] but it was also election time and I distributed flyers for the CHP […]. I feel Turkey is going backwards because of the AKP, you know, they are very conservative Muslims. And the CHP, that’s the party of Atatürk […]. Unfortunately I couldn’t vote, because you need a permit and I didn’t apply […]. On the one hand, it didn’t really matter, but on the other hand, my whole family is there […]. (Turkish female, intermediate generation)

Four other respondents more passively sympathised with a party and followed developments from a distance. Only two people had ever visited a meeting organised by a homeland political party in the Netherlands. One respondent went to a lecture organised by the AKP; the other went to a concert of the extreme left party Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front (DHKP/C), which is illegal in Turkey.

The Kurdish case differs. Two-thirds (fourteen) of the respondents had sympathised with a political party in the past. The main difference concerned the migration motives of the first generation (or parents of the intermediate and second generations).

I was very active in the left movement [Revolutionary Road Movement, Dev Yol] in the 1970s, when the PKK was established I joined them… smuggled weapons and joined their struggle [because of these activities he was arrested at the age of sixteen]… actually I was sentenced to death, but because I was under the age of seventeen I was convicted to twenty years, after eleven years I was released. They [the Turkish intelligence service] were keeping an eye on everything I was doing, so I fled. (Kurdish male, first generation)
Like some Turkish respondents who were politically active before they migrated, several Kurdish individuals maintained their political sympathies after arriving in the Netherlands. One respondent, detained in Turkey for being active in the Kurdish socialist party PSK, continued his activities for the party in exile.

Changes in Kurdish individuals’ support for specific political groups mirrored developments in Turkey. As in the Turkish and Surinamese cases, the political activity of the direct family influenced respondents’ political engagement.

I grew up in Dersim, a very leftwing area... My parents were staunch communists and that was how I was raised... After the PKK was founded, Dersim was influenced by Kurdish nationalists. (Kurdish female, first generation)

One second-generation respondent sympathised with the PKK, as her parents had done.

My father had a high position in the Turkish Communist Party/ Marxist-Leninist [TKP/ML]. This was a Marxist-Leninist party. They campaigned for Kurdish cultural rights, language and culture [both the party and its cause were illegal in Turkey]. In the early 1980s, my parents fled to the Netherlands. Here they became very active within the PKK, we went to meetings, hunger strikes and demonstrations all the time. (Kurdish female, second generation)

But in some cases, socialisation outside the family appeared as an incentive to quit.

I used to be a communist, but maybe more because my whole environment was communist or socialist and we felt suppressed by the Turkish government [...], but when I went to school I learned other things. At a certain point, I saw communism was leading nowhere. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

In the past, Kurdish individuals sympathised with a variety of parties. Heading the list were two illegal Kurdish parties – the PSK and the PKK – as well as the legal Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) and its predecessors. Kurds also sympathised with a variety of radical left parties or movements such as Dev Yol, the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and the TKP/ML. While the PKK was previously the most popular, some respondents stopped sympathising in the mid-1990s due to disappointment with its leader.
Around 1995, I became critical. I thought: ‘This man [Öcalan] cannot lead us, this man is acting like a god, at some point this goes wrong. He turns himself into a second Stalin.’ Then I became more passive, very passive. When he surrendered in 1999 we said this is betrayal. We wanted the PKK to continue their armed struggle. (Kurdish male, first generation)

I got so tired of discussions that were leading us nowhere. I was extremely disappointed when Öcalan was arrested and apologised to the parents of the Turkish soldiers who died in fights with the PKK. I already said it before: ‘He’s nuts…’ If he had been a true martyr, he would have continued his struggle till death. (Kurdish female, intermediate generation)

Disappointment with the PKK explains why those who sympathised with a party dropped from fourteen in the past to nine at the time of interviewing. Despite criticism of its leadership, the PKK, together with DEHAP, evoked the most sympathy among respondents. Some argued that DEHAP and the PKK were one in the same. One individual who used to be a member of DEHAP elaborated.

Now I am a member of the PKK. In the Netherlands, the PKK supports the struggle in Kurdistan; in Turkey they fight against the Turkish army and protect the Kurdish people in the region…. In fact, DEHAP is the political wing of the PKK. They must be crazy to admit this, but every Kurd knows […] so, actually, I didn’t really change [political parties]. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

Only one respondent voted for DEHAP in the 2002 elections in Turkey. Another obtained a seat in the Kurdish Parliament in Exile whereby he represented the PKK. More generally, however, sympathy for Kurdish or Turkish parties was expressed through attending events organised by these parties or their representatives. These meetings are often combined with cultural activities such as festivals and concerts, with political speeches mixed in between. Apart from building solidarity, these events are important fundraisers. Sixteen respondents had visited such an event more than once, not necessarily organised by the same party; all sixteen declared they had donated money or bought a ticket – even if they did not intend to actually attend the event – in order to financially support the party.

The largest number of respondents (ten) frequented meetings organised by DEHAP.

I went to a meeting just after they changed the name from HADEP to DEHAP. I think it was to promote the new name. Later they also
organised a festival with lectures and music. (Kurdish male, first generation)

I went to election campaigns. DEHAP had a kind of solidarity tour in Europe, for example, at a festival in Germany. Back in Turkey he [DEHAP official] got arrested for this. (Kurdish female, second generation)

Often it’s not the party, but representatives of the party in the Netherlands who organise these kinds of events, because DEHAP officials have difficulties obtaining visas. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

Six respondents attended meetings of the PKK (not officially announced as were DEHAP events). Another respondent regularly attended lectures by PSK officials, while three Kurdish respondents frequented the events of the illegal radical Turkish parties Revolutionary Peoples’ Liberation Front (DHKP/C) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (DKP). These meetings regularly took place together with concerts by leftwing and/or Kurdish artists.

I often go to Kurdish parties and festivals […]. The music, the songs, it’s always about politics and always political speeches are given. You can’t separate those things […]. I also went to concerts of Dev Sol [DHKP/C] and DKP, but I really went for the artists […] and, yeah, they have a clear ideology. They are Turkish, but pro-Kurdish. That’s a good thing. (Kurdish female, second generation)

That so many Kurdish respondents had recently taken part in the meetings of Kurdish or Turkish political parties is hardly surprising; parties such as the PKK, PSK and DHKP/C are illegal in Turkey and mobilise among leftwing and/or Kurdish migrants in Europe. Parties that are legal in Turkey also organise activities in the Netherlands because they are newly founded (AKP) or have succeeded an old party under a new name (DEHAP). Surinamese parties, in contrast, do not seem to provide many opportunities for individuals living in the Netherlands to participate.

These opportunities are reflected in past and present levels of sympathy for homeland political parties. Among Surinamese, one person could be categorised as a party ‘activist’ and another as an ‘adherent’ while still living in Surinam. Seventeen fell under the category of ‘voters’. But by the time of interviewing, only two Surinamese still felt committed to a Surinamese party, and even then only passively: they followed news on party matters mainly through the media.
Among Turkish respondents, four were party ‘activists’ while still living in Turkey. Thirteen were ‘voters’ or (because they were less than eighteen years of age) committed to the party because their parents were activists or adherents. After settlement in the Netherlands – or among the second generation – four could still be categorised as ‘activists’, voting in Turkey and/or actively campaigning for the party of their choice. Four others maintained their sympathy more passively and followed party matters from a distance.

Among Kurdish respondents, I found that all persons who said they sympathised with a political party in the past were activists or adherents, having actively involved themselves in party activities. After migrating to the Netherlands, nine said they still sympathised with a party; all can be considered activists or adherents due to their active participation in all kinds of activities organised by representatives of these parties. Technically, the majority of Kurdish respondents were able to vote in Turkish elections since they have dual citizenship. But only one respondent actually travelled to Turkey to exercise his right to vote – a low figure considering the relatively high number of party activists. This can partly be explained by the fact that some first-generation respondents are political refugees and are afraid to return to Turkey. The majority of respondents also support parties that are illegal and thus do not compete in Turkish elections.

Dutch political parties

At the time of interviewing in 2004, Kurdish respondents clearly sympathised most actively with political parties. Did this also apply to Dutch politics? Compared to Turks and Surinamese, Kurds were relatively more often members of a Dutch party. Two Kurdish respondents were active members of the GroenLinks and Socialist Parties. Two Turkish respondents were likewise active members of GroenLinks. Among Surinamese, four interviewees had previously been members of a Dutch political party (GroenLinks and the social democratic PvdA). Two persons gave up their membership for financial reasons and because active politics was not to their liking. In 2004, two respondents were still members of the PvdA. One, however, added that he used to be more active in the past.

[It’s] not a party for workers anymore. That’s sad. It was a beautiful party in the era of Uncle Joop [Joop den Uyl, PvdA leader between 1967 and 1986]. He was a great guy. I get emotional when I think of it […] I used to talk to people, told them about the PvdA view and their importance for society and strongly recommended them to vote for this party. (Surinamese male, first generation)
What does sympathy for homeland parties and membership in Dutch parties mean for voting behaviour? I asked respondents whether, if possible, they would vote in homeland or Dutch elections. If they could vote in the homeland, would they advise friends and family to vote for their preferred party? The answers to these questions are summarised in Table 2.5.

The vast majority of respondents would vote in Dutch elections (if they were able to). Considering their low scores on present sympathy for homeland political parties, it is striking that Surinamese scored higher than Turks on whether they would vote in the homeland. This might be explained by the fact that Surinamese cannot have dual nationality. For them, the question was purely theoretical: thirteen of those who said they might vote in Surinamese elections said it was a stupid, unrealistic question. The majority of hypothetical homeland voters also stated that they wouldn’t know whom to vote for because they weren’t familiar with the parties.

For Turks and Kurds with dual or Turkish nationality (the majority; see Table 2.1), the question is more realistic for they can vote in Turkey. Some actually did, as seen earlier in the section on sympathies for Turkish and Kurdish parties. Nevertheless, fewer than half of the Turkish and not even a third of the Kurdish respondents indicated they would exercise their right to vote. Many said they did not want to travel all the way to Turkey to cast their ballots. Some added they might vote only if they were visiting Turkey anyway. For Kurdish interviewees who came to the Netherlands for political reasons, voting in Turkey was hard to imagine – for them, visiting Turkey remains dangerous. Two other Kurdish respondents indicated other reasons they would never vote in Turkish elections.

For one, it would clash with his Kurdish nationalist agenda. The other was rather pessimistic about voting.

In my opinion, Kurds should never enter the Turkish parliament. If we want to separate, we shouldn’t cooperate with Turks. (Kurdish male, first generation)
Absolutely not! You know, when the AKP started governing we thought Turkey would become Islamic, but no, they just do what the US tells them to do. Nothing changes anyway. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

Nevertheless, during election campaigns Kurds and Turks gave friends and family voting advice more often than Surinamese. The majority of Surinamese respondents stated that how their contacts vote in Surinam is none of their business; they would have their own opinions and would know best what to do. The same reasoning was expressed by more than half the Turkish and Kurdish respondents. The Turks who gave advice simply did so because ‘their party is best’ and they wished to reiterate this to their contacts. By contrast, some Kurdish respondents recalled how they would call their contacts— even if they already trusted they would vote for the ‘Kurdish’ DEHAP— just to be sure, as each vote counts.

If respondents had to vote for national homeland or Dutch elections, which party would they vote for? The interviewers handed respondents show cards listing the main homeland and Dutch parties and asked them to rank from 1 to 10 the probability they would vote for each particular party and why (for the theoretical foundations of political party preference see Tillie 1995). The results are reproduced in simplified form in Table 2.6.

The Dutch social democratic party PvdA was the most popular among Surinamese and Turks. Generally, both Turks and Surinamese said they liked the party’s policies on labour, health care, childcare and social equality. Turks added they found the party attractive because of its immigration policies. Among Kurds, the PvdA shared first place with the leftwing Green Left (GroenLinks) and Socialist Parties (SP). GroenLinks was popular because it was perceived to be the most ‘left’, while the SP was appreciated for its ‘disciplined’ opposition in parliament. Kurds who rated the PvdA highest stated similar reasons. Two respondents said they preferred the SP and the PvdA because they had good Kurdish and Turkish

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<th>Surinam</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
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<td>Dutch political parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest preference (8-10)</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>SP/PvdA/GL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest preference (1-3)</td>
<td>LPF</td>
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<td>Homeland political parties</td>
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<td>Highest preference (8-10)</td>
<td>VHP/NPS</td>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>DEHAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowest preference (1-3)</td>
<td>NDP/ABOP</td>
<td>DEHAP</td>
<td>MHP</td>
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<td>Don’t know the parties (average)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
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candidates. The great majority of all respondents (97 out of 101) rated the populist rightwing LPF lowest, arguing that the party is ‘racist’ and anti-foreigner. While the LPF no longer exists, in 2004 it was a significant force in Dutch politics.

As for homeland political party preference, it is telling that around a third of Surinamese respondents were unfamiliar with parties in Surinam and were thus unable to rate them (generational differences were negligible).6 In contrast, only four Turkish and one Kurdish respondent were unable to rate the parties because they did not know them.

Among Surinamese, the NPS and the VHP were the most popular parties; this was comparable to findings on past political sympathies. The majority of respondents who favoured the NPS said voting for the party was a family tradition; the majority of respondents who ranked the VHP highest explained the party represented the interests of their ethnic group (East Indians). The multi-ethnic National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Maroon General Liberation and Development Party (ABOP) were the least popular. The NDP was lowly rated because many people saw its leader Bouterse as a criminal; his performance when he ruled the country as head of the army (1980-1987) also attracted criticism. The ABOP received low ratings because people did not really know the party. Respondents also associated its leader Ronny Brunswijk with violence for his past leadership of a guerrilla army.

Among Kurds, DEHAP was popular because ‘it’s the only Kurdish party’. The level of support, however, should not be overestimated: a quarter of respondents (five) ranked DEHAP lowest. Some suggested DEHAP cooperated with Turkish parties. Others felt DEHAP was too radical and that there was no need for a separate Kurdish party. A large majority of Turkish respondents rated DEHAP lowest because they were ‘communists’, ‘violent’ and/or illegitimately wanted to divide Turkey. Most Turks preferred the AKP, in government for two years at the time of interviewing and perceived to have improved Turkey’s social and economic stability. All Kurds ranked the MHP lowest for its nationalist and ‘anti-Kurdish’ ideology.

For Dutch parties, the social democratic preferences of Turks and Surinamese in my sample corresponded with the results of the 2002 Amsterdam municipal elections, with the PvdA the most popular party among Turks and Surinamese (Michon & Tillie 2003: 6). Numbers are unfortunately unavailable for Kurdish voting behaviour. Homeland voting preferences also corresponded with election results in the last national and municipal elections in the countries of origin (in Turkey in 2002 and 2004; in Surinam in 2005). In Turkey, the AKP became the largest party after national elections in 2002, and locally after the municipal elections in 2004. While DEHAP did not gain influence nationally, it had a strong showing in the south-east, where many Kurds live (for previous elections see Güneş-Ayata & Ayata 2002; İncioğlu 2002). In Surinam, the VHP and
NPS won the elections in 2005 in the alliance Nieuw Front and entered a second term in government. These outcomes suggest that Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish party preferences reflect party preferences of the majority of voters in the homeland.

In sum, the findings on transnational electoral activities and possible voting behaviour and advice suggest that migrant sympathies with homeland political parties diminish as they settle and come to consider themselves ‘integrated’ (i.e. the Surinamese). This, however, is combined with actual opportunities to continue sympathising with homeland parties in the Netherlands. As the results have shown, Surinamese parties seem to provide no opportunities for migrants to participate, whereas Turkish parties provide some opportunities and Kurdish parties provide plenty of room for those living in the Netherlands to be actively involved in party matters. These opportunities are reflected in the types of sympathy they generate. ‘Party activists’ were found most frequently among Kurds. Voting for a homeland party is a political opportunity that can only be used by sympathisers of legal political parties who (also) maintain homeland citizenship and feel they can safely return to vote.

Whether migrants wanted to vote in homeland elections had no impact on their desire to vote in the Netherlands; the majority of respondents indicated they would vote in the next Dutch elections. The ability to vote in homeland elections bore directly on homeland party preferences. Many migrants without dual citizenship (i.e. Surinamese) were unfamiliar with homeland parties. Finally, homeland party preferences seemed to mirror homeland election results. The low scores on giving homeland voting advice imply that migrants do not influence homeland politics as much as homeland politics influence migrant politics.

From mother to daughter, father to son?

The previous section showed that kinship influenced sympathy and voting preferences for political parties while still living in the country of origin. This dovetails with Kriesi’s findings on Dutch voting behaviour, which showed that in the early 1990s political socialisation through the family remained an important determinant of voting preference. Preferences were largely transmitted from one generation to the next (Kriesi 1993: 80).

Do kinship ties also affect transnational political involvement? To answer this question, I examined the similarities and differences of transnational involvement among related respondents. As recounted previously, we asked respondents to name a relative of another generation whom I could approach for an interview. In total, we interviewed seventeen Surinamese, twelve Turkish and two Kurdish ‘pairs’. This section focuses on some current indicators: embeddedness in migrant civil society, Dutch
political party membership, sympathy for a homeland political party, participation in homeland activity and participation in homeland parties’ events in the Netherlands.

Of the 31 pairs I interviewed, only one pair (two sisters) sympathised with the same homeland party (AKP), one pair comprised members of the same Dutch political party and four pairs comprised members of the same ethnic organisation with homeland activities. Eight pairs participated in the same activity concerning a homeland goal; seven of them donated money or goods via the same organisation or liaison to victims of the 1999 earthquake in Turkey. Surinamese especially scored low in this respect. Only one pair comprised members of the same ethnic organisation with homeland activities, a very small foundation that donates money to an orphanage in Surinam. But the consistent membership by a father and son came as no surprise: the father founded the orphanage. Transnational political activities thus do not seem to be reproduced by younger generations.

In some cases, I found pairs had inherited a preference for a specific political party. One intermediate-generation Turkish woman sympathised with the CHP and explained how the preference was inherited from her parents. She actively campaigned for the CHP when in Turkey during the 2002 election campaign. Her second-generation daughter, however, did not sympathise with the party and did not accompany her on the trip. The same intermediate-generation Turkish woman sits on the board of an Alevi organisation in the Netherlands that occasionally organises activities directed at Turkey. She says she helps out with such activities three times a week. Her daughter had also become a member of the organisation, though whereas her mother stated that the organisation engaged in homeland activities, the daughter claimed it did not – probably because she herself did not participate in them. At the same time, the mother is a member of the GroenLinks. Like her own parents, who were fanatical supporters of the CHP when living in Turkey, she is, in her own words, a ‘fanatic’ of GroenLinks. Thanks to her enthusiasm, a large part of the family in the Netherlands became members of the party, including her second-generation daughter and first-generation parents.

In another case, a first-generation Turkish father used to be very active in the Welfare Party (RP); in 2004 he sympathised with its spin-off, the AKP. He even went to Turkey with 40 others to vote for the party. His intermediate-generation son, however, no longer sympathised with any Turkish political parties; when he did in the past, it was with the MHP and not his father’s party.

A politically active Kurdish couple who had fled Turkey passed their involvement in the Kurdish movement onto their two daughters, who remain very active in organisations and events. When they were young, their parents took them to dozens of demonstrations and events, mainly of the PKK. According to the daughters, their parents are no longer as active and
feel the younger generation should take over. Only in this one case was pure homeland political interest reproduced.

Parental migration motives, however, do not explain everything. One Kurdish intermediate-generation youth (not interviewed within a pair) was very active within Kurdish organisations and DEHAP, though his parents arrived in the Netherlands as labour migrants. He stated that his parents initially did not support his political path.

My parents, and actually my whole family, tried to keep me away from politics as long as possible, because they are afraid of me being arrested in Turkey for what we are doing. What we do is, of course, not illegal... But, for sure, sometimes I am afraid that if I go to Turkey they say: ‘Hey... aren’t you member of this and that organisation?’ ... It’s a risk, but I take my chances. (Kurdish male, intermediate generation)

In this case, the intermediate-generation respondent was more interested in Kurdish politics than his parents. It is not an isolated example. Van Bruinessen (2000) found that Kurds who arrived in the Netherlands as ‘Turkish’ guest workers in the 1970s – before the flourishing of the Kurdish nationalist movement – had internalised Turkey’s official doctrine that every citizen of Turkey is a Turk. Only gradually did these migrants in Europe ‘rediscover’ their Kurdish identity. This process of rediscovery – which owes much to the activities of political refugees – is ongoing. The children of immigrant workers who grew up in Europe thus tend to be much more interested in Kurdish identity and politics than their parents. ‘Labour migrant’ parents did not politicise their children; rather, many parents returned to their Kurdish roots under the influence of their children (Van Bruinessen 2000).

In sum, the data on pairs suggests that first-generation individuals who remain politically attached to the homeland are unlikely to transmit their political affiliations to their children or to other younger relatives in the Netherlands. As Van Bruinessen’s work (2000) shows, neither can parental political migration motives explain such transmission; we need to take into account the historical and political environment that provides second generations with opportunities to be or not to be transnationally active. This point is underlined by Eckstein, who argues that ‘generational experiences are not only grounded in intra-family dynamics but very much shaped by the historical context in which parents and children live’ (2002: 12 see also Manheim 1959 [1952]: 292; Butterfield 1971: 30; Stacey 1978). For Kurds, the (changing) historical context was the arrival of Kurdish nationalist exiles in the Netherlands. These exiles were part of a Kurdish movement in Turkey that gained ground after many Kurds came to the Netherlands as Turkish labour migrants. By continuing their nationalist
activities in diaspora, Kurdish refugees provided the children of labour migrants with opportunities to become involved in diaspora politics and to politicise their parents. Thus, different generations were more likely to politicise one another when diaspora politics was rife. Transnational politicisation within the same family, however, rarely occurred; I found politicisation by parents significant for the first generation prior to migration.

Opportunities in the Netherlands

The previous section showed that the historical context – or in terms of the explanatory factors outlined in the introduction, homeland political climate and migrant civil society – were more important for politicisation than family ties. The preceding sections also showed that the majority of respondents would, if they could, vote in Dutch elections. Further, it was apparent that Kurds were more interested in homeland politics and were more embedded in ethnic organisations with homeland activities than Turks and Surinamese. How do these findings relate to trust in Dutch political opportunity structures, as scholars like Koopmans et al. (2005) have argued?

To answer these questions, I examine more closely two aspects of both general and field-specific political opportunity structures in the Netherlands. The first concerns consultation of migrants regarding group-specific and general problems. The Dutch government’s creation of national advisory boards in 1985 resulted in the creation of the Consultative Council of Turks in the Netherlands (IOT) and the Consultative Council of Surinamese in the Netherlands (SIO). Made up of national Turkish and Surinamese federations (see next chapter), the IOT and the SIO represent their respective group’s ‘general interests’ regarding social development, healthcare, seniors and so on, and give both solicited and unsolicited advice. In 1998, they were brought together under the auspices of the National Consultation Minorities (LOM), instated to advise the government on integration policy (for similar advisory bodies at the local level see Vermeulen & Penninx 2000: 23-24).

With this aspect of the political opportunity structure in mind, we asked respondents whether they felt their ethnic group was sufficiently consulted regarding group-specific and general problems. The majority of Kurds (eighteen) thought Kurdish group-specific and general interests were unrepresented because Dutch institutions see them as Turks. One respondent argued that Kurds should become members of the IOT. Another rhetorically asked: ‘How could Kurdish interests be represented if I am not even able to register as a Kurd?’ Another respondent felt Kurds were not consulted because ‘institutions don’t talk with radicals’. Three individuals stated the
opposite; they felt sufficiently consulted, because in their opinion Kurds should not be consulted separately from Turks.

Around half of the Turkish respondents felt Turks were not sufficiently consulted over group-specific (22) or general (eighteen) problems. Many stated that politicians should more often visit places where Turks gather, and take their opinions more seriously. Respondents who thought their problems were sufficiently represented pointed to Turkish organisations and mosques defending their interests.

A third of Surinamese individuals did not know whether Surinamese interests were sufficiently represented. As many thought Surinamese were insufficiently consulted, but argued that Surinamese themselves were to blame. In their opinion, Surinamese are not active enough in organisations and are thus invisible to Dutch institutions. Those who thought their group was adequately consulted generally saw parliamentarians of Surinamese origin as their representatives; others pointed to the Surinamese advisory organ SIO. Thirteen (out of 40) Surinamese respondents did not know whether Surinamese were sufficiently consulted over general problems; eighteen felt that they were.

The presence or absence of parliamentarians from one’s own ethnic group seemed to significantly affect feelings of being adequately represented among some Surinamese and Kurdish individuals. How did they estimate the possibility of a member of their ethnic group being elected locally or nationally? The second aspect of the political opportunity structure under study is thus the representation of migrants in Dutch political parties. Migrants with Dutch nationality are able to vote in Dutch general and municipal elections, while migrants who lack Dutch nationality but have lived in the Netherlands for at least five years obtained in 1986 both passive and active voting rights in municipal elections. Migrants have since been represented in Dutch parties (especially leftwing ones). While Turkish and Surinamese vote for parties first, they also vote on the basis of ethnicity (Michon & Tillie 2003: 43–44).

Generally speaking, migrants in the period under study were under-represented in the cabinet, parliament, municipal councils and other political bodies (see e.g. De Beus 2002). In 2002, 113 Turkish and 36 Surinamese city councillors were elected (IPP 2006: 3), while the number of Turkish city councillors who identify as Kurdish remains unknown. In 2003, four members of parliament were of Surinamese ancestry while three had Turkish backgrounds. In 2003, twelve members of the provincial executive board were of Turkish ancestry while ten members had Surinamese backgrounds. These numbers seem to suggest that Turks are better represented than Surinamese in local and national politics, though this is not the case for other political positions. Functions like minister, state secretary, mayor and alderman have been filled by individuals of Surinamese background, not Turk, at the time of research.
With these numbers in mind, we asked respondents to indicate which candidate of a certain ethnicity had the highest and lowest chances of being elected in local and national elections. Did estimates differ between the groups? And why? I posed this question as I felt it would be more fruitful to focus on differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in order to reveal group self-image (for similar questions on the self-image of migrant politicians see Cadat & Fennema 1996). We asked our respondents the following question: There are four persons with different ethnicities. Could you rate on a scale from 1-10 who, in your opinion, has the highest chance of becoming a municipal councillor or a member of parliament?

All respondents thought that ethnic Dutch have the highest chance of obtaining a seat in the municipal council or parliament. Surinamese graded their own group the highest (after the Dutch), arguing that they are more ‘Dutch’, have more political experience and are generally more accepted. In contrast, they rated Turks and Kurds low, because in their view they speak Dutch rather poorly. Kurds rated Turks higher than Kurds because, as they argued, Turks are more numerous, have their own country and are more politically active. Finally, Turks argued that they have a higher chance than Kurds because Kurds have a negative image, are associated with the PKK, do not have a homeland and are small in number.

Kurds thus felt least represented in, and most excluded from, the Dutch political arena. At the same time, they are the most active politically, interested in both Dutch and homeland politics. This suggests that homeland political activity does not preclude political participation in the Netherlands, but may actually reinforce it. Surinamese are politically and socially more active in the Netherlands than Turks, but have little interest in homeland politics — they seem ‘politically assimilated’ in the Netherlands. Turks are positioned between the two other groups. While they were more active in ethnic organisations with homeland activities in the past, Turks today are more often members of Turkish organisations — such as mosque organisations — that focus on activities in the Netherlands. Their interests have gradually shifted from the homeland to strengthening their own Turkish identity in the Netherlands.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined individual interest and involvement in national and transnational politics. Of the three groups, Kurds were the most interested in homeland politics and Surinamese, the least. Interest thus seemed to be reinforced by the availability of political opportunities in the country of origin and in diaspora. Participation in homeland-directed activities was largely determined by homeland political developments (or natural disasters); involvement in homeland politics for all groups waned as the sense
of urgency passed. I further saw that transnational political involvement was unlikely to be passed on from the first to the intermediate or second generations; in the Kurdish case, the contemporary context – in this case, the influx of political refugees – had a greater effect on group politicisation. Under these conditions, intermediate and second generations influenced the transnational behaviour of the first generation.

The degree to which respondents felt included or excluded by Dutch migrant politics corresponded with the ethnic group’s participation in formal structures and visibility in elected office. Surinamese generally felt more included than Turks, though not regarding group-specific issues. Kurds felt excluded on most levels because they are not recognised and represented as Kurds.

So far, I can state that Kurds are most involved in transnational activities and Surinamese the least. This can partly be explained by the selection bias of highly educated and politically engaged respondents in my Kurdish sample. The analysis nevertheless revealed the importance of homeland opportunities for transnational involvement. I can conclude that at the individual level, transnational political activities and ties are most likely to develop when an individual’s migrant group:

- is excluded from homeland politics or does not have a homeland;
- has a high percentage of migrants with political migration motives;
- arrived relatively recently, thus containing a large first generation;
- is highly politicised, with politics being a part of daily cultural and social life;
- has a highly developed civil society;
- maintains a strong ethnic identity that forms the basis of nationalism;
- feels politically excluded or insufficiently represented in the country of settlement.

Additionally, I found that Kurds were more involved and interested in Dutch politics than Turks, but less so than Surinamese. This means that intense homeland activity and social and political interest and participation in the country of settlement are not mutually exclusive – they can easily go together (though of course they do not have to, as seen in the almost politically assimilated Surinamese). Political engagement with the country of origin seems to positively affect political interest in the country of settlement. What matters is that one is politically engaged at all.
3 Migrant organisations and transnational politics

Previous studies on migrant organisations in the Netherlands have focused on whether they help migrants integrate into Dutch society. No systematic research, however, has been done on their ties to homeland organisations or states. This chapter aims to fill this gap. It analyses the transnational ties of Surinamese and Turkish (including Kurdish) organisational networks in the Netherlands over the periods 2001-2005 and 1999-2005, respectively, and the activities channelled through these ties. It further examines how migrant civil societies and political opportunity structures in both home and host countries – as well as diplomatic relations between them – influenced these ties.

Fennema and Tillie (1999) have argued that strong and dense organisational networks foster migrant political participation in countries of residence. This chapter asks how the strength and density of organisational networks influence transnational political participation. Are some migrant groups weakly organised because they direct their efforts at maintaining ties with the homeland? Or do strong organisational networks in the country of residence facilitate both transnational and domestic political participation?

To answer these questions, I begin with the findings of an analysis of migrant networks conducted by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Van Heelsum et al. 1999; Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002). I then turn to the transnational ties and activities of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in the Netherlands.

Civil society, networks and political participation

Inspired by Putnam (1993), Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) claim that when migrant organisations are in greater contact with each other, social trust spreads within the migrant group. This results in a community with more collective social capital – an organisational network made up of trust relations. For migrants in Amsterdam, Fennema, Tillie, Van Heelsum, Berger and Wolff (2000) postulate that networks based on interlocking directorates increase the exchange of information while limiting free riding.
Their studies found Amsterdam’s Turks – who have a higher turnout rate in municipal elections and more elected city councillors – to be organised in denser networks than Surinamese (the pattern holds nationally as well). Stronger networks create more social trust and social capital; social trust and willingness to cooperate increase political participation (Fennema et al. 2000: 15-16).

There is a significant difference in municipal election turnout between Surinamese and Turkish voters.¹ Table 3.1 shows the figures for Turks and Surinamese in five Dutch cities in 1998 and in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 2002.² Compared to Surinamese, Turks voted more often for candidates of their own ethnic origin (Fennema et al. 2000). This may partly explain why more municipal councillors of Turkish origin were elected (see Table 3.2). Turkish candidates also campaigned more within their own ethnic group, making them more attractive to Dutch political parties trying to broaden their electoral appeal. The majority of those elected as municipal councillors in the large cities were active within migrant organisations; some were approached by political parties on this basis. In the four large Dutch cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – half of the municipal councillors were elected through preferential votes; a quarter believed these were cast by members of their own migrant group (Van Heelsum 2002: 189).

Fennema and Tillie (1999) measure the amount of social capital available to migrant groups by: 1) the number of organisations, 2) the density of organisations and 3) the percentage of isolated organisations in the network. These same factors were the focus of the IMES fieldwork on Turkish and Surinamese organisations conducted, respectively, in 1998-1999 and 2001. The IMES study found 1,125 organisations among Turks

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<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Voting % of Surinamese/Antilleans and Turks in municipal elections</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese/Antilleans</td>
<td>21 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>39 30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Rooduijn and Dekker (2004: 15); Michon and Tillie (2003: 4)

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<th>Table 3.2</th>
<th>Number of Surinamese and Turkish municipal councillors, 1998 and 2002</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rooduijn and Dekker (2004: 15)
(including Kurds) and 882 organisations among Surinamese. As these numbers are fluid, the findings need to be interpreted in the year of study (1999 for Turks and 2001 for Surinamese). Table 3.3 presents the number of organisations in the Netherlands and their density (organisations per member).

The IMES network analyses were based on the interlocking directorates of organisations. This meant organisations were connected when one person sat on the administrative boards of two or more organisations. Data (names of the organisations, their addresses and the names of their board members) were acquired from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. This information was available for 80 per cent of Surinamese organisations and 69 per cent of Turkish organisations; the remainder were not included in the analysis.

Table 3.4 presents the results of the IMES network analysis. The second column shows the number and percentage of isolated organisations (those not connected with other organisations). The third column represents organisations tied to at least one other organisation; this is defined as a cluster. The fourth column indicates the number of organisations in the largest cluster while the fifth shows the number of clusters found.

There was an important qualitative difference between the largest Turkish and Surinamese clusters. While the IMES study reflected the ethnic, religious and ideological diversity of both groups, one ethnic group (East Indians) dominated the largest Surinamese cluster; in the largest Turkish cluster, all large streams were represented. The Turkish network was thus more diverse, with social capital extending to more people.

### Table 3.3 Number and density of Surinamese and Turkish organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Density (b/a x 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese (2001)</td>
<td>308,824</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks (1999)</td>
<td>299,662</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: statline.cbs.nl; Van Heelsum et al. (1999: 11); Van Heelsum and Voorthuysen (2002: 7)

### Table 3.4 Isolated and connected Surinamese and Turkish organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Isolated</th>
<th>Number connected in clusters &gt; 2 organisations</th>
<th>Number in the largest cluster</th>
<th>Number of clusters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese (N=710)</td>
<td>374 (53%)</td>
<td>336 (47%)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish (N=773)</td>
<td>374 (48%)</td>
<td>399 (52%)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Van Heelsum et al. (1999: 22); Van Heelsum and Voorthuysen (2002: 24)
outside any one ethnic, religious or ideological group. To sum up, the argument is that Turks are quantitatively and qualitatively better organised than Surinamese, which positively affects Turkish participation in Dutch politics. The question is what this means for Surinamese and Turkish transnational participation.

The conclusions drawn by IMES researchers in their study of Turkish and Surinamese networks form the starting point of this study. This chapter first provides a general picture of the transnational ties of those migrant organisations central within the IMES network – those with the most interlocking directorates and assumed to have the most contacts (Van Heelsum et al. 1999). The aim is to find all transnationally active organisations, not only the politically active ones. Most importantly, by focusing on the entire organisational network, this chapter shows which organisations are not transnationally active. It thus addresses one of the main criticisms of research on migrant transnationalism: reliance on single case studies that, due to their design, find high levels of transnational involvement. In the words of Portes et al. (2002), they ‘sample on the dependent variable’.

Many organisations that I later found to maintain transnational ties were not included in the IMES study. In large part this was due to dynamism within the migrant organisational landscape. Since the collection of data, boards of directors have changed, organisations have dissolved and new ones have been created. Some organisations were not included because essential data was missing or because they were not registered with the Chamber of Commerce. As noted earlier, the IMES network was constructed exclusively using interlocking directorates; there are, however, good reasons to include other types of ties. Membership in federations or umbrella associations – or structural cooperation within, for example, joint projects – may provide organisations with as many, if not more, ties than interlocking directorates. It further appeared that the number of transnational interlocking directorates was negligible. Administrative boards are seldom transnational in the sense that people from both the Netherlands and Surinam or Turkey are represented. Thus, additional research was needed to provide a more updated picture of the IMES network (see Figures 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5). More importantly, including these other kinds of ties allows us to see which types of ties between which types of organisations channel transnational political activity.

The new national and transnational ties I found were based on structural or sporadic cooperation, advice, memberships (among organisations and individuals) and kinship. (While ties with homeland political parties are included in the network drawings, these are discussed separately in chapters 4, 5 and 6). During the interviews I asked interviewees to provide me with the contact details of homeland organisations they maintain ties with. Out of this sample, I selected persons to interview. All contacts – including
those not interviewed – were entered into a database, which allowed me to update and ‘transnationalise’ the original IMES network. In the end, the database comprised 329 Surinamese and 416 Turkish/Kurdish names, most of which represent one or more organisations.

Despite the advantages of including the new material, limits remain. While I managed to check most of the central organisations from the IMES study to see if ties remained current, I could not trace them for the whole network. Thus, it remains plausible that interlocking directorates that no longer existed in 2005 were included. Furthermore, any mistakes made in the IMES research (see appendix in Van Heelsum et al. 1999) were automatically transferred to my network. Finally, the qualitative research is not representative; there may be many more transnational ties than I found. My findings therefore do not permit speaking of a transnational network. They do, however, provide a snapshot of the transnational ties of migrant organisational networks – and insight into the structure of Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish transnationalism in the Netherlands.

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the types of organisations included in my analysis. The first column establishes the type of organisation. The second and third columns indicate the number of organisations included in the IMES sample and the number of organisations I included from this sample in my analysis. The fourth and fifth columns show the number of migrant and homeland organisations I added to the sample.

By including ties other than interlocking directorates, the largest Surinamese cluster becomes much more diverse. Whereas the IMES network consisted predominantly of East Indian Hindu organisations, the network now also includes general Surinamese, Maroon, Javanese, a Chinese and an Amer-Indian organisation. Many relevant organisations were founded after 2001 when the IMES data collection was finished. The dynamism of the Surinamese organisational landscape in the Netherlands is breathtaking: there are almost no transnational ties between organisations over five years old.

Table 3.5 shows how I included 25 Surinamese organisations from the IMES sample, 73 newly found migrant organisations and 52 organisations located in Surinam. This brings the total to 150 organisations in one cluster (see Figure 3.1). As Table 3.6 shows, fewer Turkish organisations were included. The main explanation for this difference is that many Turkish organisations are federations that unite dozens of organisations. The majority of Surinamese organisations in contrast are single operations and are often very small.

For Turkish/Kurdish organisations, I included eighteen from the IMES sample and added 41 new migrant organisations, as well as 32 organisations or institutions located in Turkey. This brings the number of organisations included in the analysis to 91, connected in six clusters. The two
largest clusters consist of 64 and fifteen organisations (Figures 3.3 and 3.5), while four smaller clusters consist of two to six organisations.

The following sections present two versions of each network figure. The first versions (Figures 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5) present all national and transnational ties; the second versions (Figures 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6) show only the transnational ties (between organisations in the Netherlands and the homeland, as well as in third countries and excluding political parties). In the figures a distinction is made between organisations located in the Netherlands and in the homeland. I have also distinguished between highly institutionalised and lowly institutionalised ties. Highly institutionalised ties are those based on formal agreements and structural contact (interlocking directorates, organisations’ or board members’ memberships, structural cooperation). Lowly institutionalised ties are either highly informal or imply less structured contact (through kinship, sporadic cooperation, advice) (see Table 1.3). Finally, a distinction is made between migrant organisations/
NGOs and political parties. How homeland political parties are embedded (or not) in the migrant organisational network is discussed in the remaining empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 (see Figures 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2).

**Surinamese organisational networks in the Netherlands**

The complex Surinamese network consists of many small organisations, often focusing on one ethnic group and a specific religious denomination. For example, the umbrella organ of East Indian Ahmadi Muslims maintains highly institutionalised ties with Ahmadi groups in Pakistan (Lahore) and lowly institutionalised ties with the Ahmadi Muslim organisation SIV in Surinam (SIV 1983, 1988). Though these organisations and ties appear in the network Figures 3.1 and 3.2, they are not discussed further: the number of Ahmadis in both the Netherlands and Surinam is tiny, while their organisational ties do not facilitate transnational political activities relevant to either country.3 This also applies to Afro-Surinamese organisations based on shared African roots, Afro-Surinamese Pentecostal and Moravian churches, Afro-Surinamese winti organisations and the organisations of East Indian Sunnis, several East Indian Hindu denominations, Javanese Sunnis, Javanese Christians, Chinese and Amer-Indians. As previously noted, this section only examines the transnational ties of the most important organisations that represent the larger ethnic or religious groups.

Figure 3.1 shows that these different ethnic and religious organisations form sub-clusters. Javanese are clustered on the bottom left around the Committee for the Commemoration of Javanese Immigration (CHJI) and the foundation Setasan. Just above this, the Maroon sub-cluster is centred around the foundation Sabana Peti (Sabana); on its right is an Afro-Surinamese cluster centred around the Global African Congress (GAC). East Indian Hindu youth organisations are densely connected in the middle around the Hindu Student Forum in the Netherlands (HFSN). This sub-cluster is surrounded by three central East Indian Hindu organisations (OHM, SHON and HRN). Holding the national network together are organisations geared for all Surinamese, such as the National Committee (NC30) and SIO, as well as branches of Surinamese political parties in the Netherlands.

Removing from Figure 3.1 all national ties and transnational ties with political parties yields Figure 3.2. It shows that – apart from those ties with state actors that are discussed in the text below but not portrayed in the figures – the majority of transnational ties are ethnically or both ethnically and religiously defined. This is especially true for Hindus (Seva, Agni), East Indian Muslims (ULAMON), East Indian Surinamese (HVR, Radio VAHON, VVN), Afro-Surinamese (GAC), Maroons (Cottica, Sabana, Woko, R-Kabiten), Javanese (RBU, CHJI, BJSA, Setasan, SVVM) and the Moravian Church (ZZG). The only migrant organisations that do not
Figure 3.1  National and transnational ties of Surinamese organisations
Figure 3.2 Transnational ties of Surinamese organisations

Square: Political party
Circle: Migrant organisation/NGO
Black: Surinam
Grey: The Netherlands
—: Highly institutionalised
—: Lowly institutionalised
maintain ethnically or religiously defined transnational ties are those around the interest organisation VVR and the development organisation CSO. Thus, transnational ties between migrant organisations and NGOs in Surinam are less diverse than ties within the Netherlands.

**Transnational ties of central organisations in the IMES network**

In the Surinamese IMES organisational network, three East Indian Hindu organisations are central (meaning they maintain the most interlocking directorates). The Organisation for Hindu Media (OHM) and the Foundation for Hindu Education (SHON) maintain interlocking directorates with 22 and twenty organisations, respectively. The third is the Hindu Council in the Netherlands (HRN) and the organisations attached to it.

These organisations clearly reflect Dutch political opportunities. Within the Dutch system of pillarisation – which provides opportunities to specific religious groups – Hindus in the Netherlands have created their own government-supported schools and media. Three Hindu elementary schools are united under the SHON umbrella (Bloemberg & Nijhuis 1993). Even more interesting in light of Dutch political opportunities is the HRN, established under government pressure in 2001. The government had already requested such a representative organ in 1987 so it could subsidise one umbrella organisation instead of projects by several Hindu denominations. Conflicts over the distribution of seats, however, saw negotiations between the different streams stretch over fourteen years. HRN unites nine organisations covering the most important Hindu streams: Sanatanis (including its splinters), the Aryas, Hare Krishna and Sai Baba (Bakker 2003: 99). Dutch political opportunities thus had an enormous influence on the establishment of the central Surinamese organisations. What does this imply for their transnational ties?

OHM, in particular, presents itself as East Indian-Surinamese by regularly broadcasting programmes in the Surinamese East Indian language Sarnami (Marhé 2003) and through its systematic coverage of Surinamese news. During the 2005 elections, the OHM made two radio documentaries on racial structures in Surinamese politics (OHM 2005). OHM also has its own reporter in India who produces a programme on spiritual life (OHM 2006). Though it targets the East Indian-Surinamese Hindu population in the Netherlands, transnational ties with India are more institutionalised than those with Surinam.

The SHON’s transnational orientation likewise focuses on India, though most children attending a SHON elementary school have parents born in Surinam. Books from India are used for Sanatani religious education and Hindu classes (Bloemberg & Nijhuis 1993), while Hindi is provided as an extra language to give children access to cultural, spiritual and scientific sources in India (SHON 2003). Sarnami is not taught because there are no
books available (Bloemberg & Nijhuis 1993) and, more importantly, because of its low status (Marhé 2003). The school occasionally organises fundraising activities for natural disasters in India (SHON 2003).

HRN does not organise activities aimed at Surinam or India; nor does it maintain transnational organisational ties. There are, however, ties between the HRN chairman and Surinamese Hindu organisations; the latter invited him to lecture on the HRN in Surinam as they wanted to create a similar body to communicate with the government.5

Sanatan is the largest Hindu stream within the central organisations OHM, HRN and SHON. As various Sanatani federations existed alongside each other until they were taken under the HRN umbrella in 2001, it is impossible to give a singular view of the transnational ties of all Sanatan organisations in the Netherlands. But looking at the broader picture, it appears they are losing their ties with Surinam and focusing more on India. One local organisation in Amsterdam maintains sporadic contact with local Sanatani organisations in Surinam by sending books. But contacts with similar non-Surinamese East Indian organisations in other European countries are stronger. The chairman and pundits frequently visit India to study and buy books (Van Heelsum 2004: 19).

Whereas the Netherlands has never seen a strong national Sanatani federation, an umbrella organisation – the Sanatan Dharm Mahasabha – has existed in Surinam since 1929. According to its chairman, it had 150,000 members in 2005. When the first Sanatani organisations in the Netherlands were founded, they maintained contacts with Surinam. The chairman of the Sanatan in Surinam opened one of the first Sanatani organisations in the Netherlands, being in Utrecht in 1975. Initially, the two organisations maintained contact, but this faded over time. According to the chairman in Surinam, the Dutch Sanatani organisations do not feel attached to Surinam because ‘it’s all about the money’:

[…] they received money from the Dutch state to create their own organisations very easily. They came here to ask me for papers to prove that they were spiritual leaders, so they could get money […]. They only create Sanatani organisations for nostalgic reasons… when we celebrated our 75-year existence [in 2004] none of the Dutch organisations sent an official delegation […].6

The Sanatan Dharm Mahasabha in Surinam does not maintain institutionalised ties with organisations in the Netherlands. Transnational kinship ties, however, exist (see Figure 3.2). Both the chairman and the secretary of the Sanatan Dharm Mahasabha in Surinam have relatives active in East Indian civil society in the Netherlands, including the HRN chairman who visits them frequently. Occasionally, the Surinamese chairman visits his children in the Netherlands; on these visits he gives radio speeches to Surinamese
East Indians. Members’ kinship ties have a great impact on the organisation’s work in Surinam:

…for example, traditionally when somebody dies we hold a ceremony after two weeks, six months and a year. Then the mourning is over. Now everything has to be done in two weeks, because the funeral is completely paid by the family in the Netherlands who come over for the ceremony only once […] as such they fundamentally change our religious work here.7

The transnational ties of the central organisations SHON, OHM and HRN are culturally and religiously more focused on India than on Surinam. The fact that these three organisations were created in response to Dutch political opportunities probably explains why they do not maintain institutionalised ties with actors in Surinam and do not develop structured transnational activities. Instead, they focus on the religious lives of East Indian-Surinamese in the Netherlands. Transnational ties, however, are very much present at the kinship level. These ties mainly facilitate transplanted immigrant activities by influencing religious practices in Surinam. The next sections investigate the transnational orientations of Surinamese organisations that are less central or absent in the IMES network.

Surinamese student organisations

Surinamese student organisations in the 1950s and 1960s were the first collective transnational actors. Only one of these organisations (Redi Doti in Wageningen) still existed in 2005 though it no longer played a central role. In 2005, the most important student organisations were the Hindu Students Forum in the Netherlands (HSFN), Studiname in Rotterdam, the Surinamese Student Association in Amsterdam (VSSA) and WegWijz in Delft. VSSA and Studiname were founded in the mid-1980s and Wegwijz and HFSN in early 2000. These three student organisations are not connected to each other but all cooperate with the National Committee for the Commemoration of 30 years of Independence for the Republic of Surinam. Figure 3.1 shows how the HFSN is the most embedded within the national network of Surinamese organisations, including ties with the central organisations HRN and OHM.

The student organisations Studiname and WegWijz, especially, organise transnational activities focused on Surinam. In the 1990s, Studiname arranged numerous conferences on Surinamese development (Studiname 1989; Progress 1990; Studiname 1991). Today it financially supports charity projects in Surinam through the association Tamara and exchanges information with the Surinamese university ADEK (Runs & Verrest 2000: 50-52). WegWijz’s target group consists of first-generation Surinamese
students in the Netherlands; it helps them find their way in Dutch society. The association also arranges information days at high schools in Surinam, informing young Surinamese about the pros and cons of studying in the Netherlands (*De Ware Tijd* 2005c). In the Netherlands, WegWijz organises activities geared to integration as well as a smooth return to Surinam.\(^8\)

HSFN and VSSA target Dutch students of East Indian-Surinamese and Surinamese descent, respectively. Ties with Surinam are largely lacking. HFSN prefers to focus on the Indian community around the globe; according to its chairman, East Indian youths in the Netherlands have stronger ties with India than with Surinam: ‘Although they don’t have relatives there, it’s because of the films, you know. If you look at the roots, you always refer to India.’\(^9\) HSFN fundraises for projects in India, but this seldom leads to structural ties with counterparts in India.\(^10\) As their activities revolve around ethnicity, ties with organisations in Surinam are weak; they instead maintain contact with non-Surinamese Indian organisations, mainly in the UK. Such ethnic transnational ties are not included in the network as they do not facilitate Surinamese transnational politics.

Whether or not student organisations develop transnational activities and maintain ties with Surinam thus depends on the target group. Student organisations that primarily target Surinamese students aiming to return after graduation are more active in and towards Surinam than those organisations that focus primarily on students with Surinamese roots. For second-generation East Indian-Surinamese, Hinduism is a stronger basis for maintaining transnational ties than their Surinamese backgrounds.

When comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.2, one sees that the transnational activities of student organisations often take place in the absence of institutionalised transnational ties. Their transnational activities take place in the Netherlands and only rarely include the direct involvement of actors based in Surinam. They seem to use the transnational ties of other migrant organisations to facilitate their transnational activities.

*East Indian grassroots politics and homeland-directed activities among the first generation*

East Indian organisations that do not focus on religion maintain stronger ties with Surinam than East Indian religious or youth organisations. Radio VAHON, directed by a first-generation East Indian, sees it as its duty to critically follow Surinamese politics:

> Almost every month Surinamese politicians visit the Netherlands, so we invite them in the studio. We pose tough questions and criticise their policies, also the Vice President [Sardjoe of the VHP] […] he was not able to finish the interview […] they may not like this, but we have this duty as journalists.\(^11\)
Radio VAHON sporadically cooperates with two radio stations in Surinam. During the 2005 elections I met the VAHON radio director in Paramaribo, where he was reporting on the campaigns.  

First-generation East Indian organisations maintain stronger ties with Surinam than organisations for the second generation. This was evident in the two migrant associations I encountered during my fieldwork in Surinam: Friends of Nickerie (VVN) and Hindu Women Rotterdam (HVR). Both VVN and HVR have established sister organisations in Surinam. As Figure 3.1 shows, both maintain institutionalised ties with East Indian Hindu organisations in the Netherlands.

The VVN was founded in the Netherlands and Nickerie, a district in Surinam, in 2002 to support the inhabitants of Nickerie district, which has a large East Indian population (KKF 2004). VVN organises fundraising activities in the Netherlands, mainly to support schools. VVN also maintains ties with the commissioner of Nickerie, a board member of VVN’s sister organisation in Surinam. HVR was established in 1997 and is involved in numerous activities including training to encourage the participation of Hindu women in the Netherlands. It also runs exchange projects with women’s groups in India and Surinam. In 2001, HVR established its counterpart in Surinam, the Sita Foundation, directed by the HVR chairwoman’s niece and sister: ‘Money is involved in our projects, so you need trustworthy people in charge, whom you know well.’ Together they campaign for women’s emancipation in Surinam while HVR supports Sita by transmitting organisational skills. HVR also supports schools of the Sanatan Dharm in Surinam; its projects in the homeland are subsidised by the Municipality of Rotterdam’s ‘Countries of Origin’ programme (HVR 2005). HVR is also a member of the Dutch development organisation Seva Network (founded in 2003), uniting nineteen Hindu organisations. Forty per cent of its projects take place in Surinam while others take place in countries with Hindu populations including India, Guyana, Bangladesh and Nepal (Cordaid 2003). The focus on Surinam is partly due to former president of Surinam Ramsewak Shankar being one of its main advisors.

VVN and HVR’s transnational ties are highly institutionalised: they connect a mother organisation in the Netherlands and a branch in Surinam (see Figure 3.2). The transnational ties of the three East Indian first-generation organisations – VAHON, VVN and HVR – facilitate homeland-directed political activities by supporting specific groups (women and inhabitants of Nickerie) or by criticising political leaders. HVR’s activities also contain a transplanted immigrant politics component as the organisation transmits skills acquired in the Netherlands to Surinam. VVN’s activities are locally specific as they only target the district of Nickerie. The three organisations are highly embedded in the national organisational network (see Figure 3.1).
Local governments

Municipal involvement in transnational activities has gained ground over the past decade with the launching of several initiatives to improve cooperation between Dutch municipalities and the Republic of Surinam. The Surinam Platform (SP) was established by the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) in 2001 to coordinate initiatives towards Surinam and to improve cooperation between local governments (Suriname Platform 2003). The municipality of Amsterdam supports projects run by Brasa in Amsterdam and its sister organisation Sekrapatu in Surinam. Brasa and Sekrapatu were founded in 2000 by a Surinamese-Dutch architect, with a focus on social housing in the Surinamese capital Paramaribo (Het Parool 2003a).17

The municipality of The Hague supports the wish of many Surinamese in the Netherlands to contribute to development in Surinam. Towards this end, The Hague and the Surinamese Republic signed the SSDH agreement in 2002 to improve relations and information exchange between residents of The Hague and the former colony. To achieve these goals, SSDH created the project group known as ‘Promotion of Surinamese Districts in The Hague’ (SDD). The launch of SSDH and SDD were fostered by the initiatives of a municipal council member and a municipal employee, both of Surinamese origin.

The SDD’s mission is to introduce social organisations from the Surinamese districts to relevant Dutch organisations and institutions. In this way, SSD hopes to empower communities in the interior of Surinam and make them less dependent on the central government. In addition to the Republic of Surinam and the Municipality of The Hague, other partners within SDD include the Municipalities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the return migration fund for Surinamese elderly FARU and the National Committee for the Commemoration of 30 Years of Surinamese Independence. All are represented on the administrative board – SDD is thus one of the few organisations with a transnational board.18

The Surinam Platform, SDD and SSDH are local state actors; their ties with local state actors in Surinam thus do not comprise transnational but, rather, diplomatic relations, and do not appear in Figure 3.2. These ties were created by Surinamese elites in the Netherlands, including local politicians, civil servants and organisational leaders. This explains why the Surinam Platform, SDD and SSDH have ties to a variety of Surinamese migrant organisations, regardless of their ethnic target group (see Figure 3.1). The Dutch municipalities’ projects encourage different types of locally specific transnational activity.
Relations between Surinamese-Dutch organisations and the Surinamese state

While return migrant organisations aiming to expand political opportunities for Surinamese-Dutch in Surinam have been trying to establish ties with Surinamese state actors, relations remain delicate.

The National Committee for the Commemoration of 30 Years of Surinamese Independence (hereafter referred to as the National Committee) was founded in 2005 in response to Surinamese Minister of Regional Development Romeo van Russel’s statement that his government does not reject input from Surinamese living in the Netherlands. On the contrary, the minister claimed, Surinam is wide open to those who want to contribute without an ‘arrogant’ attitude. The National Committee was launched shortly thereafter, to improve Surinam’s international image and to contribute to its development.

Figure 3.1 shows how the National Committee (NC30) is connected with a variety of Surinamese organisations through the composition of its administrative and advisory boards and the many migrant organisations it cooperates with. Interlocking directorates also exist with the Dutch green party GroenLinks and the Dutch Ministry of Integration Affairs and Justice. The committee is thus highly embedded, both in the Dutch political system and migrant civil society. Figure 3.2 does not show the transnational ties of the National Committee because these are mainly with state actors, which, for the sake of clarity, are left out of the drawing.

The committee claims in its mission statement that it:

does not pretend to be superior […] The National Committee realises that Surinamese in Surinam are very capable of rebuilding their own country… the committee aims to support, to help and to participate and to invest in long-term development.

(Nationaal Comité 30 Jaar Staatkundige Onafhankelijkheid van de Republiek Suriname 2005a: 5-6)

To avoid charges of arrogance, the National Committee consults numerous parties when organising homeland-directed and transplanted immigrant politics, including Surinamese diplomatic staff in the Netherlands and Belgium, government partners and representatives of Surinamese abroad (Nationaal Comité 30 Jaar Staatkundige Onafhankelijkheid van de Republiek Suriname 2005b).

Surinamese government officials nevertheless continue to emphasise the right ‘attitude’ Surinamese in the Netherlands must show if they want to be involved. This was re-emphasised by the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation Rick Van Ravenswaay at a conference organised by the committee.
Because of your stay in the Netherlands, Surinam lost a part of its human capital… as a consequence there is a brain drain in Surinam […]. Surinamese are proud people, especially the ones who stayed behind. The people who left for the Netherlands now claim the same rights as the ones who stayed. This is not always appreciated in Surinam… [it] irritates us. All Surinamese are one, but special treatment is very difficult. Arrogance is no condition for return migration […]. Holidays are often the incentive to return permanently, but returnees have a major setback when they try to settle in Surinam […] they return to living conditions that also apply to the rest of the population […]. We argue that we could all use you in a way that is fruitful for both of us. We need to establish a new relation, which is less emotional […]. It should be a win-win situation for a collective cause […] we have demand for highly skilled people, but this does not imply return migration. There are many other ways to shape your strong bonds with Surinam. You could offer money or labour, think about virtual coaching via the Internet. Use a part of your holiday to transmit knowledge. You could use your political position in the Netherlands to keep Surinam high on the Dutch political agenda.19

Critical reactions came from the audience of Surinamese elites in the Netherlands – organisation representatives, public opinion leaders, branch chairmen of Surinamese political parties and employees of Dutch municipalities and ministries. A heated discussion followed. Some argued Surinam should again become part of the Netherlands, its independence being a farce. Others were angry with the way the minister distinguished between Surinamese ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘us’ and ‘them’. But the minister kept to his message: don’t come back all at once, the Surinamese Republic cannot accommodate large numbers of returnees. Returnees should not take jobs from graduates of the Surinamese university. Don’t act as though you know it all; don’t expect special treatment. Don’t ask for dual nationality as this increases the inequality between Surinamese nationals and return migrants.20

The above snapshot illustrates the tense relationship between Surinam state representatives and the Surinamese migrant elite in the Netherlands. Apparent is the former’s irritation with return migrants and the care and diplomacy the latter must employ if their transnational activities are to be successful. One also witnesses Surinamese emigrants’ frustration over not being seen as Surinamese but as ‘Dutchified’ or ‘Blaka Bakras’ (‘black Dutch’). Heated discussions such as the one above are commonplace (see also KROSBE 2000).21

Many Surinamese in the Netherlands nevertheless want to contribute to development in Surinam. The International Organisation for Social
Development (SIOSD) in 2002 invited Surinamese government representatives, NGOs and trade unions to discuss the possibilities for filling the ‘cadre shortage’ in Surinam with migrants from the Netherlands (Campbell & Derveld 2002). Two years later, the Centre for Surinamese Development Issues (CSO) hosted a conference to explore possibilities for dual citizenship. Again the aim was to broaden opportunities for Surinamese with Dutch passports to contribute to development in Surinam. One of the CSO recommendations to the Surinamese government was to implement special regulations to facilitate the social, economic and cultural participation of Surinamese-Dutch. More concretely, it requested an inventory of government functions for which Surinamese nationality was not required (CSO 2004).22

The organisations Shiva, the Association of Travellers (VVR) and B-Surned likewise lobby on behalf of Surinamese with Dutch passports; their activities are directed at institutions and governments in both Surinam and the Netherlands.23 VVR and Shiva argue that both governments violate the rights of Surinamese-Dutch by not following the 1975 agreement on nationality legislation – the toescheidingsovereenkomst – which states Surinamese-Dutch should have the same rights as Surinamese, including the right to enter Surinam without a visa. The organisations also find the shortening of Dutch old-age pensions (AOW) for Surinamese-Dutch unacceptable. They further complain the Dutch state stigmatises Surinamese by carrying out ‘100 per cent controls’ for passengers arriving at Schiphol Airport and that the fares for Amsterdam-Paramaribo flights are unacceptably high due to the monopoly of the Dutch KLM and Surinamese SLM airlines.

These organisations, which appeal to both Dutch and Surinamese courts, have a transnational tie to the Association of Notaries (Notarissen) in Figure 3.2. While the tie is highly institutionalised, it is also based on kinship ties between board members. Finally, Shiva and VVR submit petitions to the parliaments of both countries and air their views in the media in both the Netherlands and Surinam, activities for which transnational ties are unnecessary.24

The above-mentioned B-Surned was founded in 2004 to represent the interests of Surinamese returnees. B-Surned is connected to Shiva and VVR through the latter’s chairman. B-Surned addresses practical issues concerning rights, social security, taxes and driver’s licenses. Whereas the other organisations that aim to broaden opportunities for Surinamese-Dutch are directed by elites, B-Surned reaches the middle class of returnees in Surinam. Tensions between the Surinamese authorities and returnees were apparent at a B-Surned meeting I attended in Paramaribo. A representative of the Alien Registration Office had been invited to answer returnees’ questions; feeling exploited by the high cost of the residence permits, they swore at her. The next speaker, an employee of the tax office, explained
how the system in Surinam works; he emphasised how every citizen in Surinam must deal with the same system. One furious woman in her thirties jumped up and shouted:

If they don’t want us here, they should just say so! I will not suffer here in poverty. Many people want to come [to return to Surinam], but I said: ‘Don’t do it. If I would have known how it really is, I wouldn’t have done it!’

Afterwards, I had a talk with another board member. According to her, Surinamese-Dutch belong nowhere: ‘Here they treat us as Dutch and in the Netherlands they treat us as foreigners, because we are coloured.’

These examples illustrate the fragility of ties between organisations led by Surinamese with Dutch nationality – whether living in Surinam or in the Netherlands – and Surinamese state actors. It also shows that the state’s willingness to broaden political opportunities for Surinamese with Dutch passports is essential for the success of transnational homeland-directed and transplanted immigrant political activities. This hesitance among Surinamese state actors probably also explains why long-term transnational ties with actors in Surinam are limited despite the ‘transnational’ mission of these organisations.

Amsterdam organisations

Transnational relations with state actors and politicians, however, do not appear so problematic when Surinamese-Dutch do not try to change the homeland. Three organisations – two based in Amsterdam and one in Surinam, all directed by the same person – do not ask support from or criticise the Surinamese state. Instead, these organisations praise Surinamese politicians and criticise the Netherlands.

The Committee 30 June/1July addresses issues of history, justice and commemoration. In 2002, it sent the Dutch parliament a manifesto with ten requests. One request was for an apology from the Dutch Queen to Surinam and the Dutch Antilles for what the former colonies had endured under slavery. It further requested government pensions for Surinamese with Dutch passports regardless of where they live (Comité 30 juni/1 juli 2002). In 2003, the committee inaugurated a monument in Amsterdam to commemorate the abolition of slavery in Surinam in the presence of then mayor Job Cohen and the former Surinamese president Jules Wijdenbosch (Het Parool 2003b).

The director of Committee 30 June/1 July was also behind the establishment of a Surinamese Service Desk (SBS) for members of the Dutch Trade Union (FNV) in 2005. The latter informs return migrants about their rights to Dutch social services (De Ware Tijd 2005a, 2005b).
Finally, Kwakoe Events organises one of the most important Surinamese events in the Netherlands: the yearly Kwakoe Festival in the Amsterdam neighbourhood of de Bijlmer. The Kwakoe Festival began in 1972 as an annual football tournament between the residents of the neighbourhood’s high-rise flats. In 2005, Kwakoe provided six weeks of football and recreation and attracted one million visitors (Reus 2005), including many visitors and organisations from Surinam (De Ware Tijd 2005d).26

In addition to leisure activities, the festival invites Dutch and Surinamese politicians to give lectures and participate in political debate; the Kwakoe keynote speaker is traditionally also invited to Surinam.27 One of the highlights of the festival is the Kwakoe Award, given to Surinamese politicians and civil servants regardless of their ethnicity or political party. Recipients have included former president Jules Wijdenbosch (Democratic National Platform 2000-DNP 2000), the Javanese politician Willy Soemita (Party for National Unity and Solidarity, KTPI), the first president of Surinam Johan Ferrier, the gaanman (‘paramount chief’) of the Ndyuka Maroon tribe, Gazon Matodja and the captain of the Amer-Indian village Galibi. According to the director of Kwakoe Events, the award is meant to pay homage to the country:

We are born and raised in Surinam. If you look at Kwakoe you see that many of its successful ingredients and its format are a copy from events that are held in Surinam […] We are thankful for this baggage from Surinam which has allowed us to continue and succeed here in the Netherlands. To show our gratitude to the country and its inhabitants we wanted to honour people that have given their life for a public cause in Surinam.28

The Kwakoe Award has become a prestigious prize for Surinamese leaders and receives full attention from the Surinamese press. In 2000, the award went to the paramount chief of the Ndyuka Maroon tribe, gaanman Gazon Matodja. The gaanman explained his appreciation for this sign of gratitude from ‘his people’:

The people appreciated me as their gaanman. They did not abandon or ignore me while I was there. It was bigger than I expected […] If you have a large number of people standing behind you, you feel powerful […] when I arrived, I was received traditionally, they brought money, everything they could get a hold on they brought. This strengthened me.29

Because their activities are mainly based in Amsterdam, Kwakoe Events and the Committee 30 June/1 July maintain few strong ties with groups elsewhere in the Netherlands (see Figure 3.1). However, through their
director these organisations and SBS maintain ties with Dutch local state actors (mainly in Amsterdam) and the trade union FNV, which facilitated the establishment of a desk in Surinam. The director’s personal network, combined with his organisations’ missions, provide them with easy access to political leaders and state actors in both Surinam and the Netherlands.

**Country of residence-directed politics of the Ndyuka**

During his visit in 2000, the gaanman Matodja personally established the Council of Kabiten and Basiyas in the Netherlands. Traditionally, the kabiten (‘captain’) is the head of the village while the basiya functions as the assistant to the gaanman and the chief captain (Polimé 2007: 58-61). The gaanman clarified why he wanted traditional authorities present in the Netherlands:

> When there is a conflict, leaders solve it […] The way we work here, we wanted it in the Netherlands as well. There are many Maroons in the Netherlands, but the way whites do justice is different. We in the interior are used to straighten up quarrels before they get worse.30

The captain, the head of Drietabbetje who was present during the interview, continued:

> We arranged this council because not all quarrels should end at the police station. Some conflicts should be solved traditionally, not everything is for the police. The people who are appointed have already had positions as captain or deputy captain here.31

The installation of this council in the Netherlands is a clear – and the only – example of Surinamese country of residence-directed politics. The gaanman extended Ndyuka political opportunities from Surinam to the Netherlands to improve the living conditions of ‘his people’ abroad. Through its kabiten, who is also chairman of the Maroon organisation Sabana Peti (Sabana), the council is embedded in a sub-cluster of Maroon organisations in the Netherlands and has ties with the National Committee (NC30) (see Figure 3.1).

Surinamese civil society groups are most involved in (locally specific) homeland-directed politics and transplanted immigrant politics. Activities are often channelled through ties between migrant organisations and local governments in the Netherlands, as well as through diplomatic agreements between Surinamese and Dutch state actors (the activities of the latter not being restricted to one ethnic or religious group but geared towards all Surinamese). Homeland-directed politics (usually ethnically and/or
religiously defined) were facilitated by ties between migrant organisations and their branches in Surinam, while country of residence-directed politics were, in this case, channelled through ties between traditional authorities and their branch in the Netherlands.

**Turkish and Kurdish organisational networks in the Netherlands**

The IMES network of Turkish migrant organisations looks quite different from the Surinamese network. One of the main differences is that the Turkish and Kurdish organisational landscape has changed little since 1999 when the IMES data collection was completed. I had to add fewer organisations and fewer new ties in comparison to the Surinamese network that were not already covered by interlocking directorates. Turkish and Kurdish organisations have longer life spans and the ties between them are more institutionalised.

The national networks that appear after qualitative analysis thus do not differ substantially from the IMES network. But unlike the Surinamese network, the Turkish/Kurdish network has transnational ties with third countries, mainly with confederations in Germany and Belgium (being migrant organisations, they are also grey in Figures 3.3-3.6).

**Figure 3.3 National and transnational ties of Turkish and Kurdish organisations**

Square: Political party
Circle: Migrant organisation/NGO
Black: Turkey
Grey: The Netherlands/Europe
— : Highly institutionalised
— : Lowly institutionalised
Six organisations have a central position in the IMES network: the IOT, Diyanet-affiliated organisations, the Federation of Alevi Organisations (HAK-DER), the Turkish Federation in the Netherlands (HTF), the Federation of Social Democratic Associations (DSDF) and the Federation of Kurdish Associations in the Netherlands (FED-KOM). My analysis expands outwards from these central organisations following ideological, religious and ethnic lines. The analysis here also includes two categories not covered in the IMES network: the radical left (Figure 3.5) and local governments.

Figure 3.3 shows on the upper left a PKK-oriented Kurdish cluster centred on FED-KOM, which connects other radical leftist organisations to the network. The Kurdish/leftist sub-cluster is tied to the broader network via an interlocking directorate between a FED-KOM member (KNCCA) and the Islamic Centre (HİMV). The most central organisation is the IOT, connecting the majority of the other organisations except for the ‘rightist’ HTF. HTF is connected through an interlocking directorate between one of its member organisations (the Mosque Ulu Camii) and the Council of Mosques in the Netherlands (RMN).

Removing the national ties and political parties to focus on the transnational ties (Figure 3.4) reveals that the Kurdish cluster is especially dense, facilitated by third-country transnational ties through European confederations like KON-KURD and YEK-KOM. Such federations play an important role in the formation of transnational ties for most of the other

Figure 3.4  Transnational ties of Turkish and Kurdish organisations
religious and political denominations as well: the Alevis (AABF), the radical left (DİP-DE), the left (HDF, AADD), the extreme right (ANAF, ADÜTF), the Islamists (IGMG) and the progressive Islamists (UETD). Figure 3.4 shows that each religious or political group forms ties with similar groups in Turkey or other countries in Europe.

Consultative Council of Turks in the Netherlands (IOT)

The IOT is the official representative of the Turkish community in meetings with Dutch administrative organs as well as with other social and political organisations. Founded in 1985 by four Turkish federations at the request of the Dutch government, it functions as a spokesman for the Turkish community vis-à-vis the Dutch government; as such, it does not maintain institutionalised ties with actors in Turkey. But as its director explained, the IOT maintains ad hoc contact with the Turkish government: 

‘If problems arise for Turks in the Netherlands that relate to Turkey, then we also address this with the ambassador or the Turkish government right away.’

Such issues include return migration, military service for Turkish men with dual nationality and Dutch admission policies for Turkish migrants.

Transnational ties with the Turkish state came to the fore in April 2004 when the IOT commemorated 40 years of Turkish migration to the Netherlands, an event attended by the Dutch minister of integration, the Turkish vice-president and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül (Contrast 2004). Gül in his speech emphasised the importance of Turkish migrants integrating into Dutch society, stressing ‘it is not right to interpret the adaptation in a new country as a process that results in the loss of one’s own values, such as culture and language that have been brought from the motherland’. The fortieth anniversary was also observed in Ankara, where celebrations were jointly organised by the Dutch embassy and the Turkish Ministry of Labour. The IOT was present at the three-day event, using the opportunity to discuss the position of Turks in the Dutch labour market with the Ministry of Labour.

In the period under study, the IOT was especially active in lobbying the Dutch government on Turkish EU membership. It organised conferences and online initiatives, including a December 2002 mass email to its network to pressure European leaders, Dutch members of parliament and members of the Dutch commission on foreign affairs to support Turkish accession during the EU summit in Copenhagen.

The IOT has also had to deal with transplanted homeland politics – a consequence of the organisations that make up the council. The IOT’s task is to represent the interests of the entire Turkish community in the Netherlands. This, however, has not been easy: most guest worker organisations until the mid-1980s focused their activities on returning to Turkey
and, furthermore, mirrored the fragmented Turkish political spectrum. Leftwing and rightwing groups in Turkey were clashing violently in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and this antagonism was transplanted to guest worker organisations in the Netherlands. While time spent in the Netherlands has created common ground, opposing homeland political orientations remain visible. This has made unification under the IOT roof difficult, as the director of one its founding federations explained:

Back in the days [in the 1970s and early 1980s] we had one foot in the Netherlands and one foot in Turkey. Now both our feet are here [...] We [HTİB] were one of the founders of the IOT. We had gigantic disagreements, about religion, we still have. We say we have nothing to do with religion. It says in the IOT statutes that we do not speak about religion within IOT. There are too many [...] Turkish political parties [that have different interpretations about religion] [...] it is just useless to talk about it [religion and politics] together in IOT. But about the representation of Turks in the Netherlands, there we go together.36

Despite the agreement not to talk about Turkish politics and religion, incidents have occurred. The first involved the resignation of the whole IOT administrative board (NRC 1995) in 1995 over the admission of the Union of Turkish Islamic Associations (HTİKB). The leftist HTİB claimed HTİKB was ‘in liaison’ with the ultranationalist Grey Wolves – which was in their opinion an extremist organisation hiding its true face behind an Islamic veil. HTİB voted against its membership, arguing that the IOT could not fight racism if the organ itself cooperated with racist groups (Develioğlu 1995b).

The left-right divide came to a boil when the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (PKDW) was set up in the Netherlands. On the initiative of the Diyanet-affiliated Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TİKF), seven organisations formed an action committee. Including the TİKF, it included five (out of eight) IOT member organisations (Develioğlu 1995a). The committee called for a boycott of Dutch products in Turkey to protest against the Dutch government’s position on the Kurdish parliament. It further organised the demonstration ‘We are with you, my Turkey’ in The Hague, which began with the Turkish national anthem. The chairman of the TİKF emphasised how: ‘Turks and Kurds in the Netherlands have no problem with each other; both groups do have a terror problem with the Netherlands,’ referring to the PKDW holding its inaugural congress on Dutch soil (Develioğlu 1995a). An estimated 25,000 Turks attended the demonstration, including many from Germany (AD 1995a, b). The demonstration received ample coverage in the Turkish media, the call to join the demonstration coinciding with a fundraising campaign for Turkish soldiers
fighting the PKK in northern Iraq. The campaign was broadcast in both Turkey and Europe through the state channel TRT and its sister TRT-INT. Many Turks reportedly transferred money through Turkish banks (Develioğlu 1995a).

The actions of the nationalist-inclined protest committee were fiercely criticised by two leftist IOT members, the HTİB and HAK-DER. They were joined by the Federation of Democratic Workers Associations (DİDF). In press statements they argued that the conflict around the PKDW was an issue between the Turkish and Dutch governments, and that the Turkish government and media were behind the recent political activities of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands (Develioğlu 1995a).

What all this shows is that although the IOT does not maintain institutionalised transnational ties (see Figure 3.4), the council is clearly involved in homeland-directed and transplanted homeland politics. Institutionalised ties are thus no condition for transnational activism.

Diyanet-affiliated organisations

The Islamic federation TİKF is one of the ‘religious’ founding federations of the IOT. Its purpose is to maintain contact with the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, normally just called Diyanet) in Ankara that represents the ‘official’ Islam of the Turkish Republic (Landman 1997: 214-215). The TİKF cooperates with the Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands (HDV), which owns the Diyanet mosques in the country (Canatan 2001: 88). Although TİKF representatives are chosen by local organisations, it is not independent of the HDV. The HDV’s statutes, written by the Turkish embassy’s religious council, state that the chairman of TİKF should also be the chairman of HDV. This, the head of Diyanet in The Hague argues, is a logical construction as the TİKF manages the imams while the HDV is in charge of the mosques and Diyanet pays them both. Thus, two organisations in the Netherlands have connections to Diyanet: the HDV is structured hierarchically and linked directly; the TİKF is structured democratically and linked indirectly (Landman 1997: 221). This explains why the TİKF does not have a transnational tie with Diyanet in Figure 3.4.

The TİKF has grown enormously since its establishment in 1979. The 70 organisations it comprised in 1982 grew to 143 by 2003. Some argue this is a direct result of Turkey’s Islamisation policy following the 1980 coup, with the junta – to combat ‘extremist tendencies’ and the activities of unofficial Islam among migrant organisations – engaging in a campaign to spread official Turkish state Islam within Turkish communities in Western Europe (Canatan 2001: 88). One of the TİKF’s aims is to function as a counterweight to Marxist-Leninist organisations.
Over the past decades, the TİKF has been particularly visible in responding to Dutch parliamentary discussions so as to prevent the ‘importing’ of imams from Turkey. According to the Dutch government, imams trained in the Netherlands would contribute more to the integration of Muslim migrants than those sent by the Turkish government, who do not speak Dutch and know little about Dutch society (Het Parool 1997). The TİKF argued that such interference by the Dutch state was meant ‘to control and manipulate the life of Muslims’ (NRC 1997a) and proposed educational programmes for imams in the Netherlands without interference from the Dutch government (Landman 1997). But Diyanet remains reluctant, doubting whether courses outside Turkey would deliver the same ‘quality’ as the theological departments of the universities it cooperates with.39

Diyanet itself began acknowledging in the late 1990s that imams sent to the Netherlands needed additional country-specific training, though under the control of its own institution.40 In 1997, an imam who had recently returned from the Netherlands set up a training programme in Ankara, a programme of 100 hours taught in ten to twelve weeks covering Dutch language, history, society, health care, housing and specific problems of the Turkish migrant community in the Netherlands.41

The Turkish state is thus active in country of residence-directed politics through its programme of sending imams, its highly institutionalised ties with the HDV and the TİKF.

**Alevis**

Alevis, among the Turkish guest workers who arrived in the 1960s, began organising later than other Turkish groups. Whereas Sunni Muslims created Islamic organisations upon their arrival in the Netherlands, Alevis were active in progressive social organisations and political parties, including Kurdish ones (Landman 1992: 142-143). It was only in 1990 that the first Alevi federation HAK-DER was set up; by 2004, it united fourteen organisations. HAK-DER provides information on Alevis and Alevism and represents its members’ interests in the Netherlands. It also supports spiritual activities, for example, cem services, and lobbies for the institutionalisation of Alevis in the Netherlands.

The late development of Alevi migrant organisations is best seen in the context of the 1990s ‘Alevi revival’ in Turkey. As Turkey’s official religion – regulated by Diyanet – is Sunni Islam, Alevi houses of worship (cem) and organisations were not officially recognised. In the 1960s and 1970s, Alevis were organised in hometown and saint-based associations. Then in 1977 and 1978, the Alevi community was the victim of massacres at the hands of nationalist Sunnis. A separate Alevi identity began to emerge in the late 1980s as a result of the fall of socialism – previously a surrogate identity for Alevis (Yavuz 2003: 65-78).
The 1990s witnessed the revival of Alevi identity through separate media, associations and festivals. When prominent leftwing Alevi intellectuals gathered in Sivas in 1993 to commemorate the teachings of the Alevi saint Pir Sultan Abdal, a major conflict broke out. A mob mobilised by activists of the Islamist RP attacked the hotel where the meeting was taking place; the fire that followed killed many of those present. The conduct of the police, the government and parliament in dealing with the assault was a turning point for the Alevi community, many of whose members no longer saw the Turkish state as their own. This intensified Alevi feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis the state and the Sunni majority and catalysed their mobilisation and organisation (Yavuz 2003: 65-78).

The Sivas massacre also fuelled interest in the Alevi cause among Alevis in Western Europe. In 1998, nineteen Alevi organisations, including seven based in Europe, issued a declaration demanding legal recognition of Alevi culture and religion and the abolition of the Sunni-based state institution Diyanet. Their efforts have had some success; in practice, they now enjoy the same scope for cultural and religious activities as Sunni communities operating outside the mosque congregations funded and controlled by Diyanet. They are tolerated as long as they steer clear of the public realm, though they still have no legal status and ‘officially’ do not exist (Schüler 2000: 208-209; see also Sökefeld 2002).

HAK-DER’s transnational activities and ties reflect these developments in Turkey. The involvement of RP Partisi adherents in the Sivas massacre created tensions within the IOT, where HAK-DER had been a member since 1994. Between 1997 and 2002, HAK-DER renounced its IOT membership; the IOT, in its view, was cooperating too closely with the Turkish government, which was headed by the RP in 1996-97.

HAK-DER’s transnational activities take place in the Netherlands (country of residence-directed), at the European level, and in Turkey (homeland-directed). In the Netherlands, HAK-DER annually commemorates the Sivas massacre. In 2003, it invited one of the survivors, Lütfü Kaleli, an Alevi intellectual who travelled frequently to Western Europe to lecture on the massacres, Anatolian Alevi rituals and to advise Alevi organisations in Europe.

At the European level, HAK-DER is attached to the European Alevi confederation (AABF), founded in 2001. AABF unites federations from seven European countries. Together with AABF and Alevi organisations in Turkey, HAK-DER works for the official recognition of Alevism in Turkey. Towards this end, AABF lobbies in Brussels for the rights of Alevis in Turkey, including the official recognition of cems as places of worship (rather than as cultural sites within the current framework of Turkish accession to the EU). This latter issue has also been addressed in the European Court of Human Rights and been taken up by members of the European Parliament including Cem Özdemir from Germany and
Emine Bozkurt from the Netherlands. To facilitate cooperation between the European federation and organisations in Turkey, a supra-union (ABKBF) headquartered in Ankara was set up in 2003, uniting 450 organisations in Turkey and 147 in Europe. Earlier attempts to establish such supra-organisations had failed due to the opposition of the Turkish courts.45

Leaders of the Alevi supra-union meet several times a year in Cologne or Ankara to discuss current developments concerning Alevism in Turkey. The annual high point of Alevism is a festival in Hacibektaş, in the middle of Anatolia, which attracts half a million people including many Alevis from Europe.46 AABF and HAK-DER representatives are present to deliver speeches while the supra-union meets.47

HAK-DER thus maintains institutionalised national ties with a range of Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and institutionalised transnational ties with Alevi organisations in Europe and Turkey. Whereas national ties (Figure 3.3) generally facilitate transplanted homeland politics, third-country transnational ties (Figure 3.4 and 4.6) facilitate homeland-directed politics.

Islamists

Milli Görüş organisations have been active in the Netherlands since 1975 (Landman 1992: 120) and were united under the Dutch Islamic Federation (NIF) in 1984. NIF split into two federations in 1997, one for the north of the Netherlands (MG-NN) and one for the south (which maintained the NIF label). Both are still officially under the auspices of the NIF, which is a member of the IOT (MG-NN is not). In 2004, NIF united 54 mosque-owning organisations, while MG-NN did the same for 24. These organisations include social, cultural, women’s and youth wings, each with their own administrative boards. In addition to their official members, both federations have ties to, respectively, 60 and 70 unofficially attached associations of entrepreneurs and boarding schools.48

Both federations profile themselves as organisations focused on migrant issues; both command public platforms and encourage members to vote in Dutch elections.49 The federation in the south also encourages active participation in local politics; several members have been elected to office running for different parties. Such representation is felt to be necessary for the group’s image: ‘the Turkish and Dutch media portrayed us as radicals and fundamentalists, that was not good.’50

In the mid-1980s Milli Görüş organisations in Europe were united in the federation Islamic Community-National Vision (IGMG)51 headquartered in Cologne. Its relation with the NIF is hierarchical as the NIF chairman is indirectly appointed by the IGMG. According to the NIF chairman, the main difference between his organisation and the IGMG is that ‘our activities focus 90 per cent on Dutch society and ten per cent on Turkey, while for the
IGMG it is fifty-fifty. The NIF’s ties to Turkey are generally mediated by the IGMG, particularly when issues concern religion. Milli Görüş’ religious practices are not controlled by Diyanet; the IGMG recruits imams in Turkey for Milli Görüş mosques in the Netherlands.

This case again highlights the importance of European federations in mediating transnational activities. In the case of Milli Görüş, they facilitate country of residence-directed politics. This explains why NIF (including MG-NN) does not maintain direct transnational ties with non-party actors in Turkey (see Figure 3.4).

Ultranationalists

The largest federation of the far right is HTF, founded in 1995 and in daily life known as the Grey Wolves. In 1997, the HTF comprised around 60 cultural, youth, women’s and mosque organisations with a total membership of 19,500 (TFN 1997: 3). HTF annually meets with other European federations of Grey Wolves to discuss problems affecting Turks living in Europe.

The 1997 appearance of a book on the Grey Wolves in the Netherlands led to extensive debate within the Turkish community, one which spilled over into mainstream Dutch politics as well (see Braam & Ülger 1997, 2004). In the eyes of the Turkish community, the book was damaging; it portrayed Turks as mafiosi and extreme nationalists who were against integration. The HTF and the cultural organisation Türkevi responded separately with counter-publications (TFN 1997; El-Fers & Nibbering 1998). HTF claimed to be politically neutral, without backing by any Turkish political party (TFN 1997: 25). Questions on subsidies given to local member organisations and their affiliation to the Turkish extreme right party MHP nevertheless followed within the Dutch parliament and municipal councils. Extreme nationalist homeland-directed activities, some argued, did not aid integration into Dutch society. While the interior minister emphasised the difference between the political ideas of an organisation and those of its members, developments led to the Dutch intelligence service monitoring the Grey Wolves (BVD 1998: 26).

The present challenge for HTF is to clear its name by presenting itself as an organ in favour of integration. While the federation is attempting to build relations with local governments, Dutch political parties and Turkish organisations, especially the latter, remain wary. While the HTF has applied for IOT membership, at the time of writing it has not been approved.

One of the HTF’s member organisations is affiliated with the Turkish Council in the Netherlands (HTR), set up in 1993. HTR’s aims partly mirror those of the IOT. For example, it aspires to represent the interests of the Turkish community in the Netherlands and to encourage and coordinate
cooperation between different Turkish organisations. Unlike the IOT, however, it emphasises educational and scientific activities such as the organisation of study trips and the publication of books and studies. HTR is affiliated with the World Turkish Congress (WTC) (Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002: 17), which was founded in 1991 by a Turkish federation in the US. It has sister organisations located in Europe, Asia and Australia.

While the HTF apparently does not maintain structural ties with other homeland-based actors, its ties to the ultranationalist party MHP (see chapter 5) fosters transplanted homeland politics. Being associated with the MHP, they are excluded from Dutch political opportunities – such as becoming a member of the IOT – by other Turkish migrant organisations.

The left and social democrats

The four most prominent leftist organisations are the Turkish Women’s Association in the Netherlands (HTKB), HTİB, DİDF and DSDF. All were established by political activists fleeing Turkey in the aftermath of the 1971 and 1980 coups. The attachments of the founding members meant these organisations initially maintained close ties with political parties outlawed in Turkey. In the past, they represented a wide spectrum of the left including various communist/socialist streams and Turkish social democracy. At the same time, they sought to advance the rights of Turkish workers or the emancipation of Turkish women in the Netherlands. Today these organisations are relatively large federations and prominent players in Dutch migrant politics.

DİDF traditionally supports repressed groups and individuals, mainly Kurds (Van Zuthem 1994: 24); it lobbies for the Kurdish right to self-determination and the recognition of Kurdish rights in Turkey. One of its goals in the Netherlands is to ensure full equality between and the participation of all people from Turkey (De Voogd & Van der Meulen 2002). DİDF argues that the Turkish immigrant community is ethnically divided through the interference of the Turkish government via its consulates; it further criticises the Dutch government for directing policies towards ‘ethnic’ Turks and not for people from Turkey, thereby excluding Kurds from full participation. This is one reason why DİDF is not a member of the IOT.
DİDF has independent sister organisations of the same name in other Western European countries (see also Özcan 1992: 261-264; Yurdakul, 2009). Comparable to the social democratic federation HDF, they meet to discuss social issues relating to Turks living in Europe. The different European DİDF federations also organise summer camps for youths in the Netherlands and Germany.65

In the above examples, it is apparent that third-country transnational ties can facilitate migrant politics in countries of residence. Conversely, both DSDF/HDF and DİDF are engaged in homeland-directed activities without relying on transnational ties, for example, when they lobby in the Netherlands and Europe for Turkish EU accession or Kurdish rights in Turkey. DİDF is also engaged in transplanted homeland politics when it criticises the Dutch government for using a similar model as the Turkish state when it comes to integrating Turks – and excluding Kurds.

Kurds

Many Turkish Kurds in the Netherlands are politically unorganised or affiliated to non-Kurdish organisations like the Sunni Muslim organisation Millî Görüş and DİDF (Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 12). Kurds who are organised on the basis of Kurdish identity are gathered in two main federations: FED-KOM and Union of Associations from Kurdistan (KOMKAR). Via its local member organisation KNCCA, FED-KOM is tied to the Turkish organisational network in Figure 3.3; KOMKAR is not. Because of their different political signatures, these federations do not organise joint activities and are not tied to each other in the organisational network.

FED-KOM was established in 1993 to gather existing Kurdish social and cultural organisations under one umbrella. Its member organisations largely focus on settling into Dutch society; their activities include guiding refugees, mediating between the Kurdish community and local Dutch institutions, and encouraging political, economic and civil participation in the Netherlands (KNCCA 2003). At the European level, FED-KOM is affiliated with the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) headquartered in Brussels; it unites some twelve national federations in Europe, Australia and Canada – all together about 200 organisations.66 KON-KURD meets four times a year to discuss issues common to Kurds in Europe, especially the integration and identity of third-generation Kurds:

the first and second generation have identity problems: they are Turk, Kurd and Dutch. The third generation is able to say “I am Kurdish.” Such a strong identity will contribute to their willingness to mean something for the Kurdish cause.67
KOMKAR is the second largest Kurdish federation in the Netherlands. It was established by guest workers in the Netherlands in 1982 and in Germany in 1979; today KOMKAR has branches in eleven European countries. Initially, its activities concerned issues relevant to Turkish workers in Europe; with the arrival of large number of refugees in the 1980s its focus shifted towards the region of origin (Van Bruinessen 2000: 13).

KOMKAR’s activities regarding settlement in the Netherlands vary from specific projects in cooperation with municipalities (for example, providing Kurdish language lessons) to organising meetings during Dutch elections to stimulate political participation. For these purposes, KOMKAR cooperates with Dutch political parties and a variety of Turkish and Kurdish migrant organisations (KOMKAR 2002: 12). Regarding Kurdish issues, KOMKAR organises discussions and activities about ‘the whole of Kurdistan’ – not only Turkey. Personally, the director of KOMKAR says he wishes for an independent Kurdistan uniting the Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. But as he reflects on the situation:

The reality is different: who would support that? The aim of the organisation is that the situation for Kurds in Turkey becomes similar to Iraq. In Iraq two peoples are included in the constitution: Arabs and Kurds.68

Together with Kurdish organisations from Iraq and Syria, KOMKAR in 2003 established the Coordination Group for Kurds to improve mutual solidarity and cooperation and to represent common Kurdish interests. It has paid particular attention to how the situation of Kurds in Iraq has affected Kurds in the Netherlands (KOMKAR 2003: 8).

Neither FED-KOM nor KOMKAR are represented in the IOT. While KOMKAR was invited to discuss IOT membership, official talks ended when its chairman emphasised how ‘Kurds’ should be included in the name of the organisation. Informally, there are good relations with IOT administrators as well as with some local organisations affiliated with the IOT through national federations.69 For FED-KOM, however, its ‘exclusion’ from the IOT is a clear example of the denial of the Kurdish question in the Netherlands, caused by anti-Kurdish IOT member organisations with ‘rightist’ backing.

Each year FED-KOM and KOMKAR organise their own events to remember the victims of the poison gas attacks in the Kurdish town of Halabja, Iraq, in 1988 (KOMKAR 2003: 20).70 Newroz, the Kurdish New Year on 21 March, is also celebrated by both federations in different Dutch cities. Newroz celebrations in the Netherlands have become increasingly politicised with the influx of political refugees; they are now important venues for Kurdish organisations and political parties to mobilise. Despite its
political character, Newroz remains a family event attended by tens of thousands (Van Bruinessen 2000).

During Newroz, FED-KOM also organises activities intended to have effect in Turkey. To prevent Newroz from becoming a PKK-controlled festival, the Turkish state has tried to institutionalise the event. This led to a bloody ending of the festival in Şırnak in 1992, with over 52 civilian deaths and many arrests. FED-KOM and other European organisations responded by sending delegations to monitor the festivities from 1993 onwards. Within Turkey, these delegations are coordinated by the Turkish Human Rights Association (İHD), since most Kurdish leaders in Europe are in exile and thus unable to join the delegations. The İHD ensures the European Newroz delegations are sent to places where they are ‘most needed’, for example, to the small and politicised cities and villages around Şırnak, Hakkari and Tunceli (formerly Dersim). The İHD vice-president explained how: ‘Up to [the year] 2000, Newroz was dangerous and the risks to be arrested and tortured were high […] we invited delegations to protect the people.’ The İHD expects that the reports and recommendations of journalists and politicians, presented to European countries and the EU, will put pressure on Turkey. Although İHD has received delegations from the Netherlands for several years, it denies official involvement with FED-KOM. Relations in 2004 were mediated by DEHAP, and for this reason there are no direct transnational ties between FED-KOM and İHD.

Kurdish diaspora politics is thus mostly channelled through national ethnic ties (between Turkish-Kurdish and other Kurdish organisations in the Netherlands), third-country transnational ties and supranational ties with Dutch and European governments and media.

The extreme left

The extreme Turkish left in the Netherlands has long been active within migrant organisations. At the time of research, the most important migrant organisations with radical left sympathies were the press agency Özgürülük (meaning ‘freedom’), the music formation Grup Yorum and the Dutch branch of the Association for the Support of the Families of Prisoners (TAYAD). These groups are tied to each other via memberships and structural cooperation (see Figure 3.5).

Removing both national ties and ties with political parties does not significantly affect the picture (Figure 3.6). This can be explained by the high number of third-country transnational ties with European federations and organisations (AVEG-KON, TAYAD-EU, GY-EU, Hayat-EU). These ties are much more important for the formation of the network than national ties, showing the extreme left’s isolation from the Turkish organisational landscape in the Netherlands.
Özgürlük was established in the Netherlands in 1996 to bring the Turkish people ‘uncensored’ news and analysis of the leftist movement. The press agency is part of the political magazine Ekmek ve Adalet. Grup Yorum is known for its critical songs about the Turkish state; its lyrics often express solidarity with leftwing activists and prisoners. The European Grup Yorum unites artists who were part of the band in Turkey but whose political activities have since made them have to flee the country.

In Turkey, TAYAD, founded in 1986, reports on the state’s abuse of political activists who support illegal parties (TAYAD Solidarity Committee 2001). In 2000, TAYAD proclaimed its support of the so-called Death-Fast Resistance among prison inmates resisting the implementation of ‘F-type’ prisons ‘in which prisoners are isolated from one another, from legal advocates and from family members’, which would ‘make it easier for prison torture to go unrecorded, unchecked and unpunished’ (Anderson 2004: 816-817). F-type prisons were the Turkish government’s answer to dormitory-style prisons that political groups could use as ‘indoctrination and recruitment centres’ (Anderson 2004: 823). In 2001, relatives and friends began solidarity death fasts in ‘resistance houses’ in Istanbul to support the imprisoned Death Fast Resisters (Kulaksiz 2003).

TAYAD branches in the Netherlands and Europe also began solidarity hunger strikes to draw attention to the situation in Turkish jails.
hunger strikers were entertained by Grup Yorum (*Rotterdams Dagblad* 2000). Dutch media, however, were not very attentive; according to TAYAD, they only paid attention when Turkish nationalists killed a hunger-striker in 2000. Alongside their lobbying efforts directed at the Dutch and European parliaments, the Dutch and European branches of TAYAD financially support the mother organisation in Turkey.

The activities of the radical left are clearly homeland-directed. Apart from directly supporting their counterparts in Turkey, the important ties are with supranational institutions, national governments and the media. Via this indirect route, they aim to improve political opportunities for their counterparts in the homeland. The strategy resembles that of the Kurds. Both are excluded from political participation in Turkey, which makes it difficult – even dangerous – for actors based in Turkey to pursue transnational activities through direct transnational ties.

**City ties**

Discernable are three types of ties between Dutch cities and Turkish municipalities or villages: partnerships, long-term friendship ties and short-term projects (where no ties with the national organisational network were found). The first grew out of guest worker agreements between Dutch
companies and Turkish cities; the latter were fostered by intensive contact between migrant communities and local governments in Turkey. All three today have the same locally specific, country of residence-directed aim: to foster the integration of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Ties between Dutch and Turkish municipalities are not represented in the network figures as these are not transnational but diplomatic relations. While some of these ties are mediated by Turkish migrant organisations, they have no national ties to the largest Turkish/Kurdish clusters presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.5.

The relationship between Almelo and Denizli is a good example of an institutionalised tie between cities. The relationship dates back to the end of the 1960s when the Dutch textile company Nijverdal Ten Cate from Almelo opened a recruitment office in Denizli. This led to the arrival of many migrants in the Dutch town. Nijverdal Ten Cate institutionalised the tie between the cities in 1976 to facilitate contact between migrants and their hometown; activities have included reciprocal visits by mayors and school exchanges. Today the main aim of the relationship is to facilitate integration; activities are thus country of residence-directed. A committee affiliated with the municipality of Almelo – the Denizli committee, with Turkish and Dutch members – functions as a bridge between the two municipalities79 (for a complete overview of all city partnerships see Van Ewijk 2007).

While friendship ties between cities have only recently become institutionalised, they have existed since Turks first migrated to the Netherlands. The tie between the cities of Haarlem and Emirdağ was formalised in 1995,80 and the two cities have developed projects for children, including summer schools in the Netherlands. Another project focuses on seniors who spend the summer in Turkey and the winter in the Netherlands; the two municipalities exchange information in order to better provide their health care (Den Exter 1993; Den Exter & Kutlu 1993; Gemeente Haarlem 2003). The contact between the two municipalities is facilitated by the Haarlem-Emirdağ Foundation in Haarlem and the Tema Foundation in Emirdağ – this makes the tie transnational.81 Tema also organises summer activities for youth from Europe spending the summer with their families in Emirdağ.82 The tie thus facilitates both homeland- and country of residence-directed politics as well as diplomatic relations between the two municipalities.

The majority of Turks in Dordrecht originate from the small village of Kayapınar in Kayseri province. Remittances from emigrants in Dordrecht have become a key source of income for the poor rural village, which has experienced mass emigration since the 1970s. The village head occasionally travels to Dordrecht to raise funds, for example, to build a new mosque (Emonts, Polat, Hert & Jeurgens 2001: 137). Another consequence of mass emigration is Kayapınar’s wildly fluctuating population – 2,300 in
winter, 6,000 in summer, according to its mayor in 2004 – due to seniors living there half the year and families returning in the summer. The 1997 Census, however, put the population at 1,234. As state subsidies are calculated per capita, this has created financial difficulties. For this reason, the mayor asked emigrants to be present in Kayapınar during the 2000 Census; 400 actually were.\textsuperscript{83} Since 1999, diplomatic relations between Kayapınar and the municipality of Dordrecht have been facilitated by the Tuana Foundation,\textsuperscript{84} while civil servants in both places explore the possibilities for joint projects. Dordrecht’s aim is integration; Kayapınar’s is to decrease emigration by creating jobs and, with Dordrecht’s help, it hopes to open a factory. The tie thus channels both country of residence- and homeland-directed activities.

A more dramatic occasion for establishing city ties was the earthquake that hit the western Marmara on 17 August 1999. About 18,000 people died while many more were wounded and lost their homes. The tragedy became the focus of a Rotterdam city council meeting; one councillor, born in Gölçük, had lost his parents. Emergency aid was sent to the region by dozens of committees and working groups organised by the Turkish community in Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam 1999b). Almost all Dutch politicians with Turkish backgrounds pressured their parties to help (Gölpinar & Demirbas 2001: 25). Forty-eight out of 483 Dutch municipalities donated money; five sent goods (Gemeente Rotterdam 1999a). Some municipalities took care of Turkish-Dutch citizens who lost relatives; Amsterdam and Rotterdam held memorial services. Five municipalities established special information phone numbers. Amsterdam supported the Turkish community with therapeutic aid and continued activities in İzmit on a project basis, training the local fire brigade and establishing social work places for disabled people. Dutch municipal actions were organised quickly and supported by Turkish delegates informed about the area (VNG 2000: 16).\textsuperscript{85}

The success of long-term, continuous ties between cities depends on large migrant communities maintaining strong transnational ties, as was the case in Dordrecht, Haarlem and Almelo. Larger Dutch cities with Turkish populations originating from different provinces, however, are reluctant to establish ties with only one Turkish city. In the words of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities:

By choosing one particular municipality, others automatically were excluded. This would create disappointments amongst Turkish citizens. The earthquake automatically created a consensus among all citizens to direct efforts to the municipalities of one particular area. (VNG 2000: 16)\textsuperscript{86}

So far, it has been apparent that Turkish transnational politics come in all forms except transplanted immigrant and diaspora politics. Homeland-
directed politics is facilitated through third-country transnational ties, migrants’ national organisational networks and ties with Dutch state actors. Locally specific homeland-directed politics always seem to involve at least one Dutch or Turkish local state actor or a diplomatic agreement. Diplomatic relations are an integral part of country of residence-directed politics, as are ties between migrant organisations (often branches, sister or ‘copies’ of homeland organisations) and civil society and/or state actors in the country of origin. Transplanted homeland politics were observable when conflicts on Turkish soil played out in the Netherlands. Sympathy with the Turkish state clearly showed in actors’ ties; proponents maintained relations with Turkish state actors while these were absent among opponents. They, instead, had stronger ties with Dutch state actors. Kurdish diaspora politics seems to require strong third-country transnational ties with exiles elsewhere in Europe, as well as ties with state actors in the country of residence to place their claims on the political agenda.

Additionally observable has been the way in which transnational third-country ties facilitate migrant politics by mediating ties between Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and actors in Turkey. National ties also facilitate certain forms of transnational activity. This means that solely focusing on transnational ties (Figure 3.4) misrepresents Turkish and Kurdish transnational politics. To fully understand the mechanisms at work, it is necessary to know how the organisations maintaining these ties are embedded in national networks.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined whether Fennema and Tillie’s (1999) argument that strong organisational networks increase political participation also holds for transnational political participation. The qualitative analyses of transnational ties and activities, on the one hand, and organisational networks, on the other, showed that strong networks foster institutionalised transnational ties and transnational political activities – and with them, transnational political participation. This conclusion is based on two striking differences between Turkish/Kurdish and Surinamese civil society in the Netherlands.

First, compared to Turkish and Kurdish organisations, Surinamese organisations with central positions in the network were established only recently; those found to be most transnationally active in 2005 were absent in the 2001 IMES network, meaning their transnational ties are more recent as well. In contrast, the ties of Turkish and Kurdish organisations with homeland-based actors are often decades old. Due to their persistence over time, their transnational ties are deemed stronger.
Second, most Turkish and Kurdish organisations are part of larger federations, while in the Surinamese organisational landscape few umbrella organisations are found. This implies that Turkish and Kurdish transnational political activities have broader scope and involve larger groups. The main explanation for this difference is that Surinamese civil society consists of many small ethnic and ethnic-religious groups, all with their own small organisations. Compared to Surinamese, migrants from Turkey are less ethnically and religiously diverse. The less diversity there is in a migrant group, the broader its organisational networks – meaning greater mobilisation potential for transnational politics. All in all, these findings correspond with the conclusions for transnational political participation among individuals in chapter 2.

Lower levels of Surinamese transnational political mobilisation can partially be explained by weakly developed organisational networks in the Netherlands. But as the empirical evidence shows, transnational political involvement is hampered by Surinamese state and civil society actors’ lukewarm reception of former citizens; the latter’s initiatives are often met with scepticism towards ‘Dutch’ influence. This attitude is rooted in history as well as in Surinam’s small size, with non-migrants easily threatened by transnational initiatives. In contrast, actors in Turkey have been eager to cooperate with actors based in the Netherlands. This suggests that the responsiveness of homeland-based actors is as influential for transnational mobilisation as migrant organisational networks in the country of settlement.

Finally, this chapter has tried to establish which types of ties channel transnational politics. The empirical evidence shows that transnational politics is facilitated through diplomatic relations and national ties as much as through transnational ties proper. The importance of state actors – as channels for transnational politics or as actors within them – can be seen in the political salience of ethnicity and religion: their relevance depends on the state-created political context in which they are embedded. Transnational ties based on common ethnicity irrespective of the country of origin – for example, Indian ethnicity for Surinamese or Kurdish ethnicity (including Kurds from countries other than Turkey) for Turkish-Kurds – play, at best, a minor role within transnational politics.

Transnational ties based on religion were found to be significant – Hindu organisations among Surinamese, Muslim organisations among Turks – (this corroborates with the conclusions of Lucassen & Penninx 2009). Such ties did not facilitate transnational political mobilisation among East Indian Hindus because they do not maintain strong political ties with India. Turkish Islamic streams have been excluded from political participation by Turkish government policy, and this exclusion has facilitated transnational political mobilisation.
The relevance of the different kinds of ties for transnational political activities is summarised in Table 3.7. The left column lists different types of transnational political activity. The first row distinguishes between different types of ties. The extent to which a certain tie facilitates a specific transnational political activity is indicated as ++ (central), + (present) and – (absent).

The table shows that different types of ties are central to different types of transnational politics. Generally speaking, homeland-directed politics depends on migrant organisations’ ties with civil society and/or state actors in the country of origin, while country of residence-directed politics depends on ties with homeland actors and diplomatic relations. Transplanted homeland politics occurs when conflicts between specific ideological and/or ethnic groups are transplanted from the homeland to the host country. This seems to occur only when one of the two opposing groups maintains ties with state actors in the country of origin and the other has ties with state actors in the host country. To mobilise effectively, sympathisers and opponents of the homeland regime need strong ties within migrant organisational networks or with state actors. Transplanted immigrant politics needs responsive partners in the country of origin, be they civil society or state actors. Transnational homeland ties are not necessary for diaspora politics, though third-country transnational ties and ties with state actors in the country of residence are required. Finally, locally specific transnational politics – regardless of its direction – seems to require the involvement of at least a state actor in the country of origin, the country of settlement or both (i.e. diplomatic relations).

This chapter has focused on recent transnational political activities and the resilience of the organisational networks and transnational ties behind them. But little is still known about how transnational political activities have changed over time. Furthermore, the starting point of the analyses thus far have been actors in the Netherlands. The next chapters reverse the gaze, thus approaching the subject from the perspective of homeland political parties: what were their motives to establish transnational ties and allow influence from abroad? How are they embedded within migrant organisational networks?
Table 3.7  Relevance of specific types of ties

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-state actors in the country of residence (mainly other migrant organisations)</th>
<th>Non-state actors (civil society) in the country of origin</th>
<th>State actors in the country of origin</th>
<th>State actors in the country of residence</th>
<th>Non-state actors (migrant organisations sharing same homeland) in third countries</th>
<th>Diplomatic relations between the country of residence and the country of origin</th>
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<tr>
<td>Homeland-directed</td>
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<td>Country of residence-directed</td>
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<td>Transplanted homeland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transplanted immigrant</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Diaspora</td>
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<td>Locally specific</td>
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BEYOND DUTCH BORDERS
4  Surinam: Student activism to transnational party politics

How has the colonial history and its legacy affected Surinamese transnational party politics? It has been apparent that actors in Surinam are often ambivalent towards influence from the former colonial metropole. I have also showed that Surinamese migrant civil society’s potential for transnational mobilisation is limited by its fragmentation, with most organisations not existing for long. This is largely due to actors in Surinam not reaching out to migrant organisations, resulting in ties that are uninstitutionalised from above. This chapter examines how ethnic diversity, short-term organisational structures and homeland-based actors’ reluctance to invest in transnational ties have affected transnational party politics.

This chapter begins with an overview of past and present diplomatic relations between Surinam and the Netherlands, the evolution of Surinamese political parties and their attitudes towards the Netherlands. The chapter then turns to colonial migrant involvement in Surinamese politics in the decades before independence and a look at how military rule (1980-1987) affected transnational political involvement among exiles and settled migrants in the Netherlands as well as non-migrants and return migrants in Surinam. The final section examines how transnational party politics and international party relations evolved under post-colonial democracy between 1987 and 2005.

Political history

Towards independence, 1950s-1975

Surinam was colonised by the Dutch in 1667. Anti-colonialism – buoyed by Surinam’s economic prosperity during World War II from exporting bauxite to the United States (Meel 1990: 265) – gained adherents among the Afro-Surinamese middle class in the 1940s. In 1954, Surinam obtained autonomous status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (see Van Lier 1971: 379-421 for a detailed overview).

The light-skinned Afro-Surinamese elite defied Dutch colonialism during negotiations in The Hague. They viewed themselves as the legitimate successors of the Dutch – certainly not to be surpassed by any other ethnic group. In response, dark-skinned Afro-Surinamese, East Indians and
Javanese advocated universal suffrage, which was introduced in Surinam in 1948. Many were elected to parliament in 1949, reducing the power of the light-skinned Afro-Surinamese elite (Meel 1990: 265; see also Hassankhan 2003).

Political parties based primarily on ethnicity were formed in the run-up to the 1949 elections. Three parties have since played a leading role in Surinamese politics: the NPS, VHP and KTPI, championing the interests of Afro-Surinamese, East Indians and Javanese, respectively (for a complete overview of ethnic political parties see Dew 1996). Meel argues that:

Since the welfare of the racial group is the focal point of each party, nepotism, patronage and corruption have been widely practiced and frequently obstructed… balanced government policy. In Surinam most politicians believe national interests to be subservient to ethnic interests. (Meel 1990: 265)

The lack of commitment to Surinamese nationhood began to irritate Afro-Surinamese students in the Netherlands. In 1958, progressive dark-skinned deputies, some of whom had been studying in the Netherlands, took over the NPS leadership. Surinamese independence now became an issue; in government and parliament, NPS representatives pushed the boundaries of autonomy. In 1961, Surinamese nationalist students returning from the Netherlands founded the Nationalist Republic Party (PNR), which became devoted to Surinamese independence. PNR supporters saw the building of an independent republic as the ultimate goal of every Surinamese; they therefore abhorred the emigration of Surinamese to the Netherlands. Those who left without intent to return were considered traitors ‘exposing themselves to the mercy of the colonial oppressor’ (Meel 1990: 265-268).

The PNR never enjoyed wide support and was hampered by its inability to create a multi-ethnic following; it mainly attracted well-educated Afro-Surinamese. It was able, however, to pave the road to independence – the Dutch handed over sovereignty to a NPS-PNR coalition government in 1975. After independence was achieved, the PNR’s best days were over (Meel 1990: 268-269). The new Surinamese government was immobilised by ethnic divisions, especially between the Afro-Surinamese NPS and the East Indian VHP (Dew 1990: 195). Despite these ethnic tensions, Surinamese post-colonial nationalism can be categorised as ‘territorial nationalism’ – the nationalism of an ethnically heterogeneous nation in a single state (Marshall 2003: 242-245).

The Surinamese exodus: Emigration and return migration policies

Mass emigration to the Netherlands has had serious consequences for Surinam’s post-independence development. The exodus of Surinamese to
the Netherlands, which began in 1973, has made Surinam an emigration society par excellence (Oostindie 1990: 231). After independence, Surinamese citizens lost their Dutch nationality; the Dutch parliament, however, acknowledged the special tie that existed between Dutch and Surinamese.

Surinamese in the Netherlands were not ‘random foreigners’. At the same time, the Dutch parliament stated that the Netherlands was not their home, that they would be better off in Surinam and that their country could not do without them (Jones 2007: 251-253). Surinamese Prime Minister Henck Arron echoed the sentiment in a speech to a Surinamese audience in Amsterdam in the 1970s: ‘You don’t belong here’ (Oostindie & Klinkers 2001: 249).

The Dutch admission policy for Surinamese citizens remained flexible between 1975 and 1980, under the condition that the independent republic formulates a solid return migration policy (Jones 2007: 251-253). This resulted in the ‘return migration protocol’ of 1976 that stated that all people of Surinamese origin were ‘welcome in Surinam’, and that travel and moving expenses would be paid for by the Dutch government (Bakker, Dalhuisen, Donk, Hassankhan, Steegh & Egger 1998: 165). Between 1978 and 1993, roughly 7,500 migrants took advantage of this form of subsidised repatriation (Schalkwijk 1994: 322). The return migration rate, however, was low – never more than 25 per cent of the total number of migrants in the 1950s (Bovenkerk 1982: 196). This further decreased over the years.

The National Military Council (NMR) instituted a return desk after the 1980 coup (De Ware Tijd 1980; Solidariteitsbeweging Suriname 1980). A month later, around 400 persons had registered (De Echo 1980; Trouw 1980; Utrechts Nieuwsblad 1980). This politically motivated return migration organ, however, did not exist for long and it is unknown how many people ultimately made use of it. In any case, the Surinamese government paid little attention to return migration in the 1980s (Schalkwijk 1994: 322). In 1981, it (unsuccessfully) urged the Dutch government to legalise the situation of Surinamese illegally living in the Netherlands, while the deteriorating political climate in Surinam meant political refugees were accepted in the Netherlands between 1982 and 1988 (Jones 2007: 255-256). Large-scale political emigration to the Netherlands in the 1980s, however, provoked bitterness among Surinamese who stayed behind: ‘they abandoned us when times got rough’ (Sedney 1997: 159). To this day, this is one of the reasons why the resettlement process of return migrants is far from smooth.
The 1980 coup and its aftermath

The 1980 coup was staged by non-commissioned officers who had received their military training in the Netherlands. Around independence, they returned with ‘a suitcase full of initiatives’ (Lotens 2004: 20), but were not taken seriously by their superiors. According to the leader of the junta, Lieutenant Colonel Bouterse, the coup would not have been possible without the assistance of the Dutch military mission in Surinam. The NMR, under Bouterse’s leadership, took charge in 1980. Political parties were banned, parliament suspended, the constitution adjourned and elections postponed (Sedoc-Dahlberg 1990b: 26).

The political influence of the Netherlands on Surinam remained palpable. Initially, the Netherlands supported Surinam’s first government (installed by the NMR) with development aid, aiming to strengthen the power of Prime Minister Henk Chin A Sen vis-à-vis the military. But the bilateral relationship cooled after the military forced Chin A Sen to resign in early 1982 (De Groot 2004). The NMR surrounded itself with intellectuals of different signatures, both returnees from the Netherlands and those who had never left Surinam (Lotens 2004: 24). Most were organised in two minor nationalist parties – the Revolutionary People’s Party (RVP) and the Union of Progressive Farmers and Labourers (PALU) – that grew out of the 1960s Marxist-Leninist Surinamese student movement in the Netherlands. RVP and PALU adopted anti-Dutch and anti-US policies, condemning neo-colonialism and favouring cooperation with other Third World regimes such as Nicaragua and Venezuela (Meel 1990: 270). In the 1970s, their revolutionary ideas did not appeal to a broader constituency though, by 1980, they appealed to the military leadership (Sedoc-Dahlberg 1990a: 175).

After the military regime killed fifteen of its opponents on 8 December 1982 – the December Murders – The Hague responded by suspending development aid. This political pressure – regarded as blackmail by the military and by nationalists – was ultimately successful (Meel 1990: 270). In December 1986, Bouterse, pressed by the termination of Dutch aid and the depressed price of bauxite, announced elections for the following year (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005).

In the same year, Maroon tribes declared war on the military government. For years, the gaanmans had expressed discontent with the policies of the central government in Paramaribo. Grievances swelled after atrocities were committed against several Maroon villages in the military’s hunt for a Ndyuka defector, Brunswijk. Brunswijk, former sergeant and bodyguard of Bouterse, became the leader of the Surinamese National Liberation Army (SNLA) or ‘Jungle Commando’, which carried out raids on military outposts and extended its control over the eastern and south-central part of the country. Guerrillas joined his army from the Netherlands
and Paramaribo, including defectors from the National Army. Maroons in and around Paramaribo were harassed by Bouterse supporters or arrested by the police (Dew 1990: 200). The NMR also targeted Maroon communities that indirectly supported the Jungle Commando, including an attack on the village of Moiwana in which many villagers lost their lives (Polimé & Van Velzen 1988: 7). Many Maroons fled to French Guyana and the Netherlands.

The Dutch government indirectly supported the Jungle Commando via the humanitarian aid of the Moravian ZZG headquartered in Zeist. It also tolerated meetings of the Jungle Commando on Dutch soil (Storms 1987: 15).1 The paramount chiefs nevertheless cried for help and criticised the Netherlands for ‘doing nothing’ – reminding it of its responsibility as the former coloniser (Polimé & Van Velzen 1988: 15).

Meanwhile, in the run-up to the 1987 elections, the military transformed its political arm into the NDP while the three veteran political leaders federated the NPS, VHP and KTPI into the Front for Democracy and Development. The Front, organised along ethnic lines, won the elections easily. But the larger issues – the December Murders, the continuing war between the NMR and the Jungle Commando and Bouterse’s leadership of the army – remained unsolved after the 1987 election (Brana-Shute 1990: 222). The Jungle Commando continued its struggle in its belief that real democracy had not yet been achieved. While a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Surinamese parliament and the Jungle Commando in July 1989 (Hold Translations 1989), peace did not come as Bouterse, still in charge of the army, did not accept the agreement (Buddingh’ 1995).

Post-colonial democracy, 1987-2005

With the installation of a civilian government in 1988, Dutch development aid was restored, only to be suspended again after a second, ‘soft’ coup in December 1990 (BIZA 1998). Bouterse’s NDP formed an interim government and announced elections for 1991 (Buddingh’ 1995). Much of the pre-election debate in Surinam centred on the proposal of Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers to create a commonwealth, the main aim of which was to reduce the role of the army in Surinamese political life (IACHR 1992). The elections were won by the Front, then consisting of the NPS, VHP, KTPI and the Surinamese Labour Party (SPA). Under this government, democracy and definitive peace between the army and the Jungle Commando was established in 1992 (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 231).

The commonwealth was not to be. In 1992 a new agreement was signed promising more ‘business-like’ relations (also see Gortzak 2003). Tense relations, however, continued. In 2000, the Dutch minister of development aid and the Surinamese minister of planning and development aid decided to evaluate Dutch aid and to draw lessons from the past (Kruijt & Maks
2003). The publication of the report ‘Een belaste relatie’ (‘A loaded relationship’) was difficult, with the Dutch government criticising Surinamese obstructionism. Under pressure from the Dutch parliament, two reports finally appeared: the original version and an adapted version in which the most delicate passages were deleted. The Surinamese government nevertheless distanced itself from both reports (Ramsoedh & Hoogbergen 2006: 6-7): ‘When time and money is available’, the Surinamese president stated, ‘we will produce our own Surinamese report’ (De Ware Tijd 13 February 2004 cited in Ramsoedh & Hoogbergen 2006: 7). The report concluded that Dutch development aid was fuelled by feelings of guilt and opportunism. The authors recommended more ‘business-like’ relations, a recommendation adopted by the Dutch government in its 2004 policy brief ‘Een rijke relatie’ (‘A rich relationship’), which outlined its intention to stop structural development aid (BIZA 2004).

There has been little recent interest in development cooperation on either side. For Surinam, relations within the Caribbean region have become more important. For instance, Democratic Alternative ’91 (DA’91) campaigned for monetary union with the Netherlands in 1991 and 1996; in 2005 the Netherlands was only mentioned in passing (DA’91 1996, 2000; A1 2005). To emphasise its independence, Bouterse’s NDP denounced Dutch attempts to interfere in Surinamese affairs while NPS leader Ronald Venetiaan emphasised the Netherlands’ exploitation of Surinam and its financial responsibility towards the former colony. None of the 2005 programmes mentioned Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands.

While Dutch politicians involved with Surinamese issues around the time of its independence have retired or died there is greater continuity among Surinamese leaders. That contemporary Dutch politicians know little about colonial and post-colonial relations is particularly obvious during their visits to the former colony. The former Surinamese minister of foreign affairs explained it to me in the following way:

The difference is that I know Dutch history, but Dutch politicians do not know Surinamese history and the Dutch part in it. I lived, studied, worked in the Netherlands. I was active in Dutch protest organisations […] I know Dutch society in its soul.4

As Bouterse won the 2010 national elections and became president after ten years in which NPS was the largest party, it is likely that relations between the Netherlands and Surinam will further cool in the near future. It is widely expected that the December Murders trials in Surinam, which only started in 2007, will be delayed yet again. An additional obstacle for the Dutch Government in cooperating with Bouterse is that the Netherlands had convicted Bouterse for drug trafficking in 1999. Ever since then, he officially stayed on Surinamese territory. Ironically, Bouterse
and former opponent Brunswijk, who is also sought internationally for drug-related crimes, have since formed a government together.

**Constraints for return migrants with political ambitions**

Spending at least some of their formative years in the Netherlands (see Appendix B) does not guarantee an open gate for returnee political leaders. Very few Surinamese still living in the Netherlands have been approached by party leaders for political positions. During the military regime, Bouterse recruited one minister from the Netherlands, André Haakmat. His ministerial career, however, was short-lived. After surviving an assassination attempt he fled to the Netherlands to begin a resistance organisation against military rule (Haakmat 1987).

After the return to democracy, former VHP chairman Jagernath Lachmon was well aware that a large part of the Surinamese intelligentsia lived in the Netherlands (*Elsevier* 1989). In 1991, he approached a Surinamese migrant to become minister of justice (Boerboom & Oranje 1992). But in the words of the present VHP chairman and vice-president, looking for expertise in the Netherlands is no longer necessary:

> We have a pool of graduates here, coming straight from our own university. Academics who studied in the Netherlands used to be received as heroes when they returned […] Now they just go up in the mass.5

Another obstacle for politically ambitious return migrants is their Dutch nationality. By forfeiting Dutch nationality, one loses Dutch social security rights. Politicians from three different parties took their chances in 2005 and obtained Surinamese nationality to become candidates for political office. But in one case, citizenship became a serious issue. Just before the presidential elections, it turned out that the NDP candidate had not given up his Dutch nationality, which allowed the Nieuw Front to run television spots portraying the NDP as wanting to return Surinam to the Dutch.6

**Ethnicity and nationalism in political mobilisation**

Surinamese political parties traditionally mobilise support within single ethnic groups (that are themselves religiously heterogeneous). This ethnic-religious diversity is reflected in Surinam’s political parties. For example, five parties separately appealed to the small Javanese electorate in 2005 (see Kartokromo 2006). In the 2005 elections, 27 parties competed for 335,275 potential votes7 (in comparison, fifteen parties competed for roughly twelve million votes in the Netherlands in 2002).8 These figures highlight the narrow support base of many Surinamese political parties.
Twenty-three out of 27 parties thus entered the 2005 elections within alliances (Blanksma 2006a: 33).

Electoral alliances confederating ethnic parties have become a historical pattern. The Afro-Surinamese NPS and East Indian VHP formed coalition governments between 1958 and 1967 known as *verbroederingspolitiek* (‘fraternisation politics’). The inclusion of the two largest ethnic groups in government guaranteed peaceful relations between all groups as well as the maintenance of their cultures (Azimuth 1986; Dew 1996). In the 1960s, the VHP and NPS were both challenged by new political parties from within their own ethnic groups accusing them of making too many concessions in the *verbroederingspolitiek*. The NPS also came under increasing pressure from new nationalist parties emphasising nationalism rather than ethnicity (Dew 1996: 99-138). Nationalism was emphasised under military rule as well; its leaders saw the established parties’ use of ethnic mobilisation as a tool to keep the Surinamese people divided (Blanksma 2006a: 27).

Ethnicity was once again central in the 1987 elections, with ethnically exclusive meetings held in separate locations. There was no pretension of merging the identities of the different groups into one national culture. ‘The goal was unity in diversity and the US motto “united we stand, divided we fall” was widely used…’ (Brana-Shute 1990: 220-221). Even though the military was dominated by Afro-Surinamese, the NDP presented itself as a multi-ethnic party. The cabinet assembled in 1988 carefully balanced Afro-Surinamese, East Indian and Javanese interests. Ethnic mobilisation still plays an important role during election campaigns and in the distribution of government positions. Ethnic mobilisation, however, has a highly individual character, channelled through the personal networks of politicians who generally work for their own ethnic group, the party and themselves (Ramsoedh 2001: 91-92). Since the 1980s, alliances and large political parties have increasingly presented themselves as national parties or blocs representing the whole Surinamese nation in its diversity (see Blanksma 2006a, 2006b).

This political history has clearly had consequences for the development of transnational politics. Surinamese nationalism, on the one hand, was greatly influenced by individuals who had studied in the Netherlands while nationalist parties – and the broader public, especially when times were tough under military rule – often saw migrants as ‘traitors’. So the government and political parties thus did little to stimulate return migration or to accommodate those who returned. The relationship between the Netherlands and the independent republic further deteriorated after the December Murders, leading both parties to explore possibilities for a more ‘business-like’ relationship. The following sections examine how this turbulent history has influenced Surinamese transnational party politics.
Returnees

In the 25 years preceding Surinamese independence in 1975, Surinamese students in the Netherlands became the first transnational actors trying to influence politics in the colony. Until World War II, Surinamese students in the Netherlands belonged mainly to the Afro-Surinamese upper class; they generally shied away from politics and ‘tried to live well according to Dutch norms’ (Sedoc-Dahlberg 1971: 115). This changed in the 1950s when scholarships became available for middle-class Surinamese youths to study in the Netherlands. The colony needed well-educated citizens: students were supposed to return after their studies to contribute to society. But return migration frequently failed as graduates had difficulties finding suitable jobs (Sedoc-Dahlberg 1971: 1). Nor could return migrants easily fit into existing political parties. They were better educated than the political elite and were seen as a threat; returnees were young, ambitious and wanted change, something older politicians rarely appreciated.9 Thus, return student leaders sooner or later founded their own political parties (Nell 2008b).

Students who had been active in organisations in the Netherlands used their acquired skills to form political parties and movements upon their return. Their efforts, however, were deeply fragmented, both in the Netherlands and in Surinam; divisions mainly reflected phases of emigration and ideology but also city of settlement and ethnicity. The student groups were small, limited to an active cadre of five to ten persons—usually a charismatic leader supported by fellow students. It reflected the importance of ethnicity rather than ideology in Surinamese politics.

Nevertheless, Surinamese students in the Netherlands shared with each other the experience of their time abroad. Leaving Surinam with the idea that they were Dutch, they soon realised that they were different: ‘As a rule, the Dutch did not approach Surinamese as fellow-countrymen. Instead they were regarded as foreigners and expected to have a culture of their own’ (Meel 1990: 266). This induced Surinamese in the Netherlands to search for their own identity and to make political and cultural sense out of their alienation (van Amersfoort, 1987). At the same time, international decolonisation movements and socialist ideology inspired them to criticise Surinam’s relations with the coloniser. Returning to Surinam with their new ideas, the former students were met with suspicion.

Between 1960 and 1970, three return student leaders entered Surinamese politics. The first was Eddy Bruma, founder of the Afro-Surinamese nationalist movement Wi Eegi Sani (WES – ‘Our Own Cause’) in Amsterdam around 1950 (Jansen van Galen 2000). Inspired by anti-imperialist ideology, the WES campaigned for Surinamese independence and Sranantongo as the lingua franca. Upon Bruma’s return, established Surinamese politicians saw him as a ‘communist threat’; he did not join an
existing party but established the PNR in 1961. When the PNR recruited a representative in the Netherlands, it became the first Surinamese political party founded by a return migrant with a branch in the Netherlands. Ideologically as well as in personnel, the PNR had its roots in the WES student movement; WES activists received positions in the party in Surinam and the branch in the Netherlands. In Surinam, the party slowly gained ground in parliament until Jules Sedney, a former WES activist, became prime minister in 1969.

Four years after the foundation of the PNR, a new group of returnees from the Dutch city of Leiden created their own political party in Surinam. Former chairman of the Leiden Surinamese Student Association (SSV) Venetiaan, together with the organisation secretary Hans Prade, launched the National Peoples Party (NVP) in 1965. On reflection later, Prade said: ‘People expected us to join the NPS, but we had invited ministers of governing parties to the SSV and posed critical questions, a capital sin in those days. Our reputation had been destroyed.’

The NVP never gained ground as a party. The two board members found their way into existing parties and eventually attained high positions. Twenty-five years after their return, in 1991, the two return students ran for president. Venetiaan won, as he did again in 2000 and 2005.

The third group of transnational actors in the 1960s – a small group of nationalist East Indian-Surinamese students – aimed to establish an East Indian counterpart to the Afro-Surinamese WES based on religion and language (Gobardhan-Rambocus 1993; Ramsoedh 2003). They did not establish a new party in Surinam but instead formed a branch of the United Hindustan Party (VHP) in the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort 1970; Van der Veer & Van der Burg 1984). Instead of criticising the colonial tie with the Netherlands, the Dutch branch aimed to stimulate a sense of responsibility towards Surinam among migrants. Contact with the mother party initially meant regular visits and financial and moral support during elections. This support, however, went politically unrewarded when one of the founders of the branch returned to Surinam in 1971. Though not an ideological threat, the party kept him at a distance. He explained: ‘I did a suspicious study [political science] in a suspicious city [Amsterdam].’

This was enough to prevent his full inclusion in the VHP.

Surinamese student organisations in Amsterdam and Leiden had so far worked on their own. After their leaders returned to Surinam, their successors tried to unite the Surinamese Student Organisations (SSVs) in the Netherlands and to organise the movement nationally. But divisions between cities remained; each SSV continued to plan for the founding of its own political party when members returned. As had been the case with returnees in the 1960s, they could not rely on support from existing political parties. SSV Leiden, for example, was preparing the launch of the Peoples Party (VP) upon the chairman’s return in 1973; positions within the party-
to-be mirrored the administrative board of the student organisation. But the foundation of the VP angered the communist Democratic Peoples Front (DVF) led by non-returnees. The DVF considered the VP a threat and tried to tarnish its reputation by claiming its leader was neither a real communist nor a real Surinamese, but a Dutch intellectual (KPS/ML 1975).

To aid the party both financially and morally, the VP used its former contacts in the student movement to establish a branch in the Netherlands. The chairman’s aim was to train cadres who could quickly return to Surinam. Thirty years later, the VP chairman Ruben Lie Paw Sam saw support in the Netherlands as ‘a family process’. Looking back, he deplored that members in the Netherlands were not driven by ideology but by having friends and family in the organisation. Newly arrived students, moreover, remained politically untutored by the VP leader who now lived in Surinam. While he visited the organisation in the Netherlands every six months, relations with emigrants remained difficult: ‘If I arrived they shook their heads. They came with new ideas. It is not that I didn’t like it, but I needed practical solutions.’

Lie Paw Sam found his main opponent in Iwan Krolis, the charismatic student leader of SSV Wageningen. While Krolis was in the Netherlands, SSV Wageningen supported an existing Marxist-Leninist organisation in Surinam. Nevertheless, once back in Surinam, the Surinamese organisation mistrusted the returnees: ‘we returned with extra intellectual baggage… “You should not think that you can take from us what we have built,” was their stance.’ This motivated Krolis in 1977 to found the PALU in Surinam, with a branch in the Netherlands. The latter supported the mother party financially and morally during election campaigns but was dissolved when the last chairman returned to Surinam in 1999. The branch, however, had already lost its influence among students in the Netherlands; as students returned, other Surinamese parties tried to influence the PALU ‘bastion’ in Wageningen.

After the return of the communist student leaders Lie Paw Sam and Krolis, former SSV groups created the National Organisation of Surinamese in the Netherlands (LOSON) in 1973. LOSON aimed to stimulate return migration. But in contrast to earlier student organisations, LOSON also sought to improve the position of Surinamese in the Netherlands. Just prior to independence, LOSON became a member of the communist DVF in Surinam and, alongside the VP and PALU, fundraised in the Netherlands (LOSON 1976). But after three years, LOSON left the DVF, complaining that the party excluded it from decision-making (Solidariteitsbeweging Suriname 1979).

The political ‘comeback’ of individuals who had gone to the Netherlands to study was more difficult than expected. Their time in the Netherlands clearly had negative consequences for their political careers in
Surinam. Instead of cooperating with other returnees or with existing political parties, returnee student leaders often founded their own parties. But this transplantation of immigrant politics angered members of existing Surinamese parties. Most returnees who had supported Surinamese parties while living in the Netherlands eventually left them after returning. Nevertheless, some earlier return students did eventually achieve high political office. They were less radically ‘leftist’ than the new arrivals and, simply being earlier, were in time to fill the openings (see also Bovenkerk 1982).

Ideological, ethnic and geographical divisions between student organisations were transplanted from the Netherlands, just as this fragmentation had earlier been imported from Surinam. After their return, students’ contacts with the organisations they left behind in the Netherlands quickly weakened and, along with them, the connections needed to support their parties. Organised transnational activity among students declined after independence in 1975; the main goal had been achieved. This radically altered the position of Surinamese students in the Netherlands. The growing Surinamese migrant community was changing as well: Surinamese now officially became ‘migrants’ while their political life came to focus on residence in the Netherlands rather than return to Surinam.

Military rule

The 1980 coup dramatically changed the direction of transnational politics. Some return students in Surinam supported the coup and held advisory positions until 1982. Generally speaking, Surinamese immigrant organisations that considered themselves ‘leftist’ sympathised with the so-called revolution while supporters of the old ruling parties opposed it. It is important to underline that the central actors in this episode – both opponents and proponents of the military regime – were few in number. Homeland-directed politics further became transplanted homeland politics when the revolutionary leaders killed fifteen opponents of the regime in 1982. Political refugees in the Netherlands now schemed to overthrow the regime.

Surinamese immigrant groups in the Netherlands responded differently to the coup. Sympathisers of the traditional political parties naturally opposed it; some were active in Dutch political parties of different signatures and tried, unsuccessfully, to influence their parties’ policies regarding Surinam.17 Other migrant organisations were more sympathetic and tried to mobilise support for the ‘revolution’ (Solidariteitsbeweging Suriname 1980). The coup’s proponents united in a national umbrella organisation in 1981, the Revolutionary Movement of Surinamese Supporting Organisations (REBOSON). REBOSON maintained close contact with the NMR and included organisations and branches of parties that advised the
NMR in Surinam such as PALU (PALU 1982). REBOSON’s main goal was to increase return migration and to lobby for the resumption of frozen Dutch development aid (REBOSON 1983). Influencing Dutch foreign policy now became a key objective for transnational actors in both the Netherlands and Surinam.

In early 1983, exiles founded the Council for the Liberation of Surinam (RBS) in the Netherlands. Most RBS members had enjoyed high political office in Surinam (even the presidency). The RBS held the Dutch government responsible for the coup; it claimed the Dutch military mission had murdered Surinamese democracy and had encouraged the sergeants (RBS 1986: 8). In its activities, the RBS appealed to the responsibility of the Netherlands to help reinstall democracy; it also strengthened contacts with representatives of Dutch parties and fostered links with Cuban exile organisations in the US. As its main goal was to return to Surinam, the RBS did not cooperate with Surinamese immigrant organisations focused on improving the position of migrants in the Netherlands.

In addition to the RBS’ exiled ‘elite’, student leaders who had organised demonstrations against the NMR’s university reforms before fleeing to the Netherlands now became transnationally active (Ramlakhan probably 1983). Exiled students grouped together and tried to mobilise non-exiled Surinamese students; broad student resistance, however, was not to be. Just as ‘senior’ immigrant organisations were unwilling to work with ‘senior’ exiles in resistance organisations, immigrant students were unwilling to join the resistance organisations of students-in-exile. While still supportive of a democratic Surinam, exiled students’ activities came to resemble those of a ‘foreign student’ society rather than one of ‘militant exiles’ (see WJ jongerenorganisatie – CNV 1984). ‘A student movement cannot develop resistance activities from here,’ they argued. ‘After your study you return and resist over there.’ In other words, transplanted homeland politics was pointless – one needed to return to Surinam to make effective change.

On the pro-revolutionary side, relations with key persons in Surinam improved after 8 December 1982. To oppose the RBS and promote the Surinamese ruling order, proponents launched the League of Surinamese Patriots (LSP) in the Netherlands. In fact, this was a continuation of REBOSON. For the ‘leftist migrant organisations’, the decision to continue actions was largely based on whether relatives, friends or political leaders supported by the organisation had been among the victims of the murders (see De Waarheid 1983). These leftist migrant organisations did not create an umbrella organisation like the LSP or RBS, of which they were critical; the RBS, consisting of the former political elite, was considered a continuation of the ‘old’ politics (Kollektief Jumpa Rajguru 1984). Logically, those who opposed the dictatorship also rejected the LSP.

The activities of the resistance movement in the Netherlands triggered the Surinamese ruling order to take reprisals against the RBS and their
relatives in Surinam. In both countries – or on holidays – people watched their steps.\textsuperscript{20} According to a former resistance leader, this led to social isolation within the Dutch Surinamese community: ‘People were terrified to be associated with us.’\textsuperscript{21} This fear increased after a group of musicians were killed in a room where the RBS was scheduled to meet in 1985. The perpetrators were never found.

Transnational political activism became more diverse after 8 December 1982. The murder of the ‘expected’ opponents of military rule on Dutch territory was a clear example of transplanted homeland politics. Activities of Surinamese in the Netherlands also had consequences for their relatives in Surinam (IACHR 1985): one reason why most migrants did not participate in resistance activities even if they rejected the revolution. On the other hand, supporters of the regime became more home country-directed, maintaining strong ties with the ruling order though their positions remained informal. Exiles had few (secret) transnational contacts in this period; they tried to achieve their goals via the Dutch government and relations with third-country governments and political parties.

New prospects for the resistance movement in the Netherlands appeared when Brunswijk began his revolt against the army in 1986. Soon Brunswijk was the most wanted criminal in Surinam. He sought asylum in the Netherlands, where two resistance leaders encouraged him to begin guerrilla warfare:\textsuperscript{22}

we agreed to overturn the military regime and to reinstall democracy. That is not possible without military violence. I was to start the resistance here and people in the Netherlands would support me.\textsuperscript{23}

In Surinam, Brunswijk formed the SNLA consisting mainly of Maroons from eastern Surinam.\textsuperscript{24} Both in the Netherlands and Surinam, Maroons from eastern Surinam identified with Brunswijk’s struggle. The conflict thus gained a new dimension: the emancipation of impoverished Maroons. From this moment, the RBS took a supporting rather than leading role in the resistance against Bouterse\textsuperscript{25} – once active on Surinamese territory, exiles became wanted ‘terrorists’ (Herrenberg 1986). The conflict ended in the 1986-1992 ‘civil war’ between the SNLA and the National Army, when the SNLA controlled one-third of the country (see De Vries 2005).

In the end, the support of resistance organisations in the Netherlands was ineffective. According to Brunswijk, it was characterised by ‘promises’ (Van der Beek 1987). The resistance movement – consisting of RBS and some other organisations in the Netherlands and the SNLA in Surinam – was divided.\textsuperscript{26} The close contact of the RBS with Dutch political parties, however, was partially behind the Dutch government’s indirect financial support of the SNLA under the banner of humanitarian aid to
Maroon communities (Storms 1987). After the installation of a civilian government in 1987, resistance groups in the Netherlands officially ended their activities (Bakker et al. 1998). But the SNLA continued its struggle, arguing that real democracy – with a subordinate army – had not been achieved.

Military rule from 1980 to 1987 had a great impact on transnational politics and revealed the many divisions among its actors, both in Surinam and in the Netherlands. The divisions reflected political cleavages in the homeland, first imported into the immigrant society by students and later transnationalised in ties between settled migrants in the Netherlands and return and non-migrants in Surinam. This fragmentation weakened the capacity to mobilise and influence political change and, while military rule politicised the immigrant community, transnational actors had little impact with their small-scale actions in support of specific groups. While some return migrants (the former revolutionary leader Bouterse being the most striking example) made their mark on Surinamese politics, their transnational ties mattered little once in power. While transnational ties were vital to the creation of the SNLA, actors in the Netherlands had little influence over its subsequent actions.

**Post-colonial democracy**

The aims and activities of transnational actors changed when Surinam entered its period of ‘post-colonial democracy’. Influencing diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Surinam became less important. Some exiles did not return right away – some never did – but began seeing themselves as *migrants* in the Netherlands. Transplanted homeland politics (i.e. the import of homeland conflicts) faded away while formal transnational party politics – ties between political parties in Surinam and their sympathisers in the Netherlands – mainly channelled home country-directed transnational politics. The political fate of returnees in the 1990s was strikingly similar to those who returned before independence. They clashed with the political elite and with Surinamese political culture and created new marginal parties instead of or after joining existing parties. Returnee political entrepreneurs had to create niches for themselves.

*Transnational party politics, 1987-2005*

When political parties re-entered the political arena in the run-up to the 1987 elections, their Dutch branches were recreated and formalised. This was frequently in response to requests for money or expertise. Those involved often had kinship relations with party leaders in Surinam; such family ties are traceable up to the 2005 elections. It should be emphasised
that most party branches in the Netherlands consist of very small groups with personal ties to party cadres in Surinam. Figure 4.1 shows all national and transnational ties of Surinamese parties and their branches in the Netherlands.

The star of ties on the lower left portrays parliamentary cooperation between the Nieuw Front consisting of the predominantly Afro-Surinamese parties NPS and SPA, the East Indian VHP and the Javanese Pertjajah Luhur (PL) and the alliance A-Combinatie uniting the Maroon parties ABOP, Fraternity and Unity in Politics (BEP) and Seeka. This star is partly reflected in the Netherlands as each of the Nieuw Front parties has its own branch there. While the branches in the Netherlands organise activities as an alliance during election campaigns, cooperation with the Maroon organisations does not show in the figure; at the time of research, A-Combinatie was still exploring opportunities to establish a branch in the Netherlands. BEP, however, maintains ties with some Maroon organisations in the Netherlands. A similar reflection of the party alliance People’s Alliance for Progress (VVV), consisting of the ethnically mixed party

![Figure 4.1 National and transnational ties of Surinamese parties](image-url)

Square: Political party  
Circle: Migrant organisation/NGO  
Black: Surinam  
Grey: The Netherlands  
— : Highly institutionalised  
— : Lowly institutionalised
DNP2000, the East Indian Basis Party for Renewing and Democracy (BVD) and the Javanese KTPI can be seen in the upper right of the figure.

Generally speaking, Dutch party branches exist to support their parties financially. Since Surinamese political parties do not receive financial support from the government (see Krishnadath 2000), support from branches, be it monetarily or in kind, is very welcome. Political support is the other main contribution, with branches organising meetings for Dutch members and Surinamese party leaders – physically or via live phone connections. This is regardless of the fact that Surinamese in the Netherlands cannot vote. The leaders of the multi-ethnic VVV and the predominantly East Indian Union of Progressive Surinamese (UPS) campaigned in the Netherlands in 2005. Both believed that a Dutch campaign would influence voting behaviour in Surinam through family ties. They believed people in Surinam would look up to their relatives in the Netherlands who had studied, earned good salaries and had succeeded in Dutch society; their voting advice would be taken seriously. The NDP had a further motive to campaign in the Netherlands: to gain members among first-generation Surinamese students who may one day return.

Sympathisers of all Surinamese political parties, organised in Dutch party branches, travelled to Surinam to offer their support in person. This was not organised by the parties; those able to leave their jobs and afford to go did so. In most cases, this meant between three and ten people per party. During their stay they were often present at board meetings; public appearances were rare. Members of the Dutch branches assisted with logistics and campaigning, performed administrative tasks and acted as observers at voting stations. But when it came to concrete policy proposals, advice from the Dutch branches was generally ignored, even though individual party members in the Netherlands routinely advise individual politicians in Surinam. While such advice is requested often and taken seriously, it is usually channelled through ties between relatives or old friends. Party branches based on friendships and families have higher chances of success: their transnational ties are strong and foster frequent communication. Practically all political parties and their branches in the Netherlands are connected through such ties.

Institutionalised family ties seem omnipresent, certainly at the level of boards. Thus the institutionalised ties between branches and the mother parties in Figure 4.1 are often also based on kinship. This particularly concerns ties between brothers, sons and fathers, between uncles and nephews and between sons and fathers-in-law. The following examples are instructive.

In 1987, trade union leader Fred Derby founded the SPA. Around the same time, his son was asked to establish a SPA branch in the Netherlands. The son became SPA chairman in the Netherlands in 1989, mirroring the position of his father in Surinam. In 1987, the NPS branch was
formalised by a party member sent to the Netherlands for this purpose. A key contact was his father-in-law who had founded the Dutch NPS branch in exile. The NPS member arrived in the Netherlands to set up Frambo, the financial organ of the NPS, and to examine possibilities for Dutch support. This individual became the official contact person in Surinam while his father-in-law became chairman in the Netherlands. When the SPA leader in Surinam and the chairman of the NPS branch in the Netherlands died, the institutionalised family ties between board members disappeared. Family ties on other levels, however, continued to be politically important. NPS leadership in the Netherlands passed to a party member who had been chairman of the NPS youth branch in Surinam and whose father had been minister of education and secretary of the party council.

NPS and SPA leaders in Surinam and the Netherlands stay in regular touch by phone and email as well as during work and family visits. The NPS official responsible for contact with the Dutch branch admitted his function was unnecessary as party members are connected through family and friendship ties: ‘We are so close with each other, people contact each other straight away.’ This was confirmed by the NPS minister of foreign affairs: ‘I talk to the people in the Netherlands on the phone weekly when I need information, or when they have advice.’ The SPA leadership in both countries confirmed regular contact by phone and email; physical distance does not imply estrangement. ‘When we are in Surinam, we participate directly in meetings with the administrative board, nobody will ask why you are there, they expect it.’

Most leaders of Surinamese parties have relatives or close friends in the Netherlands who support the party leadership and are frequently consulted. This may include writing speeches or parts of the party programme, or advising candidates during election campaigns. While such individual support has no visible effect on the respective political parties, it does affect Surinamese politics.

The chairmen of Surinamese party branches in the Netherlands generally belong to the elite within Dutch Surinamese civil society (see Figure 4.1). While they may be opponents in Surinamese politics, in the Netherlands they work together (see Figure 3.1). For instance, the chairman of the VHP branch and the board members of the UPS branch are active in several East Indian organisations in The Hague as well as within national umbrella organisations; together they represent the interests of East Indians in the Netherlands. When they travelled to Surinam to support their parties in 2005, they stayed in the same hotel. Though they competed in the campaigns, after the mass meetings Surinamese elites from the Netherlands – representing different political parties – could be seen fraternising on the terraces of Paramaribo’s bars. Figure 4.1 also shows the ties of the VHP, NPS and SPA branches with the development organisations SIOSD and CSO. In fact, they have been the driving forces behind several conferences
on dual citizenship and broadening political opportunities in Surinam for Surinamese with Dutch passports, as described in the previous chapter.

Yet involvement in Dutch branches of Surinamese parties is no guarantee for success in Surinam. The former chairman of the Dutch branch of the KTPI was asked by the party leader to return to become the minister of social affairs in 1996. But party members reacted negatively to his special position and his Dutch working methods; eventually, he left the KTPI to found his own party, Democrats of the Twenty-First Century (D21). As in the 1970s, return migrants in the 1990s often established their own parties. At least two such parties competed in elections for the first time in 2005. But as was the case with returnees’ parties in the 1970s, they received few votes. What was new was the exclusive focus on the mobilisation of the rank and file in Surinam.

The above case shows how migrants’ national and transnational activities in both Surinamese civil society and Dutch politics reinforce one another. In fact, it is the same people – the elite within Surinamese civil society – who are active in both. Transnational political activities seem to succeed only when actors in the Netherlands support established political actors in Surinam. Many return migrants found that involvement in a branch of a Surinamese party in the Netherlands was no guarantee of a long-term position in Surinamese politics.

**Ties between Dutch and Surinamese political parties and the role of Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin**

Surinamese and Dutch political parties have cooperated or sympathised with each other since the 1950s, while Surinamese migrants have historically been represented within Dutch parties. In the past, simultaneous memberships within Surinamese and Dutch parties often reflected close ties between them. But as previously noted, politicians of Surinamese origin who have grown up in the Netherlands find it frustrating that the new generation of Dutch politicians knows little about Surinam. How does this affect the diplomatic relationship between political parties?

Though formal ties never existed, the NPS traditionally saw the PvdA as its ideological equivalent, the rank and file of both parties consisting of urban labourers and civil servants (Jansen van Galen 2001: 46-48). Elite members of the NPS in Surinam – including Ferrier who would become the first president of the Surinamese Republic – were PvdA members when they were students in the Netherlands (Jansen van Galen 2005). Return migrants who had been active in the PvdA further attempted to remodel the NPS along the lines of the PvdA (Jansen van Galen 2001: 47). Surinamese students in the Netherlands who had been members of the Progressive Surinamese Peoples Party (PSV) in Surinam automatically joined the Catholic Peoples Party (KVP, later the Christian Democratic Party - CDA)
in the Netherlands. The PSV in Surinam, founded by a Dutch priest on the model of the KVP, maintained close ties with its Dutch counterpart.\textsuperscript{37}

Contacts between Dutch parties and Surinamese migrants and exiles served various ends during military rule. Exiles, in particular, used their contacts to try to influence Dutch policy towards Surinam, while Dutch parties kept contact with the branches of pro-revolutionary parties such as PALU\textsuperscript{38} to stay informed about political developments in Surinam. A similar strategy employing transnational ties was used to try to improve frozen diplomatic relations during Surinamese democracy’s recovery period. Ironically, it was Bouterse – the former leader of the ‘revolution’ and now chairman of the NDP – who first attempted to influence Dutch policy by inviting PvdA politician of Surinamese origin Chas Warning to observe the 1987 elections (\textit{De Nieuwe Bijlmer} 1987a). The initiative, however, did not have the desired effect – either on the relations between the Netherlands and Surinam or on the PvdA’s stance towards Bouterse. The episode only provoked criticism within the Dutch Surinamese community (\textit{De Nieuwe Bijlmer} 1987b).

After the second coup in 1990, Bouterse, who still had considerable power within the army, wanted a new relationship with the Netherlands (\textit{De West} 1991b) – though not in the form of the commonwealth proposed by Prime Minister Lubbers. Instead, Bouterse aimed to improve communication between the two countries through Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin (\textit{Trouw} 1991b). He thus contacted local politicians representing various Dutch parties and cities to exchange thoughts on the future of Surinam after the 1991 elections (\textit{De West} 1991a). In several interviews, the delegation members explicitly stated that they were politicians in the Netherlands. Their aim was not to ‘tell them in Paramaribo what to do’ (\textit{Trouw} 1991a), but ‘to influence their Dutch parties’ standpoint regarding Surinam’ (\textit{Weekkrant Suriname} 1991). In this way they became transnational actors.

Bouterse’s opponents who had led the resistance movement in exile backed the commonwealth idea. The former exiles, aiming to advise both Dutch and Surinamese political parties, now began to act as Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands, cooperating with immigrant elites to smooth relations between the Netherlands and Surinam. While some Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin individually tried to influence relations between their parties and the Surinamese government, little was achieved.

Over time, relations that had existed between Dutch and Surinamese political parties weakened and finally dissolved. This was in large part due to key figures in the Netherlands leaving their positions. After the reinstitution of Surinamese parties in 1987, many attempted to formalise ties with parties in the Netherlands. PALU, through the mediation of its Dutch branch, maintained ties with the Dutch liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD); they exchanged ideas about liberal movements
between 1990 and 2002. This, however, ended when the VVD contact person left the party. The Progressive Hindustani Party (HPP) in Surinam likewise maintained ties with the GroenLinks party through the mediation of its Dutch branch and East Indian parliamentarian Tara Singh Varma. This contact was especially fruitful when the HPP was represented in the Surinamese assembly between 1996 and 2000. But after Singh Varma left politics, the contact ended. A similar pattern was apparent for the formerly close PSV and KVP; when the KVP merged into the CDA, the international ‘sister’ relationship ended. Traditionally strong contacts between the NPS and the PvdA also dissolved. In the 1980s the NPS had argued its members should exclusively join the PvdA; today NPS members in the Netherlands are active in all parties. What matters is having the same view on Surinamese politics.

Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin in Amsterdam have been united in an organisation since 1994. Since 2003, they have also come to cooperate at the national level through the National Platform of Surinamese Politicians (LPSP). In 2005, the LPSP counted 168 national and local politicians, local administrators and party board members. Some politicians did not join the network, fearing their parties would disapprove of their membership in a Surinamese network while representing a Dutch electorate. The LPSP, however, mainly focuses on immigrant activities and on increasing Surinamese representation in the Netherlands. In the run-up to the 2002 national elections, it sent a manifesto to all Dutch political parties arguing that more Surinamese should be placed in strategic political positions (Het Parool 2001). When President Venetiaan visited the Netherlands, he was received by the LPSP – representing Dutch politicians with a special interest in Surinam rather than as Surinamese politicians in Holland (De Volkskrant 2004).

These developments and the fact that Surinam is now a democracy gives Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin little reason to influence Dutch foreign policy on Surinam. In contrast, there are good reasons why they should focus on their work as Dutch politicians. First, contacts between Dutch and Surinamese parties are still loaded with post-colonial tensions. Second, the lack of ‘formal contact persons’ means contacts dissolve once the responsible individuals leave their positions. Third, the focus of both Dutch and Surinamese parties has been shifting towards their respective regions.

All this reveals the transient nature of international party relations. Neither shared ideology nor the mediation of Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin assures their survival. Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin are once again focused on the country of settlement; their lack of will to operate transnationally is reinforced by their professional role – to represent the interests of the Dutch electorate. Personal contacts between politicians in the two countries have in any case been fading since
independence. These developments are the result of changing priorities among both Dutch and Surinamese politicians – the latter today represent a post-colonial democracy no longer isolated in its own region.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed transnational politics over 50 years of Surinam’s history – as a colony nearing independence, under the military regime, and as a post-colonial democratic republic. It was apparent that homeland-directed political activity among migrants was successful only when it supported an existing party’s position and leadership. Ambitious return migrants who wanted to change the Surinamese political landscape were never tolerated by non-migrants and long-term returnees. Newly arrived return migrants were thus excluded – or excluded themselves – from the circle of political power.

This dynamic has its roots in post-colonial history. Surinamese political leaders have been consistently allergic to actors in the Netherlands telling them what to do. By constraining transplanted immigrant politics, Surinam-based actors have successfully undermined their impact. While post-independence nationalism in Surinam can be characterised as ‘territorial’, this nationalism still contains ‘anti-colonial’ elements towards its former citizens abroad. This explains why the Surinamese state and political parties rarely reach out to former citizens except for financial or material support.

Settled return migrants, however, remain visible in contemporary Surinamese politics, with over half of present party leaders having spent at least some of their formative years in the Netherlands. Though a new generation of politicians educated in Surinam and waning interest in the Netherlands are weakening the transnational component of Surinamese politics, strong ties between friends and relatives make it unlikely to disappear. Its impact should not be underestimated; individuals in the Netherlands can have great influence on the political decisions of individual Surinamese politicians. Reflecting Surinamese politics, such influence will become more individualised and informal.

The individual character of transnational party politics reflects the ethnically and religiously fragmented organisation of Surinamese politics and Surinamese civil society in the Netherlands. As is the case with migrant organisations, Surinamese political parties and their branches in the Netherlands are unable to mobilise large groups, even from within their own ethnic groups. Charismatic leaders are central within Surinamese parties, branches and migrant organisations. If they leave, the organisation or party generally falls apart.
The Surinamese case shows how political circumstances in the, first, colonial and, later, post-colonial homeland influenced emigration and return migration motives, and thereby the direction of transnational politics and who was involved. Since the 1950s, the Surinamese political world has not welcomed transnational involvement, while those ties that lasted reflected the structure of homeland politics. The success or failure of home country-directed initiatives depends on the responsiveness of actors in the homeland, thus underlining the importance of including non-migrants and long-term returnees in studies of transnationalism.
5 Turkey: Labour migration to transnational party politics

The associational life of first-generation Turkish migrants in the Netherlands represented the whole spectrum of homeland political parties and movements. Several decades later, most of these organisations still exist. Though ties with homeland political parties have remained remarkably stable, they are now used for very different ends. This chapter addresses this tension between organisational form and political content in the historical development of transnational party politics. In general terms, it asks how involvement in transnational party politics among Turkish migrants emerged, developed and waned over time. Central to the story are the motivations and strategies of political parties in Turkey and in European exile as well as those of the Turkish state.

This chapter consists of four main sections in which different actors play leading roles. The first introduces the political parties and factions in Turkey that had the greatest influence on migrants in the Netherlands. The second describes the evolution of ties between these actors in Turkey and Turkish migrant organisations and elites in the Netherlands. The third more specifically examines the interests of the Turkish state in migrant transnational activities. In the final section, I examine the meaning of ‘dual orientation’ for political participation in the Netherlands, specifically for Dutch politicians of Turkish origin and the Dutch political parties they represent.

The political landscape

Turkish migrants have been organised in associations since 1964; the first guest worker organisation with a clear tie to a Turkish political party was founded in 1974. To understand the transnational ties of these organisations in the context of political opportunities in Turkey, the description of political parties and movements in Turkey and the political climate they encountered starts in the 1960s – prior to the coup d’état of 1971 – and stretches until 2005. This section introduces ideologically based parties and movements from the far left to the far right as well as the role of religion for some of them.
The ‘wilderness years’

Turkish politics in the 1970s was turbulent; Pope and Pope (1997: 126-140) have called this period, not without reason, the ‘wilderness years’. The political radicalism of the 1970s was fuelled by the growth of the militant left (the right had already mobilised in the 1960s). The left radicalised after the electoral failure of the Turkish Workers Party (TİP) (Lipovsky 1992: 67-82; Poulton 1997: 211); after it was shut down in 1970, former TİP members became active in Dev Genç, where many future leaders of leftwing organisations were also active.

The nationalist parties and movements of the 1970s were rooted in the Republican Peasant and Farmers Nation Party (CKMP). In the late 1960s, its leader Alparslan Türkeş injected ‘Turkist’ and anti-communist ideology into the party’s rhetoric. Türkeş wrote in his memoirs:

Following 1968, an extreme active Marxist and separatist youth movement began. In an evaluation meeting of the party, we said that only a more attractive ideology could overcome this separatist movement. Then we discussed which ideology we could use. We decided that Turkish nationalism could be the counter-ideology and that we should rally around this ideology. (Turgut cited in Arslan 2004: 114)

The party organised youth in the Ülkü Ocakları (Hearth of the Ideal), whose members called themselves Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves). In 1969, they began a campaign to intimidate leftist students, teachers, publicists, booksellers and politicians. The Grey Wolves received paramilitary training from the party in specially designed camps; their mission was to conquer the streets and campuses to defend Turkey from communism (Landau 1974, 1981: 148; Çınar & Arkan 2002: 26-27; Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 256-257).

In the run-up to the 1969 elections, the CKMP continued as the MHP. Türkeş began to emphasise Islam as part of the Turkish national heritage, in what became known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. By including Islam the MHP aimed to mobilise the conservative-religious electorate of Central Anatolia in its fight against leftist revolutionary groups. The other major party on the right that emerged in 1969 was the pro-Islamic National Order Party (MNP) of Necmettin Erbakan. The MHP and the MNP posed a serious threat to the party in power, the conservative AP (Landman 1992: 114; Mert 2000; Çınar & Arkan 2002: 27; Yavuz 2003: 141; Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 257).

The AP seemed powerless in the face of leftwing and Grey Wolves violence. On 12 March 1971, the military’s chief general demanded that a strong and credible government be formed, one that would end the
‘anarchy’ and carry out reforms in a ‘Kemalist spirit’. The army exercised ‘its constitutional duty’ and took matters into its own hands: martial law was declared in major urban areas as well as in provinces where Kurdish nationalists were active. This effectively paralysed political life: youth organisations and all meetings of professional organisations and unions were prohibited (Ahmad 1993). The military now began a witch-hunt against anyone with leftist or progressive liberal sympathies (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 259).

The leftist workers party TİP and the extreme nationalist party MHP were shut down in the summer of 1971. The Islamist MNP of Erbakan was likewise closed by the constitutional court for having used religion for political purposes (Turan 1991: 45). Two years later, Erbakan formed the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party (MSP), stating that Turkey was alienating itself from its own cultural and religious roots by copying the West. The party’s slogan became Yeniden büyük Türkiye (‘A grand Turkey once again’), referring to the Ottoman Empire (Toprak 1981: 98-102; Sunier 1996: 54).

Political violence became a real problem in the late 1970s. The five coalition governments between 1973 and 1979 were extremely weak and gave small extremist groups disproportionate influence (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 260-263). Several leftist groups and the Grey Wolves fought for control of the streets and university campuses. The Grey Wolves were most active in recruiting new members, especially among university students. The organisation served as a ‘school’ where future MHP leaders and activists acquired organisational and leadership skills. Most, if not all, current MHP leaders and parliamentarians began their political careers as members of the Grey Wolves. Membership of both the party and the youth organisation was characterised by unconditional attachment and loyalty; leaving either could, in extreme cases, be lethal (Çınar & Arıkan 2002: 26).

Whereas the Grey Wolves formed a relatively homogenous group and combated the left as a whole, the left itself was fragmented. Ideological, political and personal conflicts led to fierce struggles. The struggle between the left and right was unequal, not only due to their relative size (60,000 armed militants on the left against 100,000 on the right), but because the police and security forces had become the exclusive preserve of the MHP. As the MHP had been in government between 1974 and 1977, these institutions were heavily infiltrated by ‘fascists’ who protected the Grey Wolves. By the end of the 1970s, whole neighbourhoods came under the control of one or the other of the competing groups and were declared ‘liberated areas’ (Landau 1981: 148; Pope & Pope 1997: 132; Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 263).

The authorities were unable to restore order in the large cities under the control of leftwing and rightwing groups and in the south-eastern provinces where the PKK was active. This, combined with economic crisis,
motivated the army to usurp power once more on 12 September 1980 (Çınar & Arıkan 2002: 28; Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 264). Under the new Party Law, politicians were banned from politics for ten years and their parties were dissolved. Political leaders were arrested, and parliamentarians and local administrators sent home. The Party Law also prohibited cooperation between political parties and associations or foundations to prevent parties being supported – financially or otherwise – by civil society. To depoliticise the extra-party political scene, associations were no longer allowed to pursue political aims (Schüler 2000: 203-204; Tachau 2002). All power was in the hands of the military, more specifically that of the National Security Council (MGK) (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 278-280).

Political liberalisation began everywhere (except in the south-east) with elections in 1983, involving three new parties approved by the MGK. The ban on former politicians was lifted in 1987; political parties were allowed to re-open under their traditional names in 1993 (Güneş-Ayata 2002: 106; Argun 2003: 140). In 1995, the Party Law was changed to allow cooperation between political parties and civil society, which had been prohibited since 1982 (Schüler 2000: 204).

Turkey in 1996 was for the first time governed by a party and a leader, Necemettin Erbakan, positioned outside the established norms of Kemalism. When it was declared that political Islam would not be allowed to come to power, Islamic organisations quickly became a part of civil society (Kramer 2000: 55). A ‘soft coup’ followed in 1997, which saw the Islamist party of Erbakan pushed aside by the military through the National Security Council (Yerasimos 2000: 21). Hostility towards political Islam is rooted in the secular foundations of the Turkish state. The principles of Atatürk remain omnipresent in Turkish daily life; even the smallest villages boast his pictures and statutes, which are obligatory in every public building (see Navaro-Yashin 2002).

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, military officers have been the most ardent guardians of secularism. The military’s interventions (in 1960-1961, 1971-1973 and 1980-1983) always had the stated purpose of safeguarding the secular-democratic state. The military’s role in government is formalised through the MGK, made up of the president, the prime minister, the ministers of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, the general chief of staff and the commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie. According to the 1982 constitution, the Council of Ministers must defer to the MGK’s recommendations. The military’s prerogatives remain largely undiluted; it continues to use the MGK to influence government policy in matters considered critical for the internal and external security of the country (Sakallıoğlu 1997; Momayezi 1998; Heper & Güney 2000: 636-651; Tachau 2002).

Following liberalisation and the formal re-entry of politicians banned after the 1980 coup, the 1990s were characterised by splits and breaks in
political parties (see Appendix C for a historical family tree of Turkish political parties). The following subsections describe the ideologies and splinters of the largest streams: the Islamists, the extreme right, the left and the social democrats.

The Islamists

The MNP, MSP and the RP were all founded under the leadership of Erbakan, who had to re-establish his parties under new names as predecessors were outlawed by the constitutional court. While party activities were replete with national symbols, national identity was clearly subordinate to religious identity. Erbakan’s parties enjoyed strong support: in the province of Istanbul alone, the women’s wing of the party once had 69,000 members. In the 1990s, it was organised in 600 neighbourhoods and had 2.6 million members (Pope & Pope 1997: 321; White 2002; Yeşilda 2002a).

Erbakan gained ground after his RP won the 1995 elections, becoming prime minister and running the country in coalition with the DYP, known as the Refahyol government. Secularists – the CHP and CHP-rooted parties – feared its goals were as extreme as those of the Taliban and the Iranian Islamist regime. The Refahyol government was forced out of power by a ‘soft coup’ in 1997 (Yeşilda 2002b: 68; Ewing 2003: 422-3).

In the following year, the RP was closed by the constitutional court and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. During this ban, Erbakan’s closest allies founded the Virtue Party (FP) (Groc 2000). Erbakan, however, continued to provide guidance to the FP. The FP’s younger elites – led by the dynamic former mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan and Gül – challenged the old guard with ideas to reform the party. In 2001, the FP, like its predecessors, was shut down by the military for threatening the secular nature of the republic. The so-called ‘Reformists’ and ‘Traditionalists’ had split. Erbakan established the Felicity Party (SP), which became marginal. On the Reformist front, Erdoğan established the AKP.

The AKP distanced itself from Erbakan and his policies. Ever since its foundation, AKP leaders have maintained that their party is not based on religion and is strictly a ‘conservative democratic party’; any suggestion that the party was Islamic would have invited closure by the Constitutional Court (Akoğlan 2006; Erdoğan 2006; Hale 2006: 66). The AKP defines secularism as an orienting principle for the state, but not for individuals; its approach is thus no different from what is stipulated in the Constitution (Heper & Toktaş 2003: 162-184). The party has thus established itself as a pro-Islamic party without any overt association to, or discussion of, Islam (Tepe 2006: 130). Defenders of Turkish secularism, in particular, the military and the Turkish president at the time of study, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, remained sceptical. The AKP, however, enjoyed overwhelming success in
the 2002 elections and formed a single-party government, attracting a broad spectrum of relatively young, religious and rightwing people (Çarkoğlu 2006: 174).

**The ultranationalists**

The MHP operated under the name of the Nationalist Workers Party (MÇP) between 1985 and 1993. In the late 1980s, the party was marginal. It returned to parliament after the 1991 elections that it joined in coalition with Erbakan’s RP (Çınar & Arıkan 2002: 29). In 1992, six MÇP deputies left the party and founded the Great Union Party (BBP) under the leadership of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu (Poulton 1997: 141). Under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli, who succeeded Türkeş after his death in 1997, voter support doubled in 1999, making the MHP the second-largest party (Çınar & Arıkan 2002: 30-31). In the 2002 elections, the MHP and BBP failed to pass the threshold. Despite this electoral failure, the youth branch of the MHP – Ülkü Ocakları – is one of the largest organisations in Turkey, with around 1,000 branches, nearly 20,000 active members and 100,000 followers (Can 2000: 335).

**The left**

Although the ban on other former politicians was lifted in 1987, communist politics still remained illegal in Turkey. In fact, certain leftist parties, such as the TKP, have been illegal for most of their existence. As a result, their activities mainly took place outside Turkey and in any case were directed from abroad. TKP leaders resided in the capitals of socialist countries such as Moscow or Prague and later moved to Western European cities. In 1987 the TKP and TİP merged in Brussels to form the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP). While their aim was to return to Turkey legally, their leaders were jailed upon arrival (see Landau 1974: 105; Lipovsky 1992: 1-3; Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 285).

Rivalry and splits based on ideological differences and internal conflicts with roots in the 1970s grew after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and drained these movements of their members (see also Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 49). In the early 1990s, some of these new parties chose to continue their activities illegally; others formed legal entities. Most of these parties – legal and illegal – are rooted in the youth movement Dev-Genç.

Though small in memberships, a whole spectrum of legal and illegal groups and parties with ideologies that mirror those of the 1970s are still present in the Turkish political arena. People who were previously active in the Dev Yol from the late 1970s until the early 1990s regrouped in the legal Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) in 1996. Illegal parties that followed Maoist communism established the legal Labour Party (EMEP) and
the Workers Party (İP). Others founded a range of small, illegal revolutionary parties, of which the most important are the DHKP/C and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP). None of the legal parties ever managed to pass the threshold in parliamentary elections. On a local level, some enjoyed minor successes.

The social democrats

Social democratic parties have their roots in Turkey’s first political party, the CHP. The CHP was established in 1923 by the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (see Mango 2002). After the 1980 coup, the CHP became the Social Democrat Peoples Party (SHP). When political parties were allowed to re-open under their traditional names, the CHP and SHP soon merged. The CHP played a marginal role in the 1990s; it was a coalition partner in the 1991-1995 government. More important in the 1990s was the Democratic Left Party (DSP) centred on Bülent Ecevit who ran the CHP until it was closed in 1980. In 1999, Ecevit became prime minister for the fifth time.

In 2002, a group split from the CHP to refound the SHP. The democratic left parties DSP and SHP were marginal after the 2002 elections (Güneş-Ayata 2002: 106); the CHP, however, became the main opposition party and Turkey’s second largest party. In 2003, a minor opposition group, Yeniden CHP (the renewed CHP), was founded by a group of friends who used to be active in the party’s youth branch in the 1970s. Yeniden CHP criticised the current CHP for focusing too much on the old ‘establishment’ and for not following a social democratic line including all layers of society.

Transnational party politics

Emigration to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s offered parties that were banned in Turkey an opportunity to mobilise guest workers (Landau 1974: 105; Turkiye Informatie 1978a). Parties targeted workers in Western Europe so that their movements would be strengthened once the migrants returned. The military interventions of 1971 and 1980 led to the arrival of Turkish political migrants in Europe, individuals who had been members of revolutionary organisations in Turkey and who now brought their political convictions with them (for Germany see Miller 1981: 53-54). Young extreme right Ülkücü Ocakları leaders also sought political asylum in Europe to escape the left-right violence in the schools and universities (Van Esbroeck 1979; Geerse 1998). Islamists such as Erbakan also moved to Europe to continue their activities, for example, in Milli Gorus (Yesilda 2002b: 65). To counter Marxist-Leninist and Islamist influences, the
Turkish state established Diyanet branches all over Europe (Canatan 2001). The conflict between the left and the right and between the Turkish state and the Islamists was transplanted to the Netherlands.

The focus on Turkish politics among migrant workers increased dramatically after the coup in 1980. Political refugees swelled their ranks. Mirroring internal and ideological divisions in Turkey, a wide spectrum of radical leftist and Kurdish groups continued their activities in exile and mobilised workers for their party in Turkey. Each of these parties had its own network of members throughout Europe. In the Netherlands, they organised activities against the Turkish junta separately, cooperating with their counterparts in Germany instead. They staged demonstrations in front of national parliaments, organised hunger strikes and publicised their views of political developments in Turkey through magazines and pamphlets (for Dev Yol see Turkije Informatie 1981a; Turkije Informatie 1981b; for Dev Sol see Turkije-Turkije Nieuws 1981). The social democrats, the Islamists and the extreme right also created organisations in Western Europe as their parties were closed after the 1980 coup (for Germany see Özcan 1992).

Political developments in Turkey thus clearly affected Turkish organisational life in the Netherlands. Ties between Turkish political parties and Turkish migrant organisations, however, were almost never formal. One reason was the Turkish law on political parties in effect from 1976 until 1995 that prohibited official branches of parties abroad (Argun 2003: 141; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 112). The constitution written by the military in 1982, which included the Party Law, also applied to organisations abroad; it forbade political parties to cooperate with, support or receive money from them. Political parties and political orientations thus found their way into ‘cultural’ or social immigrant organisations in the Netherlands and Europe (see e.g. Turkije Informatie 1978b; Tuskan & Vogel 2004). In the eyes of the Turkish community, an organisation could change its political colour from one day to the next following elections in Turkey (Penninx 1980: 65).

Though the Party Law was amended in 1995, few migrants used this opportunity to create official party branches in the Netherlands or elsewhere in Europe. Most organisations that unofficially ‘represented’ political parties did not formalise their ties. Some even denied their informal ties with a party, despite clear evidence to the contrary. In part this was because the official objectives of most migrant organisations concern ‘integration’ and not developments in Turkey. Although leaders’ political orientations are well known in the Turkish community, the fear of politics is still palpable, rooted in tensions between leftwing and rightwing organisations in the 1970s and 1980s. Those organisations with ties to political parties use them differently than twenty years ago: instead of focusing on developments in Turkish politics, they are mostly used to improve the position of migrants in the Netherlands.
Two key developments inform this shift that began in the mid-1980s. The first is related to the political climate in Turkey, more specifically to the lifting of the ban on politicians. Leaders and parties could now freely conduct their activities in Turkey and no longer needed the ‘free’ space in Europe. At the same time, migrant organisations, Turkish political parties and both the Dutch and Turkish governments began to accept that migrants were in the Netherlands to stay.

The following subsections focus on the ties between Turkish political parties and migrant organisations. It shows how these ties – and the purposes they have been used for – have evolved over time. We again cover the most important denominations in Turkey as outlined in the previous section: the Islamists, the right, the social democrats and the left. Following these descriptions, I will outline how the respective organisations are embedded in the organisational networks presented in chapter 3.

The Islamists

The Sunni Islamic organisation Millî Görüş was founded in Turkey in 1969 as a think-tank of the MNP and its successor MSP (Heper & Toktaş 2003: 160). Erbakan founded its branch in Switzerland after his party MNP was closed in 1971 (Yeşilda 2002b: 65). Millî Görüş in Europe has been able to conduct its activities and spread its views about Islam and Turkish society with a freedom it never enjoyed in Turkey (Landman 1997: 219). With the foundation of Millî Görüş in Europe, Erbakan hoped to attract support from the Turkish migrant community; during the 1973 elections, the MSP requested its European followers to come to Turkey to vote. The MSP established a central desk in Edirne, just across the border with Bulgaria.6

The growth of the organisation was aided by the 1980 coup, with members of Erbakan’s former party now arriving in Europe. The European umbrella organisation AMGT (later renamed the IGMG) was established in 1985 and directed by a member of the MSP executive committee in Cologne. Via AMGT, the MSP had a tight grip on Millî Görüş organisations in Europe. Throughout the 1980s, the federation in the Netherlands, the NIF, could not make its own decisions; its work was monitored by the AMGT through the weekly visits of its director.7

Until the mid-1980s, the activities of the NIF mainly focused on Turkey, especially on opposing the junta. When civil government returned, the NIF began to focus more on the lives of migrants. The tie between the NIF and AMGT and between the AMGT and Erbakan’s RP (by then the successor of the MNP) remained strong. When party officials visited the AMGT, they also often came to the Netherlands.8 The AMGT further scheduled guest lectures by prominent RP leaders for the NIF in the Netherlands. Erbakan lectured at a conference in Arnhem in 1989 where he explained how
migrants could introduce and spread Islam in Europe: ‘The Europeans are ill. We have the medicine to cure them…Europe becomes Islamic… You are the new army of Sultan Fatih. Europe will learn the Islam from you’ (Tercüman, June 1989 cited in Landman 1992: 127). According to Landman, such rhetoric should not be taken too seriously; it was ‘internal pep talk’.

The RP in the early 1990s was especially active in Europe during election campaigns. In 1990, Erbakan toured Europe to raise funds and garner support from AMGT-affiliated organisations. In 1991, six million Deutsch marks were transferred from Germany to Turkey and mainly used to support the RP’s election campaign (Amiraux 2003: 163). In Turkish municipal elections in 1994, two members of German Milli Görüş organisations and a co-founder of the federation in the Netherlands were elected as RP mayors. In the 1995 elections, around 30 persons from the German branch of the IGMG ran as candidates for the RP; three were elected (Seufert 1999: 296). Following Erbakan’s election victory in 1995, attention for the European organisations decreased as his party now had a sufficient base in Turkey.9

Neither the NIF in the Netherlands nor the confederation in Germany openly expressed their sympathy for Erbakan’s parties. This can be explained by the constitutional constraints on Turkish political parties abroad and the delicate situation of religiously oriented parties in Turkey in general. Apart from frequent visits by party officials, the close tie between the European confederation and the RP became more significant when Erbakan’s nephew became the general secretary of the IGMG in 1995 (NRC 1998a). Other close relatives of Erbakan linked the party to ethnic businesses in Germany and financed the leadership of the RP in Turkey (Abadan-Unat 1997: 234).

Ties between the AMGT and the NIF started weakening around 1990 when younger NIF board members began claiming autonomy from the European confederation (Sunier 1996: 68). This was especially true for the federation in the north of the Netherlands MG-NN, founded in 1997. The IGMG, however, retained a strong voice in the appointment of NIF board members (the federation in the south of the Netherlands).

Erbakan’s relative disinterest in the European organisations was short-lived as his Refahyol government was displaced by a ‘soft coup’ after only two years. The MGK was especially critical of financial support by Islamic groups in Europe. One of the MGK’s measures in 1997 was prohibiting the funding of Turkish political parties by ‘organizations installed in Europe like Milli Görüş’ (Amiraux 2003: 157-163). In 1998, the RP was closed and Erbakan banned from politics; he then turned towards the European organisations, speaking at the yearly IGMG congress held in the Netherlands in 1998. Erbakan was welcomed by 40,000 Turks from different European cities (NRC 1998b). He stated: ‘Europe has been built with
your sweat. Still you live in a backward position... it’s our duty to solve your problems’ (ANP 1998).

The break between the ‘traditionalists’ and ‘reformists’ within Erbakan’s FP affected the political orientation of organisations in Europe. Tightly linked to the IGMG, the NIF remained closer to Erbakan’s ‘traditionalist’ party (the SP) than the MG-NN. Before the split, the NIF maintained relations with FP politicians such as Erdoğan and Bülent Arınc, prime minister and AKP speaker of parliament at the time of research. After the break, the NIF only maintained relations with politicians of Erbakan’s SP. Over the past years, the NIF has organised voting trips to Turkey on its own initiative. In 2002, it organised a short trip to vote at the airport and visit relatives. Two hundred of its Dutch members used this opportunity. The SP vice-president emphasises that the party does not have organic ties with Milli Görüş organisations. They are, however, ideologically close and consider each other ‘relatives’. The SP vice-president visits the Netherlands once a year to update Turkish migrants on current developments in Turkey. Furthermore, he emphasises the importance of integrating without losing one’s cultural and religious values. Milli Görüş delegates are invited to SP congresses in Turkey.

At the time of research it was unclear whether the MG-NN had strengthened its relations with the AKP. MG-NN members are critical of the NIF’s relation with the SP: ‘In Turkey they still think of us as the uneducated labourers, they think we don’t have our own opinions.’ At the yearly NIF congress, SP representatives are invited as guests of honour. ‘It is a ritual, a pep talk in Turkish rhetoric... a waste of money.’ The MG-NN is considered ‘progressive’, its viewpoints reflecting the ‘reformist’ attitude of the AKP (see also Avcı 2006). In contrast, the NIF maintains more conservative positions, reflecting the ideology of the ‘traditionalist’ SP. The differences are clear in their stance towards Turkey’s EU membership: the MG-NN lobbies for Turkey’s candidacy whereas the NIF does not. The position of the MG-NN reflects that of the AKP, which actively campaigns for Turkey’s EU accession. The SP is against any EU interference and also against Turkey’s membership. The direction of MG-NN has de facto been taken over by the headquarters in Cologne in 2007 (Lindo 2008). As such the previous split between Milli Görüş organisations in the Netherlands has turned back.

The AKP initially attempted to tie the Milli Görüş movement in Europe to the party by ordering Turkish embassies in Europe to reinforce their contacts with Milli Görüş organisations. In response, the secretary of the MGK, General Tuncer Kilinç, undertook a tour in his personal capacity in 2003. In the Netherlands, he held a closed meeting with representatives of Turkish organisations where he emphasised the importance of integration and warned against the dangers of radical Islam (AIVD 2004: 53-54),
meaning Milli Görüş. The AKP did not establish further contacts with Milli Görüş; nor did they set up official party branches in Europe.

The AKP, however, does support the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD),17 established by highly educated German citizens of Turkish origin in 2004. The UETD aims to improve the position of European citizens of Turkish origin and to facilitate smooth diplomatic relations between Turkey and EU member countries of settlement, especially regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU.18 The UETD has branches in six European countries including the Netherlands. The Dutch branch organises seminars on Turkish EU accession and investment opportunities in Turkey.19 Like the German founding members, the directors of the Dutch branch are highly educated citizens who are well positioned in both national political parties and the Turkish community in the receiving country.20

According to the AKP, the UETD differs from traditional Turkish migrant organisations in that it is not a Turkish association but a European body. Via the UETD, the AKP hopes to improve Turkey’s image in Europe and to discuss Turkey’s problems with European governments.21 The 2005 inauguration of UETD headquarters in Cologne was attended by Prime Minster Erdoğan and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder; in his speech, Erdoğan underscored the importance of Turks integrating in their countries of settlement and expressed his pride in European Turks.22

The ultranationalists

In the 1970s, the MHP began organising Turkish workers in Western Europe through cultural institutions and mosque organisations. Under the leadership of the MHP, the Federation of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations in Europe (ADÜTDF) was founded in Germany in 1978. In the Netherlands, the Idealist Turkish Workers Association (HÜTİD) functioned as an umbrella body for local organisations (Landman 1992: 114). From 1978 to 1992, MHP leader Türkeş directly appointed the chairmen of European organisations from Turkey. Türkeş sent protégées to Europe for one or two years to lead the organisations in the ’right’ direction; they worked directly under his guidance.23

Mirroring extreme nationalist mobilisation in Turkey in the 1970s, the extreme nationalists in Europe had more members than leftist organisations and were better organised at the European level. Like the MHP, these European federations used sports associations to spread their ideology and to gain members, emphasising pride and physical strength (Penninx 1980). The mobilisation of the extreme nationalists in Western Europe also benefited from the inclusion of the so-called Outer Turks (Dış Türkler), for example, Turks living in the Soviet Union, in the MHP ideology. In the eyes of the MHP, these Outer Turks were in danger of losing their Turkish
identity (see Landau 1974: 194-195, 1981). When Turkish workers started to emigrate in the 1960s and 1970s, Europe was integrated in this ideology.24

The 1980 coup had a great impact on extreme nationalist organisations in Europe. The arrival of extreme nationalist political migrants, however, did not lead to stronger ties with the MHP – on the contrary. In the 1980s, a part of the Grey Wolves in Europe distanced themselves from Türkeş and his party. MHP influence on organisations in Europe waned. In the Netherlands, the HÜTİD dissolved in 1983, but was in some ways continued in the Federation of Turkish Associations in the Netherlands (HTDF), which had a broader composition. The federation aimed to introduce and spread Turkish-Islamic culture in the Netherlands. In the 1980s, HTDF gathered 34 local organisations, including some mosque organisations. After Türkeş’ return to the Turkish political arena in 1987, his sympathisers took over the HTDF with assistance from the ADÜTDF in Germany. HTDF (renamed HTF in 1995) thus became closely related to Türkeş’ MÇP. The HTF functioned as a branch of the ADÜTDF until 1998.

Since 1992, board members of extreme nationalist organisations have no longer been appointed by the MHP leadership. According to the MHP official formerly in charge of the party’s contacts with Turks abroad, there were two reasons for this. First-generation Turkish workers were uneducated, had insufficient knowledge of MHP ideology and organisational skills: ‘now they have sufficient knowledge and can do it on their own.’ The second reason was that since the early 1990s, Turkey was no longer the sole reference point for migrants who would, it increasingly became clear, stay in the Netherlands.25 This did not mean MHP contacts with European organisations weakened; they intensified in response to growing Kurdish diaspora activism. Rising Kurdish nationalism created a new role for the Grey Wolves in Europe as Turkish nationalists. In some German cities they even controlled individual streets (Arslan 2004: 132).

In recent years, the HTF, the federation of the Grey Wolves in the Netherlands, has invited politicians of Turkish parties such as the MHP, DYP and ANAP to its yearly congresses. Turkish experts, for example, the advisor to the Turkish president, are invited to conferences (TFN 1997: 260-261). The HTF chairman explains that it is mostly MHP politicians who accept their invitations ‘because they have similar ideas. They want us to become active in Dutch politics, to carry out our own vision.’26 Depending on the topic, the MHP selects a delegate from the party or its youth organisation Ülküçü Ocakları.27 For example, the ‘mother’ of the Grey Wolves (Asena or ‘she-wolf’) was invited to answer questions at meetings of HTF female membership organisations.28 This appeal to expertise has decreased over the years, and will, according to the MHP, wither away over the next two decades as more and more Turks in the
Netherlands receive higher education: ‘Maybe we need them in the future to tell us about Europe.’

Though the MHP and the HTF exchange information and ideas, the latter is certainly not an MHP branch, explains a member of the party’s executive committee. Another MHP official states that chairmen are elected solely by members in the Netherlands, even if MHP leader Bahçeli is present as a guest of honour at these congresses. The MHP vice-president underscores the fact that organically there are no longer any relations between the HTF, other European organisations of the Grey Wolves and the MHP: ‘the organisations are independent of Turkey and of one another. They live a happy life there, they are integrated, and that’s very good.’

But, he continues:

the MHP is like a school; we are not only a political movement but also an ideological movement of Ülkücü’s [Grey Wolves]. People who grew up here will never lose that bonding, and it is likely their families will support us.

This support is visible at the yearly MHP summer festival in Kayseri where conferences, horse races and concerts are held for one week. This festival attracts Turks from all over Turkey and the world and is attended by individuals who are members of HTF-affiliated organisations: ‘a lot of people are already on holiday in Turkey, they just go on their own, we don’t organise this.’ The MHP, however, officially invites HTF board members to send representatives, which they sometimes do (TFN 1997: 21).

The MHP argues that it does not campaign in the Netherlands during elections because migrants can follow the campaign on television. Only a small number of people who can afford it go to Turkey to cast their votes. The MHP favours migrants being able to vote at consulates in the country of settlement.

Finally, the nationalist party BBP – which broke away from the MHP in the early 1990s – maintains contact with Turks in Europe. The ideological split between organisations that later sympathised with the BBP or MHP took place in Europe and the Netherlands a few years earlier than in Turkey. Due to Türkeş’ renewed attempt to regulate the European confederation ADÜTDF, half of its member organisations split off under the leadership of Musa Serdar Çelebi (Landman 1992: 115-116). Çelebi founded the European Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations (ATİB) in 1988 (Argun 2003: 144), which distanced itself from the MÇP (the name under which the MHP operated between 1985 and 1993). Though the ATİB saw the Turkish and Islamic identities as being related, the union emphasised the religious component (Landman 1992: 116). Paralleling this development in West Germany, a board member of the Dutch federation
HTDF who had been sidelined by Türkeş sympathisers founded the federation of Turkish Islamic Associations in the Netherlands (HTIV) in 1988. HTIV later became known as the Dutch Union of Turkish Islamic Organisations (HTİKİB) (Comité Stop de Grijze Wolven! 1996: 36), which clearly distanced itself from Türkeş and his party (Landman 1992: 116).

After the split with the MHP, most BBP followers in the Netherlands were united under the HTİKİB (see Geerse 1998; Canatan 2001: 96; Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 10). The BBP (which maintains close relations with HTİKİB’s ‘ideological’ equivalent in Germany, the ATİB) set up its own federation in Europe known as the European Federation of World Order (ANAF). In Amsterdam, ANAF founded a mosque that includes the organisation Turkish Islamic Assistance (THİS). THİS maintains an interlocking directorate with the BBP; its chairman is a member of the BBP executive board and regularly travels to Turkey to attend party congresses. The BBP and ANAF chairmen are frequently invited to THİS meetings.35

The BBP considers Turkish emigrants as representatives of Turkey in Europe. As potential bridges between Turkey and Europe, the BBP chairman argues it is important to motivate migrants to become active in political parties in their country of residence. The BBP aims to support the Turkish community abroad in maintaining its identity and in its struggle for equal rights. The party further claims that due to Turkish policy failures, emigrant remittances have decreased; it aims to create incentives for emigrants to invest in Turkey (BBP 2004: 44).

The BBP has representatives of the party all over Europe; at the time of research, it was even considering setting up a formal branch in Brussels. Once a year, they organise a training week for youths and families living in Europe, during which BBP officials give lectures about the party. The trainings are attended by all European BBP representatives. During election time, the BBP does not campaign in Europe although some sympathisers with dual nationality vote at the airport. Some of them campaign for the party at these airport polls.

The social democrats

The CHP was the most important social democratic party in the 1970s and 1980s. Especially in the early 1970s, it maintained close relations with Turkish workers’ organisations in Germany. CHP leader Ecevit actively campaigned for migrant votes in the Federal Republic of Germany and was enthusiastically received by Turkish workers (Miller 1981: 45). Organisations in Germany held fundraising events to support the campaign in 1973 (HDB 1984: 11). Following the 1980 coup, the CHP was banned and Ecevit detained. CHP sympathisers in Europe, including the Netherlands, maintained contact with each other via the HDF. HDF was founded in Germany in 1977 in the presence of 600 delegates from
European countries and politicians from the CHP (HDB 1984: 23). During his detention, Ecevit sent messages to his followers in Europe via traveling CHP representatives. In the Netherlands, the former chairman of the CHP youth branch arranged for CHP representatives to meet with the chairman of the PvdA. The aim was to update the PvdA on political developments in Turkey and to rally support for its ‘equivalent’ in Turkey.\(^{36}\) Cooperation between HDF and CHP sympathisers in the Netherlands eventually led to the foundation of the DSDF in 1986.

Like other organisations, DSDF in its formative years was concerned with the aftermath of the coup in Turkey. In the past DSDF’s ties with the CHP were facilitated via the former HDF chairman, who later represented the CHP in the Turkish National Assembly. HDF no longer maintains exclusive ties with the CHP and criticises the Turkish state on human rights issues. In its annual meetings the HDF formulates positions on issues and informs the respective parties. They further invite CHP, SHP and New Turkey Party (YTP), the last two are splinters of the CHP, members of parliament to conferences.\(^{37}\)

The CHP does not actively try to tie Turkish organisations in Europe to the party. Its deputy chairman argues ‘our contacts should be with political parties, such as the PvdA and with politicians of Turkish origin.’\(^{38}\) The CHP, however, appeals to the Turkish community in Europe to vote via the state channel TRT-INT. Although an unknown number of people did travel to Turkey for this purpose, the trip was not organised. Alongside several other parties, the CHP supports changing the law to allow Turkish citizens to vote at consulates because ‘it’s too difficult to travel to Turkey only for the elections.’\(^{39}\)

The CHP encourages both the integration of migrants in their countries of residence and the upkeep of their traditions: ‘outside their homes they should feel a full member of that society and learn the language; this is written in the party programme.’\(^{40}\) Furthermore, the CHP feels that Dutch political parties, and especially the PvdA, should consult Turkish parties when developing integration policies: ‘we are always discussing problems of Turkey, but not the integration problems of the countries where Turkish migrants are settled. That is our problem too.’\(^{41}\)

As a federation DSDF has no ties with the CHP; individual DSDF members, however, have direct ties to the party. The present DSDF chairman has an extensive network within the CHP dating back to his leadership of the Young Socialist branch of the party in Adana in the late 1970s. Members of this youth branch have attained high positions in the party: one is mayor of a district in Ankara. The DSDF chairman travels between Turkey and the Netherlands to visit party congresses and other party-related events. In particular, he campaigns for Yeniden CHP, whose leader was also active in the same youth branch of the party.\(^{42}\) Through this tie, DSDF in the Netherlands has become one of Yeniden CHP’s platforms to
express its ideas on social democracy in Turkey. The leader of Yeniden CHP values his contacts with Turkish elites in Germany and the Netherlands; their knowledge of the problems confronting Turkish migrants may contribute to CHP policymaking. Contacts with these migrants can also contribute to the party’s international relations.

In Turkey, social democratic parties are supported by Kemalist NGOs (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) (Erdoğan 2000). Such organisations are relatively strong in Germany (see Argun 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e), but marginal in the Netherlands. On a personal level, however, there was a transnational tie between a board member of an Atatürk organisation and a CHP candidate running for mayor in a Turkish city in 2004.

The two parties that split from the CHP – the DSP and the SHP – do not have direct ties with Turkish organisations in Europe. The present SHP at the time of research was working on establishing party branches in Europe and reactivating ties with Turkish federations in Germany including the Alevi AABF and the social democratic HDF. While the DSP encourages Turkish migrants to vote, results are difficult to measure. According to its vice-president, turnout would be higher if elections were held during the holiday season when Turkish emigrants are visiting Turkey.

The radical left

Although numerous migrant organisations sympathetic to radical leftwing parties were founded in the 1970s, the focus here lies on the two that exist to this day. The first, HTİB, represented Moscow-oriented communism and was founded in response to the 1971 coup. The second, the Maoist-oriented DİDF, was a response to the coup of 1980.

HTİB was established in 1974 by a group of Turkish workers and refugees who had fled the military repression of 1971 (Can & Can-Engin 1997: 66). HTİB’s initial goal was to include migrant workers living in the Netherlands in the ‘Turkish people’s struggle’ for a democratic Turkey. At the same time, HTİB assisted Turkish migrant workers in their ‘struggle’ for rights in the Netherlands. With its Marxist orientation, the HTİB sympathised with the TKP.

Paralleling developments in Turkey in the 1970s, leftwing Turkish groups in the Netherlands fought one another politically as well as right-wing groups on the streets (Turkije Informatie 1977b; Rath 1985). In 1977, HTİB campaigned for banning the Grey Wolves from the Netherlands (Turkije Informatie 1977a). At the same time, HTİB was opposed by smaller Maoist groups that viewed both the TKP and HTİB as representatives of ‘social fascism’.

Between 1975 and 1979, HTİB evolved into a national umbrella organisation with different branches in the Netherlands. The organisation also
established close ties with Turkish organisations in other European countries that supported the TKP (for ties of its women’s organisation HTKB with the TKP and leftist women’s organisations in Turkey see Santing 1987).\textsuperscript{47}

The establishment of TKP headquarters in Germany and the arrival of TKP leaders after the 1980 coup had an enormous influence on HTİB. TKP leaders became members of the organisation and established a committee for the defence of human rights in Turkey (NTKVMD) in 1982. The NTKVMD tried to put international pressure on the Turkish junta. Their activities included lobbying the Dutch parliament and human rights organisations such as Amnesty International. At the same time, TKP exiles tried ‘to recruit new members, who would eventually return to Turkey and start a revolution.’\textsuperscript{48} It was, however, difficult to continue the party’s work from abroad. As a former TKP exile explains: ‘our cadre in Turkey were tortured or were in hiding. It was extremely difficult to remain in contact.’\textsuperscript{49}

Although TKP adherence was dominant among HTİB members, the TKP was not the only party with which they sympathised. The present chairman of HTİB, a member of the TKP in the Netherlands in the 1980s, was a member of Dev Yol when living in Turkey. One TKP board member now active within HTİB was previously active in the workers party TİP and the Kurdish workers party PKK. Dev Yol adherents were to be found in Turkish workers organisations throughout the Netherlands, not only within HTİB.

In the mid-1980s, TKP members within HTİB tried to work together with exiles from other political movements. An umbrella organisation in exile was created in 1986, made up of individuals from the TKP, Dev Yol, PKK and the workers’ parties Turkish Socialist Workers’ Party (TSİP) and TİP. Due to internal and ideological conflicts, however, it quickly dissolved.\textsuperscript{50} As recounted in the previous section, the TKP merged with the workers’ party TİP in 1988. Internal TKP conflicts over the merger with TİP heavily influenced HTİB in the Netherlands, whose membership was mainly composed of first-generation labour migrants attached to the TKP. When the TKP merged with the TİP, many members left the organisation.\textsuperscript{51}

Before the 1980 coup, a small but militant group following Albanian communism was active in the Netherlands (its European headquarters was in Germany). With the arrival of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey (TDKP) cadre in the Netherlands after the 1980 coup, the federation DİDF was founded in 1985 (Van Zuthem 1994: 24; Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 11). Its independent sister organisation in Germany had existed since 1980 (Özcan 1992: 261-264). The official aim of DİDF in Germany was twofold: to represent the interests of Turkish workers and to support the reinstallation of democracy in Turkey. In practice, it mainly
organised activities against the junta in Turkey. Although political refugees affiliated with the TDKP established the DİDF, the former’s influence on the latter remains unclear.

Since the late 1980s, HTİB and DİDF have concentrated their activities on the position of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Both have become active in immigrant politics while their members have also entered municipal politics, mainly representing the Dutch party GroenLinks. But while HTİB has abandoned its mission towards Turkey, DİDF has not.

Individual HTİB members presently maintain good relations with members and leaders of the legal left parties founded in the late 1990s such as the new TKP (no extension of the old TKP). The transnational contacts are personal in nature: continuations of friendships established during past involvement in the TKP or Dev Yol. Some TKP and DSİP cadre lived in exile in the Netherlands for several years and founded or joined these new parties after their return to Turkey.52

HTİB has also harboured Dev Yol members. As in Turkey, former Dev Yol cadre in the Netherlands regrouped in the left socialist party ÖDP. In 1997, one year after the foundation of the ÖDP in Turkey, a former Dev Yol exile and ex-HTİB chairman founded the ÖDP solidarity committee – Freedom and Solidarity Coordination (ÖDK) – in the Netherlands. Though founded by a former HTİB leader, ÖDK has no ties with that organisation. Instead ÖDK gathered former Dev Yol adherents in the Netherlands active in other Turkish workers organisations.

ÖDK in the Netherlands has 132 members who pay contributions to the mother party and around 500 sympathisers. In Germany this number lies somewhere between 800 and 1,000.53 ÖDK has a European umbrella – ÖDK Europe – that meets every six months to discuss the problems of Turks living in Europe; the findings are reported to the mother party in Turkey. ÖDK also takes part in party congresses. ÖDP claims that input from ÖDK members broadens the party’s vision as many individuals, including the ÖDK chairman, are active in political parties in Europe; their skills and political experience are highly valued.54

ÖDP also receives electoral support from ÖDK Europe. In 2003, ÖDP leaders toured Europe to ask for assistance in the 2004 local elections.55 In response, ÖDK members organised trips to Bahadin (Yozgat province, Central Anatolian region) and Hopa (Artvin province, Black Sea region). They arrived in cars with Dutch plates to show that they had come in support all the way from the Netherlands.56 Those with Turkish passports voted. Those who stayed in Europe contacted their friends and relatives in Turkey and advised them to vote for ÖDP.57 ÖDP eventually won mayoralties in the two villages where they campaigned.

The ÖDP wants to turn Hopa and Bahadin into exemplary villages; towards this end, ÖDK Europe remits money and material goods. Bahadin, especially, is an interesting case. A typical emigration village, temporary
returnees from Europe and large Turkish cities swell its population from 500 in winter to 3,200 in summer. The ÖDP mayor is a return migrant from Germany whose election campaign was coordinated by ‘Bahadin hemşeri organisations’ in Europe and Turkey. These organisations, which refer to common local origins, were established in the mid-1980s. In fact, they channelled Dev Yol politics as the outlawed movement could not openly exist. Today, these organisations are used to facilitate ÖDP politics in Bahadin.\textsuperscript{58}

Current HTİB members’ contacts with Turkish political parties thus continued on a personal level with the former Dev Yol cadre creating an official solidarity committee for the ÖDP. Although there is insufficient data to compare the formerly Albania-oriented DİDF’s past and present contacts with political parties, the latter’s transnational trajectory clearly differs from that of HTİB and former Dev Yol cadre. Reflecting developments in Turkey, individual members of DİDF now support EMEP (both this Turkish party and DİDF were founded by former TDKP cadre). Although DİDF has no formal ties with EMEP, its members maintain regular contact with the party in Turkey with DİDF’s chairman visiting EMEP congresses in Turkey and EMEP’s leader regularly lecturing at DİDF gatherings. More importantly, DİDF supported EMEP in the national elections of 2002 and in local elections two years later. EMEP entered the 2004 local elections in coalition with, and under the name of, the social democratic SHP. DİDF did not urge its members to vote, but stated: ‘If you happen to go and if you still have a right to vote, vote for SHP. If you have relatives who are in doubt, advise them to vote for SHP.’ \textsuperscript{59}

The illegal Turkish extreme left in the Netherlands since the 1990s

The strategies of leftwing parties established in the 1990s that remain illegal in Turkey are similar to those seen in the 1970s and 1980s. Leaders live in European exile, more or less freely continuing their activities. Through European branches and networks, these parties are active in migrant politics and organisations, lobbying national governments and European institutions to put pressure on the Turkish state. This section traces the activities of the two most important groups, DHKP/C and MLKP.

DHKP/C has its origins in Dev Yol, but broke away a year after its establishment to set up DHKP/C’s forerunner Dev Sol. Although Dev Sol activists had their own European bulletin in the 1970s and 1980s, it is unclear whether they were active within any Turkish organisations in the Netherlands. The reason for this gap in the data stems from the illegality of these parties in Turkey. The analysis of their strategies begins around their foundation in the mid-1990s when they chose to continue an illegal revolutionary course.
In the Netherlands, DHKP/C sympathisers – several dozen people are actively involved (AIVD 2004: 26) – follow a peaceful path. A branch of the party was located in Amsterdam between 1995 and 2003, but has since moved to Brussels. DHKP International, headquartered in Brussels, marked the party’s anniversary in the Netherlands in 2002 and 2005, where they commemorated their ‘revolutionary martyrs’. In the Netherlands, DHKP/C is organised around the Dutch branch of TAYAD. TAYAD and DHKP/C headquarters in Brussels jointly organise demonstrations, for instance, in solidarity with the Death Fast Resistance. Demonstrators protest in front of the European Parliament and the Turkish embassy, holding photos of hunger strikers who died in Turkey while shouting the names of DHKP/C ‘martyrs’. Despite the DHKP/C’s legality in the Netherlands, the Dutch government cooperated in an international police raid against suspected DHKP/C-affiliated organisations in 2004. In response, DHKP/C members participated in what they called the International Platform Against Isolation in Brussels, mobilising European lawyers and human rights advocates to observe the trials of DHKP/C activists in Istanbul later that year.

The MLKP in the Netherlands is made up of a tiny group of sympathisers who participate in non-violent actions such as Dutch leftwing demonstrations (AIVD 2005: 23). In its European magazine, the party publishes solidarity statements for the ‘martyred’ members of their armed wing in Turkey (MLKP 2005). In the Netherlands, MLKP members are organised in the Foundation for Culture and Art Vardiya (VEKSAV), linked to the cultural magazine Hayat ve Sanat (‘Life and Art’) in Turkey and its European federation in Germany. VEKSAV organises politically loaded cultural activities. At the European level, VEKSAV participates in the European Confederation of Oppressed Migrants (AVEG-Kon), which organises protests against globalisation, discrimination and the expulsion of political refugees who supported the Death Fast Resistance in Turkey, in which MLKP and DHKP/C prisoners participated.

While there is a clear difference between the homeland sympathies of the current left and radical left, their migrant political activities overlap. For instance, members of the illegal leftist parties and representatives and supporters of the legal Turkish parties all participate in the Dutch demonstration platform Keer het Tij. This platform – which unites roughly 500 leftwing organisations and parties – was founded in 2002, a response to the more conservative Dutch government that came to power that year. Sympathisers, members and branches of Turkish leftwing parties – the illegal parties MLKP, TKP/ML, DHKP/C and the Turkish Communist Workers Party (TKİP); the migrant organisations DİDF, HTİB and the Anatolian Cultural Centre; the branch ÖDK and the TAYAD – were all present at a Keer het Tij demonstration in 2005. In their struggle for social justice, they have found common ground in protest movements in the Netherlands.
Political parties and migrant civil society

Figure 3.3 shows that the organisations of Islamists, ultranationalists, social democrats and the left – political competitors or even enemies both in Turkey and the Netherlands – were all tied to each other. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the transnational ties of Turkish political parties. Most parties do not have official branches; third-country transnational ties play an important role in mediating contacts with migrant organisations. The parties that do have branches – the Kurdish DEHAP, the leftist ÖDP in Figure 5.1 and the extreme leftist DHKP/C and MLKP in Figure 5.2 – form denser clusters.

As noted in chapter 3, the Dutch government’s influence is one explanation for Turkish migrant organisations of different political signatures being gathered in the IOT. Many organisations have lost their radical edge and through the IOT are now more embedded in migrant civil society. Although the leftist organisation DİDF and the ultranationalist federation HTF have also largely shed their radical tendencies, the ideological heritage of the 1970s is more present in their activities than in the other central organisations in Figure 3.3. This may explain why their organisational ties in the Netherlands are not as diverse as those of IOT members. The organisations that resemble the radical leftist organisations of the 1970s are isolated from the largest cluster and grouped in a small leftist cluster (Figure 3.5).

Despite differences in their evolving ideologies, all migrant organisations are actively involved in immigrant politics. All organise activities to improve the living conditions of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands; it is their strategies and partners that differ.

The preceding historical sketch showed that extreme right and Islamist migrant organisations in the Netherlands were often controlled by Turkish political parties through umbrella organisations in Germany. Umbrella organisations founded by exiles in Germany were likewise important in the founding of leftist and social democratic organisations in the Netherlands.

With the growing focus on migrant issues in the mid-1980s, associations became more autonomous from organisations and parties in Turkey. This did not mean that their transnational ties weakened, but that they came to be used for different purposes. Rather than aiming for political change in Turkey, transnational ties were now used to enhance the position of migrants in the country of residence.

Political parties in Turkey less and less see Turkish emigrants as backward; instead they appeal to highly educated, successful and well-integrated young Turks born in or permanently residing in Europe. More recently, transnational ties have also been used to try to improve Turkey’s image in the European Union.
Figure 5.1 National and transnational ties of Turkish parties

Square: Political party
Circle: Migrant organisation/NGO
Black: Turkey
Grey: The Netherlands/Europe
— : Highly institutionalised
— : Lowly institutionalised

Figure 5.2 National and transnational ties of Turkish extreme left parties

Square: Political party
Circle: Migrant organisation/NGO
Black: Turkey
Grey: The Netherlands/Europe
— : Highly institutionalised
— : Lowly institutionalised
Differences, however, remain. HTF and NIF organisations, for example, are still heavily influenced by political parties in Turkey. This can partly be explained by the MHP’s and SP’s ideologies, where the Turkish nation includes all Turkish people irrespective of where they reside.

Finally, the Turkish extreme left continues to pursue its goals via diplomatic channels. The social and cultural organisations these parties in exile use to mobilise people, however, are nowadays mainly geared at the everyday lives of migrants.

*Diş Türkler* (‘Turks abroad’)

The Party Law that prohibited party branches abroad and ties between parties and organisations in Turkey and Europe had an enduring impact on the political opportunity structure for transnational party politics. The 1982 constitution that contained the Party Law included other amendments that affected migrant organisations and their political participation. The basic principles for emigration policy were laid down in the 1982 constitution (amended in 1995). It states:

The state shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, and shall take the necessary measures to safeguard their ties with the homeland, and to help them on their return home. (Turkish Constitution Article 62).

A wide range of measures was adopted following from this provision, including social security arrangements for overseas citizens through agreements with receiving countries (see also Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 108). Most consequential for migrant civil society was the installation of Diyanet branches across Europe. Diyanet had been sending imams to Turkish communities since 1971 (see Den Exter 1990: 46-56; Landman 1992: 101-105); its organisation in the Netherlands, HDV, was established in 1982. The policy was based on the assumption that guest workers would return and needed temporary aid while abroad. The situation of guest workers in Germany served as the template for policy covering Turkish former nationals throughout Europe.

Between 1983 and 1986, the minister of state in charge of information was responsible for Turks living abroad. Organising within the Turkish community was a means to counter the spread of radical groups outlawed in Turkey, as he explains:

We facilitated this by founding Diyanet organisations in these countries. At that time some Turkish radical [Islamic] groups organised
their own mosques, like Milli Görüş [...]. We thought the activities of these radical groups emerged because of the lack of official services […]. We also started to open Türk Evleri, cultural organisations for Turks living abroad. We have opened such cultural and religious branches in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Cologne, Brussels, etc.70

In 1987, Turkey implemented measures enabling Turks abroad to vote. Turkish migrants can now vote at customs two to three weeks before the elections. But according to the former minister of state, the method has not been widely used: ‘They want to vote at the consulates in their residing countries. Turkish laws do not allow this and there are also legislative problems with host countries.’71

Turkish authorities and institutions in the late 1980s and 1990s realised that their citizens were not going to return. Parliamentary debates have thus increasingly focused on understanding and solving the problems of Turks abroad. The most important legislative measure was the 1995 introduction of the so-called Pink Card (Pembe Kart) that grants those who gave up Turkish nationality certain rights in Turkey (voting excepted). The card is particularly used by Turks in Germany; it is unnecessary for most Turks in the Netherlands who have dual nationality (for a historical overview of Turkish citizenship laws see Fermin & Van der Hijden 2004: 225-226; Kadirbeyoğlu 2007; EUDO Nationality Laws Database http://eudo-citizenship.eu/national-citizenship-laws).

Reflecting concern over their treatment as second-class citizens and their loss of Turkish culture (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 108-109), a special commission was set up in 1995 to assess the situation of Turks living abroad. Against this backdrop, the ANAP-DSP government in 1999 set up the Consultation Commission for Citizens Living Abroad to stimulate Turkish integration without assimilation and loss of Turkish culture. The commission worked closely with the MGK (and thus the military) that had so far dominated policy vis-à-vis overseas Turks. The commission was chaired by the minister of state responsible for Turks living abroad and consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Interior and Diyanet. Also included were 45 Turkish migrants ‘who had strong societal positions in the countries of residence and were not exclusively focused on Turkey.’72 The migrant delegates were screened by Turkish embassies and consulates and were selected as individuals, not as representatives of organisations.73 The council thus completely bypassed those migrant organisations that had been calling for Turkish government action for years (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003e: 110-111); migrant organisations responded by campaigning against their exclusion.74

The commission officially met once a year, with the minister of foreign affairs debriefing the government with information gained through the embassy and consulates in Germany.75 One of the main projects was a report
on the education of Turkish children, co-written by a delegate from the Netherlands. The participation of the Dutch delegate, who was also an IOT board member, led to questions about her loyalty in the Dutch parliament in 1999 and 2001 (Fermin & Van der Hijden 2004: 231). The commission has been effectively dormant since its last meeting in 2000.\textsuperscript{76}

This did not imply lack of interest. While political liberalisation had reduced the influence of the MGK in this area, at the time of research, those organs traditionally concerned with Turks living abroad – the Ministries of Labour, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs of State (which includes Diyanet) – had their own departments for this issue. The official policy in 2004 was:

From the beginning of the flow of Turkish migrant workers abroad Turkey has spared no effort to ensure that these people are provided with the most favourable living and working conditions in the countries of destination. To realize this, Turkey has signed social security agreements with the receiving countries. Furthermore, the Turkish Government actively participates in all international forums where the rights of migrants are discussed.\textsuperscript{77}

The Ministry of Labour monitors the position of Turks abroad yearly (for 2002 and 2003 see T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı 2003, 2004). These annual reports cover the position of Turks in the fourteen most important countries of settlement in Western Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, and include information on demography, social security, income and integration policy as well as migrant organisations and their representation in local municipalities and parliaments (T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı 2003: 65-87, 2004: 57-84).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises Turkey’s desire that Turks living abroad be fully integrated in their social environments. While children should benefit from educational opportunities in host countries, education in their native language, culture and history remain crucial, it argues. For this purpose, Turkey sends teachers to major receiving countries. Between 1998 and 2004, the Netherlands provided schoolchildren with Turkish roots Turkish language classes under the OALT programme. OALT has since been abolished because, according to the Dutch government, there was no scientific consensus on whether it aided integration. In response, the Turkish Ministry of State has urged that these classes be continued and has pushed for its own involvement in consultation procedures.\textsuperscript{78} Regarding political integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that ‘Turkey wishes that Turks actively participate in the political life of the host countries… Turkey appreciates moves and initiatives towards ensuring active participation of migrants in the social and political life of the receiving countries.’\textsuperscript{79}
In 2003, another parliamentary commission was installed to study the problems of Turks living abroad, led by the former head of Diyanet and, at the time of research, an AKP member of parliament. The commission consulted embassies, Diyanet officials and representatives of Turks in European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium (TBBM 2004). The commission recommended an organisation for Turks living abroad; its findings have been discussed in the Turkish parliament but little has resulted so far. In 2005, the state expressed interest in reactivating the commission for Turks living abroad, which again would focus on religion and education. The minister of state argues that in a future council, migrant organisations should play a more prominent role to better represent the interests of Turkish migrants.

Thus, the Turkish state—especially those governments under the supervision of the military in the 1980s and 1990s—heavily influenced the political opportunities for transnational party politics. The state shifted its stance towards Turks abroad only after the political climate in Turkey had cooled, and when it became clear that migrants were going to stay in receiving countries. Turkish state strategies thus became more country of residence-directed over time. In the eyes of the Turkish government, emigrants became ambassadors for the nation’s cause to join the EU (Fermin & Van der Hijden 2004: 233).

This shift in attitude came to the fore in speeches by Minister of Foreign Affairs Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan in Rotterdam in April and June 2004. In his talk, Gül emphasised how the Turkish community is becoming a role model for Turkey in European countries:

> We all know that some European countries are hesitating about Turkey’s accession to the EU… In this context our citizens in the Netherlands have an important task. They may reflect the contemporary, democratic and modern Turkey here [in the Netherlands].

Both Gül and Erdoğan underscored the importance of integration in the Netherlands: Turks there should achieve higher positions, but without assimilation; they should maintain their own cultural and religious values. Turkey would support this process by investing in education and preparing a special ‘Education Action Plan’ that targets children and their mothers in particular. The maintenance of Turkish values would help migrants to respect beliefs and political opinions that are different from Turkish ones, says Erdoğan:

> Turkish citizenship [and culture] connects you all [with each other and with Turkey]. The most important element of our civilization is love… We have to love all people with different beliefs… because we all have been created by God.
Through upward social mobility, Turkish citizens would be able to spread new ideas and take part in decision-making – including representation in Dutch local and national politics – thereby strengthening Turkey’s position in the world.\textsuperscript{84} The emphasis on upward social mobility should also be seen against the background of Turkish workers abroad being seen as giving Western European countries the wrong image of Turks and Turkey. There is widespread concern in Ankara that Turkish migrants in Europe do not represent the modern, secular Turkey of Ankara, but the traditional rural life of Anatolian villages (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003f: 90).

Whereas the Turkish state traditionally provides opportunities for Turks to maintain ties with Turkey, the policy of the Dutch government increasingly focuses on breaking these ties. The minister of integration, at the time of research, emphasised narrowing possibilities for dual citizenship. Discarding homeland nationality, in her view, would be a sign of loyalty to the Netherlands and would aid integration in Dutch society (Fermin & Van der Hijden 2004: 225). Thus, the Turkish state remains active in country of residence-directed politics with a homeland-directed goal, though the expectation of return has been replaced by acceptance that Turks in the Netherlands are there to stay.

**Turkish-Dutch politicians**

Many Turkish political parties and state representatives are thus in favour of migrants participating in Dutch political life. Those migrants who entered Dutch mainstream politics were often first active in migrant organisations. Below I examine the ties between Dutch politicians with Turkish origins and political parties in Turkey, and how these ties influence their work in the Netherlands.

Interviews with members of Turkish political parties and the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of State revealed that they follow the careers of Dutch parliamentarians of Turkish origin with great interest. I showed in chapter 3 that many individuals with Turkish roots have been, or are active in, Dutch political parties. They are, however, careful and at times reluctant to profile themselves as ‘Turkish’ politicians. This section examines three instances of transnational activity among Dutch politicians of Turkish origin: 1) activities to influence the stance of their parties vis-à-vis Turkish EU accession; 2) attempts to encourage Turkish migrants to vote in Dutch elections; and 3) similar attempts during election campaigns for the European Parliament.

In 2003, five municipal politicians of Turkish origin active in migrant civil society established Siyaset.nl, an online forum to discuss issues related to integration and the work of Dutch politicians with Turkish roots. The webmaster ensures that the discussions do not become partisan; the forum
is meant to discuss common problems faced by these politicians, for example, in their political careers. Some politicians feel Dutch parties use them to gain Turkish migrant votes but do not take them seriously. The online discussions further revealed the need for offline activities; several have resulted, including debates during Dutch elections, visits to the European Parliament, the Dutch Parliament and Diyanet in The Hague.85

During the Dutch chairmanship of the EU, Siyaset organised a five-day trip to Turkey. The goal of the trip was to gather information on Turkish reforms – especially local ones – in light of EU requirements. Siyaset members each invited a Dutch colleague; the participation of non-Turkish Dutch colleagues would enhance the mission’s credibility and prevent accusations that they were abusing their positions for the sake of Turkish politics. The delegation visited the Dutch consulate and embassy, sites where Dutch municipalities were sponsoring projects following the Marmara earthquake, and the mayors of Ankara and Istanbul. The trip culminated in a visit to the Turkish parliament where the delegation was received by its speaker, Arınç. Arınç underlined the importance of the relationship between the Netherlands and Turkey, not least because two-thirds of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands also have Turkish nationality. The meeting further drew attention to the Dutch parliament’s reluctance to establish a friendship tie between the two parliaments.86 The parliamentarian appointed to establish the tie had been turned down by the Dutch ambassador, while parliamentarians of Turkish origin fared no better.87

Comparable to the Siyaset trip, but party-related, was a visit to Istanbul by the youth branch (JOVD) of the Dutch liberal party VVD. The visit, which aimed to form an independent opinion of Turkey, was initiated by the former JOVD chairman (who has a Turkish father and a Dutch mother). Fadime Örgu, a VVD parliamentarian of Turkish origin, served as a guest delegate and advisor. The delegation visited Turkish trade unions and the Liberal Democartic Party (LDP) that maintains good relations with the VVD. The JOVD hoped to establish closer relations with the youth branches of the LDP and AKP and to foster exchange projects.88

One of the Siyaset members, a local politician in the Dutch town of Venlo and a board member of the Diyanet federation TİC, organised a meeting before the 2002 national elections with both Turkish AKP and Dutch PvdA parliamentarians present. According to the organiser, first-generation Turks in the Netherlands, especially, are more concerned with Turkish than with Dutch politics. This uninterest, he states, is due to the language barrier and a perceived lack of political influence. In contrast, interest in Turkish politics stems from knowledge of the Turkish language, media coverage, political scandals and ideological differences between Turkish political parties – all of which make Turkish politics juicy. The goal of the meeting was to encourage political participation in the Netherlands – with the help of Turkish politicians. In their speeches, the
Turkish parliamentarians urged the migrants to leave Turkish politics to the 70 million people in Turkey. As their future lies in the Netherlands, they should cast their vote there.89

A local CDA politician of Turkish origin ran for a seat in the European Parliament in 2004. During his campaign he clearly presented himself as a politician with dual antennae and extensively used Turkish media in the Netherlands. The last week of the campaign, he argues, is crucial. The most important thing is to be visible in the press, but it is difficult to get into high profile opinion programmes on Dutch television, like NOVA or Netwerk, but Turks in the Netherlands use dish antennas like crazy… I wanted to be visible and thought this is only possible via Turkish broadcasting… first I went to Germany where some Turkish stations, like TRT-INT, TV8 and Canal 7, broadcast. I have spent the last week of my campaign in Istanbul and was advised by a Turkish public relations agency… I have visited 22 TV stations in one week. 90

Prime Minister Erdoğan told the CDA candidate during a meeting in Berlin that he was proud of him. Others said that if he was not elected he should run for a seat in the Turkish parliament: ‘It flattered me… but no… okay maybe I would think about it if they would approach me.’ 91

These examples show that Dutch politicians of Turkish descent are often in a difficult position. Their parties expect them to draw votes from the Turkish community but become suspicious when they rely on it too much. Moreover, some feel that they are not taken seriously by their Dutch colleagues if they are elected through preferential votes; others cannot get the same media exposure in the Netherlands as they get in Turkey. Dutch politicians of Turkish descent thus use their ties with Turkey cautiously – in their election campaigns and regarding issues surrounding Turkey’s accession to the EU. As such, they are engaged in homeland-directed politics with a country of residence-directed goal.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the structure of Turkish migrant organisational networks cannot be understood independently of the political climate and specific political opportunities for political parties in Turkey. Most migrant organisations were founded in the 1970s on the initiative of the Turkish state and representatives of political parties in response to developments in Turkey.

In the past, Turkish parties and the state mainly focused on Turkish migrant workers. Parties rallied support; the state aimed to facilitate their
return and to combat the radical movements that could freely exist in Europe. Today, having accepted that emigrants are in the Netherlands to stay, the Turkish state and political parties no longer try to control former citizens as they once did. They increasingly direct their attention to highly educated Turks, including the second generation. The state hopes that they will serve as representatives of Turkey and improve Turkey’s image in Europe, while political parties increasingly rely on highly educated Turks for their international relations.

These developments, however, do not mean that the Turkish state and political parties have lost interest in ordinary migrants with guest worker backgrounds. Since the beginning of emigration, the Turkish state has felt responsible for migrants’ well-being; today it tries to stimulate their integration in receiving societies. The Turkish government’s views on integration, however, do not correspond with the Dutch government’s ideas. Whereas Turkey emphasises the maintenance of Turkish culture, secular religion and citizenship (also in non-legal terms), the Netherlands discourages such attachments. Turkey’s stance makes it what Levitt and Glick Schiller call a strategically selective state that encourages certain forms of transnational participation while trying to selectively manage what migrants can and cannot do. The state’s sense of responsibility towards its former citizens abroad is rooted in the strength of Turkish nationalism as laid down by the founder of the Turkish Republic.

Ties between Turkish political parties and migrant organisations continue to exist. This especially applies to the Islamists, ultranationalists and illegal extreme left parties. The success of ultranationalist transnational mobilisation is largely due to their nationalist programme that include Outer Turks, while for the Islamists religion obviously plays a major role. For the illegal parties, Europe remains a place where they can freely mobilise and rally support; their ties to civil society are vital for their existence.

The weakening of ties between migrant organisations and political parties follows their legalisation in Turkey, making support from abroad obsolete. Parties that remain marginal in Turkey, however, still invest in electoral support from abroad. While this is often initiated by migrant organisations themselves, migrants only seem to have a voice in party matters and policy when the majority of the administrative board in Turkey has a migrant history as well. Migrant involvement in transnational party politics is rarely rewarded by political position in the homeland. Instead, such ties are increasingly used to facilitate political participation in the Netherlands.

For both the Turkish state and Turkish political parties, Germany has been the main reference point for issues to do with Turks abroad. Linkages often run from Turkey to Germany and from representatives in Germany to the Netherlands. Although organisations have become more autonomous over time, key issues are still handled by headquarters and confederations in Germany. Turkish hopes for EU accession, however, have increased
Brussels’ importance, especially for political parties in exile, diaspora groups and marginal parties in Turkish politics.

What this shows is that transnational politics is not only about activities or loyalties that transcend national borders; what happens at the organizational nodes in the country of origin is often crucial for developments in the country of settlement. Indeed, many groups that are unproblematically seen as migrant organisations only became true migrant organisations after their counterparts in the homeland chose a political path that made support from abroad obsolete. This becomes clear when comparing the central collective actors in chapter 3 with the central actors in this chapter: to a large extent, they correspond, showing that migrant organisations are part and parcel of transnational party politics, and indeed, have often been established for this reason. Homeland politics thus casts an even longer shadow over transnational politics than is often acknowledged.

These findings suggest the need to specify homeland-related factors that determine transnational political practices in the country of settlement. Instead of assuming that homeland ‘political opportunities’ similarly affect all groups, one should ask how specific groups – even within the same political stream – are included or excluded from homeland political participation. Only then can one explain how and why migrant organisations continue homeland-directed activities, redirect their interests to the country of settlement or combine elements of both. Finally, as this chapter has shown, there is no indication that maintaining interest in homeland politics today hinders political integration or threatens Dutch democracy.
6 Kurdish diaspora politics

The previous chapter showed how specific political opportunities in Turkey affected the emergence of migrant organisations in the Netherlands. It also illustrated how third-country transnational ties and the use of supranational opportunity structures were especially relevant for groups excluded from political participation in their homelands. This chapter continues this line of analysis for (self-identifying) Kurds living in the Netherlands. It focuses on the impact of the political climate and opportunity structure in Turkey, new Dutch and European opportunity structures and third-country and ethnic transnational ties on Kurdish diaspora politics.

I begin with the growth of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey in the 1970s up to the 1980 coup. I then examine the strategies of both legal and illegal Kurdish and pro-Kurdish political parties, in Turkey and in European exile. Special attention is devoted to the PKK in Europe, the organisation that dominated both the ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey and Kurdish activities in the Netherlands in the 1990s. The final section examines the ties between Kurdish parties and migrant organisations in the Netherlands and Europe between 2002 and 2004.

The rise of Kurdish nationalism

The TİP was the first legal party to recognise Kurds in 1970. This led to its closure by the constitutional court and the prosecution of its leaders for encouraging activities to divide the country (Ahmad 1993: 311). Kurds had been prominent in Marxist groups in the 1970s and were engaged in street fighting with extreme right youths (Poulton 1997: 212). This period saw the founding of two important Kurdish parties, the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (PSKT) and the PKK. Their leaders had roots in the workers party TİP and the student movement Dev Genç, respectively (see Appendix C).

The PSKT saw Turkey as colonising the Kurdish people. It desired independence for the Kurdish nation but remained open to a federal solution. In any case, the Kurdish question should be solved by democratic means (PSK 2000). The Marxist-Leninist PKK was equally opposed to the ‘Turkish imperialism’ that prevailed in ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ (Güney 2002:...
123). It aspired to a united and independent socialist Kurdistan (including the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran and Syria) through a ‘national democratic’ revolution (White 2000: 142). The PKK strategy was to mobilise destitute social classes, uprooted small-town youths and poor peasants against landlords and traditional chiefs cooperating with the central government in Ankara (Taspinar 2005: 95). For the PKK, the intensity of Kurdish national feeling was accentuated by the loss of spoken Kurdish among its founding members (McDowall 1996: 419).

The 1982 constitution contained specific provisions to strengthen cultural and political suppression in the south-eastern provinces mainly inhabited by Kurds. These provisions completely prohibited the spoken and written use of the Kurdish language and were based on one of the founding principles of the Turkish nation-state, the ‘denial of Kurdish ethnicity and cultural identity’ (Taspinar 2005: 96-97).

After the 1980 coup, PSKT leader Kemal Burkay went into exile in Sweden. Most PKK leaders managed to flee Turkey; Öcalan settled in Damascus. With the help of the Syrian government he established training camps in the Beqa’a Valley where Syrian and Palestinian officers trained his guerrillas. The PKK continued its activities on Turkish soil from Syria and through Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iran-Iraq War, which started in 1982, had an important effect; the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Turkish border came under the control of Mahmut Barzani’s Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDK), which allowed the PKK to operate from the areas it controlled (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 316). By the mid-1980s the PKK had become a professional organisation comprising a party proper, the Kurdistan National Liberation Army (ARGK) and its political wing the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (ERNK) (Poulton 1997: 230). The PKK also established educational programmes as well as women’s, student and youth sections (Özcan 2006: 198).

While political liberalisation was slowly gaining ground in the rest of Turkey, the government introduced martial law and a state of emergency in the majority of Kurdish provinces in 1986. An agreement between Ankara and Baghdad allowed Turkish forces to cross the border freely in case PKK forces took refuge in Iraqi territory. Turkish forces made no distinction between the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PKK camps. This strained PKK-KDP cooperation in 1987 (Taspinar 2005: 100) and led to the PSKT renouncing the PKK’s ideology and strategy, which it labelled pure terrorism (Van Bruinessen 1998). The PSKT unsuccessfully united with various patriotic Kurdish forces in the anti-PKK alliance Kurdistan Liberation Movement (TEVGER) in 1988. Though TEVGER was strengthened by defections from the PKK leadership, its leadership remained restricted to Kurdish communities in Europe (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 314).
Illegal Kurdish parties

The two most important illegal Kurdish parties in the 1990s were Öcalan’s PKK and the PSK (the successor of PSKT) under Burkay’s leadership. It was the PKK that dominated the Kurdish question in Turkey in the 1990s. The military’s Spring Operation in 1992 was part of the ‘solution’ for the ‘Kurdish problem’ President Özal had announced earlier that year. Its aim was to defeat the uprising among Kurds protesting against the government’s policies, state terrorism and torture in the southeast. The protests, which began on a large scale in 1990, erupted after clashes between the PKK and Turkish troops and showed growing local sympathy for Kurdish nationalist aspirations. The PKK’s guerrilla wing ARGK claimed this broad support made the creation of ‘liberated zones’, where the PKK would be the sole political authority, imminent. Turkish troops had already started cross-border raids to hit PKK bases in Iraq, while the Turkish authorities suppressed all manifestations of Kurdishness. PKK activities nevertheless intensified in severity and scope and began to paralyse the southeast (White 2000: 164-166). In response, the Turkish military began evacuating Kurdish villages in the southeast (for the Turkish scorched earth policy see Barkey & Fuller 1998: 133-156).

In 1998, Turkey issued an ultimatum to Syria: remove the PKK and expel Öcalan or risk military attack. Öcalan ordered his fighters out of Syria and left the country while Turkey and Syria reached an agreement on total opposition to the PKK. On the run seeking asylum and diplomatic protection in several countries, Öcalan was eventually kidnapped in Kenya and brought back to Turkey where he was detained (White 2000: 186).

After his arrest, Öcalan remained the PKK leader from prison and urged the party to withdraw its fighters and seek a democratic solution (Taspinar 2005: 105-111). The majority of full-time guerrillas remained in the camps in northern Iraq (10,000 in early 2000). In 2002, the PKK – just before it was added to the EU list of terrorist organisations and arguing that it had ceased its activities – renamed itself the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK). KADEK instated itself in Brussels and termed its new strategy a democratic policy struggle (Cline 2004: 327). Since 2003, there have nevertheless been several breaches of the ‘cease-fire’. KADEK, unable to rid itself of the PKK label, dissolved in 2003 and founded the KONGRA-GEL. KONGRA-GEL has maintained its guerrilla fighters in northern Iraq.

At the time of research, the KONGRA-GEL (the successor of the PKK and KNK; see next section) had an office in Brussels and its headquarters in the mountains of the Kurdish part of Iraq. Its administrative board comprises 30 members, twelve of whom reside in Europe. The whole congress counts 300 members working in various commissions. Leaders in Iraq develop activities on the ground, whereas the European desk has a diplomatic
function: to introduce the party to the EU and to put the Kurdish question on the European agenda during negotiations for Turkish EU membership.1

The PSK works mainly from abroad, cooperating with organisations in Turkey and clandestinely spreading its publications in the homeland (also see PSK 2000). The party declined to participate in the PKDW, arguing that the parliament in exile was formed by the PKK and Democratic Party (DEP) without consulting other Kurdish groups (Kirişçi & Winrow 1998: 148). But when Öcalan asked for asylum in Italy in 1998, Burkay urged the Italian prime minister to give him refugee status. This seemed to indicate that years of competition between the PKK and other Kurdish movements was waning (Van Bruinessen 1998).

Pro-Kurdish and Kurdish parties

Historically, Kurds in Turkey are represented in political parties and organisations that range from those promoting Turkish nationalism to illegal ones advocating a separate state. The workers parties TİP and İP, the Islamist FP and social democratic SHP have all taken up the Kurdish question in that they want it solved. Other parties such as the extreme right MHP, the social democratic DSP and conservative DYP deny there is a Kurdish question to begin with, arguing instead that the problem is one of terrorism (Kirişçi & Winrow 1998: 141-151). The political parties that took up the Kurdish question in the 1990s can be divided into legal Turkish parties as well as into legal and illegal Kurdish parties.

Mainstream and pro-Kurdish parties taking up the Kurdish issue continuously face the threat of being banned and their deputies imprisoned (see family tree in Appendix C). Seven Kurdish SHP parliamentarians were expelled from the party in 1989 for attending an international conference on the Kurdish question in Paris (Taspinar 2005: 102). In response, they established the pro-Kurdish People’s Work Party (HEP), which merged with the SHP for the 1991 elections. When taking their oath in parliament, however, several former HEP politicians switched to the Kurdish language and displayed the PKK’s colours. Soon thereafter they left the SHP to re-establish the HEP, which was itself banned in 1993. The HEP was succeeded by the DEP, whose leadership was divided on whether to support the PKK. More radical deputies such as Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana declared the PKK was a political rather than a terrorist organisation and demanded a political solution to the Kurdish question. In 1994, six DEP deputies of Kurdish origin were arrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, the DEP was closed by the constitutional court for ‘making provocative statements against the Turkish Republic’ (Güney 2002: 124-125). A number of DEP parliamentarians sought refuge in Europe and founded the PKDW in 1995. Other DEP
members set up the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and the Democracy and Change Party (DDP).

The DDP was short-lived. Its programme was seen as undermining the territorial integrity of the state and the unity of the Turkish nation, and the party was shut down in 1996. The DDP was succeeded by the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR) in 2002, which advocates a democratic and civil resolution to the Kurdish issue and its associated violence. As the party aims to reach a solution via the EU, Turkish EU membership was one of its main concerns in the 2004 municipal elections. The party blames the Turkish government for ignoring positive alternatives (such as itself) and focusing solely on the PKK:

The PKK and the Turkish Republic are in full agreement on non-settlement of the Kurdish issue. Under this frame, the Turkish Government does not allow development of any Kurdish opposition other than PKK.

HAK-PAR urges European governing institutes to help them out of their isolated position. The party also maintains good relations with Kurdish leaders in Iraq.

HADEP turned down Öcalan’s call to join the PKDW (Kirişçi & Winrow 1998: 148) and managed to survive until 2003 by formally keeping its distance from the PKK. But after his arrest in 1999, Öcalan claimed the PKK had financially contributed to HADEP and nominated candidates for elections; in return, HADEP had trained militants for the PKK (Güney 2002: 126). HADEP was succeeded by the DEHAP. Öcalan, however, remained a source of inspiration especially within DEHAP youth education programmes, based in Diyarbakır and at DEHAP headquarters in Ankara.

While DEHAP cannot officially be part of KONGRA-GEL (the illegal successor of the PKK), DEHAP members explained that individuals can be.

In national elections in the 1990s and around the beginning of the millennium, HADEP and DEHAP enjoyed little success and were unable to pass the threshold (Güney 2002: 128). In contrast to general elections, there is no threshold to pass in local elections; all parties regardless of their size can win mayoralties and seats on municipal councils (Kurdistan Observer 2004). In the southeast, HADEP and DEHAP did very well. In the 1995 and 1999 elections in Diyarbakır, they won 46.3 and 62.5 per cent of the votes, respectively (Güney 2002: 128). In 2005, DEHAP announced its merger with the Democratic Society Party (DTP), founded by former DEP deputies Zana and Dicle who had been released from prison in 2004. Despite electoral losses in the 2004 municipal elections, DEHAP/DTP has mayoralties in 55 municipalities, mainly in southeastern provinces.
PKK mobilisation in Europe

The PKK started mobilising migrant workers in Western Europe in 1978; a ‘Europe Bureau’ to organise fundraising activities was founded in 1981 (Argun 2003: 123). The Europe Bureau recruited guerrillas and staff members among highly skilled second-generation migrants and young labourers. These Kurdish migrants were connected in a dense network of workers and student organisations, publishing houses and information bureaus such as the Kurdish Information Centres (KIC) (Van Bruinessen 2000: 13; Argun 2003: 123). KICs, which existed in several European countries, lobbied for an independent Kurdistan and functioned as mouthpieces of the PKK (NRC 1999a).

The KIC in the Netherlands, which existed from 1992 to 1999, was established to inform the Dutch public about the Kurdish people and the conflict in Turkey. Another motive for its creation, as its former chairman explains, was to improve the negative image of Kurds: ‘There were a lot of prejudices about Kurds. People saw us as terrorists.’ To provide a more positive, and in their view realistic, picture of the Kurdish question they published the magazine Koerdistan Nederland between 1993 and 1999. The Kurdish migrant federation FED-KOM took over the functions of the KIC when the centre dissolved. By this time, the political wing of the PKK, the ERNK, had built strong networks with branches in Western European and non-European countries with a Kurdish population (Özcan 2006: 198). The European migrant confederation KON-KURD and its national member organisations such as FED-KOM were part of the ERNK (NRC 1999a). Through KON-KURD the PKK is linked to the Turkish/Kurdish organisational network in Figure 3.3.

Throughout the 1990s, political events in Turkey directly affected the activities of Kurdish organisations in Europe and the Netherlands, resulting in numerous demonstrations, hunger strikes and sometimes clashes with Turkish nationalists. In the newspapers, it was mostly the KIC that acted as the spokesperson for the Kurdish community in the Netherlands. In response to the Spring Operation in 1992, PKK followers in the Netherlands protested in front of the Turkish consulates in the cities of Deventer and Rotterdam; their aim was for the Dutch government to oppose Turkish military action against the PKK in eastern Turkey and to support an independent Kurdistan. In different cities in the Netherlands, groups of Kurds raided Turkish companies such as Turkish Airlines.

As in Turkey, celebration of the Kurdish New Year Newroz in the Netherlands has come to symbolise the Kurdish struggle against Turkish repression. Newroz assumed this function after the armed uprising of the PKK in 1984 (Gambetti 2004). During Newroz 1992, Öcalan called on Kurds to join in mass uprisings. The festivities thus became the day for protests and rallies by the PKK to secure maximum publicity (see also
Yanik 2006). Through the 1990s, the KIC as the PKK’s mouthpiece in the Netherlands was prominent in the Dutch media around Newroz.

In 1993, the Turkish authorities declared a policy of ‘total war’ to solve the Kurdish problem, a response to the PKK’s announcement that it was returning to terrorism after the government had declined its invitation to negotiate a political solution. Heavy fighting and the military’s orders to inhabitants to leave their villages triggered an exodus from Kurdish areas (White 2000: 169-172). Kurdish villages in the mountains were now destroyed in an effort to cut off the PKK from its bases of support (Zürcher 2004 [1993]: 318). These events led to protests by PKK supporters in many European countries. Whereas the protests turned violent in other countries, they remained relatively peaceful in the Netherlands. In the words of the KIC spokesman:

Problems in Germany arose after the people’s uprising in Kurdistan was suppressed. Kurds reacted against the Turkish Consulate or threw stones. Even Molotov cocktails were thrown in some countries […] then some panic in Europe evolved. Germany’s attitude towards the Kurds was tough […] in the Netherlands Kurds were free. In Germany the police raided Kurdish organisations, this never happened in the Netherlands. [Radical actions] depend on the policy, not on the Kurds […] There is plenty of room for protest [in the Netherlands].

The KIC spokesman thus argued that terrorist and violent actions were unlikely in the Netherlands as the open political arena provided sufficient space for democratic action, for instance, offering petitions to the Dutch parliament on the ‘genocide’ in Turkey, referring to the 50 Kurdish villages that had been reduced to ashes (NRC 1993).

Over the years, the PKK grew more involved in lobbying in Europe, supporting the establishment of the PKDW. As previously mentioned, the PKDW was an initiative of former parliamentarians of the Kurdish party DEP after it was banned in 1994. Some DEP parliamentarians were sentenced; others sought refuge in Europe. One of these refugees, Yaşar Kaya, became chairman of the PKDW, which came to function as a ‘travelling’ parliament with a permanent seat in Brussels. The PKDW aspired to represent Kurds in exile in Europe, Australia and Canada and to find a political solution to the armed struggle in eastern Turkey (Trouw 1995). The parliament had 65 seats apportioned among different organisations in exile such as the ERNK (the largest faction with twelve seats), the PKK (three seats) and the DEP (nine seats). The PKDW was central to placing the Kurdish question on the European political agenda.

The PKDW’s inaugural congress took place in The Hague in 1995 and was co-organised by the KIC. The former KIC chairman explains:
In Turkey Kurdish parliamentarians were expelled, some fled [...] In Europe a large group of Kurdish intellectuals found refuge, and were exploring the possibilities for a civil administration. On the military side there was of course the PKK, they dominated everything. But they [the parliamentarians in exile] were looking for alternatives, it was their idea to form a Parliament in Exile and I organised it. So the idea was launched, but in which country do you install such a Parliament? In most countries there was a legal problem [...]. We had Kurdish Information Centres all over Europe [...] also in Brussels. But we said the Netherlands is suitable [...]. According to Dutch law, it was just a conference, organised by the KIC. In fact it was the installation of the Parliament in Exile [...]. After the inauguration the PKDW established an office in Brussels, because it’s the capital of Europe.¹⁴

The KIC spokesman thus pointed to the favourable political climate for Kurdish nationalists in the Netherlands. Compared to other European countries where PKK-affiliated organisations were active, the Dutch policy on Kurds and its judicial system appeared the most accommodating. This put relations between Turkey and the Netherlands under pressure; relations were frozen and the Turkish ambassador was temporarily recalled (Trouw 1995; Can & Can-Engin 1997: 72). In this period, KIC activities were closely monitored by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the minister directly questioning the centre about the activities that had sparked Ankara’s protest.¹⁵

It was not so much the lobbying of the Kurdish movement that placed the issue on the Dutch political agenda. Rather, Dutch politicians responded to confrontations between Turkish and Kurdish groups, which they saw as a threat to security and public order. This was particularly the case after violent clashes between Turks and Kurds in different Dutch cities in 1997 (for Deventer see Kuiper 1998). Maxime Verhagen, a CDA member of parliament, argued that the confrontations between the two groups were ‘a threat to national security… it is unacceptable that this conflict plays out on Dutch territory’ (NRC 1997c). According to him, the conflict entered the Netherlands when the PKDW was allowed to install itself in the country; Minister of Interior Affairs Hans Dijkstal likewise argued that the Netherlands had no intentions ‘to import Turkish problems’. He vowed to take strict measures if the violence continued (ibid.).

The KIC explained in the Dutch media that ‘there are only tensions between the Kurds and the Turkish state’ and that the Turkish state is organising anti-Kurdish actions in the Netherlands (NRC 1997b). According to a KIC spokesman, Turkish migrants were being used by Ankara to obstruct Kurdish activities in the Netherlands.¹⁶
The lobby of the Kurds against the Turkish state was so strong [...] the Turkish state had to do something. What could they do? So they started to mobilise Turkish associations, the Turkish community here [...] they used the Left Kemalists [followers of the ideology of Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic] [...] were actually more used for lobbying activities [...] in bureaucracy, because they are well educated, and the rest on the streets [Grey Wolves]. During my lobby activities I was more bothered by the [...]. Kemalists than by the Grey Wolves [...]. You don’t have to meet them necessarily in person, but their opinions [...] everywhere!17

Massive PKK mobilisation took place in the winter of 1998 prior to the detention of Öcalan in early 1999. The PKK Central Committee appealed via the internet to Kurdish patriots around the world, urging every Kurd in Kurdistan and abroad to take democratic action to stand up for their leadership (PKK 1998 cited in White 2000: 181). Protests occurred in over 22 cities in Europe, including in the Netherlands (Böhler 2000; Gunter 2000: 851). A member of the PKK Central Committee stated in a Dutch newspaper that it was hardly surprising that Kurds could mobilise so quickly: ‘people are obliged to follow instructions given by the party.’ He further emphasised that people needed to act in an organised manner and individuals were not allowed to undertake solo actions (NRC 1999a). A member of the ERNK (the political wing of the PKK) stated that the PKK and the ERNK were very well organised in the Netherlands and could count on broad support from Kurdish migrants:

People who are active in the Kurdish social-cultural organisations [FED-KOM affiliated] are politically engaged. They do not belong to the militant, radical heart of the PKK, but they do show up at PKK activities [...] we organise a protest action in one day or less. (ibid.)

In the same newspaper article, the KIC chairman explained that these social-cultural associations are indirectly linked to the ERNK through membership in the confederation KON-KURD. According to the KIC chairman and the ERNK member, the organisational structure – a small underground centre in combination with public associations – allows the ERNK to mobilise hundreds of people with just a few phone calls (ibid.).

On the diplomatic level, the PKDW merged into a new body, the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK). The KNK was also inaugurated in the Netherlands, this time in Amsterdam. Initiated by the PKK, the KNK included a wide range of Iraqi and Iranian parties and sought to represent all parts of Kurdistan.18 The Turkish capture of the PKK leader Öcalan in early 1999 contributed to a new sense of unity between Kurds from
different countries and of different political signatures (Van Bruinessen 2000). The KNK had 174 members representing 29 organisations and parties (NRC 1999b). But in the end, the KNK remained a mostly Turkish-Kurdish organ.

Kurdish parties in the Netherlands

The two most important legal Kurdish parties, DEHAP and HAK-PAR, and the two most relevant illegal Kurdish parties, KONGRA-GEL and PSK, are represented and supported by migrant groups in Europe. DEHAP recently moved its European office, which functions as a ‘diplomatic information centre’, from Germany to Brussels. The party maintains no institutionalised ties with the confederation KON-KURD (in which a PKK wing is represented) and its member organisations. DEHAP representatives do, however, attend KON-KURD and its member organisations’ events, especially during election time. In these campaigns, DEHAP officials ask European Kurds with dual nationality to vote and to advise their relatives in Turkey to vote for DEHAP.

In 2002, ten airplanes were charted for DEHAP voters in Europe (ANP 2002). In the Netherlands, the DEHAP solidarity committee – established by the Kurdish migrant federation FED-KOM and the leftist workers organisation DİDF – organised a one-day trip to vote at Istanbul’s airport (Ülger 2002: 10). Most supporters simply cast their ballots; others helped fundraise and campaign. The cooperation between DİDF and FED-KOM mirrored EMEP’s participation under the DEHAP banner (see Figure 5.1). During the election campaign, the two federations organised several meetings to underline Turkish-Kurdish fraternity, while EMEP’s leader was invited for another joint meeting. FED-KOM also asked its members to convince their Kurdish relatives in Turkey to register in the city where they reside. Due to internal (often forced) migration from small villages to large cities, a significant number of Kurds are not registered and hence do not have a right to vote.

During the 2004 local elections, FED-KOM sent delegations to DEHAP in eastern Turkey to monitor proceedings. All parties were allowed to have their own observers at polling stations; observers from Europe were thought to be especially important. In total, fourteen delegations from Europe were sent to the SHP’s coordination point in Diyarbakır (DEHAP joined the SHP in these elections), through contacts with Kurdish and human rights organisations in Europe. Finally, DEHAP also organised festivals, sometimes hosted by FED-KOM, to spread the party’s ideas and raise money. DEHAP advises Kurds to integrate in receiving societies; at the same time, the party wants its supporters to know that ‘they are not alone in Europe’; once in power, DEHAP claims it will facilitate their return.
KONGRA-GEL claims that KON-KURD organisations are no part of the congress. However, Kurdish organisations in Europe such as FED-KOM’s local member organisations assist in organising outreach activities. Local FED-KOM member organisations give room to KONGRA-GEL information evenings where interested youth can embark on a career as a guerrilla. KONGRA-GEL also provides socio-cultural trainings in the Netherlands; military trainings, in contrast, are held in the country of origin. Finally, Europe is important for the organisation’s finances: during festivals, but also through door-to-door collections, considerable sums are raised each year.27

KOMKAR supports the Kurdish party HAK-PAR. In 2003, 40 HAK-PAR members, who also were committed to the PSK, were arrested in Diyarbakır. In response, KOMKAR in the Netherlands and Europe contacted national parliaments and human rights organisations, leading to their release.28 While HAK-PAR was only competing in Diyarbakır’s local elections in 2004, it organised meetings in Europe preceding them; its campaign was supported by KOMKAR and the HAK-PAR branch in Germany.29 The PSK secretary general, living in exile in Sweden, is occasionally invited to the Netherlands by KOMKAR to lecture on Turkey’s accession to the EU and on the position of Kurds there (KOMKAR 2002: 12). The PSK does not have an official branch in the Netherlands, though it is occasionally represented by KOMKAR’s chairman (KOMKAR 2002: 20). In line with the PSK, KOMKAR did not support the PKDW because it was created by the PKK. The federation joined the Platform of Kurds in Europe (KPE) instead. Since 2004, the KPE has united 34 European Kurdish organisations and political parties in exile, including the PSK. The platform urges the EU not to accept Turkish membership until the Kurdish nation and identity are fully acknowledged.30

Conclusion

What does the Kurdish case tell us about the evolution of transnational ties among migrants engaged in diaspora politics? First, it appears that the PKK, especially, worked to institutionalise ties and activities in the diaspora in the 1980s and 1990s. Its methods resembled those of other Turkish organisations excluded from political participation, as well as those of the Turkish state described in the previous chapter. Mirroring findings in the Turkish case, ideology combined with a nationalist programme facilitated the creation of networks spanning numerous countries with strong leaderships appointed from above. Through ties with migrant organisations, illegal parties are embedded in these organisational networks.

While the pattern of transnational political ties has proven highly stable over time (the frequent changing of organisations’ names notwithstanding),
the relative calm in southeastern Turkey in the 2000s has changed the way actors based in the Netherlands employ them. While the emphasis in earlier periods was on direct action – often below the radar of host state governments – Kurdish actors in the Netherlands have recently begun lobbying the Dutch government. Turkey’s probable accession to the EU gives leverage to their claims (see also Yildiz 2005).

The new strategy points to an important development: though Kurds continue to feel excluded from Dutch political opportunities created specifically for migrants, they are beginning to make creative use of general political opportunity structures. In comparison to other European countries, the Dutch system has been the most open to Kurdish migrant activities, swelling the diaspora in the country. These links to the Dutch government, which inevitably took time to bear fruit, are an important channel of transnational political influence for Kurds living in the Netherlands. As such, they are a viable alternative to other, more ‘direct’ forms of political action.

Finally, transnational mobilisation along ethnic lines to put the Kurdish question on national, supranational and international agendas has been on the rise. Kurds in the Netherlands as well as European diaspora leaders are increasingly concerned with the ‘Kurdish question’. It is, however, impossible to isolate this development from highly context-specific factors, in particular, the US-led war in Iraq and the subsequent growth of Kurdish autonomy there. References to the ‘Kurdish question’ may reflect the opportunities perceived by some Kurds to work towards a pan-Kurdish solution in the region – an unthinkable step in earlier decades.
7 Conclusion: Looking both ways

This study has investigated the transnational political participation of Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish migrants and their descendents in the Netherlands over a period of roughly 50 years. Drawing on a variety of methods and both primary qualitative and secondary quantitative data, it has analysed transnational politics in the homelands as well as in the country of residence. By focusing on transnational activities and especially ties, it has sought to provide an in-depth view of the mechanisms and larger structures of migrant transnational politics on the individual, collective and state levels.

Three lines of inquiry guided the study. First, what explains the emergence and development of transnational migrant politics? Second, how has transnational political participation evolved over time, particularly in light of globalised communications and the coming of age of a second generation in countries of settlement? Third, how does migrants’ political integration in receiving societies impact on political transnationalism and vice versa?

The introduction distinguished between five types and one sub-type of transnational politics: homeland-directed, diaspora, transplanted homeland, transplanted immigrant, country of residence-directed and locally specific transnational politics. I expected these activities to be channelled through ties between actors in the country of origin and the country of residence, between migrants from the same country settled in different countries and ties based on ethnicity independent of the country of origin.

The introduction further introduced three phases of the immigrant settlement process as formulated by Vermeulen (2006). The first phase is a period of adjustment; the second is a time of increased adaptation. In the third phase, migrants become permanent residents. Of course migrant groups cannot be so neatly placed; individual migration continues, while political refugees arrived later than colonial, post-colonial and labour migrants. Nevertheless, these later arrivals could draw on the organisational networks created by earlier immigrants. As heuristic shorthand, then, these phases can be applied to the large-scale settlement process of migrants from Surinam and Turkey to the Netherlands.

As Surinamese arrived a little earlier than Turks and Kurds, phase one roughly stretches from the 1950s to 1975. This period covers both the
The arrival of colonial students from Surinam and the recruitment of labour from Turkey. The second phase begins in 1975 when Surinam gained independence and Dutch labour recruitment in Turkey officially ended. Coups in both Turkey and Surinam in 1980 produced political refugees. The second phase ends in 1987 with the political climate in both countries calming down and democracy gradually being restored. In the third phase, from 1987 to 2005, the second generation of both migrant groups reaches adulthood. This is the phase of permanent adaptation, with immigrants focusing on their lives in the Netherlands.

Table 7.1 shows in which phase migrants and refugees from Surinam and Turkey were most involved in which type of transnational politics. Below I discuss the findings for each group.

**Surinamese**

The route to the former colonial metropole was obvious. Colonial migrants were Dutch citizens with many of its associated political rights; post-colonial migrants and refugees had a command of the Dutch language and were acquainted with Dutch culture. By far, the largest population of Surinamese migrants lives in the Netherlands, while most Surinamese have relatives there.

In the first phase, Surinamese transnational actors were colonial students involved in *homeland-directed politics*, motivated by aspirations for Surinamese independence. Their organisations initially supported activities in the Netherlands and their ties with actors in Surinam were weak at best. The first students to return to Surinam established their own political parties, whose leaderships often consisted of the same individuals who had led Surinamese student organisations in the Netherlands. Student returnees in this way transplanted *immigrant politics* to Surinam. As they remained in contact with the Dutch student organisations, their return created...
collective transnational ties as well. As non-migrants in Surinam did not particularly welcome returnees, their political isolation made support from the Netherlands more important.

In the second phase, Surinam became independent (1975) and collective homeland-directed and transplanted immigrant politics decreased. Overall, the focus of migrants’ collective activities shifted towards their lives in the Netherlands. The arrival of political refugees due to the 1980 coup, however, led to political polarisation in the migrant community; this, in turn, fuelled transplanted homeland politics between small groups of sympathisers and opponents of the military regime. Refugees’ transnational ties, minimal at first, strengthened when homeland-based actors began organised resistance against the regime. As a counterweight, the military leaders cultivated ties with migrants in the Netherlands sympathetic to the regime. Even if the numbers involved in homeland-directed and transplanted homeland politics was small, their impact was considerable, affecting the whole Surinamese migrant community. In contrast, the effects of homeland-directed and transplanted homeland politics on Surinam itself remained limited.

The third phase witnessed broader collective engagement in transnational politics. Old ties were reactivated and new ones emerged after the reinstallation of democracy in Surinam. Political elites in Surinam appealed to migrant elites for support, though such collective requests diminished as Surinamese political parties became more securely established. Nowadays, it is mostly Surinamese elites or organisations in the Netherlands that initiate homeland-directed activities, often in the form of locally specific transnational politics, where relations are established between Dutch municipalities and the Surinamese Republic or its districts. Also observable were transnational ties based on ethnicity, especially among East Indian-Surinamese, though these ties – that facilitate transnational religious, social and cultural activities – remain insignificant for political mobilisation.

The most durable ties in the Surinamese case have been based on kinship and friendship. Due to the informal and individualistic character of these ties, the activities they channelled generally had little impact on organised politics in both home and host countries.

**Turks**

Intergovernmental labour migration agreements informed the migration process. Because Turkey signed agreements with several countries, the Turkish migrant population is spread across Western Europe.

In the first phase of Turkish settlement in the Netherlands, the most influential actors were based in the homeland. Their activities were country of residence-directed but had a homeland-directed goal. Homeland-based
actors did not want migrants to intervene in Turkish politics, but to support existing parties and organisations. Homeland-based actors directed their activities towards several West European countries of residence, thereby facilitating the creation of Turkish organisational networks across Europe. As the political climate in Turkey hardened in the late 1970s, tensions between rival political groups were transplanted to migrants’ individual and organisational lives as well.

In the second phase, transplanted homeland politics came to dominate Turkish migrant organisations. In opposition to, or support of, homeland parties and organisations, European third-country transnational ties became increasingly important in homeland-directed mobilisation. At the same time, homeland-based groups still sought the support of migrants and refugees abroad and thus participated in country of residence-directed politics.

In the third phase, homeland-directed activities decreased, partly due to the more stable political climate in Turkey. Improving migrants’ positions both as emigrants of Turkey and as immigrants in the Netherlands grew in importance. On the Turkish side, there were new image-building campaigns to facilitate Turkish accession to the EU, while actors in both the Netherlands and Turkey tried to disrupt the activities of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Netherlands, thus involving themselves in transplanted homeland politics. Finally, observable was the rise of locally specific transnational politics – campaigning in villages of origin as well as lobbying by migrant organisations and Turkish-Dutch municipal councillors to establish relations between cities in Turkey and the Netherlands. Though such ties always existed on a personal level, in recent years they have been politically institutionalised and exploited.

Kurds

Kurdish transnational politics began in the second phase of immigration from Turkey; the central actors were Kurdish refugees and labour migrants influenced by Kurdish nationalism. Generally speaking, their activities comprised diaspora politics as their goal was the creation of an independent homeland. Transnational ties with actors based in Turkey were few compared to ties with Kurdish exiles in other European and Middle Eastern countries. As their core transnational activities took place in Europe, conflicts from Turkey were transplanted to host countries. Kurdish political leaders maintained a firm grip on the diaspora activities of migrants.

In the third phase, the course of transplanted homeland politics has depended on the political climate. As the position of Kurds in Turkey improved over the past decade, the scope of diaspora politics and its effect on
Turkey has declined. But should the political climate worsen in Turkey or in the Middle East – think, for example, of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq in February 2008 – this would add fuel to the fire of diaspora politics.

Kurdish diaspora politics has traditionally had a broad scope; the current trend is towards transnational mobilisation among Kurds living in and originating from different countries. Recent developments in Iraq, where Kurds have gained more autonomy, may well strengthen this trend in the future.

**Explaining transnational politics**

Examining transnational political involvement over settlement phases shows significant differences between migrants from Surinam and Turkey. *Homeland-directed* activities were most constant among Surinamese. *Country of residence-directed* and *transplanted homeland politics* were most prominent among Turks, while Kurds were most active in *diaspora* and *transplanted homeland politics*. The transnational ties of Turkish actors were generally institutionalised from above by state actors or political leaders in Turkey, while Kurdish transnational ties were institutionalised by leaders of influential political organisations in exile. In contrast, small grassroots organisations or individuals generally institutionalised Surinamese transnational ties from below. The transnational ties of Kurdish and Turkish groups that emerged in the first and second phases of settlement generally still exist, whereas those of Surinamese have faded. How can such differences be explained?

For refugees as well as for labour and colonial and post-colonial migrants, the openness or closure of homeland political opportunity structures clearly affected the formation and activities of migrant civil society. In Levitt and Glick Schiller’s (2004) conceptualisation, Turkey is a *strategically selective state* that encourages certain forms of transnational participation while aiming to manage what migrants can and cannot do.¹ In contrast, Surinam is a *denouncing state* that treats migrants as if they no longer belong to the homeland; they are seen as having abandoned the homeland, or even as traitors to its cause.

The differences in the two sending states’ approaches to their former overseas citizens can largely be traced to differences in their *ideologies of nationhood*. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, successive governments have advocated the creation of a singular Turkish identity above and beyond ethnic differences. This conceptualisation includes Turks who live outside the state, as well as individuals who have naturalised in other countries (Lucassen & Penninx 2009). The official nationalism of the Republic of Surinam – while ‘territorial’ – has explicitly anti-colonial
roots. Out of fear that Surinamese from abroad will take over the country, the anti-colonial elements within Surinamese nationalism are mobilised to reduce foreign influence. There is thus great ambivalence over whether Surinamese-Dutch are indeed ‘one of us’.

More ‘inclusive’ forms of homeland nationalism facilitate the institutionalising of transnational ties. The Turkish state maintains contacts with emigrants through formal institutions. In some areas it extends political opportunities, for example, in allowing dual citizenship and allowing dual-nationality emigrants to vote. State institutions also reach out to emigrants in countries of settlement: Diyanet to influence religious life, TRT-INT to provide news and information, and a consultation board for emigrants to express specific grievances. The Turkish state takes an active interest in the political activities of its emigrants, particularly when they are of a transnational nature. In large part, this is a security issue. In an attempt to limit the growth of opposition groups; Turkey continues to forbid its overseas citizens to found political parties. Up until the present, Surinam has provided few opportunities for migrants to participate politically and has denied the opportunity for dual citizenship. Post-colonial intergovernmental tensions constrained possibilities for transnational political involvement; to limit Dutch influence, the Surinamese elite erected barriers to Surinamese-Dutch as well.

The greater involvement of state, party and civil society actors in Turkey contributed to much more highly institutionalised ties with migrant organisations in the Netherlands than in the Surinamese case. The first main Turkish migrant organisations reflected political streams in the homeland; their transnational ties were invariably based on ideology. When individual leaders stepped down, structural relations continued. In contrast, ties between Surinamese migrant organisations and political parties were primarily based on the individual and fewer institutionalised ties of kinship, friendship and ethnicity. The organisational structure of transnational politics for both groups thus reflected the organisation of politics in the homeland: formal, collective and ideological in Turkey, informal and ethnically fragmented in Surinam. Due to their greater organisational capacities, Turks and Kurds were able to mobilise more quickly and reach wider publics.

Political opportunity structures in the country of settlement began to play a role in the second phase of settlement. This corroborates Vermeulen’s (2006) findings that both migrants and host state authorities see little need to interact in the initial phase due to the (perceived) temporariness of stay. But as social and political issues arise once a larger group is settled for a longer time, political responses become necessary (Vermeulen 2006: 178). By providing organisational models and representative bodies (as happened in the Dutch case), host country opportunities over time come to weigh more heavily than those of the sending country.
Host country political opportunities such as participation in advisory bodies and government subsidies weakened formal orientations towards the homeland. The importance given to migrant advisory boards led over time to a dense and diverse network of Turkish migrant organisations in the Netherlands. Turkish political streams that opposed each other in the 1970s and 1980s were seduced to sit at the table together, to work collectively for a common future in the Netherlands. In Dutch integration discourse, homeland orientation is seen negatively; this clearly affected the way Turkish organisations present themselves. Even though many of their activities have a transnational dimension, and some organisations have ties to Turkish political parties, representatives habitually downplay their relevance. As Turkish law prohibited branches of Turkish parties and organisations abroad for decades, both Dutch and Turkish policies discouraged explicitly political forms of transnational involvement. The impact of host country political opportunities on Surinamese migrant civil society was less clear-cut. An elaborate system of state subsidies led to the founding of numerous welfare organisations in the 1980s. But apart from organisations promoting return migration, central actors within Surinamese-Dutch civil society rarely engaged in transnational politics.

Ethnic groups excluded from political opportunities in the sending country, such as Kurds, were more likely to perceive specific political opportunities in the host country to be exclusionary as well. In this case, host country opportunities were indeed closed through the non-representation of Kurds in the official Turkish advisory board. Such exclusion strengthened transnational political involvement. In this respect, the findings here corroborate those of authors who argue that exclusive political opportunity structures reinforce transnational activities while inclusive political opportunity structures decrease homeland orientations by fostering integration (Koopmans et al. 2005). Host country political opportunities especially influenced the formal (or visible) structure of migrant civil society.

Dense migrant organisational networks facilitate both national and transnational political participation. The leaders of central migrant organisations belong to the transnational and migrant elite; their activities skilfully navigate the Dutch political opportunity structure. This can also apply to activists within movements that remain illegal in the homeland. In times of dictatorship or the repression of specific groups, opponents of regimes aim to intervene by pressuring foreign affairs ministries in host countries to take a stand. This was evident in the 1990s when the Netherlands allowed the installation of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. Further examples of homeland-directed and immigrant politics going hand in hand included adherents of the illegal Turkish party MLKP demonstrating against Dutch policy on migrants and asylum seekers. In the case of the migrant Kurdish leader enjoying direct contact with the minister of foreign affairs, the objective
clearly related to Turkey and not to integration. Nevertheless, these and similar activities facilitate migrant political integration by familiarising activists with the Dutch political system. The acquired skills and contacts can easily be used in other contexts. It should also be noted that very few transnational activities have been violent in nature. Even radical groups such as the Kurdish PKK, the Turkish DHKP/C and the Surinamese adherents of Brunswijk who supported ‘liberation armies’ on Turkish and Surinamese soil have very rarely pursued violent actions in the Netherlands.

The structure and density of organisational networks in the host country influence not only political participation in the Netherlands, but also the effectiveness of political mobilisation for transnational purposes. In the Turkish and Kurdish cases, dense networks in the Netherlands and Europe connect numerous local and larger organisations. These broader platforms facilitate relations with homeland-based actors as well as collective transnational action. Patterns of involvement among exiles and refugees from the two sending countries were similar. Though they tended to continue their political struggles in the country of settlement, their transnational ties with actors in the homeland were weak, or at least highly secretive. Instead, exiles turned to supranational institutions, the foreign policy of the country of settlement, and migrant civil society (for Turks and Kurds, this included migrant organisations in other European countries). Turkey’s attempt to enter the EU encouraged Alevi and Kurds to lobby at the supranational level – often in close cooperation with homeland civil society and similar migrant organisations elsewhere in Europe. Joint lobbying by Alevi organisations based in Turkey and in the Netherlands increasingly takes place in the EU capital of Brussels. In this way, growing opportunities at the European level indirectly strengthen transnational ties with groups in third countries.

Political developments in the homeland provide ongoing incentives for transnational activism among migrants and refugees. This became abundantly clear in the aftermaths of the 1980 coups in Turkey and Surinam. In both cases, military rule created political refugees who politicised migrant communities in the country of settlement. Since the installation of full democracy, political developments in Surinam no longer motivate transnational activism among most Surinamese in the Netherlands; the country’s economic malaise appears to be a more important incentive for transnational action, while homeland politics is largely a matter of indifference to second-generation individuals and their organisations. While Turkish migrant organisations continue to respond to political developments in Turkey – particularly concerning issues around EU accession – the calmer political climate means homeland politics no longer dominates individual lives and migrant organisations as it did in the 1970s and 1980s. The transnational ties of the first and, especially, the second generations are now used for different purposes and often directed towards the country of settlement. Among second-
and intermediate-generation Kurds, the focus is increasingly on improving their position as Kurds in the Netherlands and Europe overall.

As first-generation migrants realise their stay in the country of settlement is permanent, their transnational political involvement on the whole declines. For the second generation, involvement in transnational politics is more a conscious choice than the matter of fact that it was for their parents.

Though new communication and transportation technologies have revolutionised the way information is exchanged, transnational politics has not, as a result, grown more important or broader in scope. Transnational politics is not simply a function of ‘transnational identity formation’ – it is politics, involving political institutions and opportunity structures, organisations, personal and political interests, struggles over leadership and so on.

Nor has transnational politics been deterritorialised; it clearly remains bound to nation-states and influenced by the opportunities they do or do not provide. Compared to the Turkish and Surinamese cases, Kurdish diaspora politics has a broader scope and involves a much higher percentage of the migrant group – including second and third generations. But even here, far from all Kurds are engaged in diaspora politics; the elite forms its activist core. As Kasinitz et al. (2002) argue, the impact of the core group should not be underestimated; it is likely that structural diaspora ties will be revitalised when political developments motivate this. Diasporas are, almost by definition, highly engaged in politics.

The activities of migrants are often a direct response to political changes in the country of origin or settlement. Activities emerge, change and disappear, often in response to specific political developments. Ties, in contrast, persist even if the activities that led to their establishment have ceased. New activities may be channelled through old ties; in this sense, a shadow of the past remains in contemporary transnational politics. The significance of transnational politics lies in the existence of transnational ties through which collectivities can be mobilised. Once established, they can be used for social-cultural, economic or political purposes. Ties have the broadest scope when they are collective and are more highly institutionalised. Such ties will more likely survive and evolve among second and third generations.

Most studies on transnationalism, especially comparative quantitative work, still focus on migrants in the country of residence and their transnational activities. The primary theoretical contribution of this study is therefore its focus on both ties and activities, which allows studying the structure and process of transnational politics over time. Its second theoretical contribution is that it examines how actors in both the host and home country are motivated to engage in transnational political activity. The politics studied in this book is about migrants ‘looking both ways’. Research that is to grasp migrants’ transnational engagement should do the same.
Appendices

Appendix A: Methodology

Individual transnational involvement

Research on individual transnational political involvement began with an inventory of existing studies in the Netherlands. Most statistical information on migrants in the Netherlands is collected to measure their social, cultural and economic position in the country and, in one way or another, to examine their integration. One of the largest surveys is the Social Position and Use of Facilities of Migrants (SPVA), carried out every three to four years since 1988 by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (see Groeneveld & Weijers-Martens 2003). Only the 2002 survey included two sub-questions referring to migrants’ homeland. One referred to individual remittances and the other to broad collective transnational activities, but the answers were not subsequently analysed.

The data necessary for this project were thus lacking. To fill this gap, I designed and oversaw a survey, carried out by six students and a project assistant between March and August 2004 as part of the MA graduation project entitled ‘Transnational Political Ties’ in the Political Science Department of the University of Amsterdam.

Our respondents were initially selected from a sample the ISEO used for its 2002 SPVA survey, where respondents were a select sampled through the registers of thirteen Dutch municipalities. Individuals were considered Turkish or Surinamese when this person or at least one of his parents was born in the former country of origin. ISEO made available the names and addresses of Surinamese, Turks and Kurds (Turkish respondents who had identified themselves as Kurdish in an earlier interview) in Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, who in the SPVA 2002 had made no objections to further interviewing. As this sample was based on ‘heads of households’, the majority of respondents belonged to the first generation.

Of this SPVA sample, the telephone numbers of 106 Surinamese, 73 Turkish and nine Kurdish respondents were traced via Telefoonids.nl. All Turkish and Kurdish respondents as well as 69 Surinamese respondents were called. To ensure that they fit my minimal profile and were at least eighteen years old, I asked those whom I could reach five basic questions
concerning their political interest in the country of origin and in the Netherlands. If they answered positively to at least one of these questions, they were invited for a face-to-face interview. I additionally sent letters, including a short questionnaire, to 30 Turkish and 26 Kurdish respondents whose telephone numbers could not be found. The project team also visited the addresses of the Kurdish respondents in Amsterdam and The Hague, and of two Turkish respondents in Amsterdam.

Of the approached Turks, 40 refused and 39 could not be reached. Of the approached Surinamese, 22 could not be reached, twenty refused and two did not fit the profile. Of the approached Kurds, fifteen refused, sixteen could not be reached and one did not fit the profile. Actual non-response was thus highest among Kurds (43 per cent) and Turks (38 per cent) and lowest among Surinamese (29 per cent). Non-response among Turks and Surinamese in my research, however, was almost 20 per cent lower than in large-scale national surveys (CBS 2005: 75-76).

In the end, I interviewed 28 Turks, 23 Surinamese and three Kurds from the SPV A sample. As the numbers indicate, there were few Kurdish respondents. This can be explained by the fact that Kurds in the Netherlands are not registered as Kurds, but as Turks. The Kurdish respondents in the SPV A sample had indicated in earlier interviews that they identified as Kurds. Such self-identification, however, is biased. One Turkish respondent did not indicate in the SPV A interview that he identified as Kurd, but did so with one of my fieldworkers. Likewise, one respondent who indicated in the SPV A interview that he identified as a Kurd told us he had Kurdish roots but was not a ‘Kurd’. As in the SPV A study, these two persons were counted in my survey as ‘Turk’ and ‘Kurd’, respectively. Identifying as a Kurd was seen by most of my respondents as a political statement – publicly stating one is ‘Kurdish’ has been heavily punished in Turkey. It is thus plausible that some Turkish respondents in the SPV A sample were ethnic Kurds.

To include more Kurdish respondents, the project team began snowball sampling in my own private and professional networks, within Kurdish organisations and on Kurdish websites. Through a combination of these methods, I found an additional seventeen Kurds willing to be interviewed. In total, I interviewed 21 Kurds (sixteen through snowball sampling, three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Turks N=298</th>
<th>Kurds N=35</th>
<th>Surinamese N=424</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total by generation</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from the SPV A sample and two relatives of an earlier respondent). The fact that all Kurdish respondents were selected through self-identification and/or snowball sampling means the sample is biased towards highly educated and politically engaged respondents. Other researchers who have studied Turkish-Kurdish migrants in the Netherlands have encountered similar problems (see Van Loon 1992; Latuheru, De Vries & De Jong 1994). The results for the Kurdish sample thus need to be interpreted carefully.

Among Surinamese, I tried to ensure representation of East Indians and Afro-Surinamese – the largest groups in both the Netherlands and Surinam. Maroons, the third largest group in Surinam, were not included in my sample. This can be explained by their small number in the Netherlands and their absence in the SPV A. Amer-Indians and Chinese were included in my sample but were not represented, or under-represented, in the SPV A, while Javanese were represented in the SPV A but not in my sample. I only contacted respondents who indicated in the SPV A that they would welcome further interviewing, and only addresses of those SPVA participants living in Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague were available. These factors may explain why Javanese were not represented in my sample.

As one of my concerns was how transnational political involvement is reproduced in the second generation, I asked my (mostly first-generation) respondents to name a relative of another generation, preferably an own child or a child of a sibling. In the four cases in which it was not possible to find such a relative, I interviewed relatives of the same generation. Through snowballing within families, I interviewed an additional seventeen Surinamese, twelve Turkish and one Kurdish respondent.

Finding enough Turkish and Kurdish women to interview proved to be a challenge. Only 11 per cent of potential Turkish respondents (56 out of 298) and 20 per cent of Kurdish respondents (seven out of 35) in the initial SPV A list were women. Overall, Turkish and Kurdish non-response was already high, and this created a particular problem for the small sample of women. To increase response, I included within the interview team a Turkish female student and a Dutch female student married to a Kurd, assuming that women would be more willing to talk to a female interviewer from or close to their own ethnic group. These female interviewers ended up interviewing the majority of Turkish and Kurdish women. I did not have this problem among Surinamese as the sample was larger, non-response was lower and women made up 53 per cent of the original SPVA list (225 out of 424). The percentage of women I interviewed among Turks

Table A.2 Sample by sex and country of origin/ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surinam N=40</th>
<th>Turkey N=40</th>
<th>Kurds N= 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDICES

205
Table A.3  Issues discussed in the interviews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational activities</th>
<th>Activities focused on the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting own property in the homeland</td>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending money and goods to the homeland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media usage</td>
<td>Media usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing homeland politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political commitment of youths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting behaviour</td>
<td>Voting behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of language and culture of the partner</td>
<td>Importance of language and culture of the partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits to the homeland for holiday, family, return migration</td>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with relatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining contact with relatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language skills</td>
<td>Language skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic and religious identification</td>
<td>Ethnic identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration motives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching movies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For a similar categorisation see Engbersen et al. (2003)

(25 per cent) and Kurds (33 per cent) was thus higher than in the SPVA sample, while the percentage of Surinamese women (43 per cent) was lower than in the SPVA sample. In total, the project team conducted 101 interviews, with 40 Turkish, 21 Kurdish and 40 Surinamese individuals.

The first part of the questionnaire consisted of closed questions to gather background information on age, nationality, migration motives, length of stay, etc. The second part included semi-open questions and more detailed retrospective questions on concrete transnational activities that respondents had participated in or were still involved in. Answers to the first part were written down during the interview; the second, more open part was taped and transcribed.
Migrant organisations

For research on transnational migrant politics at the collective level, I began with the networks of Surinamese and Turkish organisations drawn by researchers at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Van Heelsum et al. 1999; Fennema et al. 2000; Berger, Fennema et al. 2001; Fennema & Tillie 2001; Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002). I approached the chairmen of the central federations for in-depth interviews. Though topics ultimately varied according to what respondents revealed during the conversations, the interviews in any case included questions on: a) the founding date, aims, history and members of the organisation; b) activities in the Netherlands; c) organisations in the Netherlands that they cooperate with; d) activities related to or directed towards the homeland; e) visits by homeland organisations and political parties to their organisation and the content and frequency of such visits; f) visits of the organisation’s representatives to the homeland and the content and frequency of such visits; g) visits of the chairman in a personal capacity to the homeland and the content and frequency of such visits; h) a list of the organisation’s and chairman’s past and present homeland contacts and an indication of the content, type and frequency of contact; i) other organisations in the Netherlands that maintain strong ties with homeland actors with activities directed towards the homeland; j) the opportunity to provide me with written material (annual reports, magazines, flyers advertising activities, etc.); k) the opportunity to put me on their organisation mailing list to keep me up to date on their activities.

With these interviews as starting points, I used snowball sampling via organisations in the Netherlands and in the homeland until saturation was reached. I created a database containing information on: a) background information on the respondent; b) how or through whom I found the respondent; c) the organisation’s contacts in the homeland; d) written documents provided by the respondent; and e) information about the interview. By the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representatives of</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant organisations in the Netherlands</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations in the homeland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch political parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches of homeland political parties in the Netherlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland political parties</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch state agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland state agencies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
end, the database comprised 329 Surinamese and 416 Turkish/Kurdish names; this database was central to the tracing of the transnational ties of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and drawing the figures with the computer program Netdraw. Snowball sampling eventually led to 241 interviews: 105, 112 and 24 for the Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish cases, respectively.

Fieldwork and participant observation

The Netherlands
I was a participant observer at just under twenty events organised by Surinamese migrant organisations including festivals, support campaigns for Surinamese political parties, commemorations of slavery’s abolition and East Indian migration to Surinam and various seminars; around twenty events organised by Turkish migrant groups including demonstrations in the Netherlands and Brussels, the board meetings of European federations and numerous debates; and nine Kurdish events including debates and festivals (political or otherwise) in both the Netherlands and Germany.

Participation allowed me to verify the information respondents provided during the interviews. It also gave me a more realistic picture of the people involved in the activities and what was ‘really going on’. On some occasions, participation allowed me to approach new respondents, to gain access to more radical groups that would otherwise have been difficult to reach and to interview guests from Surinam and Turkey. Some Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish politicians were interviewed in the Netherlands rather than in their homelands. My fieldwork in the Netherlands formed the starting point for selecting respondents in the homelands.

Surinam
In order to prepare for fieldwork in Surinam, I paid the country a two-and-a-half week initial visit in February 2004. I attended a conference and had meetings with directors of research institutes and university staff; I also interviewed several politicians.

The longest fieldwork period was from May until the end of August 2005. Most of the work took place in and around the capital, Paramaribo. The period was selected to observe first-hand the national elections, held on 25 May 2005. I closely observed the election campaigns, the involvement of groups and individuals from the Netherlands and how parties referred to Surinam’s post-colonial relations with the Netherlands. During this period, I met many leaders of the Dutch branches of Surinamese political parties. They, in turn, introduced me to the national leadership of their parties, many of whom I interviewed after the elections. Finally, I
interviewed representatives of the state itself, for example, former and current ministers and ambassadors.

Although in many ways this period constituted one on-going participant observation, I counted around 31 activities in which I participated, mainly meetings of political parties during the election campaign, but also lectures and the celebration of the abolition of Dutch slavery.

Although the official language of Surinam is Dutch, many politicians reiterate their statements in Sranantongo, the country’s lingua franca. To be able to follow (in broad lines), I took private lessons in Sranantongo during my months in Surinam. I also read the three daily newspapers circulating in Paramaribo and regularly watched the evening news to better understand Surinamese political culture. At least as beneficial were discussions with friends in the country who could explain and elaborate on the intrigues and gossip within Surinamese politics.

**Turkey**

During my first two-month visit in the summer of 2003 I followed an intensive Turkish language course in Istanbul. During that visit, I also conducted explorative fieldwork in Istanbul, Izmir, Izmit and Hacıbektaş. This included two small case studies, one on city partnerships and one on Alevis. I also interviewed experts, university professors and several NGOs and politicians whose names had been provided by Turkish organisations in the Netherlands and the Dutch consulate in Istanbul.

The second visit was a week-long trip in spring 2004 to follow local elections in Diyarbakır in eastern Turkey (considered Turkish Kurdistan by a part of the Kurdish community). In particular, I followed how a Kurdish organisation in exile in the Netherlands sent observers and how this mission unfolded. I also observed the elections more generally and conducted interviews with politicians and NGOs.

The third fieldwork period was a week in October 2004. This time I travelled with an organisation of Dutch politicians of Turkish origin (siyaset.nl) on a fact-finding mission to Istanbul and Ankara regarding Turkish preparations for EU accession. Together with the delegation, I visited mayors of districts in Istanbul and Ankara and a school supported by a Dutch municipality following the earthquake in Adapazari. I also had meetings with the speaker of the Grand National Assembly, members of parliamentary committees working on EU accession, an advisor to the Turkish prime minister, and at the Dutch embassy in Ankara. Participation in this delegation was one of the main sources on which I based the case study on the double orientations of Dutch politicians of Turkish origin in chapter 5. It also generated useful contacts for the final and longest round of fieldwork.

During this fourth fieldwork period between November 2004 and February 2005, I was based mostly in Ankara and Istanbul. Most politicians and state agencies were interviewed in Ankara. As overseas branches
of Turkish political parties have been prohibited for decades, not all mi-
grant organisations in the Netherlands were willing to divulge a full list of their contacts. I thus approached all important political parties in Turkey for an interview and was successful in securing one in most cases. I also interviewed NGO activists in Istanbul and made short trips to villages in Central Anatolia, including Emirdağ and Kayapınar, where many Turks in the Netherlands come from. During this period, I was a participant observer in about twenty events, including congresses of political parties, seminars, festivals and election campaigns.

*In-depth interviews and triangulation*

Most interviews in the Netherlands and Surinam were conducted in Dutch. Interviews in Turkey were conducted in English, German, French and Turkish. The majority of interviews in Turkish were conducted with the help of a translator.

The interviews were triangulated through posing similar questions about the same tie or activity to various people in the Netherlands and the homeland. I often interviewed several persons representing the same political party. To corroborate material, I made use of newspaper databases such as LexisNexis, bulletins and publications of Surinamese and Turkish organisations from the 1970s and 1980s found in the libraries of the University of Amsterdam, websites and internet discussion platforms and reports of the National Grand Assembly in Ankara. Finally, I asked interviewees in the Netherlands, Surinam and Turkey to provide me with written material, which was useful for triangulation.
## Appendix B: Selection of the most important Surinamese political parties mentioned in chapter 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Year of foundation</th>
<th>Founders'/leaders' residence in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij</td>
<td>Progressive Reform Party</td>
<td>VHP</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationale Partij Suriname</td>
<td>National Party of Surinam</td>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Currently led by previous chairman of the student organisation SSV Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij</td>
<td>Progressive' Surinamese People's Party</td>
<td>PSV</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Founded by a Dutch priest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerukanan Tulodo Pranatan Ingit</td>
<td>Party for National Unity and Solidarity</td>
<td>KTPI</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partij Nationalistische Republiek Suriname</td>
<td>Nationalist Party of the Surinamese Republic</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Founded by founder of the nationalist movement WES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationale Volkspartij</td>
<td>National People's Party</td>
<td>NVP</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Founded by previous board members of the student association SSV Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkspartij</td>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>VP</td>
<td>1973 (non-active)</td>
<td>Founded by previous board members of the student association SSV Leiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisch Volksfront</td>
<td>Democratic People's Front</td>
<td>DVF</td>
<td>± 1975 (no longer exists)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie</td>
<td>Progressive Workers and Peasants' Union</td>
<td>PALU</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Founded by previous board members of the student association SSV Wageningen (Redi Doti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationale Democratische Partij Suriname</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Founder/president had military training in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algemene Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelings Partij</td>
<td>General Liberation and Development Party</td>
<td>ABOP</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisch Alternatief '91</td>
<td>Democratic Alternative '91</td>
<td>DA'91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Founder and president studied in Leiden and Groningen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B (continued): Selection of the most important Surinamese political parties mentioned in chapter 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Year of foundation</th>
<th>Founders'/leaders' residence in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democraten van de 21ste eeuw</td>
<td>Democrats of the 21st Century</td>
<td>D 21</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Founder and president was very active in Javanese organisations in the Netherlands, among them BJSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratisch Nationaal Platform</td>
<td>Democratic National Platform</td>
<td>DNP 2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Founder and president studied in Amsterdam, worked for Amsterdam municipality, was active in an organisation for Surinamese return migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pertjajah Luhur</td>
<td>Full Confidence</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>± 2000</td>
<td>Founder and president fled in 1982, became active in the RBS and founded a branch of the Javanese party Pendawalima in exile in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieuw Suriname</td>
<td>New Surinam</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Founder and president fled after the December murders in 1982 and continued his studies in Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindostaanse Progressieve Partij-Plus</td>
<td>Progressive Hindustani Party-Plus</td>
<td>HPP-Plus</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Founder and president fled after the December Murders in 1982, continued his studies in the Netherlands, active within ZZG and RBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unie van Progressieve Surinamers/Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid</td>
<td>Union of Progressive Surinamese/Party for Democracy and Development through Unity</td>
<td>UPS/DOE</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>One board member studied in the Netherlands and worked for Rotterdam municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Family trees of Turkish and Kurdish political parties, 1920s-2005

Figure C1  Simplified family tree of the Turkish party spectrum

Parties that no longer exist

Parties that still exist

1993, parties allowed to reopen under original name
Figure C2  *Simplified family tree of the Turkish radical left*

Coup 1971  
TKP 1920 - 1989  
TKP/ML 1972  
Dev Genç 1969  
PSKT 1974 - 1993  
Dev Yol 1977 - 1992  
TSP 1974  
THKP/C 1971  
TKP 1971 - 1974  
SCG 1970  
PKK 1977 - 2002  
TDKP 1980  
TBKP 1988 - 1994  
PSK 1993  
TKP (new) 2001  
ODP 1996  
DHKP/C 1994  
MLKP 1995  
IP 1992  
EMEP 1996  
KADEK 2002 - 2003  
KONGRAGEL 2003

- Parties that no longer exist
- Legal parties that still exist
- Illegal parties that still exist

Coup 1980  
Coup 1980  
Fall of Berlin Wall 1989/collapse of Soviet Union 1990

- TKP 1920 - 1989
- TIP 1961 - 1988
- Dev Yol 1977 - 1992
- Dev Sol 1978 - 1993
- PKK 1977 - 2002
- TDKP 1980
- TKP (new) 2001

- Parties that no longer exist
- Legal parties that still exist
- Illegal parties that still exist

Figure C2  *Simplified family tree of the Turkish radical left*
Chapter 1

1. The Kurdish people are spread over several countries including Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Unless indicated differently, in this volume I use the ‘term’ Kurd to refer to Kurds from Turkey; while I use the term ‘Kurdistan’ to refer to the ideal of the creation of one united Kurdistan.

2. Unlike the UK and France, post-colonial groups in the Netherlands are no larger than labour migrant groups. Debates around post-colonialism thus had less effect on Dutch policies than in other countries; together with labour migrants they became minorities (Bosma 2009; Kennedy 2003).


Chapter 2

1. For example, by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) or the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP).

2. For this reason, RISBO conducted research on individual transnational social, economic and political commitment and its relation to integration. Surinamese, Turks and Kurds were not included in this study by Engbersen et al. (2003).

3. Channels in Surinam are so few they can be counted on one hand. Everyday at prime-time, Surinamese television airs productions of the public Dutch channel BVN, short for Het beste van Nederland (‘The best of the Netherlands’), with news and opinion programmes for Dutch and Flemish people living abroad. Other Dutch programmes were also popular, especially that of the Dutch Surinamese comedian Jörgen Raymann who includes a regular feature on Paramaribo in his weekly programmes.

4. At the time of interviewing, the PKK no longer officially existed, having been succeeded by the KONGRA-GEL. Generally, however, people continued referring to the old name of PKK.

5. Kurmançî is one of the four Kurdish languages.

6. Public broadcaster Radio Nederland Wereldomroep conducted a telephone survey in May 2005 among 500 Surinamese in the Netherlands. They were asked whom they would vote for, were voting possible. The results were comparable to the present study’s: 54 per cent of respondents could not name a party; the NPS and the VHP were the most popular (16 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively).

7. Via the internet and personal communication, there should have been at least three city councillors who identified as Kurd, see also www.azady.nl/readarticle.php?
article_id=433; accessed 27 November 2007. In official statistics, however, they are counted as Turks.


George Ellis, minister in the Kuyper cabinet (1901-1905) (De Beus 2002: 49-58). Also Mayor of Venhuizen in 1999 Roy Ho-Ten-Soeng (CDA); Secretary of State for Emancipation and Family Affairs in 2002 Philomena Bijlhout (LPF); Rotterdam Alderwoman in 2002 Rabella de Faria (Leefbaar Rotterdam) and Amsterdam Alderwoman in 2002 Hannah Belliot (PvdA). In 2007 the Dutch-Turkish Nebahat Albayrak has been appointed as Secretary of Justice (PvdA).

Chapter 3

1 Numbers for national elections are unavailable.

2 Turks in these studies refer to all migrants from Turkey, including Kurds; numbers for Surinamese are combined with the outcomes of Antilleans.

3 Interview with SIV secretary, Paramaribo, 18 August 2005.

4 Interview with HRN founder and chairman, Zoetermeer, 18 April 2005.

5 Ibid.

6 Interview with the chairman of the Sanatan Dharm Mahasabha, Paramaribo, 18 August 2005.

7 Ibid.


10 My own observations at the Hindu Hangama, a fair co-organised by HSFN in Rijswijk, 18 April 2004.

11 Interview with the director of Radio VAHON and an HRN board member, The Hague, 5 June 2004.

12 Fieldnotes, Paramaribo, 18 May 2005.


14 Interview with VVN Nickerie chairman, Nickerie, 22 July 2005.

15 Interview with HVR chairwoman, Paramaribo, 5 August 2005.


20 Ibid.

21 Fieldnotes of the ‘srefidensi’ party of Stichting Srefidensi Dey, Amsterdam, 26 November 2005.

22 CSO is tied to the network via HRN, and SIOSD via the Dutch branch of the Surinamese party VHP.
NOTES

23 Interview with Shiva and VVR chairman, Paramaribo, 13 June 2005; interview with VVR notary, Paramaribo, 24 June 2005.
25 Fieldnotes, 17 June 2005, B-Surned meeting in Paramaribo.
26 Interview with the director of Kwakoe Events, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
27 Fieldnotes on Kwakoe lecture by former Minister of Interior Affairs and former Mayor of Rotterdam Bram Peper, Paramaribo, 18 May 2005.
28 Interview with the director of Kwakoe Events, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
29 Interview with gaanman Gazon Matodja, Drietabbetje, 6 August 2005.
30 Ibid.
31 The captain of Drietabbetje, while interviewing gaanman Gazon Matodja, Drietabbetje, 6 August 2005.
35 Email sent by IOT chairman, 3 December 2002.
36 Interview with HTIB director, Amsterdam, 19 October 2004.
38 Interview with the TIKF chairman, Apeldoorn, 4 June 2003.
41 Interview with the Diyanet teacher for imams destined for the Netherlands, Ankara, 4 November 2004.
42 Interview with HAK-DER chairman, Rotterdam, 30 September 2004.
43 Interview with Sivas survivor and board member of Istanbul Shakulu Sultan Kulliyesi, Istanbul, 7 August 2003.
44 Interview with chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Vakfi, Ankara, 27 November 2005.
46 Own observations in Hacıbektas¸, 15 August 2003.
48 Interview with NIF chairman, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
49 Interview with MG-NN director, Amsterdam, 24 June 2003.
50 Interview with NIF chairman, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
51 Organisation of the National Vision in Europe, AMGT, until 1995.
52 Ibid.; see next chapter for Milli Görüs ties with political parties in Turkey.
53 Also known as Hollanda Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (HÜTDF – Federation of Turkish Idealist Organisations in the Netherlands).
54 Interview with HTF chairman, Amsterdam, 26 October 2004.
57 Interview with HTF chairman, Amsterdam, 26 October 2004.
60 Uniting thirteen, five, ten and seven local organisations, respectively.
61 Member federations are located in Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Austria. See also www.hdf-online.de/d/frame-set-d.htm; accessed 22 May 2006.
62 Interview with HDF chairman, Venlo, 2 October 2004.

Interview with DİDF chairman, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.

Ibid.


Interview with FED-KOM chairman, Amsterdam, 9 March 2004.


Ibid.


Call of the Newrozcomité Nederland (Newroz committee in the Netherlands) for Newroz delegates, Amsterdam, 30 January 1995.

Interview with İHD vice-president, Diyarbakır, 30 March 2004.

Interview with press agency Özgürlük spokesman, Amsterdam, 17 September 2004.

See, for example, DVD ‘BORAN’ by Grup Yorum, produced by İdil Yapin.

Interview with Grup Yorum representative in Turkey, İstanbul, 8 January 2005.

Solidarity hunger strikes were held in Germany, the UK, Austria and France. Interview with Anadolu Kültür Merkezi volunteer, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.


Interview with press agency Özgürlük spokesman, Amsterdam, 17 September 2004.

Interview with the coordinator of the Almelo-Denizli city partnership, Almelo, 27 September 2004.

Haarlem is home to around 6,000 Turks, 4,000 of whom are from Emirdağ (Gemeente Haarlem 2003).

Interview with two board members of the Haarlem-Emirdağ Foundation, Haarlem, 17 September 2004.

Interview with Tema chairman, Emirdağ, 11 December 2004.

Interview with the mayor of Kayapınar, Kayapınar, 9 November 2004.

Interview with Tuana chairman, Dordrecht, 18 October 2004.

Interview with employee of the housing department of Amsterdam municipality, Amsterdam, 20 July 2004; observation during memorial of the Marmara Earthquake attended by representatives of the municipality of Amsterdam and the Dutch consulate in Istanbul, İzmit, 18 August 2003.

Interview with employee of the housing department of Amsterdam municipality, Amsterdam, 20 July 2004; observation during memorial of the Marmara earthquake attended by representatives of the municipality of Amsterdam and the Dutch consulate in Istanbul, İzmit, 18 August 2003.
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Chapter 4

1 See Dirk Kruijt in an interview with the Wereldomroep, 25 November 2005; www2.rnw.nl/rnw/nl/achtergronden/caribenensuriname/car20052511_uitzending.html.
3 Speech by Ronald Venetiaan on Nieuw Front election meeting, Brokopondo, 26 April 2005, reported by Anne Blanksma.
5 Interview with vice-president and VHP chairman, Paramaribo, 27 August 2005.
6 Fieldnotes, Paramaribo/Nickerie, 22 July-1 August 2005.
8 www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g61leshz; accessed January 2006.
9 Interview with former student leader in Leiden, Paramaribo, 18 August 2005.
10 Interview with former secretary of SSV Leiden, Rotterdam, 6 May 2005.
14 Interview with VHP representative in the Netherlands in the 1960s, Rotterdam, 13 April 2005.
15 Interview with former SSV Leiden chairman and VP founder, Paramaribo, 16 June 2005.
16 Interview with former SSV Wageningen chairman and PALU founder, Paramaribo, 13 June 2005.
17 Interview with member of the Dutch PvdA and the Surinamese NPS, Amstelveen, 4 April 2005.
18 Discussion group notes of a meeting held 29 June 1985 in Bijlmermeer, personal archive of former member of the Jungle Commando, received in Paramaribo, August 2005.
19 Interview with LSP founder, Paramaribo, 19 May 2005.
20 Interview with the son of former resistance leader, Paramaribo, 3 August 2005.
21 Interview with former board member of the Pendawa Lima, Paramaribo, 30 July 2005.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with the founder of the SNLA ‘Jungle Commando’, Paramaribo, 29 August 2005.
24 Descendents of runaway slaves, members of the group themselves often speak of ‘bush negroes’ or use the specific name of the tribe. Scholars usually use the term ‘Maroon’ (Polimé & Van Velzen).
25 Notes of students’ meeting with Chin A Sen, 27 October 1986; received from former Jungle Commando member in Paramaribo, August 2005.
26 Diary of former Jungle Commando member, Saint Lauraint, French Guyana, 18 January 1987; received in Paramaribo, August 2005.
27 Only Surinamese with Surinamese nationality are allowed to vote. Voting takes place exclusively on Surinamese territory.
Chapter 5

2 For a complete overview of the Turkish radical left from 1918-2004 see www.broad-left.org/tr.htm.
3 For a description of the SHP see countrystudies.us/turkey/70.htm; accessed 18 May 2006.
4 For election outcomes see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Turkey; accessed 22 May 2006.
5 Interview with the leader of Yeniden CHP, Istanbul, 11 February 2005.
6 Interview with SP vice-president, Ankara, 2 December 2004.
7 Interview with AMGT founder and SP Istanbul chairman, Istanbul, 2 February 2005.
8 Interview with MG-NN director, Amsterdam, 24 June 2003.
9 Ibid. and interview with NIF chairman, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
10 Interview with NIF chairman, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
11 Interview with SP vice-president, Ankara, 2 December 2004.
12 Interview with SP member of the executive committee, Ankara, 25 November 2004.
13 Interview with MG-NN director, Amsterdam, 24 June 2003.
14 Ibid.
15 Personal observations during several debates on the accession of Turkey to the EU attended by the MG-NN director in Amsterdam in 2004.
16 Interview with the Dutch ambassador, Ankara, 26 November 2004.
17 Interview with AKP member of parliament – former imam in the Netherlands and member of parliament for the RP – Ankara, 19 November 2004.
18 See www.uetd.de; accessed 8 June 2006.
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20 See also www.cda-enschede.nl/Overig/Kandidaten/Suat-Ari; accessed 8 June 2006.
21 Interview with AKP Deputy President Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 3 December 2004.
23 Interview with former chairman of the Ülkcü Ocakları in charge of MHP contacts with Turks abroad and present member of the MHP executive committee, Ankara, 24 January 2005.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Interview with HTF chairman, Amsterdam, 26 October 2004.
27 Interview with former chairman of the Ülkcü Ocakları in charge of MHP contacts with Turks abroad and present member of the MHP executive committee, Ankara, 24 January 2005.
28 Interview with member of the MHP executive committee, Istanbul, 12 January 2005.
29 Interview with former chairman of the Ülkcü Ocakları in charge of MHP contacts with Turks abroad and present member of the MHP executive committee, Ankara, 24 January 2005.
30 Interview with member of the MHP executive committee, Istanbul, 12 January 2005.
31 Interview with former chairman of the Ülkcü Ocakları in charge of MHP contacts with Turks abroad and present member of the MHP executive committee, Ankara, 24 January 2005; personal communication with a former HTF member who served as a guide to Türkç during his visits to the Netherlands, Ankara, 24 January 2005.
33 Interview with HTF chairman, Amsterdam, 26 October 2004.
34 Interview with former chairman of the Ülkcü Ocakları in charge of MHP contacts with Turks abroad and present member of the MHP executive committee, Ankara, 24 January 2005.
36 Interview with former chairman of the CHP youths in Adana and present DSDF chairman, Amsterdam, 19 October 2004.
37 Interview with HDF chairman, Venlo, 2 October 2004.
38 Interview with CHP deputy chairman, Ankara, 9 December 2004.
39 Interview with the CHP international secretary, Ankara, 7 December 2004.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview with CHP deputy chairman, Ankara, 9 December 2004.
42 Interview with former chairman of the CHP youths in Adana and present DSDF chairman, Amsterdam, 19 October 2004. See also Açılım 1(3) January 2004.
46 Interview with DSP vice-president, Ankara, 16 December 2004.
48 Interview with HTIB chairman and former TKP member, Amsterdam, 19 October 2004.
49 Interview with former TKP and HTIB board member, Istanbul, 19 January 2004.
50 Ibid.
52 Interview with HTIB chairman and former TKP and Dev Yol member, Amsterdam, 19 October 2004.
53 Interview with ÖDK NL chairman, Amsterdam, 6 October 2004.
54 Interview with ÖDP co-founder and member of the party assembly, Ankara, 11 November 2004.
55 Notes of meetings of ÖDP Europe: 4-5 January 2003, 8-9 May 2004 in Basel, Switzerland; 15-16 November 2003 in Paris, France; 31 January – 1 February 2004 in Mainz, Germany. Received by email from ÖDP co-founder and member of the party assembly, November 2004.
56 Interview with ÖDK NL chairman, Amsterdam, 6 October 2004.
57 Interview with ÖDP co-founder and member of the party assembly, Ankara, 11 November 2004.
58 Interview with the coordinator of Bahadin committees in Europe and Turkey, advisor of mayor of Bahadin and former Dev Yol activist, Ankara, 11 November 2004.
59 Interview with DİDF chairman, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
60 Interview with a spokesman of press agency Özgürlük, Amsterdam, 17 September 2004.
63 Personal communication with delegate from the UK at TAYAD demonstration in Brussels, 21 October 2004.
65 See also thecaravan.org/files/caravan/Berber_de.pdf; accessed May 2006.
68 Interview with representative of the Social Insurance Institution (SSK) and with a representative of the Ministry of Labour, Ankara, 22 February 2005.
71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
76 Interview with coordinator for Turks living abroad at the ministry of state, Ankara, 26 January 2005.
78 Interview with coordinator for Turks living abroad at the ministry of state, Ankara, 26 January 2005.
Chapter 6

1 Interview with PKDW, KNK and KONGRA-GEL founding member and member of the KONGRA-GEL administrative board and Foreign Affairs Commission, Hengelo, 27 April 2004.


7 Interview with instructor of DEHAP political youth education programme, Çankırı, 26 March 2004.

8 Interview with SHP campaigners and employee of NGO in solidarity with prisoners, Diyarbakır, 27 March 2004.


10 Interview with former KIC chairman in the Netherlands, Amsterdam, 9 March 2004.

11 Interview with former KIC chairman in the Netherlands, Amsterdam, 9 March 2004.

12 Interview with FED-KOM chairman, Amsterdam, 9 March 2004.

13 The remaining seats were divided among Kurdish Alevi, Assyrian Christians, Islamic and women’s organisations, representatives from trade unions and Kurds originating from Syria, Iran and Iraq. See also: ‘A Message from the Kurdish Parliament in Exile’, undated, www.ariga.com/kurdish.shtml; accessed 3 July 2006.
Chapter 7

1 This not only applies to Turks in Europe but also in the US (Balgamış & Karpat 2008).

Appendices

1 The 1,054 Surinamese respondents interviewed for SPVA identified themselves as follows: 357 Afro-Surinamese, 345 East Indians, 58 Javanese and six Chinese.

2 I owe this idea to Ruben Gowricharn.
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