The last two decades have witnessed sweeping changes in the composition, orientation and dynamics of international migration. While it’s no surprise these transformations affect societies of origin and settlement, we still seek to understand how and why they carry with them certain social challenges. *Migration in a Globalised World* shines a light. Ten chapters astutely present theoretical and empirical insights by experts in the fields of international migration and social cohesion, transnationalisation, the migration-development nexus and the ever-blurring categories of refugee and asylum seeker. With its broad thematic scope and lively dialogue between French, Anglo-Saxon and Northern European academic traditions, this volume offers a major new perspective to further research and, potentially, to improve the quality of life in a globalised world.

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"From social cohesion and development to transnationalism and forced migration, this book spans many issues through well-structured dialogues between established scholars of the English- and French-speaking worlds. An achievement deserving acknowledgment."

Rosita Fibbi, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, University of Neuchâtel

"A major advantage of this book is the different perspectives it offers on various subjects, themes and research approaches that, in my opinion, are very useful for academics and students in advanced courses."

Lorenzo Cachón, Department of Sociology, Complutense University of Madrid

"This book provides valuable insight into current migration research by concentrating on crucial topics such as social cohesion, transnationalisation, migration and development and forced migration. It analyses migration as an entanglement of social and spatial processes."

Felicitas Hillmann, Department of Social Sciences, Bremen University
Migration in a Globalised World
IMISCOE

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe

The IMISCOE Research Network unites researchers from, at present, 25 institutes specialising in studies of international migration, integration and social cohesion in Europe. What began in 2004 as a Network of Excellence sponsored by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission has become, as of April 2009, an independent self-funding endeavour. From the start, IMISCOE has promoted integrated, multidisciplinary and globally comparative research led by scholars from various branches of the economic and social sciences, the humanities and law. The Network furthers existing studies and pioneers new scholarship on migration and migrant integration. Encouraging innovative lines of inquiry key to European policymaking and governance is also a priority.

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Introduction

1 International migration in the era of globalisation: recent issues and new concerns for research

Cédric Audebert and Mohamed Kamel Doraï

1 Changing patterns of international migration in a context of globalisation

Liberalisation of the economies at the global level, increasing interdependence among nations, new infrastructures of transportation, increasing income inequalities and demographic disparities worldwide have provided the context within which recent population movements have occurred. In parallel, contemporary geopolitical tensions and environmental crises have locally brought about more flows. Between 1970 and 2005, the number of international migrants more than doubled, from 81.3 million to 190.6 million (United Nations 2006). Nonetheless, given the high rate of population growth, the share of international migrants in the world population only rose from 2.5 per cent to 3.0 per cent during that period.

The most significant changes rather lie in the composition, orientation and dynamics of international migration flows (Simon 2002; Castle & Miller 2003; Penninx, Berger & Kraal 2006). In relation with the modernisation of societies, the evolution of the status of women and new familial strategies of survival and prosperity, the percentage of female migrants has increased. Almost one out of two immigrants in the world is a woman – though this situation is not universal. With the global integration of national economies, new categories of migrants have come to light. They have developed into new, more fluid practices of mobility – students, businessmen, agents of multinational corporations, retirees – along with more traditional migration patterns (IOM 2003). Informal transnational merchants have also become prominent though silent agents of globalisation, as illustrated by Moroccan and Algerian transnational networks in South-Western Europe (Tarrius 2002) and Haitian tradeswomen in the Caribbean and the United States. The disintegration of the Socialist bloc and post-cold war...
instability in specific areas in Africa, the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia have also had an impact on the movement of refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2006). As a result, flows have intensified as their composition has diversified and their dynamics have become more complex, with processes of reversibility and circular mobility.

In this context, the source areas of the flows have also diversified, as pointed out by Rinus Penninx regarding Europe in this volume. Thirty years ago, movements were still largely characterised in one of three ways:

1) a colonial or post-colonial heritage: e.g. Algerian migration to France; Puerto Rican movement to the US; Indian and Pakistani settlement in the United Kingdom; West African migration to France and the UK; Surinamese migration to the Netherlands.

2) labour migration: e.g. Turkish Gastarbeiter to Germany; Mexican Braceros to the US.

3) cold war refugee migrations from the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and Third World ‘hotspots’ like Cuba or Vietnam.

Today, the development of new migrant categories along with undocumented migration account for the fact that newcomers in post-industrial societies spring from all over the world. Migrants have increasingly headed towards the most prosperous regions of the world, as the vast majority of them move in search of better economic opportunities. North America, Europe and Australia absorbed all the increases in international migration in the 1990s, and these three areas concentrated 56 per cent of all international migrants in 2000 according to the United Nations (2006). Immigration is also a demographic necessity for Western societies experiencing low fertility rates, with a net migration rate which is twice the rate of natural increase – 2.2 per thousand vs. 1.2 per thousand between 1995 and 2000.

Meanwhile, new immigration destinations have emerged and South-South flows are nearly as large as South-North flows. Emerging economies of the newly industrialised countries of East and South-East Asia and, more recently, the Persian Gulf and South-Western Europe have also had to resort to migrant workers to ensure their expansion. Many former emigration countries have recently become immigration countries and many societies now experience simultaneous inflows and outflows of people. Consequently, in many countries, new challenges for social cohesion have arisen that are more and more intertwined with global geopolitical issues. The heritage of transatlantic slavery in ‘race’ relations, post-colonial issues and the place of Islam in Western societies appear as local issues that have important repercussions in the field of international relations. The question of social cohesion in many places is further raised by transnational practices and their incidence on settlement and integration processes (Tarrius 2001; Schnapper...
2001; Faist 2007) and political practices (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003).

Nowhere else has this relation between local and global processes been better articulated than in the world cities that have served as magnets for an important part of cross-border flows of people. The metropolisation of international migration has economically and culturally transformed these places (Sassen 2001). Urban economies and employment markets have been increasingly connected to globalisation. Contextual differences notwithstanding, urban populations have undergone profound cultural changes and new cosmopolitan identities have emerged (Vertovec 2006). In metropolitan areas like Dubai and Toronto, immigrants make up, respectively, 83 per cent and 45 per cent of the population. Between 30 and 35 per cent of the population of Los Angeles, Riyadh, Sydney and San Francisco are foreign-born. Other places like New York, Amsterdam and London have almost 30 per cent of their population who are immigrants. In a traditional global magnet like London, the origins of immigrants reflect its post-colonial relations with the Commonwealth, with an overrepresentation of the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. In more recent world cities, the composition of immigration reflects more their position as fast growing regional hubs: immigrants are mainly from the Caribbean in Miami, four out of five newcomers in Singapore are from nearby Malaysia and South-Eastern China, and the same proportion of foreign-born individuals in Dubai are from South Asia.

The increasing interconnectedness of social, economic and cultural systems, as well as of individuals and places, has had far-reaching consequences on the relation between people and space in the contemporary era. This has led scholars to reassess notions of territoriality and sense of belonging. At the global level, it has materialised in the form of an unprecedented intensity in the flows of capital, information, ideas and technologies – finanscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes and technoscapes, as Appadurai would characterise them – and goods across state frontiers, new divisions of labour transcending state territories, and the emergence of global governance (Appadurai 1995; Hannerz 1992; Castells 1996). Worldwide communication and trade and new technologies have given a new impetus to human mobility. Although these global dynamics are nothing new in nature, they have been important factors of societal change and have provided the basis for the development of further migration. The dissociation between society and the state has resulted in innovative social constructions and new territorial representations and practises (Ma Mung 1992; Bruneau 1994; Ong 1999). New feelings of belonging emerge as the result of the interpenetration of various social and cultural spheres (Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc 1992). In this respect, emigration state initiatives to reach out to
their diaspora, new information and communication technologies and changing state policies towards more (or less) immigrant integration have set the conditions for the consolidation of transnational relations (Antebay-Yemini, Berthomière & Sheffer 2005; Töloyan 1996).

The economic and social context of globalisation in which international movements of people have intensified is not exempt from contradiction. Though migration is a constitutive element of globalisation and one of the most symbolic effects of free trade of goods and cross-border connectedness, it is also confronted with harsh measures of state and supranational protectionism as well as the lack of global governance. For instance, the US and Mexico have set one of the most liberal frameworks for the international movement of goods and capital through the North American Free Trade Agreement, but free movement of people between both countries is still not on the agenda. Likewise, the control of immigration flows has become one of the greatest concerns of the EU in its relations with African and Mediterranean countries, along with trade agreements and security concerns. Nonetheless, whether at the state or at the supranational level, this specific treatment of migration has fallen short of responding to the new challenges related to the changing patterns in international movements of people. Ironically, free circulation of goods, capital, technology and information encouraged by such regional agreements acts as an incentive for these new migration patterns that governments precisely seek to control.

2 Recent issues and new concerns in international migration research

These contemporary trends in relation to the intensification and increasing complexity of globalisation patterns have led social scientists to change their scope. They have come to consider new research perspectives so as to thoroughly analyse the new dynamics of migration and settlement. How have new forms of migration and mobility impacted on integration processes among various populations and in various national contexts? We may wonder to what extent these changes have called into question the power of states – or reassessed their margin of action – and to what extent they have challenged the modern conception of the nation. How have public opinions reacted to these changes? And how have nation states, local governments and supranational entities responded to the new challenges associated with new migration dynamics?

Migration has long been treated as an independent and somewhat marginal phenomenon. This has come thanks to its perception as a temporary dynamic, even as an anomaly, by policymakers and scholars
in Western Europe up until the 1980s. In this perspective, the experiences of migrants were misleadingly thought of as separate from the destiny of settlement societies. Later, when new integration policies were designed as a response to the constitution of migrant communities in countries like Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands, settlement and social insertion were analysed as one-way processes that were often theoretically associated with a greater distance of individuals and families from the country of origin. In both cases, the dominant view of the migrant was one of a passive agent dependent on global and national economic contingencies, rather than one of an active transnational agent or one of a productive development agent whose social space could encompass both origin and settlement countries.

Along with the realisation of the economic and demographic necessity for immigration in post-industrial societies, a change is being observed in the way receiving societies perceive migrants. The idea of their long-term settlement is more and more integrated into the national imagination, though with some strong contextual variations. But at the same time, the traditional view of migration as a problem and even a threat is still inveterate. To come to grips with contradictory societal representations, researchers are addressing new questions. They are looking into the public’s perception of immigration and its effects on the receiving society as well as how such representations implicate the distinction between legal immigrants and citizens or between immigrants and their children. Contemporary immigration and its incidence on ethnic diversification in Western Europe, North America and other regions of the world raises the issue of the integration of ethnic minorities in the imagined community (Anderson 1983) and their acceptance in the political community of the nation (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello & Vertovec 2004; Alba & Nee 2003). Recent events show that concerns related to the incorporation of immigrants have strong bearings on the design of migration policies.

This trend is best illustrated by the substitution of restrictive migration policies with selective ones in North-Western Europe, with the debate on the national identity of receiving societies and the resurgence of neo-nativist attitudes in the background. Implicit links are made by policymakers between the perception of the ability of immigrant groups to integrate and the migration policies they design (Papademetriou 2006). Policymakers and public opinion are very much alive to this issue because it deals with what they perceive as their ‘collective identity’ and the redefinition of the nation in the face of globalisation. Indeed, globalisation processes bring new cultural and political challenges to nation states. What are the implications of cultural globalisation and the forging of new identities for the integration path of immigrants and for their feelings of belonging to national entities? We may
also wonder how experiences of immigrants and their descendents in terms of economic incorporation and of social interaction with the mainstream society affect the possible establishment of ethnic ties and the emergence of transnational identities (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994).

At the global level, what still needs to be clarified is the contradictory relation between the contribution of cross-border social constructions and identities to the cultural homogenisation of the world, on the one hand, and their resulting in more cultural complexity in the places they encompass, on the other. Empirical observations have shown that social commitments and identity references to more than one nation do not result in greater homogeneity. Nor do syncretism and creolisation in relation to migration processes necessarily produce the disappearance of background cultures. Instead, we might be witnessing a change in the very dynamics of culture more than in the nature of culture itself (Vertovec 2006) – with instantaneous and simultaneous access to images and values from many parts of the world. These are some of the many issues social sciences have to address to grasp the way globalisation and transnational processes affect identities, immigrants’ integration and nation states.

All these issues underscore the connection between migration and integration processes. In their search for new ways to explore this relation, social scientists have engaged in a reassessment of traditional theories. Segmented and binary approaches have been dismissed for their lack of comprehensive perspective. Among the many questions formulated by researchers are those pertaining to the global and transnational levels. For instance, are settlement and incorporation processes necessarily in conflict with the preservation of cross-bordering ties with family and kin left behind? There are also those that pertain to the local and metropolitan levels: for example, do migrants necessarily have to choose between ‘ethnic’ and ‘mainstream’ strategies in their interaction dynamics with the receiving society?

The growing awareness among social scientists that migration processes are not opposite or contradictory to but, rather, intertwined with settlement, integration, transnationality and socio-economic development has led scholars to explore the many relationships between these issues. Such an innovative change in focus – from a separated view of issues and policy fields to an approach more concerned with the link between them – has required a change of scale and the proposition of a new analytical framework grounded on the articulation of the local and global levels. As a matter of fact, diasporic and transnational experiences show that global flows of persons, ideas, goods and money are not disconnected from the experience of places. Moreover, the transformation of localities in many fields (politics, economy, culture)
has much to do with cross-border linkages, as discussed above. The conception that referred to ‘methodological territorialism’ – that is, the idea of the convergence of state, society and the territory – has been disqualified or at least critically assessed along with the traditional Western view of the convergence of state and nation that gave birth to the idea of the nation state more than three centuries ago (Al-Ali & Koser 2002; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2003).

The texts presented in this volume intend to respond to the social issues and research questions introduced above. They are the results of the plenary sessions of the international conference ‘1985-2005: Twenty years of research on international migration’, organised by Migrinter and the HumanitarianNet European network in Poitiers on 7 July 2006. The innovation of the collective analysis offered in this book lies in the purpose of the conference itself, which was to facilitate dialogue between social sciences and national academic traditions in the field of international migration. Exchange of ideas among sociologists, geographers, anthropologists and other social scientists of Anglo-Saxon, French, Northern European and Near Eastern background was particularly stimulating. Theoretical reflections and empirical insights have been conducted along four broad lines: 1) the link between settlement, social cohesion and migration processes; 2) transnationalisation dynamics and the related transnational approach; 3) the reciprocal relation between international migration and development; and 4) the blurring categories of refugees and asylum seekers.

### 3 New perspectives of research on international migration: the challenge of a more integrated approach

The first part of this volume is dedicated to the issue of the integration of international migrants and the social cohesion of the receiving societies. A broad theoretical perspective on the migratory changes in Europe and the way research has responded to them is complemented by two empirical analyses on the perception of immigration by the public opinion in France and the US, and the construction of cultural racism and hegemony in a post-colonial context.

In his state of the art on European research on international migration and settlement of immigrants, Rinus Penninx addresses a series of questions pertaining to migration changes and the evolution of integration dynamics since the mid-1970s. His focus on the new dynamics of both migration and integration and on the way European societies have reacted to these changes serves as a prelude to the question of the contribution of European research to understand the new dynamics. The ultimate concern of this comprehensive and critical analysis is
about the possible strategies to improve our research efforts to better address the challenges related to international migration.

A promising way to tackle the issue of integration and social cohesion is precisely to pay more attention to the perception of recent immigration waves by the receiving societies. In this perspective, Roger Waldinger compares the French and the American national contexts of reception with special attention to the way immigration is seen by the public opinion in both countries. How have French and US authorities responded to the challenge of immigration? To what extent are their migration and integration policies influenced by the perception of ethnic majorities? The radically different images of both societies in ideological and socio-institutional terms make such an approach particularly enlightening on the views of ethnic majorities in these immigrant democracies.

Another angle of approach is to consider the issue of integration and social cohesion in settlement societies from the point of view of immigrants themselves and also from the perspective of the origin countries. Based on an analysis of the case of the Danish cartoon controversy in 2006 and of the perception of immigrants from Muslim countries by Western societies, Sari Hanafi replaces the interaction of Muslim immigrant communities with their settlement societies within the context of international relations. The relevance of an approach to the problem grounded on the argument of cultural difference is questioned by an approach focusing on the dichotomy between values and power structure and on how these values are instrumentalised and put into action in the framework of cultural hegemony ‘as a cultural logic of late capitalism’.

The second part of this volume assesses the contribution of transnational studies to the reflection on migration. Considering international migration within the context of globalisation paradoxically requires a reassessment of the relevance of globalisation theories in the analysis of population movements and their consequences. Though international movements of people are to be contextualised within the broader framework of interstate relations, global governance and the increasing intensity of flows, the transnational perspective puts into question theories based either on the neo-functionalist approach or on the rational actor model. As underlined by Thomas Faist, by drawing the attention to the role of cross-border social formations in the development and maintaining of migration flows, transnationalist scholars critically assess the legitimacy of global social orders (Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al. 1999; Levitt & Nyberg-Sorensen 2004).

It is commonly acknowledged that one of transnational studies’ best contributions is its critique of the hypothesis of sedentariness and the assumption that migration is a permanent settlement. Yet, further
Investigation into the contribution of transnational approaches is needed for a better understanding of the reciprocal relation between local and global forces in the migration process and to overcoming misleading distinctions such as the ‘economic migrants vs. political refugees’ conception and the ‘emigration country vs. immigration country’ opposition. It is questionable whether the establishment of social relations across borders is to be considered a de-territorialisation process or whether it should be rather seen as a re-territorialisation. Does the dissociation between social formations and political territories necessarily mean that the notion of territory is no longer relevant in migration studies? Do social constructions related to discontinuous spaces dissolve identity references to nation states?

Further conceptual and methodological reflection is required to avoid the pitfalls inherent to essentialist approaches, especially those that overestimate the ethnic or diasporic dimension to the detriment of the role of the nation state or the action of non-diasporic networks (Portes, Guarnizo & Landholt 1999). Another excess lies in the underestimation of historical processes and in the perception of long-distance migration, cultural hybridity and diasporic identities as characteristics of the contemporary era (Waldinger 2004). In this respect, Alessandro Monsutti calls for an analysis of migration in its historical and epistemological context, in order to critically apprehend the incidences of postmodernism in this misapprehension. In parallel, a promising research perspective lies in the relation between transnationalism and development. We might investigate how the reassessment of the relation between migration and development from a transnational point of view could help transcend ‘origin vs. destination’ or ‘North vs. South’ dichotomies, as Thomas Faist puts it. All these points are discussed by Stéphane De Tapia from a geographical and epistemological point of view.

Research on the relation between migration and development appears to be one of the most promising paths to analytic innovation in the study of international movements of people. The third part of this volume addresses how an in-depth investigation of this theoretical link could give way to a new look at population movements and at the economic and social role of migrants in their transnational space of reference. At a time when migration is to a certain extent misleadingly thought of as an independent phenomenon, Ronald Skeldon reminds us that a link was made from the beginning of migration research – more than a century ago – between migration, on the one hand, and the different stages of economic development and the construction of nation states on the other. Today, the incidence of development on population movements is still a topical issue and, more than ever, should be investigated from technological and environmental perspectives.
Conversely, a thorough understanding of the impact of contemporary migration patterns on development is of prime importance. It is commonly admitted that people who leave are generally not the poorest – nor are they the least educated. Brain drain is particularly a problem (or a solution?) in micro-states of the Caribbean and the Pacific which strongly depend on the employment markets of North American and European metropolitan powers. In Surinam, Guyana, Jamaica and Haiti, 80 per cent to 90 per cent of tertiary educated individuals have emigrated. This is also an issue in large poor countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, estimates of the proportion of the emigration of physicians trained in the region range from 9 per cent to 28 per cent according to the UN and the World Bank. For this reason, emigration has often been thought of as more detrimental than beneficial to development.

But at the same time, the remittances of migrants and the experience and skills that returnees acquired abroad have benefited many developing countries. As a matter of fact, 74 per cent of officially recorded remittances in 2006 were channelled towards developing countries, and in countries like Haiti or Lebanon, remittances represent the equivalent of more than 20 per cent of the gross domestic product. An approach to the relation between migration and development which takes into account and articulates the different levels of analysis – global, national, transnational, and individual – is needed to address current issues dealing with financial remittances, diasporic linkages, brain drain and skilled return migration. What also needs to be assessed, among other issues, is the role of infrastructures and political structures in source countries for emigration and return migration to be positive for development.

The relational approach between migration and development also points out the weaknesses of the traditional macro-societal conceptions of development (De Haas 2006). In fact, the answer to the question of how and to what extent financial and social transfers of emigrants contribute to the development process of source countries depends on our own conception of development and on the spatial scale of analysis (Stark 2003; Kuznetsov 2006). It compels scholars to bear in mind the notion of development in an innovative way by paying attention to family and kin strategies at the local level of villages and regions of origin. In this vein, Patrick Gonin focuses on the link between incorporation processes of post-colonial migrants in the North, conceived of as ‘intermediary agents’, and the elaboration of local development projects geared towards African source countries.

In the last part of the book, which deals with refugees and asylum, Michel Agier discusses the emerging profile of migrants resulting from present regulation of asylum management and points out the convergence between police action and humanitarian action. The new
profile of ‘failed asylum seeker’, a category produced by the rejection by the nation state, is thus equated to stateless citizen. Finally, the analysis of Véronique Lassailly-Jacob deals with the migration-development relation from the angle of the experience of refugees in Africa. Her perspective reminds us that the geography of forced migration is shaped by a regional geopolitical context of instability that is intimately related to developmental concerns.

References


Part I

International migration and the challenge of social cohesion
2 European research on international migration and settlement of immigrants: a state of the art and suggestions for improvement

Rinus Penninx

1 Introduction

A comprehensive reflection is needed on the state of the art of research on international migration and settlement in Europe today. I will do this on the basis of work that has been performed in the first phase of the existence of the IMISCOE Network of Excellence. Nine clusters of researchers have, as a start of the Network, produced state-of-the-art reports covering nine sub-domains. The essential information in these reports has been brought together in a book published in the IMISCOE Joint Studies Series (Penninx, Berger & Kraal 2006) under the title The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe.

In this chapter I will, firstly, outline what has changed on the European scene since the mid-1970s in the field of international migration and settlement of immigrants. Secondly, I will indicate how European societies have reacted to these changes. In a third step, I will sketch how the research world has reacted to these changes, particularly asking the question of what it has contributed to the understanding of the new dynamics and indicating where it has failed to do so. This leads, fourthly, to the question of how we might improve our research efforts in the near future. I will conclude by giving a few examples of new research lines that illustrate a way forward.

2 Times are changing

In recent decades, international migration has become a major phenomenon. While the number of persons living outside their country of birth worldwide was estimated at ‘more than 105 million’ in 1985 (United Nations 1998: 1), this number had nearly doubled to approximately 200 million twenty years later (GCIM 2005). Figures for the European
continent show an even steeper increase of residents in European countries that have been born outside their present country of residence: in a shorter period of fifteen years their number grew from an estimated 23 million in 1985 (United Nations 1998: 1) to more than 56 million, or 7.7 per cent of the total European population in 2000 (IOM 2003: 29).

Such absolute numbers already demonstrate that Europe has factually become an immigration continent. The relevance of this thesis is reinforced if we look at the relative importance of migration in the demography of Europe. Recent analyses of Eurostat show that since 1988 net migration has become a more substantial contributor to the growth of the population of the fifteen original member states of the EU than natural growth (i.e. births minus deaths). Net migration is expected to prevent an absolute decrease of the EU population until the year 2025 (Eurostat 2005; Eurostat 2006).

However impressive such general figures for Europe may be, they do not mirror the differential impact of immigration. Migration and settlement patterns of immigrants are basically uneven, both in time and in space. Some Western European countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium and France, have a history of immigration before World War II, and immigration resumed soon after 1945. Other countries in the western part of Europe only started to acquire their immigration experience in the decades following World War II; these include the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. For a number of European countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland that were emigration countries until the 1980s, the current immigration experience spans a period of about two decades. Still other countries, among them most of the ten recently admitted EU member states, are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time. Obviously, such historical differences are reflected in the size and composition of their immigrant populations.

The unevenness of the immigration experience in scale and in time is as much noticeable within the countries in question. More than in the past, new immigrants in recent decades have tended to concentrate in urban areas. Within these metropolises, moreover, there is almost always a skewed distribution of these newcomers over districts and wards, and in urban public facilities like schools. The new immigration has changed the composition of the urban population significantly, forcing local governments to react (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello & Vertovec 2004).

The picture is further complicated by what is called the new geography of migration (King 2002). Up until the 1980s, origins could conveniently be grouped under three headings: a) migration with a colonial background that connected certain European countries to their former
colonies; b) labour migration that connected a number of ‘recruiting countries’ to a limited number of ‘sending countries’; and c) refugee migration that was strongly dominated by refugee migration from Eastern Europe to the West. As such, geographical migration patterns came to embrace Europe and the Mediterranean countries, plus a limited number of colonies, both present and former. This picture is now completely blurred. Nowadays, immigrants, compelled by varying motives and under different guises, come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational companies and international organisations, skilled workers from everywhere, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from Africa, the Near East, Asia, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just to single out some of the major immigrant categories. The result in some places is so heterogeneous that Steven Vertovec (2006) recently coined the term ‘super-diversity’, illustrating the case of the UK overall and the London metropolis, in particular.

All these facts about the changing size, origin, destination and composition of international migration do seem part of a broader context of change: increasing globalisation. This has expressed itself in several domains: the financial world has been one of the first to do away with national barriers; agricultural and industrial production and part of the world of service supply have increasingly developed new divisions of labour across borders; trade across borders has been eased and has increased; culture and knowledge have developed new and rapid ways of dissemination unhindered by national borders.

These changes have had far-reaching consequences for the mobility of people across borders. The first is that, in such a globalising world, the type of people’s mobility overall has also changed significantly. This is particularly relevant when it comes to short-term stays (e.g. for business travel, study and tourism), but also for longer stays by those involved in the aforementioned forms of globalisation (e.g. employees of international organisations and multinational enterprises and highly skilled people). One could unite these individuals under the category of the wanted travellers and migrants. The expected benefits for global actors and national governments in given spatial territories coincide and their mobility is thus facilitated, if not promoted. But this is not necessarily the case for others who, as a consequence of the same process of globalisation, decide themselves to look for an economically better and/or politically safer new destination. Paradoxically, national boundaries and borders and the sovereign right of states to decide on admission of non-nationals have gained importance for them. For non-solicited and non-invited migrants, new and increasing barriers have been erected. The new notions in scientific analysis have thus become ‘supply vs.
demand driven migration' and in policy terms ‘the wanted vs. unsolicited’. This ambivalent reaction to international migration in a globalising context has taken a special form within the EU. On the one hand, the EU (and its predecessors) essentially created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for citizens and residents of its member states. On the other hand, EU member states have developed restrictive and defensive immigration policies to keep out unasked-for migrants. This amounts to the paradoxical trend towards ‘free mobility’ for those within, and increasing closure for those outside the EU.

A second consequence of globalisation and the specific selection of migration and the movements it stimulates, concerns changes to the forms of settlement. While migration tended to be viewed in the past predominantly as a once-off movement leading to permanent resettlement (a conception that prevailed in the literature on classic immigration countries), recent migration – helped by strongly increased transport and communication facilities – has shifted to more fluid practices of international mobility in which more migrants have consecutive stays in different countries, alternate their residence between countries, etc. This may lead to new practices of residence, integration and community formation. Researchers are exploring these new phenomena under new notions, such as transnationalism. Policymakers are asking the uneasy question what such practices mean for integration.

3 Reactions of societies: changing policies

The new dynamics of both migration and integration have also led to policy changes. While the policy domains of migration and integration have been separate ones in most European countries in the past, one of the most significant new trends is that these two policy domains have become more and more intertwined. Let us look briefly at each of the two fields and illustrate how they tend to become interwoven.

As for migration, one first observation to be made is that European countries have consistently defined themselves as non-immigration countries, in contrast to countries such as Canada, Australia and the US. While the rhetoric about being a ‘nation of immigrants’ is strong in the latter countries, it is singularly absent in Europe. Such a framing of the migration question has been a constant factor in Europe, irrespective of the fact that quite a few countries have had higher immigration rates than classic immigration countries, measured simply by the percentages of foreign-born in their total populations: Switzerland and Germany, for instance, have higher percentages than the US.

This framing has had pervasive consequences. In North-Western European countries the ‘temporary’ labour migration policies developed
since the mid-1950s were abandoned after the first oil crisis of 1973. In general, ad hoc and lenient migration policies were replaced by restrictive policies that were justified by a simultaneous decrease or absence of demand, particularly for lower skilled migrants, and an increase of supply-driven migration presenting itself under the policy categories of family reunion and formation, and refuge and asylum. In a spiral pattern of reactionary new measures of restriction and control and ‘innovative’ new forms of immigration, new actors and new dynamics developed. Immigration was increasingly criminalised: tougher regulations by definition led to more illegality and irregularity, creating opportunities for new actors like smugglers and traffickers. International political terrorism has furthermore put migrants into focus from a security perspective. Migration thus became, first and foremost, associated with problems and threats and as such it rose to the top of the political agenda in many countries in recent times.

Not being an immigration country has also had direct consequences for settlement and policies of integration. North-Western European countries had ‘solved’ the contradiction of not being an immigration country and importing significant labour in the 1950s and 1960s by defining these migrants as ‘temporary guests’. That meant limited facilities for accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. But here, too, the ‘fact’ that a significant portion stayed for good and formed communities that gradually grew by using their rights to bring families and spouses, contradicted perceptions and expectations. Some national governments identified these tensions relatively early and initiated some form of policy of inclusion or integration, as did Sweden in the mid-1970s and the Netherlands in the early 1980s. Most countries acknowledged the need to formulate ‘integration policies’ much later in the 1990s, often hesitantly and partially (Penninx 2005).

The idea that integration of long-term residents was a necessity for sound and cohesive societies was initially, particularly in the early policies of states like Sweden and the Netherlands, inspired by a philosophy of equality and equity in a welfare state context. It was not seen as contradicting the philosophy of not being an immigration country. On the contrary, at that time restrictive immigration policies in these countries were seen as a necessary condition for a successful integration policy (too much and continuous immigration would make integration an impossible task). These early integration policies were strongly rights-based, embracing not only the socio-economic but also the political and cultural domains of life. For most other European national governments, however, such ideas went too far and they were content to maintain ad hoc adaptive measures, in most cases leaving the integration responsibility to parties in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations.
Whatever the intensity and content of integration policies, and irrespective of the question whether such policies have been primarily initiated by national or local authorities, integration has become a central theme in politics in Europe since the 1990s. And in becoming so, it showed that integration policies inevitably go far beyond the simple idea of providing facilities for newcomers to adapt and function in the new society. The premise of any integration policy ultimately leads to questions of how the society in which newcomers ‘integrate’ essentially defines itself and whether it is able and willing to change. This made integration policies as sensitive politically as immigration itself. North-Western European countries seem to have moved in recent years from earlier conceptions of integration policies that focused on the position of newcomers in society to one that is primarily focusing on the cohesion of societies as a whole and on commonalities that are supposed to be crucial for such social cohesion. This has led to much more fundamental questions and discussions on the identity of immigration societies: ‘who are we?’ The outcomes of such discussions have consequences for newcomers and for what their integration should mean (in the eyes of the society of destination, of course). Some observers have called the recent policies in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands ‘neo-assimilationist’ (see Penninx 2006 for the Dutch case).

It is at this point that the nexus between the two policy fields of migration and integration becomes stronger, inextricable even. To the old policy assumption that restrictive immigration is a necessary condition for the success of an integration policy, a new one is added: integration policy measures are used to select those immigrants that are able and willing to integrate and deter those who are not. Making first admission dependent on tests in the country of origin, extension of residence permits on success in integration courses, and naturalisation on even more elaborate requirements of integration are examples of measures that fit this inversion.

The picture outlined here is strongly based on the North-Western European experience. Southern European countries have a much more recent experience in immigration and integration, but at the same time a stronger growth of immigration than North-West Europe. Their institutional framework for regulation is new and their practices are much less determined by a long history of migration regulation and the path dependency that it may entail. In certain respects this leads to quite different measures of regulation, such as the frequent regularisations. For most of the ten new members of the EU, the topic of migration and integration is relatively new and takes multiple forms: emigration, immigration and transit migration coexist in most of these countries. The EU has become an important forum for policy development through
its initiatives to create a framework for common migration policies (since the late 1990s) and integration policies (since 2003).

4 Research on migration, settlement and social cohesion

In the wake of the developments outlined above, research in Europe has developed and expanded and followed roughly the timing of the migration phenomenon itself. Initially, in the 1960s and 1970s, individuals engaged in research often focusing on one particular flow of migrants or immigrant group. The 1980s saw the first research institutes with more comprehensive programmes in Sweden, the UK, France (e.g. Migrinter) and the Netherlands; a pattern that expanded to other Western European countries and to the Southern countries in the late 1990s.

Traditionally, this migration and integration research was strongly embedded in national contexts, both in terms of its framing of the questions and its funding. As a consequence it reflected strong national concerns and perspectives. Accordingly, topics and priorities were those that related primarily to destination countries. Most of that research was furthermore mono-disciplinary.

It was the Sixth Framework Programme for Research of the European Commission that offered a possibility to try and overcome the fragmented nature of research, and in doing so provide a coherent and more comprehensive analytic and empirical basis for policies and the public discourse on international migration and integration. In 2004, nineteen research institutes from ten European countries established the IMISCOE Network of Excellence, whose task is to build an infrastructure for research in the domain of international migration, integration and social cohesion by developing a coherent, multidisciplinary, cross-national comparative research programme. Furthermore it should develop an infrastructure for training of future researchers and a system of dissemination of results of research to a wide audience. Such activities should contribute to a sound and solid basis for public discourse and policymaking in this area.

So far, these are observations on the context of research. What about the content? In how far has research been able to come to grips with the new dynamics of migration itself, the more complicated processes of settlement, the policy responses of sending and receiving societies, the politicisation and normative undertones that go with it? Did research feed the public and political discourse on migration and settlement with adequate analytical insights and concomitant empirical data?
The state of the art of research as it was done by the IMISCOE clusters contains a double message. On the one hand, there is a growing amount of research available that is not adequately disseminated and thus under-used. On the other hand, there are significant gaps in empirical data and, more importantly, there is also the general recognition that research still fails to produce comprehensive insights in present migration processes and their consequences for migrants and their communities, and for countries of origin and destination. To put it bluntly: research in Europe has not kept pace with developments in the field it studies. This weakness is most commonly qualified as being the result of three forms of fragmentation, manifested as a lack of comparative research, a lack of cooperation between disciplines and a lack of integration of the different levels at which phenomena are studied.4

5 Challenges for the organisation of research

Such weaknesses in the present European research call for specific efforts in the organisation and methodology of research for the future. I will briefly dwell on each of these causes of fragmentation and indicate how these could possibly be remedied.

5.1 Systematic comparison as a strategic tool

There seems to be a consensus both on the lack of comparative research and on the expectation that systematic comparison will bring our knowledge base a big step forward. But what does this mean in practice? The challenges here lay on different levels that all have relevance in the design of a comparative research framework. The first and most practical level is that of basic administrative data that are often used by researchers. It was reported that cross-national comparability of seemingly simple data such as those on migration is profoundly problematic. The problem is that administrative data are collected within a specified institutional context for specific purposes, using definitions that reflect their particular tasks, assumptions and preoccupations. The problem for scientists – apart from the validity and reliability of the data within the system in which they are collected – in using such data for comparative purposes is essentially twofold: do they measure the same phenomenon? And are they complete or representative? Critical assessment of comparability is thus a fundamental requirement here, possibly leading to practical proposals for change.

The second level is that of the design of comparisons. The kind of comparison we choose to make directly relates to the specific questions
that we would like to answer. A research design that compares different immigrant populations within one national or local context will draw attention, by the choice of the design, to factors within these immigrant populations that explain the differential outcomes. A design that compares the same ethnic group within different national or local contexts, however, will focus on factors within these contexts that explain differences. The same holds for comparisons in which time is brought into the design. Significant work remains to develop a toolkit of rigid comparison. Preferably, this would be done in an internationally coordinated research programme.

The third level concerns concepts and terminology. That the same terms are used in different national or local contexts – e.g. integration policy vs. multicultural policies – may create the illusion that one and the same phenomena are being dealt with. Empirical research, however, has shown that not only are the ideas and assumptions behind such policies different, but the practice and measures of such policies vary considerably in different places and situations (see Vermeulen 1997). Another complication is that academic concepts may develop a normative connotation in public and political discourse, which makes it difficult for scholars to communicate about them with a broader audience. This has been described for the concepts of assimilation and integration as well as multiculturalism. We therefore need to design analytical frameworks in which such abstract concepts and notions are operationalised in such a way that empirical data can be collected in the same way in different contexts.\footnote{5}

Working on systematically comparative research is thus scientifically a significant challenge, and a costly one in practice, but it will bring research a fundamental step further. At the same time, it will provide a sound basis for policymakers who are increasingly looking across borders to see how other countries are dealing with the dilemmas they are confronted with.\footnote{6}

5.2 Multidisciplinarity/interdisciplinarity

Critiques on the involvement of various disciplines in the study of migration and settlement in the IMISCOE state-of-the-art reports essentially refer to two aspects. The first is the observation that in the past the research field has been dominated by a limited number of disciplines, often anthropology, sociology, social geography, economics and law, while other disciplines came in relatively late, such as political sciences and history.

The second is that disciplines often develop their research and perspectives in relative isolation – this point is made strongly for economists, for example, but it can also be applied to other disciplines like
history and law – and that comprehensive multidisciplinary research is rare, let alone interdisciplinary research projects.\(^7\)

The challenge for future research is thus to transcend old divisions of disciplines in research on international migration and settlement of migrants. Cooperation across disciplines can be done most fruitfully when participants in such endeavours work from the strength of their own discipline. This means that researchers should not be isolated to or within their discipline (to form another isolated thematic field of research on migration and settlement). They should act as links between their discipline and the thematic field: stimulating research on the thematic field within the discipline and bringing the special expertise from the discipline to the thematic field. In practice, this should be done at two levels. The first is to create multidisciplinary organisational structures, such as IMISCOE, that bring disciplines together and encourage exchange and cooperation. The second, deeper level is to conceive and implement interdisciplinary projects and programmes in which such cooperation is built ex ante into the central questions and design, while the collection of material is integrated into the analysis and reporting.\(^8\)

### 5.3 Integrating levels of analysis

Yet, another form of fragmentation relates to levels of units of analysis and the lack of integration of these levels. This may express itself in the form where (mostly qualitative) research on the micro-level of small groups does not seem to have any relation with (mostly quantitative) research on the aggregate level of groups or categories.\(^9\) This classical kind of fragmentation is not unique to the field of migration and integration, but this observation does not make the challenge to overcome less urgent or easier.

The fragmentation may also take a more space-based form, particularly when the unit of analysis refers to the different levels at which societies are politically organised and policy efforts are involved: the borough, the city, the region, the nation state and supranational or international agents. While the nation state has been an important level from the beginning and has dominated in research, there is a growing body of research on the local level on the one hand, and on the international and supranational level on the other. The relations between these levels and the complex way in which they influence each other, however, are yet to be explored.

This form of fragmentation has a special dimension in the European context. Since the early start of Europeanisation, in the form of the European Economic Community, up until the present EU, an ever more significant supranational level has developed. In its early phase –
starting back as far as the 1950s – mobility within the European Eco-
nomic Community and later the EU has been a topic of complicated
interaction between national governments and the European Commis-
sion (Goedings 2005), while discussions focusing on immigration
from outside the EU have grown in importance since the 1980s, and
integration policies since 2003. There is a growing awareness among
researchers that there is a need to overcome this fragmentation, and at
the same time an expectation that this will greatly enhance our under-
standing of policies and policymaking in the field.

6 New perspectives on immigration and integration research
in Europe

Apart from improvements in the organisation of research by involving
relevant disciplines, using comparison as a strategic tool and designing
research that comprises more levels and the interaction between them,
the state-of-the-art reports suggested time and again that there are also
significant challenges in terms of the development of new theoretical
and analytical perspectives. The term ‘perspective’ means here looking
at the field from a different angle and thus asking different questions,
taking other units of analysis as a starting point and collecting new
kinds of empirical material. These suggestions can be brought together
under three headings.

6.1 Rethinking the relation between migration and settlement

International migration and integration (or alternative terms such as
‘assimilation’, ‘incorporation’ and ‘settlement’) have established them-
seves as more or less independent fields of research and theory. This
is partly also reflected in the way IMISCOE initially structured its re-
search clusters. The first – international migration – is then defined as
the spatial movement, voluntary or forced, of persons across political
borders as a process, together with its causes and consequences. The
second pertains to the process of settlement and integration of immi-
grants and their descendants in the society of destination and the con-
sequences this has for these societies. Most of the existing body of the-
ories in these fields is being developed on the basis of experience in
traditional Anglo-Saxon immigration countries and by researchers
from these countries.

Though it is useful to start from that knowledge and build on it, the
state-of-the-art reports reveal that there are at least two kinds of pro-
bles stemming from such definitions and the implied division be-
tween migration and integration research. The first kind of question
arises when we see migration and integration as self-contained and independent fields of research, thus decoupling migration from settlement. As noted earlier, international migration has changed in character: the migration process has become more complex, more fluid and less permanent. The implicitly assumed one-off movement and the time sequence of migration followed by a settlement process are increasingly blurred.

The second set of issues refers to a specificity of the European context: having defined itself as a set of non-immigration countries has had far-reaching consequences both for international migration and integration separately, but also for the nexus between the two fields. There is a new tendency in policy thinking that sets integration requirements as criteria for the selection and admission of immigrants (see e.g. Carrera 2006).

There is thus a need to reformulate the research field as one complex field, rather than two separate ones. It is necessary to introduce new perspectives and questions that focus on this more complicated interconnectedness. Focusing on the migrants themselves, one of these new perspectives is that of transnationalism. This notion basically challenges the above-mentioned assumptions of once-off movements, followed by gradual settlement. It does so by asking pertinent questions about the nature and continuity of migrants’ ties with several places and communities and, thus, their simultaneous ‘integration’ in them. Looking at both sending and receiving societies, a number of new questions also arises (or is cast in a different light) that interconnect migration and integration. For example, how are migration and development issues influenced by new migration patterns, by the formation of transnational communities and by integration policies in destination countries? How do arguments related to integration (and concrete policy measures in that field) influence admission and immigration policies and practices as well as the patterns of continued immigration and return?

6.2 Shifting the focus from migrants to society

There is another observation on the state of the art of migration and integration research that hints at the need to introduce new perspectives. Nearly all research focuses primarily on migration, immigrants and their integration, while the societal systems into which the migration phenomenon and the immigrants themselves are to be integrated is taken for granted. It is interesting to observe how when the effects of migration on societal structures are studied, it is mainly from a sending country perspective. Migration and development seem to be topics relevant for countries that send migrants, rather than for countries that receive them. Migration’s effects on social structures in sending
countries have been studied under headings such as brain drain, with a view to how families, households, peasant economies and local markets are affected. More recently, much attention has been given to the potential that migration and migrant communities have on the development of regions of origin. To put it ironically, migration research has looked more at the societal effects of the ‘absence of migrants’ in sending countries than at the societal effects of the ‘presence of migrants’ in receiving ones.

But if we really want to make sense of integration and social cohesion – beyond the political attractiveness of their semantics on the global, European and nation state level – we must include the effects of migration on the societal structures in Europe in our analysis as well. Europe and its nation states have become – in an uneven process – a world region of international migration. If migration is linked to major social dynamics, as is claimed by migration researchers and increasingly accepted as common sense knowledge, then it needs to be demonstrated to what extent migration has affected the core structures of European immigrant-receiving societies themselves.

This general perspective leads to a focus on such issues as the short-term and long-term effects of migration and the presence of immigrants on the various societal realms such as politics, the economy, law, science, education, health, religion, mass media, arts, sports and the family. In asking such questions for each of these domains, several social levels should be taken into account, such as the institutional level, that of organisations, networks and their interactions.

Such new lines of research can be illustrated by taking the examples of the effect of migration on the health care system and educational system. In the health care realm there is more to be studied than just the integration of newcomers into the existing provisions of health care. Migration affects not only the composition of patients, but also concepts of illness and disease, modes of communication and cultural expectations and the organisation of care and composition of staff. Since the health care system is – among others – strongly based on processes of social interaction, questions arise as to how its various organisations cope with the cultural and ethnic diversity of their new clients. Comparable questions can be asked for other institutional fields, such as the educational system where, probably even more than in the case of the health system, the causes and consequences of societal change and migration have two directions. On the one hand, what are the effects of structural changes of the education system on migration flows (e.g. students, teachers, scientists)? And on the other, how does the presence of migrants and their children affect the educational system?
6.3 Perspectives ‘from outside’

The foregoing observations on new perspectives refer to imbalances within the fields of international migration, integration and social cohesion and suggest ways to address them. But this thematic area is not to be regarded as an isolated one. Taking a different angle may yield unexpected insights. The state-of-the-art reports have shown several times that new issues and questions arise when their particular fields are seen in a broader perspective, of which I will mention only two examples.

The first involves looking at international migration as just one of the forms that spatial mobility may take. Systematic comparison with other forms of mobility that do not imply crossing national borders (such as internal migration) or that have a shorter time horizon (such as cross-border commuting, tourism and business travel) may bring the special characteristics and underlying mechanisms of international migration to the fore.

Another broader perspective is the one that now falls under the term ‘globalisation’. From such a perspective, important questions arise regarding how the physical migration of people across borders relates to the ‘travel’ of money, goods, ideas and cultural and religious meanings and practices across these same borders, some of which are physical but others much less so, or not at all. And what do such relations mean for the way we should look at the process of settlement of immigrants?

7 Examples for the way forward

Applying the above suggestions for organisational changes in research and taking new perspectives into account opens, in theory, nearly endless possibilities for promising future research. Making strategic choices is the only option in practice. This is exactly the strategy that IMISCOE is implementing. During its first two years, the network began implementing three special projects to prepare new strategic research lines that combine the above-mentioned suggestions for improvement. These three new research lines – still in a nascent phase at the time of writing – will be described here briefly as examples for a possible way forward.

The research line, known by the acronym EUROLINKS, aims to study Europe as both an established and continuously changing migration system. It creates a common framework for understanding migration to Europe in terms of various interconnections between geographical areas and complicated cause and effect explanations of migration.
The central question is: how does the migration system as developed within the present EU and between the EU and adjacent areas – the Mediterranean rim and Central and Eastern Europe – interact with increasing social and economic interdependencies between these areas? The basic idea is to conceptualise migration as partly caused, and evoked by, broader economic, political, social and cultural developments and partly contributing to these developments itself.

The primary research question will be addressed in a programme of coordinated research projects that focuses on different migration subsystems within or to Europe. The evolution of such subsystems will be studied in terms of both their historical context and their present and possible future forms, with a particular focus on the interconnections between economic, political and cultural linkages and migration processes. The basic units of analysis will be migration systems at the country-to-country level chosen strategically to untangle the various contextual and substantive factors, such as specific characteristics of migrants themselves, the institutional architecture and policy variations. Such comparisons will therefore include: a) countries that have the same sending area, e.g. Turkey-to-Germany and Turkey-to-the Netherlands; b) country-to-country sub-systems that have the same target area, e.g. the Turkey-to-Germany or Poland-to-Germany systems; c) destination countries inside and outside the EU, e.g. Germany vs. Switzerland; and d) comparisons of systems that have their roots in colonial or ex-colonial ties.

A second research line in the domain of immigrant integration, given the acronym INTPOL, focuses on the systematic comparative analysis of integration processes and related policies. Institutional arrangements and policies are important factors that may influence or steer integration processes. Even though local arrangements and policies are embedded in national systems, and even though national systems are increasingly embedded in supranational systems like that of the EU, such institutional arrangements and policies may have differential mechanisms and implications at all these levels.

This leads to the central overarching research question: to what extent do different national and local institutional arrangements and policies result in differential outcomes of integration processes (the divergence hypothesis), and to what extent do comparable practical problems of integration lead to convergence in these processes and policies (the convergence hypothesis)? Specific questions such as how supranational policies like EU policies influence processes of integration and related policies, or whether the approaches from one setting can be applied and/or converted to other settings can be formulated to supplement this general research question.
INTPOL starts from the assumption that the analysis of processes of integration and related policies is to be done empirically, comparatively and comprehensively and should take into account different relevant dimensions (political, economic, social and cultural). INTPOL will study the two sets of actors involved in this field: individuals, organisations and institutions of the immigrants themselves as well as actors at corresponding levels of the receiving society. It is the interaction between these two sets of actors that determines directions of processes of integration and ultimate outcomes.

Within such a general framework, specific and complementary case studies will be selected and implemented. In view of the large domain covered, it is envisaged to make strategic choices. Certain domains, such as education and health, will have priority. Particular comparisons will get preference, such as those between cities or local policies.

A third research line, in the domain of social cohesion, has been given the acronym SOCO. This project focuses on the political and social dynamics of migration and integration as phenomena of European societies. Often seen as a threat, migration is easily associated in Europe with defensive attitudes, xenophobia and racism on the individual level, and with political mobilisation against migrants and ethnic minorities on the group level. In its turn, such mobilisation may lead to counter-mobilisation such as anti-racism movements and the mobilisation of immigrants themselves.

These three forms of social movements stemming from migration and the interactions between movements are taken as a specific focus. In order to understand the dynamics involved in such processes and interactions, these processes will not only be studied in their national context and cross-nationally, but also in their historical dimension.

The central question of this research line is then: how does migration affect political mobilisation in its potential threefold manifestation: anti-immigrant mobilisation, anti-racist mobilisation (or the solidarity movements) and political mobilisation of immigrants themselves? How do these different mobilisations interact?

These are three examples of how the IMISCOE Network of Excellence approaches the issues of international comparison, interdisciplinarity and multilevel analysis in the fields of international migration and integration in the European context. They concretely represent the challenge to contribute to a better understanding of migration and settlement in the coming years, primarily as a development of science. By choosing strategic topics, IMISCOE simultaneously works in the service to better inform public and political discussions and policymaking.
Notes

1. The acronym IMISCOE stands for International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe. This Network of Excellence was established on 1 April 2004, thanks to five years worth of funding granted by the Sixth Framework Programme of Directorate-General for Research of the European Commission. The author serves as coordinator of IMISCOE.

2. Most of the reports are available in full at www.imiscoe.org.

3. A collection of recent analyses of European policies and choices for the future was given the apt subtitle ‘A new deal or a continuing dialogue of the deaf?’ (Papademetriou 2006).

4. The fragmentation has been described in some cases by pointing to relatively isolated national traditions of research. Such traditions have often developed in a context in which funding for research is significantly influenced by policy interests. This implies a strong focus on the national case that may lead not only to a lack of cross-national comparison, but also to preclude research to specific foci. In general, more attention is given to migrants as the object of study rather than to the receiving society. Crucial to include in research still are perspectives of receiving countries, rather than those of sending countries. Some observers have coined the term ‘methodological nationalism’ for this phenomenon (Al-Ali & Koser 2002; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2003). Recent publications such as Bommes (2006), Lavenex (2005) and Vasta and Vaddamalay (2006) substantiate the limitations of such national traditions in the empirical comparison of countries.

5. Within IMISCOE various initiatives have already been taken. On a still relatively abstract level, the INTPOL study by Heckmann and Bosswick (2006) delivered an analytical framework for the comparative study of integration processes of immigrants.

6. The key phrase in such international exchanges has become ‘to learn from best practices elsewhere’. However, here there is also a problem of comparability: since any practice – bad, good or best – is rooted in a much broader local and national institutional setting, the crucial question is whether a good practice is transferable from one institutional setting to another. It is knowledge about the mechanisms of a good practice and the conditions under which it works that make it transferable, rather than the specific form it has taken at a certain moment and place.

7. For practical purposes I prefer to use ‘multidisciplinary’ as a quality pertaining to research institutes, teams and programmes in which researchers among several disciplines are involved. I use ‘interdisciplinary’ specifically as an adjective describing research projects. It indicates that the project’s design and central questions is conceived as an integrated, complementary work across disciplines beforehand, though is subsequently expressed in the coordinated collection of material, integrated analysis and reporting.

8. For an interesting contribution to this topic, see Bommes and Morawska (2005).

9. Admittedly, this cleavage has been discussed since the late 1980s in migration studies, and ‘meso-level’ mechanisms were introduced to bridge the gap, particularly in the form of various networks. In integration studies, however, there is much less of an effort to bridge the microaggregate and macroaggregate levels.

10. For a concise overview, see Van Selm and Tsolakis (2005).

11. We see the same strong focus on immigrants even though, in the new rhetoric of integration policy, the statement that integration is a two-sided process of change for migrants and the receiving society is accepted. For examples, see the Communication of the European Commission on Integration (European Commission 2003) and the Common Basic Principles for integration policies approved by the Conference of Integration ministers in Groningen (European Commission 2004).
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3 Unacceptable realities: public opinion and the challenge of immigration in a Franco-American comparison

Roger Waldinger

1 Introduction

At the turn of the twenty-first century, ‘globalisation’ is the order of the day. With international migration bringing the alien ‘other’ from Third World to First, and worldwide trade and communications amplifying the feedbacks travelling in the opposite direction, the view that nation state and society normally converge has waned. Instead, social scientists are looking for new ways to think about the connections between ‘here’ and ‘there’, as evidenced by the interest in the many things called ‘transnational’. Those studying international migration evince particular excitement. Observing that migration produces a plethora of connections spanning ‘home’ and ‘host’ societies, these scholars proclaim the emergence of ‘transnational communities’ (see Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc 1992; Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999; Levitt, DeWind & Vertovec 2003; and accompanying articles in International Migration Review 37: 3).

If some scholars look at today’s immigration and see home-place connectedness as its distinguishing feature, others examine the same reality and find that old country ties inevitably give way to new, just as in the past. As Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003) have argued in their recent eloquent defence of assimilation, Remaking the American mainstream, the attenuation of home place connections derives from the dynamics of the migration process itself. Immigration is motivated by the search for the better life, a quest that usually has no inherent relationship to assimilation. Only in some instances is assimilation self-consciously embraced; often, it is precisely the end that the immigrants wish to avoid. Nonetheless, the effort to secure a better future – find a better job, a safer neighbourhood, a higher quality school – confronts immigrants with the need to choose between strategies of an ‘ethnic’ or ‘mainstream’ sort. Insofar as the better future is found in a place where out-group contacts are more plentiful than in the neighbourhoods or workplaces where the newcomers begin, the newcomers are
likely to select ‘mainstream strategies’ – and thereby progress towards assimilation, whether wanted or not.

While diverging in particulars, the professional students of immigration see a world of migration as far more open than the era of mass migration of a century ago. Standing with their back at the national frontier and looking inwards, the students of assimilation argue that prejudice no longer confines immigrants to ethnic ghettos or enclaves, giving them far more choice than their predecessors possessed. Extending their vision to encompass both receiving and sending societies, the transnationalists argue that migrants are no longer compelled to break ties with friends and family left behind, but instead enjoy the option of living lives across borders.

However, neither camp has appeared to consult the nationals of the nation state societies on which the immigrants have converged, an important omission as the views of the nationals certainly have some bearing on the possibilities awaiting the newcomers. As it happens, the national peoples of the rich, immigrant-receiving democracies all want their national communities maintained. Keeping membership restricted is of strategic value, especially when the place in question is a wealthy society that attracts the poor. Selfishness is not the only motivation at work; however, the idea of the national community, understood as a broad, family-like, group of people responsible for taking care of one another, but not everyone outside the circle, is also an ideal. Whatever the motivations propelling the public, governments do what their people want, making strenuous efforts to control movements across the border. In 2001, the United States and France were joined by nineteen out of 48 developed countries sharing policies designed to reduce immigration, as opposed to only two with policies aimed at expansion (United Nations 2002).

Though immigration restrictions would seem successful, if evaluated in light of the quantities of poor people they deter, boundaries nonetheless prove leaky. Political frontiers do not naturally divide: regional integration is the first and easiest path, which is why controlling movements across the border requires so much effort. Natural and political barriers to migration notwithstanding, the economic disparities between rich and poor places are such that the benefits of migration often outweigh the costs. Restrictions also collide with the social processes of migration, such that once implanted, the activation of migration networks makes the cross-border movements of people hard to stop (Massey, Alarcon, Durand & Gonzalez 1987). As efforts to control borders never fully succeed, the rich democracies have all created the ‘illegal’ immigrant, whose arrival produces additional efforts at policing boundaries between foreigners who do and do not belong (Ngai 2004).
With the advent of international migration, aliens move from outside the state’s boundaries, entering the territory. Consequently, international migrations also yield a new contrast, this time opposing the people in the state with the people of the state. The presence of foreigners on national soil, and the questions of whether they should belong, and if so how, inevitably provide the grounds for contention (Waldinger 2007). In the liberal democracies of France or the US – as opposed to the more despotic labour importing countries found in the Persian Gulf or East Asia – entry into the territory, whether via legal or illegal means, gives migrants a capacity to claim rights not available on the other side of the border. While foreign persons on national soil may have some rights – often more than many nationals want – they usually do not enjoy the full set of rights to which citizens are entitled; nationals often want to maintain that difference, for reasons having to do with both self-interest and values, namely, preserving citizenship’s symbolic importance. In democracies with established histories of immigration; birth on the territory yields citizenship, regardless of the place of one’s parents’ birth or the citizenship that the parents hold (Hansen & Weil 2001). While elites may understand that birthright citizenship is a key to effective integration, the public does not necessarily share this point of view, thinking that citizenship should result from deliberation and commitment, not just the accident of birth. Indeed, these views are perceptible to political entrepreneurs, who, on both sides of the Atlantic, have sought means to overturn birthright citizenship. While unsuccessful thus far, the campaigns against birthright citizenship do highlight the desire, at least among a part of the public, to build walls, not only around the frontier, but within the country as well.

Beyond the strictly political issues, involving rights and membership, are issues related to cultural belonging (Koopmans et al. 2006). The sociological studies of assimilation, conducted on both sides of the Atlantic, show that the Western democracies remain quite capable of nationalising their foreigners. It is certainly the case that the immigrants to the US are turned into Americans (Alba & Nee 2003); survey data suggest that the same holds true in France (Brouard & Tiberj 2006). Nonetheless, foreign-born and foreign-origin persons often retain at least some attachment to the place of origin and its culture and politics – and usually more than many nationals think they should (Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). While preaching assimilation, the nationals do not always practise acceptance; in insisting on immigration control, they also tell the immigrants that they were never really wanted. Experiencing rejection, the immigrants and their descendants find reason to activate ethnic ties and identities that they might otherwise have abandoned. The end result is a reactive cycle, in which the
legitimacy of home country affections and cultural practices is a subject of ongoing conflict.

Thus, for the liberal democracies of both the old and new worlds, the advent of international migration produces an unending set of social dilemmas. But if there is a generic quality to these dilemmas, the ways in which the problems are framed, as well as the types of responses they elicit are inevitably affected by the historical specificities of the places on which the immigrants converge. Among the range of possible comparisons, the contrast between France and the US would seem ideal. On the one hand, the long-term realities in France and the US make for especially significant similarities: both countries have experienced relatively high levels of immigration for much of the past hundred years; in both countries, citizenship is relatively easy for foreigners to obtain and it is provided automatically to the children of foreign-born parents who are themselves born in the reception country (Horowitz & Noiriel 1992).

On the other hand, mythology divides the two countries – with the US, but not France, a self-proclaimed country of immigration (Green 1999). While the US is far from the communitarian model so often perceived from the European side of the Atlantic, the national mythology may make it easier for the Americans, as compared to the French, to accept ethnic attachments among the immigrants. Although the American mythology is contested, competing with a variety of ethno-national, as well as racist, national self-images (Huntington 2004), it might lend itself to a more positive assessment of immigration’s impact than is true on this side of the Atlantic.

In this chapter, I will argue that opinion towards immigration issues divides precisely along these lines of generic vs. historical conditions. In both immigrant receiving societies, the ‘ethnic majority’ – what might be called ‘les Français de souche’ in France and ‘third-generation whites’ in the US – advocates a more tightly bounded society, involving tougher controls at the national frontier, as well as the internal boundary separating nationals from foreign-origin or resident persons living on the territory. By contrast, ethnic majorities in the two countries differ greatly, both in expectations for cultural change among the immigrants and in their assessment of immigration’s impact. As I will show, the Americans are more supportive of ethnic pluralism than are the French, though in a not fully predictable way. In both countries, ethnic majorities do not view immigration as yielding positive effects. But the average response masks great internal differences, with American views clustering towards the modestly negative and French views being highly polarised.
2 Data, variables, analysis

This chapter seeks to develop this comparison through the analysis of public opinion, using data collected by the 2003 International Social Survey Program module on National Identity. The ISSP surveyed 37,192 individuals in 31 countries, including France, the US and all of the major immigrant-receiving countries of the developed world.1 The sample included 1,669 respondents in France and 1,216 in the US. The survey asked questions about respondents’ citizenship as well as the citizenship of their parents at the time when the respondents were born. I have used this information to distinguish three generational categories:

- first generation: respondents who are not citizens of the country of residence
- second generation: respondents who are citizens of the country of residence, but with at least one parent who was not a citizen of the country of residence at the time of the respondents’ birth
- ‘third generation or more’: respondents who are citizens of the country of residence, both of whose parents were citizens of the country of residence at the time of the respondents’ birth.

Respondents falling into the categories of the first and second generations are used for the purpose of providing statistical controls only: sample sizes, especially for the first generation, tend to be small, making results unreliable; furthermore, the samples are probably biased against respondents unable to answer in either French or English. For practical reasons, therefore, I focus on respondents falling into the third generation or more category. Substantive considerations point in the same direction. For better or worse, it is this part of the public whose opinions exercise the greatest influence in the political arena; their views are equally crucial in determining the social and cultural environment that foreign-born or foreign-origin persons are likely to encounter.

Unfortunately, the ‘third generation or more’ category is a statistical construct, at some distance from the sociologically relevant category of ‘ethnic majority’, linking ancestry (real or putative) to social and political domination. Given the histories of immigration on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems clear that, in both countries, respondents falling into the third generation do not all or evenly belong to a sociological ethnic majority. While the ethnic majority has often proven to be expandable – extending its boundaries to encompass persons of foreign-origin – not all boundaries have proven equally flexible. In particular, the ethnic majority of the US has not yet sufficiently expanded to include African-Americans. For the purposes of this chapter, I
consequently compare third generation or more respondents in the US who categorise themselves as 'white' with third generation or more respondents in France (for whom the survey provides no racial or ethnic self-categorisation). I concede that this particular choice of categorisation is open to dispute. Further, categorisations of this sort can be essentialising, imposing a rigidity that everyday social life does not provide. On the other hand, the same could be equally said about all of the categories that we habitually use, without ever giving them a second thought.

Comparing French and American views towards a broad range of immigration issues, I ask two sets of questions. First, do French and American views differ, both before and after applying controls for background characteristics and views towards flows of foreign goods and foreign ideas? When seeking to answer this question, I pool the responses from all the French and American respondents. Second, are the factors that affect the opinion towards immigration similar or different in the two countries? When seeking to answer this question, I analyse French and American respondents separately.

For the most part, I work with a standard model, taking into account the age, sex, marital status, place of residence, education, religion, and political orientation of respondents. I distinguish urban residents as those living in a large city, as contrasted to others. I similarly distinguish respondents reporting no religious affiliation from all those respondents who report a religious affiliation of all types. Political orientation corresponds to political party preference, whether left, right, or centre, as coded by the survey. As the dependent variables are all dichotomies, I use logistic regression.

While demographic and socio-economic characteristics are likely to be influential, views towards immigration may be related to attitudes towards other types of global flows, whether of goods or ideas. As the economists note, free flows of people should yield the same positive impacts as free flows of goods or ideas; on the other hand, if it is globalisation that nationals find disturbing, negative attitudes towards trade or foreign ideas or cultural influences should be correlated with negative attitudes towards immigration, independent of any xenophobic effects. French respondents are a good deal more supportive of trade than are their American counterparts: 62 per cent of Americans favour limiting the import of foreign products, as opposed to 54 per cent of the French (a difference which is statistically significant). By contrast, 44 per cent of French respondents as opposed to 14 per cent of American respondents think that increased exposure to foreign films, music and books is damaging to the national culture. Responses to these two questions are added to all of the statistical models on which I report in this chapter.
Building on the discussion above, the chapter draws on a variety of questions asked in the 2003 National Identity Survey to move from external to internal dimensions of the phenomenon. At the external level are issues of migration control:
- Should the number of immigrants coming to the country be increased or decreased?
- Should the country take tighter measures to control illegal immigration?

Boundaries are never watertight: hence, policies at the external level need be supplemented by internal policies distinguishing nationals from persons on the territory who are either born or originate in some other country. Internal policies involve rights and citizenship:
- Should legal immigrants in the country enjoy the same rights as citizens?
- What policies should influence access to citizenship for foreign-origin persons born or raised on the territory?

As international migration is not just a political, but also a social phenomenon, the advent of a population of alien origins, but often accepting national norms and aspiring to national membership, generates conflict over the range of acceptable, social differences. While responding to these differences is sometimes a matter of policy, it also entails a purely social component:
- Should ethnic minorities be given government assistance to preserve their traditions and cultures?
- Is it better for society if ethnic and racial minorities blend into the larger society or should they maintain their distinct customs and traditions?
- Can people who do not fully share the national culture ever fully become national?

Last, immigration produces a variety of effects, of which the most important seem to be economic and cultural. Regardless of the dimension, impacts can be seen as positive or negative:
- Immigrants are generally good for the economy.
- Immigrants take jobs away from people born in the country.
- Immigrants improve the country by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
- Immigrants increase crime rates.

For the first three sets of questions – pertaining to migration policy; citizenship policy; ethnic pluralism and assimilation – I have recoded all responses to generate a series of dichotomous variables: respondents are coded as either agreeing or disagreeing with the question (that immigration should be reduced, for example). As explained below, I have
used factor analysis to identify a common factor underlying views of immigration’s impact.

3 Findings

*Migration control*: Employing a commonly used question, the survey asked respondents about their views regarding the desired size of the immigrant flow: should it be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot. As shown in Figure 3.1, French and American third generation or more respondents answered in strikingly similar terms: 67 per cent of the US respondents and 72 per cent of the French respondents thought that immigrant flows should be reduced, a difference that was not statistically significant. A regression controlling for background characteristics and views towards trade and towards foreign flows of ideas found that French respondents were significantly more likely than their US counterparts to prefer that immigrant numbers be reduced. But if the French were more restrictionist than the Americans, the difference was relatively slight: after controlling for all factors, the predicted probability that French respondents wanted flows to be reduced was three out of four, as opposed to two out of three among the Americans. In both countries, majorities of the ethnic majorities want less, not more, immigration.

Likewise, French and American respondents responded quite similarly when asked whether their country should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. Almost three quarters of American re-

![Figure 3.1 Migration Policy: predicted probabilities of agreement](image-url)
spondents, and just over two thirds of French respondents answered affirmatively, a difference that was not statistically significant. A regression for the background factors mentioned above confirmed the convergence in opinion between these two groups. After controlling for all factors, the predicted probability that Americans would endorse stronger measures towards exclusion was 0.76; among the French the predicted probability was 0.72. Again, opinions agree in favour of more stringent efforts to keep boundaries watertight.

Focusing on the impact of ideological factors underscores the strength of the convergent factors in both countries, as can be seen from Figure 3.2. Among Americans, left-wing respondents are less likely than right-wing respondents to advocate a reduction in immigration, but they do not differ from their centrist counterparts. In France, the ideological gap is much greater, yielding significant differences between left and centre, as well as centre and right. But in both countries, there is majority support on the left for reducing immigrant numbers. By contrast, when the question turns to efforts aimed at excluding illegal immigrants, right and centrist views diverge more sharply in the US than in France. But in both countries this question too reveals a basic consensus across the ideological divides: majorities on both right and left and in both France and the US want their governments to do more to keep out the unwanted.

Rights and citizenship: If French and American respondents strongly support a reduction in immigration and more vigorous efforts to exclude illegal immigrants, they tend to take a somewhat different position when asked about the boundaries separating nationals from foreign-born or foreign-origin persons living on national soil. As shown in Figure 3.3, both French and American respondents prefer clear-cut
lines when asked whether legal immigrants lacking citizenship should have the same rights as citizens: just over a third of the American respondents and just over 40 per cent of the French respondents voiced support for equality of rights. Although this difference was not significant, application of controls found that French respondents were more likely to support equality of rights, at conventional levels of statistical significance.

While voicing support, both for external barriers and for those internal barriers dividing citizens from foreigners, majorities among both American and French respondents favour relatively easy access to citizenship for children, who are either born in the country or have at least one parent who is a citizen. Before controls, American respondents are significantly more likely than the French to think that children born in the country to non-citizen parents should have the right to become citizens; that difference, however, loses significance after the application of controls. Both before and after controls, Americans are significantly more likely than the French to think children born abroad to at least one parent holding French or American citizenship should have the right to become citizens. Again, however, the differences between the two groups seem far less important than the similarities.

Thus, in both France and the US, citizenship and immigration policy seem to involve quite different dimensions, with popular views endorsing barriers to foreigners, but supporting long-established practices that have historically made for minimal legal differences between persons born or raised in the country, regardless of parents’ place of birth.
or citizenship. Further evidence of this pattern of common divergence across policy areas can be seen by examining the responses of those persons who endorsed exclusionary immigration policies. In both France and the US, respondents endorsing restriction, whether entailing reduced immigrant numbers or stricter control of illegal immigration, opposed equality of rights between foreigners and citizens. But in both countries, a majority of those respondents endorsing exclusionary immigration policies supported inclusionary citizenship policies, with particular support for access to citizenship for those foreign-born children with at least one citizen parent. Further confirmation comes from inquiring into the effects of political orientation. While left-wing respondents are the most in favour of birthright citizenship, majority support can be found across the political spectrum, both in France and the US, with a particularly strong propensity to endorse birthright citizenship for foreign-origin children when at least one parent is a citizen.

**Multiculturalism and assimilation**: As shown by the travails of the second generation in both the US and France, formal citizenship hardly guarantees acceptance. Historically, acceptance in both countries has been conditioned on cultural change, with the immigrants and their descendants expected to shed foreign habits, tastes, and attachments. As characterised by Nathan Glazer, the ‘American ethnic pattern’ of the earlier twentieth century accepted ethnic difference as long as it was voluntary and confined to the private spheres of family and community, a description that could equally well apply to France.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, one can clearly observe an American pattern quite different from the one discerned by Glazer.
more than a quarter century ago. As compared to the past, the new Americans seem relatively free to retain what they wish of the old country; on the other hand, they are still expected to master and take over native ways. Similarly, there is more room than previously for pluralistic identities, though it would appear that minority or ethnic identities are acceptable only as long as they are attached to a political identity defined and understood in fundamentally American terms. But does greater acceptance of ethnic difference imply support of a hard form of multiculturalism, in which immigrants may not only preserve traditions, but are helped to do so by government? Or does it simply pertain to the sphere of civil society in which ethnic minorities can come together as interest groups, to get things done, or as cultural groups, to celebrate ethnic holidays, but only as long as the activity is voluntary, initiated by the group itself?

Neither in the US nor in France do members of the ethnic majority show any enthusiasm for multiculturalism of the hard sort, as shown in Figure 3.5. When asked whether ‘ethnic minorities [should] be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions’, less than a fifth of both the French and the American respondents answered ‘yes’. For all practical purposes, the application of controls left the probabilities of support for multiculturalism unchanged. Given the widespread opposition to multiculturalism, the ideological factors that usually exercise so powerful an influence have little effect: on this question, respondents at the political centre and political right agree, both in France and in the US. Whereas left-wing respondents in both

**Figure 3.5** Multiculturalism, ethnic pluralism, assimilation: predicted probabilities of agreement

![Graph showing predicted probabilities of agreement](image-url)
countries are more likely to support multiculturalism than those who are further to the right, support for multiculturalism is restricted to a small minority of respondents, even on the left.

Thus, Americans and the French have convergent views when asked about the role of the state in preserving minority customs and traditions: in both countries, the ethnic majorities are strongly opposed to state assistance. Of course, there is another possibility: namely, that states actively try to wean minorities from their cultures and traditions, as was the case during the last great era of mass migration and its aftermath, when state institutions were busily transforming immigrants into nationals. Unfortunately, the survey did not include a question corresponding to this policy option; however, it did ask whether respondents adhered to traditional expectations for assimilation – in which minorities blended and adapted into the larger society – or whether they thought it would be better that minorities preserved their traditions and customs, in effect endorsing cultural pluralism. In both countries, the majority of third generation or more respondents endorsed the assimilation option; in the US, however, just over 50 per cent preferred assimilation as opposed to three quarters in France, a difference that was statistically significant. Controls for background and other characteristics slightly widened the gap, which remained statistically significant. Both among the French and among the US members of the ethnic majority, ideology has relatively weak effects, with no significant differences between right and centre respondents in either country. Left and right do differ in both places, although controls for ideology underline the cross-cultural divergence: support for ethnic

Figure 3.6  Effect of political orientation: multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism (predicted probabilities)
pluralism is actually lower among left-wing French respondents than among their right-wing US counterparts.

In societies characterised by civic nationalism, cultural assimilation has historically served as the pathway to political integration: by abandoning home country attachments and cultures immigrants and their descendants gained entry into the national community. The connection between assimilation and civic nationalism would seem to be a logical one as well: where, by contrast, the prevailing orientation takes an ethnic nationalist form, ethnic retention by minorities seems to be more acceptable as well. On the other hand, the distinctions between nationalisms of an ethnic and civic kind are often overdrawn. As Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, civic nationalism implies a strong sense of peoplehood; if nationals think that members of the community need to share common values and memories are to be shared, they may endorse assimilation all the while thinking that attachments to a foreign culture may preclude belonging (Brubaker 2004). In this light, it is not surprising to find that the survey suggests that civic nationalism takes a very different form in the two countries. In the US most third-generation whites endorse assimilation, but reject the view that ‘it is impossible for people who do not share American customs to become fully American’. By contrast, the same view, reworded appropriately for the French context, received support of well over half of the French third-generation respondents – a difference that was statistically significant, remaining so after application of controls. The impact of political ideology, however, varies between the two countries, as can be seen in Figure 3.6. In the US, ideology has only mild effects, with left-wing respondents actually more likely than their counterparts in the centre to advocate an ethnonationalist view. By contrast, right and left are sharply divided in France, though the probability that left-wing respondents would advocate an ethnonationalist position puts them well above the level observed in the US.

Attitudes towards immigrants: In addition to inquiring into views towards state policies or preference for immigrant adaptation, the survey also asked about respondents’ assessment of the effects associated with immigration. The questions fall into two categories, one having to do with explicitly economic aspects, the second having to do with social or cultural aspects. In both France and the US, only a minority of ethnic majority respondents agreed that immigrants were good for the economy; likewise, a minority in both countries disagreed with the statement that immigrants increase crime. In the US, but not in France, a majority disagreed with the statement that immigrants’ ideas and culture do not improve the country. In France, but not in the US, a majority disagreed with the statement that immigrants take jobs away from
natives. On three of the four questions – having to do with crime, the economy, and ideas or culture – the Franco-American gap is relatively small, with major disagreement emerging only in response to the question regarding job competition.

Although responses differ from one question to another, previous research suggests that there is a common, underlying view. Indeed, a factor analysis of these four items found a single factor, to which I first assigned a score, and then standardised, yielding a factor with an average of 100. High scores on the factor imply negative assessments of immigration’s impact; low scores on the factor imply positive assessments.

Average scores among French and American members of the ethnic majority barely differ. The convergence in average scores, however, hides very different patterns in the distribution of scores. As can be seen in Figures 3.7-3.9, Americans tend to cluster away from the extremes and towards the centre; by contrast, the views among the French are heavily polarised, with concentrations at the positive and negative ends, and a very strong tilt towards more negative assessments. The impact of ideology also greatly differs. In France, right and left respondents take almost exactly opposing views: left-wing respondents lean heavily towards a positive assessment of immigration’s impact; right-wing respondents tilt almost symmetrically to the other direction. In the US, by contrast, diverging political commitments yield views that are barely divergent and not statistically significant.

Other foreign flows: The advent of foreign people goes hand in hand with the arrival of foreign goods and ideas. While the residents of the rich democracies have been resistant to the free movement of peoples, they have been willing to accept, if not support, increasingly unrestricted movements of goods and ideas. The arrival of foreign people is of course more visible than the movement of foreign goods, not to
speak of the movement of foreign ideas, which is why it may spark the greatest opposition.

Nonetheless, one would expect that opinions towards freedom of movement – whether of people, goods, or ideas – might take a reasonably consistent form, such that people favouring free movement of either goods or ideas would be more accepting of free movements of people. In general, French and American responses reveal just such a pattern: persons who opposed limits on trade or who disagreed with the statement that foreign cultural influences were damaging to the national culture were likely to oppose tougher migration policies, support flexible citizenship policies, and endorse ethnic pluralism. On only one issue – opinions regarding multiculturalism – did views towards either aspect of freedom of movement have no impact on the answers.
provided by US respondents; among the French, by contrast, assimilation was the sole issue unrelated to views towards movement of goods or ideas.

On the other hand, the closer relationship seems to involve views regarding movements of goods and of peoples, as opposed to movements of ideas and peoples. As shown in Figures 3.10-3.11, which present predicted probabilities controlling for all other factors, opinion on issues
of migration policy shifts substantially, depending on whether one approves or disapproves of free trade in foreign goods. For example, among Americans who strongly agree with the statement that ‘a country should limit the import of foreign products’, the probability of thinking that immigration should be reduced is almost four out of five. Among their counterparts who strongly disagree with the same statement, however, the probability of supporting reduced immigration is barely two out of five. By contrast, views towards foreign cultural influences have more modest effects.

4 Conclusion

The turn of the twenty-first century has brought a world of mass migration, but this is a reality that the residents of the rich democracies do not like. Often wanting foreign workers, but having much less taste for foreign people who settle down, the residents of the rich democracies want their national communities maintained. As shown in this chapter, ethnic majorities in these immigrant democracies on the two sides of the Atlantic have remarkably convergent views. Majorities in both countries want fewer immigrants, rather than more; likewise, majorities want their governments to work harder at excluding the illegal immigrants who seek to evade controls. Only a minority thinks that immigration yields positive effects.

Preferring less immigration, rather than more, ethnic majorities in both France and the US also prefer sharp distinctions between legal immigrants and citizens. Theorists of post-nationalism may contend that citizenship does not matter, and that international human rights codes provide immigrants and their descendants with all the protections they need. While adjudicating post-national claims is a matter for a different discussion, it is worth noting that the nationals questioned for this survey strongly believe that immigrants do not deserve the full panoply of rights enjoyed by citizens – a view that, in and of itself, suggests that immigrant rights may be less invulnerable than the post-nationalists think. By contrast, policies that have historically facilitated citizenship for members of the second generation were strongly affirmed by ethnic majorities in both democracies.

While ready to accept immigrants’ descendants into the political community of the nation, members of the ethnic majority are much less willing to accept an ethnic identity that is either separate from, or even an addition to, the core national identity. French and American respondents are resolutely opposed to the idea that their governments might promote multiculturalism. Opinion divides on the question of social or civic ethnic pluralism, with the French strongly opposed and
the Americans split; likewise, ethnic nationalism is more heavily endorsed among the French, though a sizeable minority of Americans take the same point of view.

Thus, established publics in the US and France have not responded to the new immigrant realities in exactly the same way. While retaining the same commitment to exclusion at the national frontier, there is a clear divergence as to the options that are acceptable for those immigrants who have settled down for good. While a study like this cannot shed light on the underlying factors that have produced this difference, variations in the long-term history of both nations would seem to be the most likely cause. In the US, immigration is part of the national mythology in a way that is not, and probably cannot be, true in France. Hence, in the US, division over immigration cross-cuts differences in political orientation and partisanship. For that reason as well, Americans are more willing to accept the possibility that immigrants will retain some degree of cultural difference, at least in the medium term.

These differences notwithstanding, it is hard not to note a fundamental, trans-Atlantic similarity, in large measure because immigration poses the same sort of social dilemma on both sides of the Atlantic. The foreigners seeking to cross national borders are just implementing the programme that assimilationists, whether folk or scholarly, clearly endorse: forsaking primordial ties to ethnic group and place in search of a better life somewhere else. But since a national community could not be maintained if foreigners were able to come and go as they pleased, nationals are ready to endorse illiberal means in order to keep out foreigners, who are only looking to better their condition, via efforts of their own. Moreover, once foreign-born numbers burgeon, a gap emerges between the people of the state and the people in the state. Believing in the idea of the national community, the nationals are also reluctant to provide membership to any and all who might happen to have crossed the border. Since immigration restriction in liberal societies inherently produces ‘illegal’ immigration, the commitment to external exclusion yields support for policies designed to exclude the least acceptable foreigners from the privileges enjoyed by the people both in and of the state. Moreover, the tension between internal inclusion and external exclusion renders the usual ideological divisions out of date. While left and right still divide on issues involving internal dimensions of inclusion, left and right fundamentally agree on the need to keep external boundaries controlled.

Immigration control, therefore, reflects popular opinion. No government, however, is ready to go as far as its people would like, which is why both French and Americans want policies that are more restrictive than those that currently exist. But the insistence that fewer immigrants would be better also sends an unwelcoming message to the
immigrants who have already arrived. Consequently, the influx of foreigners produces a dis-integrating response among nationals, who are not willing to accept the reality of immigration or the distinctive self-understanding of the foreign-origin population. Having been repeatedly told that they were never really wanted, people of foreign origin are not ready for the blending urged on them by the nationals.

Notes

1. The base N includes separate surveys conducted in the former West Germany and East Germany and among Jewish and Israeli Arabs.

2. Age is a continuous variable. Marital status is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent is married and 0 if other. Education is represented by the variables of less than high school, some college, college; high school completion is the omitted category. Religion is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent reports no religion and 0 if other. Urban residence is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the respondent lives in a big city and 0 if other. Political orientation is represented by the dummy variables of left, coded 1 if the respondent belongs to a left party and 0 if other, and right, coded 1 if the respondent belongs to a right party and 0 if other; centre is the omitted category.

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4 Culture and politics: the Danish cartoon controversy within migration and colonial spaces

Sari Hanafi

The growing role of intermestic (international-domestic) affairs is a general trend. Global multiculturalism means engagement with conflicts worldwide. If societies are engaged globally it means that conflicts travel too. Conflicts cannot be contained locally. Multiculturalism and foreign policy cannot be treated separately. (Pieterse 2007: 73)

1 Introduction

In July 2002, Germany’s former Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, met with a delegation of Palestinian civil society members. He had just returned from a trip to Israel, during which he visited a night club that had been bombed by a Palestinian suicide bomber, resulting in the death of twelve young Israelis. Fischer’s introductory speech expressed how touched he was by this visit, saying that he considered the issue of Israeli suffering a very serious matter. His concerns were based on the idea that Israeli youth are not able to enjoy their evenings or, for that matter, their lives – what had happened at the night club was a case in point. The Palestinian delegation, in turn, was upset that Fischer had only expressed his profound sadness for the Israeli victims and the general conditions being faced by Israeli youth. In the delegation’s view, Fischer failed to consider the Palestinian youth, who are unable to work, to move outside their villages or to enjoy the bare-minimum requirements for a normal life. Upon expressing my shock at the minister’s position in a discussion with friends, one friend stated that the Arab perception of a young person is different from that of Fischer, for whom the notion of going out in the summer time might have been very important.

This chapter will argue that the growing polarisation between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ does not really concern cultural differences. Rather, it concerns cultural hegemony as a cultural logic of late
capitalism, in which global capital and colonial power are allied and in which the colonised/migrants are either invisible or hyper-visible. I will take the Danish cartoon episode as an example of a controversy reflecting the cultural hegemony and power structure deployed against an undesirable and sometimes invisible group of people (mainly migrants) living in European or other countries. Yet, they are not mere victims; they have a responsibility for their own situation.

After contextualising this controversy within migration and colonial studies, I will argue that the controversy does not concern censorship and freedom of expression. It is a question of how one defines universalism. Finally, the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be addressed as the major factor galvanising the resentment of some parts of the Muslim world and of the Muslim minorities in Europe vis-à-vis those who support Israeli colonial practices. In this issue, the occupation of Iraq and the support for Arab dictatorships also hold major concern.

2 Cultural hegemony

While colonial power maintains its dominance through coercion, certain Western powers employ a kind of hegemony. This consists of political power that flows from intellectual and moral leadership, authority or consensus; it is different from mere armed force. Cultural hegemony does not refer anymore to Western rationality conceived by the ruling classes. It refers to a more complex set of discursive strategies of principles from different systems of thought combining into one coherent ideology (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). In the American style of hegemony, democracy, liberalism, freedom of trade and ‘the war on terror’ are all discursively tied together into one coherent bundle being imposed by violence all over the world. It is a hegemony that is imposed in the form of an empire. The cultural hegemony here can be understood only as stemming from the power structures of the empire builder (vs. the colonised people) exercised with superiority, arrogance and fascination of the power that the coloniser carries. Thus, the problem is not the dichotomy between Oriental values and Western ones, but the dichotomy between values and power structure and how those values are then instrumentalised and put into action.

Cultural hegemony seems to be a very compelling medium for reading the power structures between different cultures. This proves much more significant than merely evoking those differentiated cultural sensitivities that could exist between the Arab and Western worlds. Ever since Edward Said analysed the concept of an oriental ‘Other’ for its constructions of colonial hegemony, we have come to know the way
the Other has carried a kind of ‘neo-racism’ – what Etienne Balibar called ‘cultural racism’. In fact, racism, as studied by many sociologists in European societies, is one of the major phenomena threatening the integration of migrant communities in these very societies (Wieviorka 1995). Cultural hegemony has thus not produced cultural differences, but instead, cultural racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia in the majority of Western countries.

In the meantime, we would argue that the clash is not civilizational. As Bernard Lewis wrote once: ‘in the Muslim perception there has been, since the time of the Prophet, an ongoing struggle between the two world religions, Christendom and Islam’ (Khan 2007). The division line seems to be cultural, not religious. A secular Arab citizen could have much more in common with a secular German than with an Islamist neighbour. However, Lewis’ and Samuel Huntington’s self-fulfilling prophecy encourages analysis of some controversies and conflicts as being both a civilizational and a cultural clash. The portrayal of Islamic movements as a tide of religious fanaticism threatening the West and major participants in the coming ‘clash of civilisations’ has increasingly impacted the future of international relations. François Burgat (2003) argues that political Islam’s desire to restore a culture distorted by colonisation does not necessarily compromise its progress to more democracy and greater tolerance.

In one of his articles, Said argued that if there is a clash, it is between empire builders and those who believe in dialogue. The problem faced by Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and George W. Bush’s neo-cons is that both need to construct empires, forcing their ideas beyond the nation state boundaries by violence. However, the analogy does not mean symmetry: al-Qaeda and its franchises in Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria are extremist groups outside of the paradigmatic understanding of Islam, while the neo-cons govern the US, progressively passing on their influence to Europe as well. There is no cultural hegemony in the former, though there is in the latter. Building empires is the opposite of globalised and glocal circulation of cultures in a world in which migrants play a major role (Hanafi & Tabar 2005). Let us address the socio-cultural side of the relationship between the Muslim migrants and the European host society.

New literature in migration studies highlights the fact that movement and attachment are neither linear nor sequential, but capable of rotating back and forth and changing direction over time. The median point on this gauge is not full incorporation but rather simultaneity of connection. But this simultaneity should not hide the power structures between migrants and the social structures in the host society. Migrants are subject to the hegemonic constructions and practices which are constantly created and re-enacted. These conceptions and categories
are in part internalised by both dominant and dominated alike and create a sense of common loyalty and legitimacy for the dominant classes (Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc 1992: 13). In some Western countries, hegemonic construction speaks little of class but much more directly of culture, religion and ethnicity.

Migrants are a site of conflict between different ideologies, values and lifestyles and this is why one should examine them in the framework of the transnational relationship that a migrant had founded between host and origin countries, as well as in the framework of diaspora studies. The diasporic space in which a migrant lives entails an inter-polarity and multi-polarity of his other set of the relationship. For instance, one Palestinian individual or group living in France not only has ties to Palestine, but to many Palestinian communities scattered all over the world. In the process of globalisation, both migrants and nation states undergo a major change. One should thus see transnationalism not in terms of unstructured flows, but in terms of tensions between movements and social orders. This issue deserves to be tackled so as to understand the problematic relationship between Muslim migrants in European societies.

The twentieth century was the century of the emergence of supranational entities and the possibility of multiple citizenships, but above all the idea of differentiated citizenship. Differentiated citizenship is completely different from multiculturalism where you have common ground citizenship and then differentiated rights. It is more a process of tailoring citizenship according to the utility of the migrants/subjects to the ruling classes, as well as transmigrants developing a flexible notion of citizenship in order to accumulate capital and power. According to Awio Ong, flexible citizenship refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political and economic conditions (1999: 19). Meanwhile though, the state seeks to preserve its rigid sovereignty. Thus, flexible citizenship is constituted within mutually reinforcing dynamics of discipline and escape as globalisation has induced a situation of graduated citizenship, whereby even as the state maintains control over its territory, it is also willing in some cases to let corporate entities set terms for constituting and regulating some domains while weaker and less desirable groups are given over to the regulation of supranational entities. ‘What results is a system of variegated citizenship in which populations subjected to different regimes of value enjoy different kinds of rights, discipline, caring, and security’ (Ong 1999: 215).

The contribution of Giorgio Agamben (1988) to understanding the power mechanisms deployed by the sovereign is very valuable. The sovereign has the capacity to proclaim the state of exception in order to
create different status of the population. The sovereign power according to Agamben routinely distinguishes between those who are to be admitted to ‘political life’ and those who are to be excluded as the mute bearers of ‘bare life’. ‘Bare life’ is when people do not have a right to defend their rights as a minority or as refugees/asylum seekers spending several years in refugee camps without having any knowledge about their future destiny (Hanafi 2005). It is a process of categorising people and bodies in order to manage, control and survey them and reduce them to a bare life, a life which refers to the body’s mere ‘vegetative’ being, separated from the particular qualities such as the social, political and historical attributes that constitute individual subjectivity.

From a societal level, one can witness a differentiation in the process of integration, depending on whether the migrants or the minority communities are city dwellers or suburban lower middle class dwellers. The fault line is first social-urban, but also cultural. Culturally, one should distinguish between a majority of migrants acculturated without major difficulty, managing different cultures without feeling schizophrenia; and those who constitute a tiny minority, who believe in the clash of civilisations and whose values are very different from that of the Western world. This mode of thinking comes mainly in reaction to the posture of the hegemonic culture of the host society cultures. Since Huntingtonian philosophy’s ‘clash of civilisations’ in the mid-1990s, the paradigmatic model of constructing the ‘otherness’ took the form of ‘good against the evil’, ‘being with us or against us’ and has alienated migrants above all. In this complex context, the polarisation has escalated with the emergence of the al-Qaeda culture. After all, this culture considers Western nations as enemies, mainly for political reasons such as supporting Israel and their interest in the Gulf area’s oil from one side and the new Saudi media, which for the first time is not only just available for the migrants but also tailored to them. Here the emphasis is placed on the cultural-religious aspect much more than on the political one. This is the context of post-9/11, of which one of the most dangerous consequences is that the polarisation between opposing fundamentalisms has shunted aside the thoughtful and constructive quest for the welfare and happiness of all human societies, and of human beings as individuals and as exponents of diverse cultures that are not in adversarial relationships or hierarchically juxtaposed on the basis of some notion of good or bad (Bishara 2006).

Having said that, I suggest approaching Middle Eastern migrants as individuals who are sensitive to both political and cultural arenas. The Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony provides an excellent conceptual framework to at least understand problems that have emerged in the Western societies, including the Danish cartoon controversy.
3 Cartoon controversy: a crisis in the making

On 30 September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten published twelve cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, followed by many reproductions in a number of European newspapers. This led to protests in many countries of the Muslim world, including official complaints by Islamic governments, boycotts of European products, demonstrations (sometimes leading to loss of life) and attacks on several Western embassies in the Middle East. Moreover, an Iranian newspaper launched a competition for cartoons on themes including the Holocaust and later published them.

The broad context is very tumultuous, especially if one looks at how some parts of Islam perceive it. Appearing when memories are still fresh about reports – later denied – of the desecration of the Koran by American troops at the Guantanamo prison, the cartoons’ propagation strengthened the perception among many Muslims that not only are they being exploited economically and manipulated politically by Western powers, but they are also being culturally insulted by the ‘West’. At the same time, troops from several Western countries are deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq; Israel continues occupying Palestinian Territories and destroying part of Lebanon; the international community has stopped its financial support for the Palestinian Authority now that parliamentary elections have been won by the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas; and tension is rising over Iran’s nuclear programme. In many Western countries, Muslims and other minority communities have, for a long time, been facing what they see as the erosion of cultural diversity and increasing prejudice. In such a highly polarised world, the continuation and escalation of this new conflict can have disastrous consequences.

In this broad context, the local European context is very important. There had been a build-up of anti-Muslim sentiment in Denmark before Jyllandsposten’s publication of the cartoons and many acts of racism against some Muslim populations (e.g. interdictions of mosque constructions, a xenophobic declaration by the Queen). The Danish government did not live up to its international obligations when, referring to the right to freedom of expression, it refused to take a position towards the cartoons and also refused to meet with the eleven ambassadors representing Arab countries.

The cartoon controversy reveals popular resentment in the Arab World against the cultural hegemony of some Western countries. For the first time, a mass mobilisation occurred in the Arab-Persian Gulf states investing in the public sphere and expressing the agency of this population. The phenomenon of popular boycott emerged against the economic interest of Norway as a pacific mode of action. It was of
course not the first time that a boycott campaign was launched as there have been many against Israeli companies and Western companies associated with the Israeli ones. However, such campaigns have been officially facilitated, while the Danish products boycott was motivated by popular mobilisation. What is interesting about this mode of action is that it rebalances the highly imbalanced power structures between global capital and the very disempowered mass population in the Arab World.

The different modes of action concerning the cartoon controversy suddenly reflected a perceived confrontational moment with the West, including reducing it to Christianity or to its support to colonialism. This controversy tended to shadow the long process of dialogue between different cultures in our globalised world. My fieldwork interviewing Syrian and Egyptian engineers shows a wide variation of images of the West (science, technology, punctuality, respect of environment, credibility) seen as positive images and others as negative (political support of Israel, dress of women in the public sphere) (Hanafi 1997).

4 Freedom of expression and universalism(s)

Some have defended the propagation of the cartoons on the grounds of freedom of expression. In an article published with the cartoons, cultural editor Flemming Rose wrote that due to the right of freedom of expression one has to be prepared to submit to ‘scorn, mockery, and ridicule’ and that religious feelings cannot be taken into consideration. The public prosecutor decided that the editor-in-chief could not be proceeded against. However, in his statement, the public prosecutor emphasised that the laws on racism and blasphemy contain protection of peoples’ religious feelings, and therefore there is no free and unlimited access to express oneself about religious issues. The prosecutor, however, stated that what was written in the *Jyllandsposten* article could not be considered as a violation of the existing law.

The public prosecutor’s statement seems to be problematic if one views the event and its context and compares it to similar events. Many events suggest that freedom of expression, which is a basic human right, becomes problematic when intellectual rigor and social responsibility are lacking. To present the Prophet Muhammad as a symbol of terrorism, as is done in one of the cartoons, is no different from presenting Moses as the symbol of right-wing Israelis’ actions against Palestinians, an association that would be rightly condemned as anti-Semitic and is prohibited by the laws of many European countries. No Muslim has ever blamed Jesus Christ for the many atrocities that have been committed around the world in the name of Christianity. The
populist reductionism that lies behind the publication of the cartoons is embedded in the tradition of European anti-Semitism that began with the demonisation of the Jews, their faith and their culture and ended in the attempt at their extermination. I did not endorse the symmetry with the Holocaust. However, I am strongly against the French legislation – the so-called Loi Gayssot – that punishes ‘revisionist’ or ‘negationist’ discourse: denying the existence of gas chambers and the killing of Jews, etc. This is an anti-liberal law but, in this case, the symmetry – as you find in the text circulated during the cartoon controversy and currently exploited by the Iranian government – was misleading and even flawed: on one side, you have a symbol and, on the other, you have genocide.  

At a time when the heads of some secular states proclaim they are performing divine missions (George W. Bush’s mission, for instance), the views of ordinary believers in any religion can only be ignored or denigrated by the ignorant, the arrogant and the bigoted. There is contempt for Islamic values by some producers of Western culture. These values, they find, oppose a traditional commitment to the facts and rational analysis that have distinguished the best in Western thought since the Enlightenment. Writings on Islam by secular authors such as the late Montgomery Watt and the late Maxime Rodinson – respectively, British and French biographers of the Prophet Muhammad – are regarded by many Muslims and non-Muslims as models of scholarship.

At a time when humanity is in dire need of understanding to ensure peaceful coexistence, the propagation of a set of ill-conceived cartoons in several European countries has reinforced ignorance and hatred towards Muslims, and incited, albeit inadvertently, violence against European citizens and interests in Arab and Islamic countries.

Again, Muslim anger at the Danish cartoons seems not to be about the limit of freedom of expression or a kind of a defence of the particular vis-à-vis the universal, but about the notion of competing universalisms. Defending one’s freedom of expression is a fundamental issue, as Balibar argues, even when it is misused, although I prefer to defend it when it is a work of art or intelligence, even a ‘blasphemy’. But I do not feel obliged to fall into a trap that has been set up by ‘neo-con’-style Danish journalists and what Neal Ascherson called ‘a carnival of stupidity’. British newspaper *The Sun*’s 23 July 2006 edition, showing a photo of Angela Merkel semi-naked at her hotel swimming pool during a vacation in Italy, is cheap, bad taste, while the decision of the German newspapers not to republish it is an elegant move.

Thus, defending freedom of expression raises many questions that go beyond the legal aspect. Freedom of expression as a universal human rights value is an object both impossible and necessary – always
requiring the presence of limits related to the privacy and freedom of the others. How can we reconcile universalism with the postmodern notion of the plurality of (mostly ethnic, sexual or lifestyle) struggles for recognition? Or does the recent resurgence of right-wing populism compel us to rethink the limits of each movement? What is the meaning of a new trend of right-wing as well as leftist governments who define universality by how much a woman can be uncovered, in reaction to the Islamist governments who define it by how much a woman can cover her body?

Sexuality and the female body have become two major sites for moral entrepreneurs to impose their vision on a society which is increasingly defined by its diversity, thus allowing it to become a real battlefield of the cultural hegemony and Islamist control. In some European countries like Germany and the Netherlands, gaining access to the status of refugee, asylum seeker or citizen requires accepting a specific vision of the female body and sexuality. Following Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (2000: 2), universality is not a static presumption, nor is it a priori given, and it ought instead to be understood as a process or condition irreducible to any of its determinate modes of appearance. Wearing a mini jupe (miniskirt) is not a universalistic value, but the fact that it is a woman's choice to dress how she likes in the public sphere should be universalistic. The possibility of choice becomes the condition for the mini jupe's appearance. Wearing a scarf or having an uncovered head is not universalism, but ensuring the freedom of choice without constraint from the community or the family on the individual is true universalism. For this reason and in order not to conflate condition with appearance, Butler (2000) prefers to talk about 'competing universalisms' to pre-empt the perception of universalism as a singular, or 'multiple modernities' to invoke Nilüfer Gölê (2000). The question of some Muslim reactions to the cartoon controversy is not how much we can talk about the particular in the face of universality and is not to render the particular as representative of the universal, but to adjudicate among competing notions of universality. To put it in Michel Wieviorka's words: 'religion is part of an endeavor to participate in modernity rather than to exclude oneself from it' (2004: 284).

5 Conclusion

Intellectuals and human rights organisations in European countries have different positions that have sometimes produced paradoxes. Concerning freedom of expression, the French philosopher Régis Debray was very clear in his formulation of the question concerning the limits
of freedom of expression, as he is convinced that it ‘ends where the rights of others begin’. This was also the point of Amnesty International: freedom of speech ‘carries responsibilities and it may, therefore, be subject to restrictions in the name of safeguarding the rights of others’. Debray is convinced that we must oppose intolerance, but not arrogantly; the identity of others should be respected. Human Rights Watch asserted that:

\[\text{the main complaint against the cartoons is that they offend Islam, not that they have inspired acts of violence, criminal harassment or tangible discrimination against Danish or other Muslims.}\]

But what is ‘tangible discrimination’? The processes of radicalisation are often intangible. Many studies criticised the tendency to only focus on Auschwitz and the act of annihilation when the crimes committed against the Jews during World War II have been addressed. Often one tends to forget the processes and developments that are previous to such extreme acts of exclusion. Would Flemming Rose publish anti-Semitic cartoons from Iran? In fact, at one stage he said he would, but he then changed his mind. This might have evoked vestiges in some people minds about an uncomfortable European past that is not very distant, and it might illustrate the moral questions that the initial cartoons inevitably raised.

Highlighting European misunderstanding of the position of many activists in the Muslim world and the European racism against some Arab and Muslim migrants does not imply the latter are purely victims. It is hard to find a plausible, serene reflection on a problem where one side exclusively feels victimhood. A solution cannot come from the pain of an experience, and risking the emergence of the populist position is very challenging (Saghie 2001). One should think about the responsibility we should assume in bridging those two virtual worlds. In any case, the agency of the Muslim minority in Europe is expressed in different ways. It also becomes progressively important, going from the scientific contribution of this community to its social integration, but also to the use of violence by some groups, such as the terrorist act by al-Qaeda that killed some 3,000 Americans in the World Trade Center. While one should not minimise such acts, the whole Muslim community should not be victimised because of them. The current debate in the UK surrounding the niqab (a complete veil for the face) shows what Khaled Hroub has called coquetry and abuse of cultural diversity by some Muslim Europeans. This dress code, which is more a political expression than a religious one, has flagged the problem of communicativity in society and harms all possibility of dialogue between these veiled women and the society. Since the suicide bombing phenomenon
appeared in the UK, with all its hideous damage – none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of 9/11 – it has become migrant communities’ responsibility to question its mode of incorporation inside the host society.

At this stage, one should recall the work of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2007). According to Pieterse, multiculturalism has gone global and migrants’ identification has become flexible. Global multiculturalism means engagement with conflicts worldwide. If societies are engaged globally it means that conflicts travel, too. Conflicts cannot be contained locally. Multiculturalism and foreign policy cannot be treated separately. After 7/7, the British Council of Muslims informed the Prime Minister that the alienation felt by some members of the UK’s Muslim community was due to the government’s complacent position towards Israeli colonial practices. Symbolically, the Arab-Israeli conflict is still central, though it is less intense than the war in Iraq. The climate of degradation between European and American empire-builders (i.e. the trend of neo-cons), on the one side, and the Muslim world, on the other, comes thanks to the former remaining in strong support of the Israeli occupation and striving to control the oil in the Middle East region. The problem does not concern the support of Western powers – to different extents, to Israel and its security in the region – but their reluctance to take a serious decision. These decisions include the settlement issue (the number of settlers has tripled during the peace process), Jerusalem (refusal to publish the EU report on Jerusalem), and the wall separating Israel and the Palestinian territories (refusal to denounce the itinerary of the wall). European diplomats used to say that they had a balanced position between the Palestinian and Israeli opinions as they claimed a two-state solution: a position skilfully elaborated as being irrelevant, as Israel is continuing its ‘spacio-cidal’ project and its fait accompli and everyday colonial practices. This position was problematic even before the Palestinian use of suicide bombers or Hamas came to power.

Many Western countries continue to suffer from a strong guilt complex for their anti-Semitic history, culminating in the Holocaust. This is something I see as a kind of a trade-off between the non-recognition and the repression of their past and the blind support of the colonial practices of Israeli governments. It is interesting that this trade-off has been operating for quite a long time and serves as the paradigmatic model of the relations between the West and Israel. The negotiation between David Ben Gurion and Konrad Adenauer about the German apology to Israel concerning the Holocaust in 1952 led to a very humiliating outcome. For Germany, it was easier to compensate Jewish property than to acknowledge the German people’s responsibility for the Holocaust (Lustick 2005). As Ben Gurion explained it to the
Knesset after a colossal critique of Menachem Begin who was in opposition at that time and considered the former to be a traitor, Israel needed German financial support much more than a clear apology for the Jewish plight in World War II.

I can also recall the feeling I had when I visited the Leopardo Museum in Vienna in the summer of 2004. In the wing exhibiting the painter Oskar Kokoschka, I was very surprised to see how some portions of the Austrian population and its officials were unable to cope with their past. A sign explaining Kokoschka’s life read ‘he was wounded in 1915 in Ukraine’ without mentioning that it was during World War I. This was followed by ‘in 1939, due to the political developments, he migrated to London’. Is Nazism a simple political development? It seems to me that this incapacity to deal with the past is a major reason why Europeans do not want to take a clear stance on Israeli occupational tactics. Many European countries do not want to recognise their contribution to Jewish suffering during World War II (through lack of compensation or the delaying thereof; attribution only to the Germans, rejecting refugees, minimising the role of collaboration, etc.), and the Palestinians are currently paying the price. This analysis was further confirmed by Matti Bunzl, an anthropologist specialised in the Jewish community of Austria. The right-wing elite were arguing against memorials of World War II, remembering how the Jews were forced to clean away anti-Nazi graffiti on the streets.

Finally, the Holocaust legacy does not concern only the Europeans, but the whole of humanity. I do agree with Fischer. Arabs’ understanding of the plight of Jewish communities in history is extremely important for establishing a climate in which the end of occupation can be achieved.11

Notes

1 The author would like to thank many scholars who contributed to enriching ideas in this chapter. They include Hossein Shahidi, with whom the author initiated a statement at the beginning of the Danish cartoon controversy, part of which is reproduced in this chapter (section III) (Shahidi & Hanafi 2006); some 200 academics from different Arab and European countries who signed the statement forming the basis of the first part of this chapter; as well as Etienne Balibar, Nabil Dajani, Baudouin Dupret and Armando Selvadore who all provided comments.
2 Actually, not all of them are of the Prophet.
3 The peace process has been exploited as a perfect period during which to triple the settler numbers and to seize double the settlement areas.
5 The reflections of Marek Halter, a philosopher who participated in the conference arranged by the NGO Reporters Without Borders, elucidate the many dilemmas of this multivalent controversy:
Voltaire didn’t like Protestants, but he always said he’d fight for their right to express themselves. I’ve known two totalitarian systems, Nazism and Stalinism, so censorship makes me shudder. (www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/RSFCaricaturesEng.pdf) For the same reason, he was against banning the National Front party, and he had the same immediate reaction to the cartoons.

But I felt uncomfortable when I saw the cartoons because they reminded me of the ones of Jews decades ago, with the same way of drawing Semitic individuals with a hooked nose and big ears. Then I saw the demonstrations and the calls for hatred, especially by the Iranian regime.’ (ibid.)

There is the ideal of freedom of speech in democratic societies, which is a praiseworthy principle to which most people adhere. But there is also a lurking racism behind stereotypic depictions. In response to racism, there is a violence, which cannot be defended but which bears witness to an anger about injustice on a more international political level.


7 Debray’s speech at the Reporters Without Borders conference on 22 November 2005.


9 See the Human Rights Watch website (www.hrw.org) and www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v_12 issue_04/opinion_06.html.

10 Spacio-cide is a concept I forged in order to understand Israeli colonial practices since 1948. I argue that these practices are spacio-cidal (as opposed to genocidal) in that they target land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which they live (Hanafi 2005).


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Part II

Migration and transnational approaches
5 Transnationalisation: its conceptual and empirical relevance

Thomas Faist

1 Introduction

Discussions of globalisation have amply and aptly described the increase in the intensity, velocity and scope of cross-border exchanges. These exchanges have included financial transactions, the trade of goods and services and various efforts to deal with these challenges, including the supranational advancement of global governance (see e.g. Lechner & Boli 2003). Much less attention has been devoted to conceptualising cross-border social and symbolic ties and their concatenation, such as the life-worlds of persons and the organisational activities of associations who move around and maintain ties in a cross-borderised world. In order to capture the societal dimensions of cross-border social life, terms such as transnational social spaces, transnational social fields or transnational social formations usually refer to sustained ties of geographically mobile persons, networks and organisations across borders across multiple nation states (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994; Faist 2000; Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999). To list but a few examples, transnational families practise complex forms of livelihood that imply geographical distance and social proximity in earning a living and raising children (e.g. Murray 1981). Chinese entrepreneurs have long been known to rely on guanxi – friendship-communal – networks dating back to hometown ties in China in order to integrate economically into a great variety of countries all over the globe (Ong 1992). Kurdish political activists in various European countries have organised in various associations to address both governments of immigration states and rulers in Turkey to advance their cause of an autonomous ‘Kurdistan’. And in the United Kingdom, Muslim organisations made up of migrants from South Asia have sought to gain recognition as a religious association while forming part of a global umma. Such border-crossing social formations – political, economic and cultural – are not only found in the North and the West, but are probably equally widespread in the South and East. After all, cross-border migration is
not only South-North and North-South; it can also run South-South, East-East and North-North.1

Although transnational approaches have centred on cross-border interactions and social formations in the context of international migration, and have thus pointed to sustained and dense cross-border transactions involving North and South, East and West, most research has focused on, and been carried out in, the West and the North. But not only has research focused on these regions – not surprising in view of the fact that most scholars working in a transnational vein were socialised and work in these regions – what is noteworthy is that comparatively little attention has been given to a balanced description of North-South sites and linkages. If the South is included, they are mostly valuable studies on locales in the South (e.g. Haugen & Carling 2005; Leichtman 2005). What is certainly needed is a strengthening of research on the South and the East, giving perspectives from scholars from the South. Short of such mid-term goals, a first step for the short term involves a more rigorous analysis of the interlinkages between North and South, East and West. One of the venues for this much-needed step in research on transnationalisation is the newly rediscovered migration-development nexus – that is, the two-way link between migration and development.

In particular, transnational migrant networks and migrant associations have lately been at the centre of optimistic visions of national governments in the OECD world and international economic development policy establishments such as the World Bank (for an overview, see Maimba & Ratha 2005; on optimistic claims, see World Bank 2006). First, the surge in financial remittances over the past three decades transferred by transnational migrants has given rise to a kind of euphoria. Annual remittances from economically developed to developing and transformation countries more than doubled during the 1990s and have been approximately 20 per cent higher than official development assistance (ODA) to these countries. Second, knowledge transferred from North to South through networks of scientists and experts is increasingly seen as ‘brain circulation’, beneficial to all parties involved (see Findlay 2003). The transfer of ideas is seen as helping developing and transformation countries to participate in knowledge societies, which are the basis for innovation, productivity, and development. In a wide sense this knowledge transfer includes networks of scientists and experts from the United States to China, or the diffusion of the practice of participation in the formal labour market by women migrants from Bangladesh who stayed in Malaysia and returned to the country of origin (Dannecker 2004). Third, there are social remittances, which involve the transfer of ideas regarding the rule of law, good governance, democracy, gender equity and human rights.
Politically, social remittances have achieved a growing prominence in the aftermath of interventions into armed conflicts and efforts at reconstructing countries ravaged by civil war – evidenced lately in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Occasionally, diasporas made up of exiles, refugees and labour migrants are hailed as mediators in conflict resolution, for example, in the cases of South Africa or Nigeria. However, all these mechanisms of transfer also have their dark sides. For example, refugee and exile communities that have fuelled conflicts in the countries of origin from abroad, such as Kosovo Albanians or Chechen freedom fighters.

The newest round of the migration-development nexus is the idea of what in French has been called ‘co-développement’. Co-development means that migrants are productive development agents. It describes very well the public policy approaches of immigration countries to the migration-development nexus, at least those propagated by several states such as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and international organisations such as the World Bank. Co-development does not build upon the permanent return of migrants to the countries of origin but tries to tap into existing transnational ties of migrants who are seen to be transmission belts of development cooperation. The question that comes up is how this new enthusiasm (Faist 2007a) can be fruitfully analysed from a transnational perspective. What is puzzling from a transnational view is that the new optimism envisages one-way flows from North to South, occluding reverse flows.

The central puzzle then becomes clear. On the one hand, we can observe how public and academic debates in the newest round of the migration-development nexus address mostly one-way flows, the transfer of resources from North to South – financial remittances, human capital, knowledge and even so-called social remittances, such as the export of democracy and human rights. The newest round of the migration-development debate, like the older ones in the 1960s and 1980s, is couched in terms of development and development cooperation. On the other hand, studies taking a transnational approach suggest that we do not see one-way traffic but two-way flows. Certainly, we can still observe brain drain, as evidenced in research on ‘brain strain hotspots’, such as the health care sector in much of sub-Saharan Africa, where the nurses and doctors who migrated abroad cannot be replaced (see Lowell, Findlay & Stewart 2004). Also, countries such as the US and the UK have benefited tremendously from tuition fees from students hailing from the South and East. Moreover, we may think of findings that indicate ‘reverse remittances’, for example, families of migrants in Accra, Ghana paying for their kinfolk in Amsterdam to ‘get their papers’ – that is, to legalise their status in the Netherlands. And taking a broader historical perspective, it seems odd that the migration-
development debate would focus predominantly on North-South transfers, as it is well-established that only colonial and imperial domination of large regions of Africa and Asia set the conditions in which migration systems could develop (Wallerstein 1983).

The first part of the analysis delineates three levels of transnational analysis, located in the respective realms of life-worlds, associations and systems. While the focus of transnational approaches is on the associational level (meso-level; Faist 1997), the life-world or interaction level (micro-level) and the systems level (macro-level) are to be included. The second part shifts attention to various types of meso-level social formations, called transnational social spaces. Transnational spaces can be conceptualised as in between a space of places and a space of flows (Faist 2000a: chapter 1). The third part deals with transnational methodology, arguing that research should strive to consider multi-sited research, and research dealing with meso-level formations – not only associations but also the ‘spaces in between associations’ and organisations. In the fourth part the analysis then moves on to consider an application of transnational methodology, the recently rediscovered migration-development nexus.

2 Transnational approaches: life-worlds, associations and systems

The Oxford Dictionary of English dates the emergence of the term ‘transnational’ to about 1920, documented with a quotation from an economic text that saw Europe after World War I characterised by its ‘international or more correctly transnational economy’ (ODE 2003: 1762). Indeed, the term re-emerged in the late 1960s to denote increasing economic and political interdependence between industrialised countries and the spread of transnational or multinational companies operating across the globe (Keohane & Nye 1977). The newest round of the term ‘transnational’, which started in the late 1980s and early 1990s, took a bottom-up perspective and asked about migrants as agents in constellations of increased cross-border flows not only of goods, but also of people (Basch et al. 1994). It is within this latest context that transnational approaches have since flourished. They have explored counter-trends to the dis-embedding of social systems in an increasingly globalised world. Transnational studies look at processes of re-embedding the social in cross-border societal formations.

Transnational social formations – also fields, spaces – consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organisations and networks of organisations that cut across the borders of at least two nation states. In other words, the
term refers to sustained and continuous plurilocal transactions crossing state borders. Most of these formations are located in between, on the one hand, the life-world of personal interactions and, on the other, the functional systems of differentiated spheres, such as the economy, polity, law, science and religion. The smallest element of transnational social formations consists of transactions – that is, bounded communications between at least three persons. More aggregated levels encompass groups, households, organisations and firms.

There are various ways to conceptualise transnational social formations, which can be thought to be part of more general cross-border societal configurations. Transnational approaches, along with globalisation theories, world society and world polity theories, look at the current waves of global connectivity not as a new material phenomenon. Cultural pluralisation is not anything new in world history, but has been the rule for centuries. Colonialism, wars of conquest, mass migrations, the slave trade, world wars and refugee movements have been processes with global dimensions for several centuries. Viewed in a world-system perspective, capitalist markets required migration across borders of states and empires (Wallerstein 1974). What is new is not so much cultural pluralisation as a result of increasing global connectivity – more a matter of degree than a new quality – but global awareness of it. This awareness can be described as one important dimension of globalisation (Robertson 1992). It is reflected in academic analyses and mass media.

Nonetheless, transnational approaches differ from world society and world polity theories and more general globalisation studies. On an epistemological level, transnational views argue against a simplistic top-down world society or world polity version of global or glocal conditions, which suffer from a neo-functionalist oversimplification in the first case and an exogenous rational actor model in the latter. World society theories view societal processes from the vantage point of an already existing world society. The systems-theoretic notion of world society presupposes that global communicative connectivity already exists. According to theorists such as Niklas Luhmann, society is the most encompassing social system, defined as the sum total of all communication connected to communication. As communication is geared towards global connectivity, only one society exists: world society (Luhmann 1975: 57). World society theory places a high premium on functional differentiation. In a functionally differentiated society, each subsystem fulfils one specific function coded in a binary way. For example, the political system decides on power or not to have power, the science system on truth or not truth, the economic system on money or not to have money, and so forth. Such functional differentiation is a form of homogenisation. Social formations other than those
which are functionally differentiated, such as segmented or stratified forms, only play a secondary role. World society is the inevitable result of functional differentiation (Luhmann 1997: 809). In the world polity theory of John W. Meyer and the Stanford School, the starting point is the existence of a world culture, which is culture exogenous to local contexts, worldwide, and based on the premises of modern rationalisation in Max Weber's sense (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 2000). This world culture is rationalistic in that it does not primarily consist of values and norms that are debated and towards which actors orient their behaviour; rather it consists of 'cognitive models'. Actors accept such models, even though they may not be ready to act according to the standards prescribed, for example, in taking over English-language curricula without a suitable curriculum.

There are various problems with both world society and world polity theory. First, these theories postulate a priori and without further systematic empirical consideration that a world society or world polity actually exists. We can certainly observe the emergence of global institutions, for example, in the realm of political governance, such as the United Nations and its sub-organisations or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Other prominent examples are the nation state as a universal principle of political organisation, the use of money as a medium of economic exchange, and global standards in travel, time and communication. Yet, such global structures or globally diffused institutions only exist in selected policy domains. Even if we turn to the universal semantics of human rights, rule of law, democracy or gender equity – terms which fulfil the function of meta-norms of meta-cognitive models – we observe that they do not rule universally. Also, functionally differentiated structures exist only to a very narrowly confined extent in many parts of the world. Social protection and social insurance in many parts of the world are just one crucial example (Faist 2007c). While some policy fields such as trade have been regulated by complex and evolving international regimes which may amount to elements of global governance, cross-cutting issue areas such as geographical mobility are a long way from being regulated by such mechanisms. Even in the realm of the UN, various agencies compete for competence in these fields. Second, both world society and world polity approaches are top-down approaches which define the properties of lower order elements. Moreover, according to such views, it is modern organisations and networks that rule the societal world, while social formations such as families, tribes, and communities play a negligible role, if at all. World polity theory maintains that cognitive models shape the actors, although authors working in this mould have conceded that it is not only world polity and world culture that shapes actors but it is also actors who shape world polity. For example, the very
fact that the World Bank has championed the diaspora model of development has very real consequences for conceiving development. Different agents – a term used to ascribe effectiveness of actors to influence the social world – hold different notions of development. These notions change as a result of new paradigms. As a consequence, it still has to be shown how world society or world polity models shape local or national patterns. We can name many local or national patterns which do not necessarily go back to global models. For example, states in the OECD countries have employed very different models of incorporating migrants at the national level, ranging from assimilationist to multicultural paradigms (Castles & Miller 2003). Moreover, states have viewed very differently the desirability of migrants’ transnational ties. While former colonial powers with a long experience in penetrating developing countries have seized quickly upon the idea of co-development – that is, employing migrants as development agents. Others, often characterised by less intense transnational and international ties, have only recently started to think about such models. Examples for the former category are nation states such as France, the UK, Spain and the Netherlands; for the latter, Germany, Austria and Sweden (see De Haas 2006).

Second, neo-functionalist approaches neglect the crucial aspect of legitimation and, thus, the whole realm of normatively bounded agency (Peters 1993). And the world polity approach suggests that actors reap benefits from adapting to cognitive models such as the mainstreaming of tertiary education models, for example, the Bologna Process in the EU. Political conflict over the very definition of such processes is merely semantic. However, to reduce the analysis of social and societal formations to instrumental concerns, and to occlude normative and ethical or expressive dimensions is to truncate the rich variety of the orientation of agency. Conflicts over whether social orders or systems are legitimate are a driving force of social change and transformation. For example, political agents active in pushing for gender equity criticise existing political arrangements and justify their strategies by reference to overall meta-norms such as human rights. In a similar way, those trying to establish a nation state from abroad through secession may refer to norms such as national self-determination. In these two very different cases it is the legitimacy of existing orders which is at stake, both on the level of empirically observable acceptance of authority and power and on the level of normative criteria used to evaluate institutions.

Transnational approaches also need to be carefully distinguished from globalisation theories. Transnational views refer to overlapping ties and linkages of non-state agents between various nation states. The hunch is that political transnationalisation as a set of processes
with a potential global scope has implications for the functions of states, supra-national and international organisations. By contrast, globalisation approaches focus on processes transcending state territories. Various aspects of society and governance on the local, national, regional and global levels can be thought to be nested within each other – always connected by potentially global communication. This characteristic also applies to global governance, namely, the rapid emergence of multilateral cooperation and international organisations.

On a methodological level, transnational approaches – along with world society and world polity theories – aim to overcome ‘methodological territorialism’ (Scholte 2000: 56). That is, they aim to conflate society, state and territory. Such methodological territorialism is evident in many analyses which prioritise state agency in the traditional Weberian trilogy of the congruence of territory, authority and people. Yet, it is evident from empirical observation that processes such as migration challenge national institutions such as citizenship, and – in conjunction with processes such as gender equity and denizenship rights – favour dual citizenship (Faist 2007b). In addition, transnational approaches also strive to overcome ‘methodological nationalism’, the conflation of society, state and nation (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2004). Again, the increasing tolerance towards dual citizenship suggests that affiliations to nations may not be exclusive and monogamous but overlapping and plural.

Transnational perspectives on cross-border societal formations relate to the concepts of fields and spaces. While the former connotes the systemic dimensions of societal formations, the latter refers to associations and life-worlds. The notion of fields refers to the inner logic of social action of functionally differentiated realms. Although Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of fields points towards the internal logic of systems, such as the economy, polity, science or law, transnational approaches do not presume an evolutionary and linear logic of a trend towards a functionally differentiated world society. The notion of transnational social fields is much more concerned with issues of agency and diverse social formations. By contrast, the notion of space denotes the spatial dimension of social life (Faist 2004a; Pries 2001). Transnational social spaces are not synonymous with concepts such as ‘network society’ which postulate a trend towards societal life as a ‘space of flows’ (Castells 1996). Undoubtedly, the intensity and velocity of the transfer of goods, capital, and ideas across borders has increased. And so has, in less spectacular rates of increase, cross-border migration. However, the dynamics of migration cannot be understood without considering the life-worlds of persons, the social and symbolic ties they entertain into regions of origin, destination and onward mobility.
Social space, in particular, has been neglected for several decades in the social sciences (Faist 2004b). In globalist or cosmopolitan approaches time definitively trumps place, namely, territory. The now often-used descriptions of the world as a ‘space of flows’ are creative reformulations of Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’ famous dictum on capitalism: ‘all that is solid melts into air’. The latter statement is still the clearest expression of the claim that there is an annihilation of space by time (Marx & Engels 1918). Systems theory argues that migration can be substituted by routines (see Stichweh 2003). The core argument is that functional differentiation leads to the disappearance of social space and the diminishing relevance of face-to-face communication in social systems. In a way, it is the end of geography. The counter-argument is equally simple but based on empirical evidence: social geographers have firmly established that face-to-face contact is the main functional reason for the spatial clustering of knowledge and skills. This is exactly why nowadays there is great fanfare about clusters of excellence in academia, such as Oxbridge in the UK, or clusters of growth in industry, such as the Rhine Valley or Shanghai. Other examples are international financial centres in places like New York, London or Frankfurt (see e.g. Thrift 1996). We observe a spatial clustering of practical knowledge, tacit knowledge and scientific knowledge. This trend is tied to production processes, which require simultaneous inputs and feedbacks (Sassen 2006: 72). Social spaces expand and direct contacts grow as technological possibilities grow, and the short-term and even long-term mobility of persons certainly does not decline but has steadily increased. It is not only true in the world of business but also in the life-worlds of migrants, new telecommunications that technology is a complement to rather than a substitute for face-to-face contact. It appears that information is still an ‘experience good’ and that face-to-face contact still helps to build the trust needed to close deals (Rauch 2001), or to build reciprocity and solidarity in kinship groups. This example indicates that spaces of flows – not only those of persons but also of goods – are embedded in spaces of places. In other words, intensive and continuous cross-border flows of persons, ideas and goods do not necessarily result in a de-bordered world.

Flows are tied to the experience of place(s). The production of space can be considered a dialectical process. On the one hand, globalisation allows a de-placing from concrete territorial places – space of flows. On the other hand, global flows have to be anchored locally in specific places – space of places. Space is conceived as a relational process of structuring relative positions of social and symbolic ties between social actors, social resources and goods inherent in social ties, and the connection of these ties to places. On a meso- or associational level – the main focus of transnational approaches – the dialectics of flows and
places goes hand in hand with the possibility of transfer of resources in space. Financial capital, for example, is distinctly more mobile than social capital. It is therefore often seen as the prototype of a global good. By contrast, social capital, such as networks of solidarity and trust, are place-bound, local assets, which can only be rendered mobile across space by social ties in kinship groups, organisations, communities, which connect distinct places. Any conceptualisation of space across borders would therefore depend on the type of ties and (social) goods to be exchanged. At the interstices of the space of flows and space of places are processes of glocalisation. Glocalisation then means, first, that the local is produced – to a large extent – on the global or transnational level. Second, the local is also important in reconfiguring place. An empirical example for this approach is transnational social spaces. The concept of transnational social spaces probes into the question by what principles geographical propinquity, which implies the embeddedness of ties in place, is supplemented or transformed by transnational flows.

3 Types of transnational social spaces

The reality of transnational social spaces made up of migrants indicates, first, that migration and re-migration may not be definite, irrevocable and irreversible decisions – transnational lives in themselves may become a strategy of survival and betterment. Also, transnational webs include relatively immobile persons and collectives. Second, even those migrants who have settled for a considerable time outside the original countries of origin frequently entertain strong transnational links. Third, these links can be of a more informal nature, such as intra-household or family ties, or they can be institutionalised, such as political parties entertaining branches in various countries of immigration and emigration.

Under propitious conditions transnational social spaces find a fertile breeding ground. Favourable conditions for the reproduction of transnational ties include: 1) modern technologies such as satellite or cable TV, instant mass communication, personal communication bridging long distances via telephone and fax, mass affordable short-term long-distance travel; 2) liberal state policies, such as polyethnic rights and anti-discrimination policies, or the opposite; 3) cultural discrimination and socio-economic exclusion of migrants in immigration states; 4) and changing emigration state policies which reach out to migrants living abroad for remittances, investment, and political support.
There are three stylised types of transnational social spaces: small groups, in particular kinship systems, issue networks and transnational organisations or associations.

1) Formalised transboundary relations within *small groups*, such as households and wider kinship systems, are representative for many migrants. Families may live apart because one or more members work abroad as contract workers (e.g. the former guest workers in Germany) or as posted employees within multinational companies. Small household and family groups have a strong sense of belonging to a common home. A classic example for such relations are transnational families, who conceive of themselves as both an economic unit and a unit of solidarity and who keep, besides the main house, a kind of shadow household in another country. Economic assets are mostly transferred from abroad to those who continue to run the household ‘back home’. It is estimated that the vast amount of financial remittances are transferred within such small groups of kinship systems.

2) *Transnational issue networks* are sets of ties between persons and organisations in which information and services are exchanged for the purpose of achieving a common goal. Linkage patterns may concatenate into advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998), business networks or scientists’ networks. These issue-specific networks engage in areas such as human rights and environmental protection. While issue networks look back upon a long tradition in the realm of human rights, and are making steady progress in ecology, they are also emerging among migrants who have moved from the so-called third countries to the EU. Among the immigrant and citizenship associations are, for example, the European Citizenship Action Service (ECAS), the Migration Policy Group (MPG), which includes the British NGO Justice, the Immigration Lawyers Practitioners’ Association and the Dutch Standing Group of Experts on Immigration and Asylum. Some of these networks – usually headed by non-migrant EU citizens – have succeeded in bringing issues such as discrimination onto the agendas of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) and, ultimately, into the Treaty of Maastricht (1997).

3) *Transnational organisations*: an early type of transnational organisation – interstate non-governmental organisations (INGOs) – developed out of issue networks like the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Greenpeace. At the other extreme are organisations that are based in one specific country but whose sphere of influence extends abroad, as with the ethno-nationalist Tamil Tigers that seek an autonomous Tamil state on the territory of contemporary Sri Lanka. Transnational enterprises constitute a further type of cross-border organisation. These businesses are differentiated transboundary organisations with an extremely detailed internal division of labour.
Transnational social spaces have cultural, political and economic aspects. Syncretist cultural practices – e.g. music styles, language diffusion and mixing – and hybrid identities – such as German-Turkish or French-Algerian – are phenomena that tend to accompany processes of transnational migration. Although such phenomena may range from evanescent and temporary to more enduring and stable patterns over time, their observable existence has implications for the self-conception of individuals and groups, and for the definition of these same actors by others. How intensive this trend really is remains a matter of dispute. In principle, the idea of transnational cultural diffusion and syncretism implies the cross-border movement of people, symbols, practices and texts. All such movements help establish patterns of common cultural belief across borders and reciprocal transactions between separate places, whereby cultural ideas found in one influence those in another.

Transnational migrant culture cannot be seen as a template or baggage. It is not something to be figuratively packed and unpacked, uprooted (assimilationists) and transplanted from one national context to another (cultural pluralists and multiculturalists). Transnational cultures are cross-border mixes, which may not only involve novel elements but also ‘hardware’ found in national or local cultures from regions of origin and destination. Syncretist identities and practices do not imply a diaspora consciousness, such as a collective identity carrying elements of both Turkish or Kurdish and German, but with a strong dominance of the former element due to an imagined homeland or collective religious community. Nor do these mixing identities necessarily denote a successful stage in the transition from one collective identity to another, such as the prototypical development: Sicilian → Italian → Italian-American → US-American. Rather, it is an outcome of transnational ties and often segmented cultural communities that do refer to a successful synthesis in some cases – such as hip-hop musicians among the cultural elite. Also, there may be religious hybridity, mixing a Protestant attitude of an individualist relationship to God with Islam (Roy 2004). On an organisational level, it is sometimes religious communities, called by some observers as Islamist, such as Milli Görüş (an organisation originating in Turkey with branches all over Europe), that have moved more than Islamic organisations supported by the Turkish state to a Christian-type model of religious activity, giving the Imam a more prominent role than in traditional ‘folk Islam’, more akin to Christian pastors. Quite important, syncretism and migrant incorporation are not necessarily opposite processes. For example, while many Chinese migrants in Canada may be incorporated socio-economically, they may engage in syncretist cultural practices related to both Canada and the region of origin.
In the political realm, over the last few decades more than half of all sovereign states have come to tolerate dual or multiple citizenship for various reasons (Faist 2007b; Faist & Kivisto 2007). This is astonishing when one considers how, a few decades ago, citizenship and political loyalty to a state were still considered inseparable. Dual citizenship could be conceived of as the political foundation of the transnational experience, enabling transnational migrants and their children to lead multiple lives across borders. There has been a push towards tolerating dual nationality from both ends, from immigration and emigration countries, albeit for somewhat different reasons. In immigration countries it has been the spread of an equal-rights perspective, advanced by considerations of gender equity and equal political freedom for all residents, that has provided the momentum towards increasing tolerance. Categories of persons to whom tolerance has been shown have continued to grow, starting from stateless persons, those not allowed to renounce their nationality – that is, not released from their original citizenship – and, finally, spouses and children in bi-national marriages. In emigration countries, the reasons for increasing tolerance often have been pronounced in more instrumental ways. For instance, representatives of political regimes have attempted to forge continuous links to expatriates living abroad.

While political transnationalisation is not a new phenomenon, the transnational activists of today, unlike those of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, do not comprise solely of professionals. A major difference between today and the turn of the twentieth century may be that now, in addition to nationalist activists or diasporists, ethnic business persons and their associates, there is probably a greater proportion of groups concerned with human rights and fundamental rights issues. Transnational activists are not merely internationally oriented cosmopolitans but rather need a firm grounding in local or national contexts. In order to inquire into the rootedness of transnational political actors, it is necessary to distinguish the organisational form their activities take. First, there are transnationally active NGOs, such as cultural organisations, diasporic organisations and organisations founded by political exiles and dissidents with the intention of overturning authoritarian regimes in their country of origin. Second, there are also genuinely transnational NGOs or INGOs, in which migrant activists operate, such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International (Tarrow 1998).
4 Methodology: ‘spaces in between’ associations and nation states

Most empirical studies on the process of forming and reproducing transnational social spaces – transnationalisation – focus on association and organisations (see Moja 2005). Such studies need to be complemented by those looking at the ‘spaces in between associations’ – that is, transactions criss-crossing multiple associations, networks forming within associations, and non-organised engagement. For example, village cultural associations of Overseas Chinese in South-East Asia nowadays also function as an arena for businesspersons planning to invest in China (Hong Liu 1998). In such cases, associations function as platforms for persons who are participating in other social groups as well, an instance of cross-cutting social circles (see Simmel 1955).

Methodologically, the exhortation of transnational approaches to ‘follow the flow of persons, money, ideas and so forth’ has not really been taken very seriously, contrary to most announcements. A more systematic network approach not only in the metaphorical sense is necessary. Taking multi-sited fieldwork seriously – that is, simultaneous research in locations – would mean following financial or other transactions in tracing lateral connectivities to other immigration and emigration regions. A case at hand is a five-year study meticulously tracing transactions involving persons, groups and organisations in the case of networks of Ghanaian migrants located in Amsterdam, back to locations in Ghana and in other regions of the world (Mazzucato 2007). Such a methodological approach does not presume concepts of world society which presuppose too much unity and systemic differentiation. In sum, exploring transnational connectivities through multi-sited fieldwork enables us to look at the great variety of societal forms – associations, small groups, networks of associations (issue networks) and informal social networks. In particular, it allows us to trace the combination of a high degree of local clustering with a relatively low average path distance between nodes and hubs, which are located in different nation states.

Networks in the ‘spaces in between’ and within associations can be built around various categorical distinctions, such as ethnicity, race, gender, schooling, professional training, political affiliation and sexual preference. Ethnicity constitutes a particularly vexing issue in transnational studies. On the one hand, a transnational approach should be able to overcome the ‘ethnic’ bias inherent in much migration scholarship. The fallacy is to label migrants immediately by ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ categories. Often scholars presuppose prematurely that categories, such as Turks, Brazilians and so forth, matter a lot, since they do in public discourse. On the other hand, methods should be able to
trace actually existing ethnic social formations, such as networks of reciprocity, which are of great importance, for example, in informal transfer systems of financial remittances. Yet, ethnic networks may be complemented by networks in the financial sector which are not ethnically based at all. For example, informal remittance networks extending from Manchester, UK, to Lahore, Pakistan, rely on intermediaries or financial brokers in Dubai (Ballard 2005). In such cases we may speak of networks characterised by overlapping categories. In essence, a network approach means to turn the issue of the importance of ethnicity into an empirical question.

Transnational agents, such as groups, associations, organisations, and diasporas, cannot be treated as unitary actors if one wants to understand the tensions inherent in transnational social formations. Certainly, the opportunities for transnational agents have changed in the process of globalisation, not only for migrant-based collectives (see Evans 2000). Because of the apparent increase in interconnectedness through long-distance communication, facilitated face-to-face communication and interaction through travel and interaction, and the diffusion of ideas and knowledge, social life extending across the borders of states has become more dense and extensive. The spaces ‘in between’ states have multiplied. Some of the cherished concepts of migration research need to be questioned because they may not be adequate to capture more fluid lifestyles, modes of action and collective behaviour. The lives of migrants are not necessarily characterised by one-time settlement and commitment to one society or associations and groups in one society. Therefore, dichotomous distinctions such as ‘origin’ vs. ‘destination’ and ‘emigration’ vs. ‘immigration’ no longer hold, if only because many traditional emigration countries have become both transit and immigration countries (Turkey being a typical example). Less obviously, other dichotomies such as ‘temporary vs. permanent’ and ‘labour migrant vs. refugee’ also lose ground if the goal is to map trajectories of mobile populations. One first step has been a renewed interest in the notion of social space. This has implied, among other things, the need to conceptualise migration beyond its demographic construction as ‘flows’ and ‘stocks’ of people and to look at the ‘in between places’. Nonetheless, overcoming unhelpful binary conceptual oppositions does not mean to occlude political conflicts in policy fields such as migration and development.
Public debates and research on the relationship between migration and development has increased considerably over the past years. To be more precise, it has experienced yet another climax after two previous ones, in the 1960s and 1980s. From a simple cost-benefit point of view the basic idea has always been that the flow of emigrants and the loss of brain power are partly or wholly compensated by a reverse flow of money, ideas and knowledge. Yet, there is very little systematic thought given to what is ‘new’ around this time. A transnational approach means to look at the emergence of a new transnational agent in development discourse – intermittently called ‘migrants’, ‘diaspora’ or ‘transnational community’. In the eyes of some international organisations, states and development agencies, they have turned into development agents. Increasingly, the cross-border ties of geographically mobile persons and collectives are taken to the centre of attention. And nation states, local governments, international and supranational organisations and development agencies seek to co-opt and establish ties to such agents who are engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border relationships on a personal, collective and organisational level. Also, and this is crucial for any kind of scientific endeavour, the emergence of this new type of development agent can be tackled by the decidedly transnational methodology just sketched. Only then can we hope to look at what is usually called ‘development’ in both North and South, and what the different agents involved understand by ‘development’; hence, one may use the plural, ‘developments’. Development is a decidedly normative term and may be of little value analytically. However, its main purpose for this discussion is that it concentrates academic and public debates on the conflicting and evolving notions of what different agents understand by leading a ‘good life’.

Various agents have repositioned themselves locally in the global changes over the past decades. Both public policies and rhetoric have changed. A prominent example for the transformed political semantics is the discursive and institutional changes the People’s Republic of China has implemented. Discursively, the slogan to ‘serve the country’ (wei guo fuwu) replaced the previous motto of ‘return to serve’ (huiguo fuwu) (Cheng Xi in Nyiri 2001: 637). Such rhetoric has been complemented by various public policy changes. Examples are easy to spot, including adaptations through mechanisms such as dual citizenship for emigrants and immigrants, voting rights for absentees, tax incentives for citizens abroad and the co-optation of migrant organisations by local, regional and state governments for development cooperation. Instead of permanent return migration, temporary returns, visits and other
forms of transactions have moved to the centre of attention. Thus, in recent years, the notion of migrants’ return as an asset of development has been complemented by the idea that even if there is no eventual return, the commitment of migrants living abroad could be tapped through not only hometown associations, for example, but also through informal ‘diaspora knowledge networks’ (Meyer 2005). This refers to networks of scientists and R&D personnel, business networks and networks of professionals working for multinational companies (Kuznetsov 2006). States, development agencies and international organisations try to support the circulatory mobility of persons engaged.

The key term is ‘temporary return’: an example is the Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA) programme of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), which sends migrants as experts back to countries of origin for short periods of time (see Kapur & McHale 2005). And, of course, governments try to tap into the activities of hometown associations. A prominent example is the Mexican Tres por Uno (3x1) programme, in which each ‘migradollar’ sent by migrants from abroad is complemented by three US dollars from various governmental levels. More recently, banks have joined the fray and announced 4x1 programmes. The examples given suggest that states and organisations have started to build programmes on obligations and commitments felt by migrants towards ‘home country’ institutions.

Much of the semantics focuses on community. The two most fashionable terms are ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnational communities’. There is an interesting difference: diaspora is used frequently in the development discourse, and refers to individuals dispersed all over the globe, while transnational community is found more often in the transnationalist literature. Both terminologies refer to ‘communities without propinquity’ (Faist 2000b). Such communities are not primarily built upon geographical closeness, but on a series of social and symbolic ties that connect ethnic, religious and professional diasporas. Yet, the notions of diaspora and transnational community need to be unbundled and even rejected in order to get closer to a systematic analysis. Rogers Brubaker cogently observed that the ‘universalisation of the diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of the diaspora’ (Brubaker 2005: 3). In recent decades there has been a telling change of meaning. First, in the classical meaning, diaspora referred to forced migration and violent dispersal. Nowadays it denotes any kind of migration; hence, the talk of labour diaspora, trade diaspora, business diaspora and refugee diasporas. Second, in the classical way, diaspora implied a return to an imagined or real homeland. Today it simply conjures some sort of sustained tie back to the home country and, in postmodern usage, even suggests lateral ties – that is, ties not only from emigration to one immigration country, but connectivity all over the globe. Third,
in the old meaning, diaspora referred to various forms of diaspora segregation in the immigration country. In the new meaning, it is a sort of culturally pluralist boundary maintenance in the host country. While these are interesting shifts in meaning, the terms ‘diaspora’ and transnational community, both, are too restrictive. They imagine a rather homogeneous cross-border social formation. They repeat the same mistake as much migration scholarship that assumes rather homogenous national, ethnic or religious groupings. In sum, in a transnational approach terms such as ‘community’ and ‘diaspora’ do play a role. Nonetheless, they should not be used in a conceptually inflationary manner because this leads to an essentialisation of these categories.

The newest wave of the migration-development nexus raises a couple of challenges to transnational approaches:

1) Incorporation and development

So far, incorporation and development studies are disjointed, even in transnational studies. Studies either take the perspective of the country or region, in which immigrants live, and deal from a transnational angle with issues of incorporation into labour markets, housing, education and cultural pluralism, but also social security, state security, wage differentials and so forth. Or studies deal with the effects of transnational ties on home countries, villages, formations from which migrants originate, such as demographic dynamics, remittance flows and cultural impacts and often involving an analysis of transnational flows. The former studies, preoccupied with effects on immigration regions, have entered into a dialogue with assimilation and multiculturalism perspectives, and the latter, focusing on emigration regions, with development studies. Yet, the two areas still make for awkward dance partners. For example, studies have found in the case of immigrants from Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Colombia in the US that transnational immigrant organisations’ members are older, better-established, and possess above-average levels of education (Portes, Escobar & Walton Radford 2007). This could be interpreted, depending on one’s conceptual predisposition, as transnationalism and assimilation not being opposites or as a strong transnational orientation indicating a specific path of incorporation.

However, if not carried onwards, such discussions miss the essence of a transnational approach. From such a perspective incorporation in national polities of immigration is one of several dimensions, the other being emigration countries and transnational social formations themselves. This is clearly visible in two-way flows. From an integrated South-North-South perspective one has to look not only at remittances as North-South transfers but also at potential ‘reverse remittances’. There are indeed empirical findings of ‘reverse remittances’ or two way flows: they can be important especially at the beginning stages of
migration of persons or groups to, for example, help undocumented migrants get papers and thus legalise their stay. In this particular case, reverse remittances may be indicative of an immigrant incorporation policy that externalises the costs of integration. Yet, such support structures only function if there are cross-border formations, consisting of various elements, such as kinship groups or brokers.

It is questionable whether terms such as ‘immigrant integration’ or ‘incorporation’ are able to capture how two-way flows shape associational life in between emigration and immigration regions. They are valid perspectives, of course, centring on regions of destination and origin. Nonetheless, the in-between transactions constitute social facts sui generis. Yet, we have not yet found an appropriate terminology to deal with these social facts. For example, migrant associations in immigration regions cannot be neatly categorised into those concerned with social integration and those interested in development cooperation. It is thus not surprising that local governments in some European countries have started to link incorporation, development and migration policies. This opens up new ways of thinking about the link between incorporation and development. Not only may those best incorporated be most active in migrant organisations dealing with development (a result which is not really surprising), but development cooperation can also be seen as incorporation. And yet, the sphere then is not restricted to immigration states but extends to regions of origin. In Spanish metropolitan areas such as Madrid and Barcelona, for example, there has been a marked shift by local governments to not just support co-development, but tie incorporation in Spain to development abroad. Cooperation between local authorities and migrants is then directed not only at development in the countries of origin but also seen as a means to foster incorporation in Spain. Questions that arise are: is this an instance of the co-optation of migrant organisations by local state agencies? Or do we see collaboration between migrant associations and state power? What are the functions of local cooperation for migration control or management? Why do we see the triangulation of development, migration control and incorporation in countries that have only recently turned into major receiving countries, such as Spain? And, ultimately, given the plurilocality of incorporation in multiple sites in Spain and abroad: incorporation into what? In addition, it stands to reason why the combination of development, migration control and incorporation get a prime importance now and the motives behind. In the end, the issue of co-development on the local level and the plurality of agents involved suggest that we need to pay more attention to different layers of statehood to get at the triangulation. After all, it is the nation state which is explicitly engaged in migration
control, while at the local level issues of incorporation achieve prime importance.

2) Public policy, politics and inequality

Many studies look positively at remittances – financial, knowledge and social – because they may reduce poverty or even eradicate it and contribute to economic growth. However, there is almost no discussion of how this may work – as though an invisible hand will transform remittances into poverty reduction and economic growth. Needless to say, this is a myopic view of the public policy relevance of remittances. If we are to try tying transnational migration to global social inequality, then remittances must be examined in their relevance for social policy. Seen in this way, they do not constitute explicit social policies, of course, but form a basis for fostering social solidarity among citizens.

There is, first, an interesting nexus between remittances, social policy and development. Here remittances constitute a sort of intervening variable because they are an expression of diffuse solidarity and generalised reciprocity, upon which any kind of social policy has to be built. Second, only by integrating transnational migrants and their associations into policy circuits on various governance levels can such potentials be realised. At the very least, we need to analyse the social policy potential inherent in transnational with respect to state agencies on various levels, non-governmental organisations and economic organisations such as firms.

Therefore, the crucial policy question is how to fit remittances into universal social policies. How can remittances be factored into what a recent publication by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) calls ‘developmental welfare’? Social policy and social rights are not something that might merely evolve after a certain level of development has been reached. Rather, ‘social policy is a key instrument for economic and social development’ (UNRISD 2007: 2). Since there is no simple remittance-development-nexus, we need to look at policies which can forge social solidarity and are thus based on social citizenship across the borders of nation states (Faist 2007c). All great theorists of societal membership – from Aristotle, Cicero, John Stuart Mill, Hannah Arendt, T.H. Marshall – have agreed that in order to participate fully in public life, persons need to be in a certain socio-economic and political position. In Marshall’s tradition, we may call it social citizenship; more recently the term ‘capabilities’ has been introduced by Amartya Sen to capture the same thought (Marshall 1950; Sen 1999).

However, for remittances to play a role in social policy, one has to consider the evident difficulties involved in the exchange of financial flows (see Guarnizo 2003). For various reasons, macro-political agents such as governments and international organisations have tried to
control such flows. States in the North, the US in particular, have tried to redirect flows through the hawala and hindi systems to the formal banking system. Officially, this has been part of states' efforts to gain political control over resource flows after 9/11 in the 'war against terrorism'. From a state control point of view, remittances transferred through informal channels indicate the transgressive behaviour of migrants, not only their entrepreneurial spirit; remittances do not go to countries as such but to particular villages; states try to get control (emigration states). For international organisations, remittances are one of the instances in which the control over development finance is at stake. The World Bank and the regional development banks, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank give credits to poor countries. The profit made comes from the small margin of interest rates imposed. However, in the aftermath of structural adjustment programmes and, above all, alternative sources for credits (e.g. China in Africa), more and more developing countries seem to be less and less interested in development finance issued with all the strings attached, such as the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights, scaling down social subsidies, China requires none of these stifling conditions. As a result, the World Bank issues fewer credits and the volume of transactions thus decreases. This state of affairs constitutes a challenge indeed to the mandate of the World Bank. A transnational perspective must take into account the frictions and sometimes even political conflicts raised by the efforts at controlling financial remittances.

With respect to all forms of remittances – whether financial, human capital or social – the issue of their usage for purposes such as social and economic welfare point towards a deeper question. They signal different and often divergent visions around the notion of development. If one uses the notion of development, the questions are: what kind of development, whose development and for whom? Is there congruence between development visions of diaspora groups and development agencies? Do transfers imply transformations? The cooperation, and sometimes co-optation, of migrant associations by development agencies and local governments raises the issue of who sets the standards for the goals to be achieved. Listening to the voices of migrants and communities affected by migration may involve redefining the goals and indicators of development to focus on human well-being rather than monetary wealth. Yet, it would be naive to ascribe an emphasis on community and equality to migrant agency, and more instrumental aims to development agencies, governments of nation states and international organisations.
3) Transnationalisation through coupling migration control and development aid

Paradoxically, restrictive migration policies may be conducive to financial remittances and the maintenance of transnational kinship groups. Contemporary international borders are much more akin to sieves than to medieval brick walls. Their principal function is to protect the integrity of the socio-economic, demographic and cultural integrity of the population lying behind them. One important measure is to filter unacceptable or illegitimate migrants and welcoming those which increase the competitiveness of the economy. The hewers of wood and the drawers of water are implicitly ‘wanted but not welcome’ (Zolberg 1987). By contrast, those regarded as highly skilled migrants who transmit knowledge and foreign investments are not only wanted but also quite welcome. The migration-development link is usually mentioned in its function to reduce the propensities for migration to Europe. Coupled with such controls are policies making development aid to states in the European periphery conditional upon their willingness to control undocumented migration (Faist & Ette 2007). In other words, emigration countries need to show their willingness to control illegal migration to immigration countries in order to get development aid. A good example for such conditionality is Morocco, which partly depends on the EU for financial contributions. Yet, these policies, provided they are half-way effective, may produce unintended consequences. For example, the implicit migration policy logic of remittance and development discussions is that migrants should keep migrating, in a rather restrictive migration control configuration that sets migrants up to remit: family members are left behind. This is so because restrictive immigration policy towards some categories of mobiles, especially illegal ones, produces ruptured transnational families. Remittances may then become even more relevant. Seen from a functional point of view, the public policies that differ on undocumented migrants and the highly skilled – restrictive in the former case and welcoming in the latter – are important for sustaining the same kind of effect, namely, the circulation of persons and other resources.

4) Transnational concepts and the concept of the transnational

Not all ‘national’ concepts can or should be ‘transnationalised’. It is very nebulous what a term like ‘transnational citizenship’ could mean. Sometimes the term is used to connote membership of migrants to local communities (Fitzgerald 2004). However, it then does not have a legal referent. Citizenship usually connotes equal political freedom, equal rights of full members and affiliation to a politically bounded group (Faist 2007b). A very loose definition of citizenship as transnational does not help analytical work. On the level of nation states, it is therefore more precise to speak of dual or multiple citizenships. This
issue is also relevant on the level of supra-state polities such as the European Community or EU citizenship, which comprises several layers of citizenship nested within each other – regional, national and European. Therefore, we are better off speaking of transnational membership when discussing the involvement of geographically mobile persons in local communities in two or more countries. The situation may be different when talking about transnational civil society. Civil society and rule of law – or even democratic statehood – are mutually constitutive. Civil society is usually held to be a sphere distinct from ‘market’ and ‘state’ and, as such, can only be thought of as basic human and civil rights guaranteed by state structures. Migrant organisations may be part of groups active in the civil sphere (Faist 2000b: chapter 9).

The difficulties involved in transnationalising concepts such as citizenship and civil society point towards a larger problématique. Too often the prefix ‘trans’ means only overcoming unhelpful binary oppositions. And indeed, from a transnational angle, oppositions such as emigrant and immigrant can partly be dissolved in the concept of a transnational migrant. Also, as mentioned above, there is no necessary opposition between transnational ties and the incorporation of geographically mobile persons in different and distinct local and national civil, economic and political spheres. However, it should not be forgotten that ‘trans’ does not simply imply going beyond – namely, beyond conflicts created by the very transnationality of ties and social structures. For example, there are numerous documented instances of conflicts between development visions of hometown associations and those remaining in the locales of origin. While the former may see stipends awarded to bright students for study abroad as an appropriate tool of development, the latter may be interested in the improvement of local infrastructures (for examples, see Waldinger 2006).

6 Conclusion

Transnational approaches offer a counter-balance to macro-oriented, top-down approaches of globalisation, world society and world polity theory. Although they are less integrated theoretically than these three broad groups of approaches, they offer much-needed heuristic tools to call into question unrealistic notions of these other cross-border theories in at least two respects. First, transnational approaches occupy the conceptual space in between ‘container’ social sciences fraught by problems such as methodological territorialism and methodological nationalism, on the one hand, and world society and world polity theories, on the other hand (on related but differing concepts such as ‘cosmopolitanism’, see Beck & Sznaider 2006). Transnational approaches
fulfil this function because they emphasise the tension between space as place and space as flows. Although the boundaries of many national institutions, including the nation states themselves, are rapidly changing, binary oppositions are not going to dissolve. If one is interested in emergent structures of world society or world polity, one has to take very seriously the nexus between local and global models and look at how they shape each other. Doing so requires attention to cross-border agency. This means allowing for both tendencies towards homogeneity and heterogeneity, incorporation and disintegration of societal formations across the globe. Second, globalisation and world society approaches usually do not pose the central question any political sociology has to put at its centre – the problem of legitimacy of social orders and social systems. Issues of legitimate social order, here shown in an exemplary way regarding the migration-development nexus, are at the root of social change and transformation in any kind of societal formation.

Notes

1 The United Nations defines migrants as persons living outside their country of birth or citizenship for over a year. The world total of migrants amounted to about 100 million in 1980. Of those, approximately 50 million were in the North, compared with 52 million in the South. By 2006, out of a global total of some 190 million migrants, 61 million had moved South-South, 53 million North-North, fourteen million North-South and 62 million South-North (UNDESA 2006). Obviously, categories such as North and South represent gross oversimplifications, since many countries cannot be readily classified as either North or South. For example, there are also quite a few transformation or transition countries in the former Eastern Bloc, or emerging powers such as China.

2 Ultimately, these analyses have to be reconnected to macro-level analysis in the realm of systems or fields. On a macro-level, the reconfiguration of social space is visible, for example, in the political realm. In a process of ‘unbundling’ territoriality (Ruggie 1993), various types of functional regimes have come to intersect territorially defined nation states. Such institutions include common markets, border-crossing political communities and international and supranational organisations. Non-territorial functional space-as-flows and territorial nation states as space-of-places are the grids wherein international or global society is anchored. Such ruptures render the conventional distinction between internal and external increasingly problematic because there are various tiers of making collectively binding decisions. It also calls into question the concept of state sovereignty as an expression of a single fixed viewpoint and the research strategy of ‘methodological nationalism’, which takes for granted nation states as container-like units. These units are subsequently defined by the congruence of a fixed state territory, an intergenerational political community and a legitimate state authority. By contrast, multi-layered systems of rule, such as the EU, demand a multi-perspective framework.
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The contribution of migration studies and transnationalism to the anthropological debate: a critical perspective

Alessandro Monsutti

Towards a new paradigm in anthropology

At the junction between two millennia, many anthropologists feel deeply uneasy about the object and method of their discipline. Although there are scarcely any more grand systems of explanation, the theoretical debate remains intense. In this rich if disorganised intellectual climate, there have been important advances in the study of migration and refugee flows, in connection with the theme of transnationalism and globalisation, and this has had a wider impact on anthropology and the social sciences in general.

Since the 1980s, a new epistemological perspective (originating mostly among North American authors who adopt the perspective of postmodern anthropology) has broken with the previously dominant model that conceived of communities as discrete units, each woven together and rooted in a particular territory. Although numerous voices have been raised against the excesses of this new current, and against its oversimplification of the history of the discipline, it is no longer possible to keep doing anthropology as it was done in the 1950s, the 1960s or even the 1970s. The study of migration has played a major role in this turn (Kearney 1986: 332).

Migration is often explained in terms of violent conflicts or the attraction of labour markets in rich countries or urban centres. Although other factors may be in play, such as natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, prolonged drought, etc.) or certain kinds of development projects (dam construction, agrarian reforms, programmes to settle nomadic populations, etc.), it is political or economic causes that are ordinarily used to distinguish between forced migration and voluntary migration. The media and public opinion in the West echo this by readily contrasting political refugees with economic migrants, seeing many mobile people as bogus refugees who use asylum procedures to come and work in Western Europe or North America.
It is becoming increasingly clear that this mainly causal framework cannot do justice to the complexity of today’s global migration flows. We will gain by going beyond anthropological conceptions in which cultures and communities appear as spatially located phenomena. Migration will then no longer be seen as movement from one place to another, but rather as:

\[\text{multidirectional (sometimes circular) relocation which changes place of residence but not always the places where time is actually spent, the intensity of social relations but not systematically their structure. It is therefore a complex social phenomenon involving much more than flight or attraction towards prosperous lands. The conception of a definitive resettlement or irreversible move does not take account of the social reality, for the migratory phenomena observable today are mostly bidirectional or circular (Droz & Sottas 1997: 70).}\]

In many cases, spatial dispersion is a survival strategy that makes it possible to use a variety of ecological and socio-economic niches and to spread risks. Migration, then, should no longer be seen in terms of ‘flight by individuals in search of a better life’; for, although migrants do leave, ‘at the same time – through family circulation strategies – they remain at home’ (Droz & Sottas 1997: 86).

International migration by no means signals a recent change from a world of homogeneous and mutually separated social-cultural entities. From the very beginnings, mobility has been a major constituent of human history. To be sure, population movements have been particularly intense in the last part of the twentieth century, but this is not enough to explain the current theoretical infatuation with the problems of migration and refugees. We also need to bear in mind other factors, such as the rise of postmodern theories in philosophy and social science, the accompanying crisis of grand systems of explanation in anthropology and the gradual institutionalisation of development aid and humanitarian action in two distinct stages (after World War II and then after the end of the cold war).

Focusing more specifically on an appraisal of the work of some North American scholars, this chapter aims to assess the scope and limits of the existing anthropological literature on migration and its contribution to the debate on the object and methods of the discipline. Thought needs to be given to an open conception of the relationship between social-cultural groups and territories, in a way that goes beyond the assumption of sedentariness and the opposition between voluntary economic migrants and involuntary political refugees.
2 Beyond places

In their critical reflection on the object and methods of anthropology, the various (mainly North American) authors of Writing culture (Clifford & Marcus 1986) consider the links among social-cultural groups, territorial areas and the phenomenon of migration. According to Clifford and Marcus, for a long time, anthropologists saw their object of investigation as consisting of culturally and linguistically homogeneous territorial groups. By travelling from one location to another and from one culture to another, migrants challenged this vision of a world composed of a mosaic of discrete socio-cultural entities. Then it was thought that migrants simply moved from one place or culture to another, in a one-way and time-bound process that ended with the more or less successful integration of the migrant in his or her host society or return to his or her society of origin.

Beginning in the 1980s, an increasing number of researchers sought to shift the focus from clearly defined territorial groups to the trajectories of migrants crossing political and cultural frontiers. There was growing interest in cultural hybridity, creolisation, public culture or global economics and in transnationalism and diaspora existence, as aspects of a world undergoing massive change in which the metaphor of rootedness no longer seemed to apply. The success of the term ‘diaspora’ – which reached its peak in 1991 with the founding of an eponymous journal – testifies to the rise of migration studies. In fact, it derives from a Greek word meaning ‘dispersion’ and has been used historically to refer to the Jews within the Roman Empire (Tolóyan 1996: 10). In a programmatic text that appeared in the first issue of the journal, William Safran defined its referent as follows:

[expatriate communities whose members share several of the following characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘centre’ to two or more ‘peripheral’, or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness]
and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such relationship. (Safran 1991: 83-84)

This definition reflects the Jewish origin of the concept and its extension to certain other communities (Greeks and Armenians). Since the early 1990s, the term ‘diaspora’ has become very popular in both academic and journalistic writings to denote an ever-increasing number of dispersed peoples – from the Turks of Germany to the Asians of Britain, from the Palestinians to the Chinese of South-East Asia (Bruneau 1994; Töloyan 1996; Schnapper 2001). If such a proliferation has unduly stretched the meaning of the word (Brubaker 2005), it is necessary to go beyond paradigmatic cases to understand the changing global conditions of our time. James Clifford (1994), in a critique of Safran’s text, suggested that the concept should be widened as part of an anthropology of travel. In his view, it was not useful to define a term such as ‘diaspora’ by reference to an ‘ideal type’, so that various groups then became more or less ‘diasporic’ by virtue of various qualities they did or did not have. Instead, he argued for an anthropology that could offer an open, non-normative account of decolonisation, migration, global communication, transport, and any other phenomenon linked to multilocality and mobility. In the rapidly changing world of the late twentieth century, social links were becoming diffuse and transnational relations more widespread. Diaspora discourses therefore reflected a general tendency of belonging to transnational networks that included a person’s place of origin as one ‘mooring’ among others.

Although diasporas are often brought about by political and economic inequality, Clifford stressed the capacity for resistance of displaced peoples. Diaspora communities such as the Jews contradict the idea of self-sufficient cultures turned in on themselves and tied to a single place. They cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the nation state or global capitalism, for they have become a constituent feature of the contemporary world. This should impel us to define a new set of conceptual tools.

Clifford’s points concerning diasporas are part of a wider attempt to redefine the method of anthropology. He is aware that there have always been dissident tendencies, but the field was conceived in the legacy of Bronislaw Malinowski as a joint residence rather than a trip or visit. In other words, the dominant concept of the field implied a stay in a given place. This method had its source in a conception of culture as an integrated, homogeneous entity within a clearly defined space. Clifford, by contrast, saw culture in terms of travelling – not only in the literal sense, but as a whole series of more or less allegorical or imaginary relocations. He also thought that anthropology should draw its inspiration from certain techniques in travel writing, to allow
greater room for the author’s emotions. Fieldwork was therefore no longer the study of distant peoples, of an essentialist Other, but involved a (not only spatial) experience of decentring.

In a text originally published in 1990, Arjun Appadurai (1999) also asked how anthropology could apprehend the contemporary world, and attempted to go beyond such dichotomies as global-local or North-South. He proposed five conceptual categories as a way of organising the anthropology of global culture and economy: ethnoscapes, produced by the movement of persons (refugees and migrants, of course, but also seasonal workers and tourists); technoscapes, constituted through the circulation of technologies; finanscapes (i.e. capital flows and stock exchanges); mediascapes, consisting of information and images produced by radio, television, newspapers, cinema and other media; and ideoscapes, deriving from state or non-state political ideologies (freedom, public good, rights, sovereignty, etc.). Far from culturally homogenising the world, these five types of flow produce new differences and resurgent identities. Appadurai made further use of these distinctions in another text that appeared shortly afterwards (1991).

As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories and reconfigure their ethnic ‘project’, the ethno in ethnography takes on a slippery, non-localised quality (...) groups are no longer tightly territorialised, spatially bounded, historically unself-conscious or culturally homogenous. (Appadurai 1991: 191)

In Appadurai’s view, the movement of persons is an essential characteristic of the contemporary world. He argues for a ‘cosmopolitan ethnology’ based upon new research strategies that enable us to understand the deterritorialised world in which we live (1991: 196); it should not only study actual movement but also focus on the imagination and its various representations. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992; 1997) have further elaborated this theoretical effort, in reflections on field practice and its links with a localised conception of culture. The fact that societies, cultures and nations appear to be distinct from one another derives from a particular conception of space, whereas migrants and refugees call into question the conjunction of culture and territory.

### 3 Towards transnationalism

These general theoretical efforts extended into the field of migration studies, where an increasing number of authors no longer consider their object of study to be closed units or localised communities. The term ‘transnationalism’ has now become dominant to describe this
approach. We will here stick to the definition made by Steven Vertovec who summarises the debate as follows:

most social scientists working in the field may agree that ‘transnationalism’ broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states. (1999: 447)

Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc have specialised in the theory of transnationalism, defining it as a social process whereby migrants establish relations across geographical, political and cultural frontiers and link together their country of origin with their country of resettlement. They call ‘transmigrants’ those individuals who develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, religious or political – across political, cultural and geographical frontiers, and whose identity is therefore linked to networks stretching across several nation states (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: ix, 1; see Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 48, 54; and Basch et al. 1994: 7).

According to these authors, globalisation is characterised by the intensification of relations among distant places, so that a local situation is influenced by events taking place far away. Anthropologists cannot take cultures in isolation, but must study the flows of persons, objects, capital, images and information. The perfect example of a transnational phenomenon is therefore a migratory process affecting several countries, but globalisation has a more abstract dimension less directly linked to particular countries (Kearney 1995: 548 referring to Glick Schiller et al. 1992). Both concepts, however, point beyond a world divided between a core and a periphery; both involve a more complex view in which different social-cultural spheres interpenetrate. The research object for anthropology thus shifts from territorial (or supposedly territorial) communities within a nation state towards discontinuous spaces whose nations are only one component and not the overarching frame of reference. This raises a number of theoretical and methodological issues (Kearney 1995: 548-549).

Globalisation may be seen as an increase in the number of links and flows across state frontiers. It brings new types of movement of goods and information, as well as new feelings of belonging. Nation states lose some of their decision-making power in relation to economic phenomena (the globalisation of capital seems more critical here than the globalisation and acceleration of trade flows), but this tendency – as many researchers have pointed out – goes together with the rise of ethnicist political discourses and ‘essentialist nationalism’ (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 52; see Appadurai 1999). Benedict Anderson, for his part, speaks of ‘long-distance nationalism’ (1992: 12). There are two very
different evaluations of this process. Some authors consider that the homogenising force of Western social-economic imperialism threatens the cultural diversity of the world, while others stress that transnational flows are locally reinterpreted or that, as George E. Marcus points out (1992: 313), the homogenisation process encounters resistance and goes together with the creation of new differences. For Anderson (1992) this bodes nothing but ill, whereas for Appadurai (1995) it marks a new opening out.

A number of researchers have used the concept of transnational network to study forced migrations. The work of Liisa Malkki (1992; 1995a; 1995b; 1997), for instance, expresses the same drive to rethink the whole problematic of migration. She attacks the metaphor of rootedness, which has metaphysical implications in so far as it naturalises the ties between people and territories; the concept of a place of origin is indeed becoming hard to use, since more and more people identify with deterritorialised categories. The study of people on the move points to a new theoretical sensitivity, whose main interest is in frontiers and border-crossing. This paradigm shift allows us to cast a critical eye on the effects that a national frame of reference may have on research relating to refugees and other displaced persons.

Migration appears as an anomaly to social scientists for whom societies and cultures are rooted in a land, with the result that many academic studies adopt a quasi-medical or psychologistic perspective. But it is also anomalous in relation to the political organisation of the world, divided as it is into a multiplicity of nation states (Zolberg 1981: 6). The usual conceptions of culture tend ‘toward rooting rather than travel’, writes Malkki (1992: 33) with reference to Clifford. Like Glick Schiller et al. (1995) and many others, she lays bare the sedentarist presuppositions in xenophobic anti-immigrant discourse. The ‘order of things’ of which she speaks is that of the natural division of the world into a number of sovereign states.

Malkki sums up her argument in four points: 1) the world of nations tends to be seen as a compartmentalised space of disjointed territories; 2) the relationship of local populations with space tends to be naturalised through botanical metaphors; 3) the concept of culture has many points in common with the concept of nation, since both imply rooting in particular places; this reveals a ‘metaphysical sedentarism’ or a ‘metaphysic of sedentariness’; and 4) naturalisation of the links between populations and spaces implies that relocation is an anomaly – an idea expressed in the metaphor of ‘uprootedness’.

This overview has highlighted at least three features of transnational studies: the phenomena in question cross the frontiers of autonomous political entities; the links are established over a long distance; and a diversity of meanings and cultural forms is implied. Ulf Hannerz has

4 Migration, transnationalism and globalisation

How should we assess the significance of the epistemological turn in post-structuralist anthropology? Does the postmodern perspective correspond to a passing fashion or to a genuine theoretical regeneration?

Transnational studies take account of the rich diversity of migrant situations beyond the narrow framework of nation states. It takes on board the fact that migrants retain links with their country of origin; it concerns itself not only with adaptation processes and the forging of new identities but also, and above all, with the social relations that migrants develop. This goes beyond the idea that migration is a single event involving relocation from A to B, a one-way and irreversible occurrence. The migrant is not simply seen as an agent executing rational choices to maximise his or her interests. Without going to the opposite extreme (the idea that migrants are submerged by social forces on which they have no purchase), it is necessary to consider the social field and political context in which the lives of migrants and refugees unfold. In other words, we must avoid two pitfalls: ‘an undersocialized view of migration in which all action reflect(s) individual wishes and preferences’ and ‘an oversocialized view in which people (are) passive agents in the migratory process’ (Boyd 1989: 641).

More generally, the current that takes a special interest in globalisation and transnationalism raises questions about the object and methods of anthropology. Many are those who claim that the impossibility of demarcating and territorialising social groups should make us abandon the concept of culture. But it is not always clear whether this is bound up with empirical considerations – that is, with the changing features of migration since the 1960s – or whether it is a theoretical statement. Does the altered perspective correspond to an objective evolution of the contemporary world, or does it stem from a new awareness of the limitations of the old anthropological and social-scientific paradigms? Are we speaking of a response to external changes or a conceptual adjustment? It is essential to distinguish these two levels,
which the critical movement in North American anthropology often tends to confuse. In fact, we may reproach it with two interrelated defects: a misguided view of the social and economic history of the world, and a simplistic conception of the history of anthropology. Let us consider these in turn.

5 History of migration in perspective

Authors who specialise in transnationalism and globalisation usually argue that the flows of persons, capital, commodities and information acquired an unprecedented scale in the second half of the twentieth century. Glick Schiller and her colleagues clearly opt for the view that this was a novel phenomenon and seek to outline a corresponding field for research (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: x, 1).6

Theories of transnationalism and globalisation would therefore seem to originate in a view of the faster cross-border circulation of persons, goods and money, as well as of information and ideas. But is this really so new? Many authors remain sceptical (e.g. Shami 1996: 4) and criticise the performative dimension of the statements in question, the quest for special effects, and the use of various stylistic figures. It is perfectly legitimate to take an interest in human groups on the move. But Sidney W. Mintz (1998), for example, wonders whether the term ‘transnational’ introduces anything new. He does not deny that separate places may be linked through the continual movement of individuals, money, goods and information. Basing himself on the experience of the Caribbean, however, he shows that globalisation has been characterised by periodicity. In the nineteenth century several hundred million people migrated; roughly half of these were Europeans who left to become citizens of the United States, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Australia or New Zealand; but the other half – Africans, Chinese or Indians – migrated as a labour force from colonised countries to other colonised countries. This vast movement therefore expressed a certain relationship of forces and division of labour at international level. It is true that migration took new forms in the twentieth century, as many Africans, Chinese or Indians settled in the West, but that was only one stage in a larger process that had begun several centuries earlier. Only a profound short-sightedness makes the bards of transnationalism overlook this fact. Mintz concludes in polemical fashion:

The massive movement of people globally is centuries old. The identification of persons with more than one community is similarly ancient. (...) The new theories of transnationalism and globa-
Gupta (2000), who bases his work on the spread of agricultural products and new food habits, also situates globalisation in a broader historical and geographical perspective. From the Middle Ages on, the tastes of Westerners were influenced, or even fundamentally altered, by food supplied from China, India or Africa, while in a symmetrical process many of the ingredients in Indian cooking originated in the New World. Northern Europe played a minor role until the Industrial Revolution, although dense trade flows linked Southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Far East. What mainly characterises the contemporary period, therefore, is not globalisation but a crisis of sovereignty affecting the nation states that developed in the West after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Discourses centred upon globalisation mostly emanate from Western academics immersed in a specific political model. They do not really acknowledge that, in many other parts of the world, the nation state remained a fiction while social, cultural and commercial relations maintained a stable existence. As a lot of research has shown, migration and trade are age-old phenomena that acquired particular intensity in the last few centuries and in regions outside Europe. The acceleration of recent times is largely a question of degree.

Another frequent element in definitions of globalisation is the emergence of deterritorialised identity referents. The dispersion of certain peoples combined with a persistent sense of unity is certainly not a new phenomenon; it was long masked by the nation state model yet is an integral part of human history. Without denying that the circulation of capital and information is nowadays unprecedented in both speed and scale, we need to keep in mind that the rise, triumph and relative weakening of nation states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took place at a particular historical moment. After a long period in which it was held back, the expression of transnational relations and loyalties has gained new visibility in the contemporary world (Schnapper 2001). Nevertheless, far from being specific to post-modernity or globalisation, this ‘polycentric’ mode of ‘discontinuous and reticulate’ organisation is older than the nation state, with its characteristic ‘homogeneity and centralisation’ (Bruneau 1994: 13).

It is a particular historical angle of vision that makes us think of transnationalism as a recent phenomenon, whereas in reality (as shown by Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983 and Hobsbawm 1990), the nation state is a novelty linked to the development of capitalism and industrialisation, which resulted in a new system of representing space.
and community ties. Today people travel and communicate faster than in the past, but it is the scale rather than the nature of the phenomenon which has changed (Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 40). Perhaps what best defines the present day is the fact that a division of space into sovereign nation states is superimposed onto multiple movement across state frontiers linked to the spread of post-industrial capitalism.

6 History of anthropology in perspective

How do the main North American researchers working on the conditions of production of anthropological knowledge see the history of their own discipline? They argue in favour of opening up or disembedding the field, so that the links between culture and territory are weakened and the whole approach becomes more pluralist and less totalising (e.g. Marcus 1989: 8). Their criticisms cannot be lightly dismissed; indeed, they are a key aid in helping us to understand migratory phenomena and the contemporary world. Unfortunately, however, they are in danger of rapidly becoming new academic clichés, which are not always built around in-depth ethnography.

In order to present their own discourse as innovative, such authors as Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc claim that classical anthropology conceived of each society as a ‘discrete and bounded entity’. Each society, they stated, had its own distinctive economy, culture and historical trajectory, and it was tied to a ‘bounded view of society and culture’, ‘static models’ (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: 6) or ‘bounded social science concepts’ (Basch et al. 1994: 22). But these pictures of the history of the discipline tend to be too crude and schematic. Nor can one refrain from criticising the search for stylistic effect when they speak of the ‘discovery’ of transnationalism (Basch et al. 1994: 4-7).

At the same time, however, it is necessary to look critically at the tradition defined by Malinowski and then taken up by the whole of the discipline; to rethink the anthropology of refugees and migration through a critique of the idea of the rootedness and territoriality of human groups. The more or less functionalist conceptions implicit in the work of many anthropologists have led them to see relocation as an anomaly that requires psychological services to provide a new framework for those who have been subjected to the trauma. Regrettably, Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc confuse the part with the whole; what they denounce is in fact the result of Malinowski’s reaction to diffusionism. As Gupta and Ferguson point out (1997: 19-21), the diffusionist current represented by William H. R. Rivers, for example, laid great stress on contact between cultures. Franz Boas also took an interest in the history of migration and seriously doubted whether
there were primitive societies that had never had any contact with the outside. Rather than simply emphasising the undeniable changes in the contemporary world, it is therefore crucially important to reflect on the history of anthropology and on its way of constructing its object of study.

In one polemical text, whose starting point is not migration but the concept of culture, Robert Brightman (1995) makes an incisive critique of the new thinking among American anthropologists. Questioning the significance of the postmodern 'epistemological turn', he argues that their contributions often aim to do no more than express old problems in a new vocabulary, with a superficial reading, or even ignorance, of the classical texts. This is what he calls 'relexification'. Malkki, for instance, invoking Clifford, writes that for classical anthropology 'the idea of culture carries with it an expectation of roots, of a stable, territorialized existence' (1992: 29), whereas Brightman attacks this prejudice through a detailed reading of certain texts. The same charge may be made against Appadurai, when he claims that 'natives are not only persons who are from certain places, and belong to those places, but they are also those who are somehow incarcerated, or confined, in those places' (Appadurai 1988: 38).

Brightman argues that such critiques involve a 'construction of defective culture' (1995: 526), in the sense that they deny the diversity of previous definitions. In reality, the object of study in classical anthropology was much more fluid, and its use of the term 'culture' indicated a shared terminology but by no means substantive conceptual agreement. Many of the criticisms of the concept of culture actually represent rhetorical strategies in which the wealth of usage is selectively narrowed down. Brightman does not deny the interest of contemporary debates, nor that many questions need to be posed differently in the changed intellectual context, but he does reproach many authors for their performative utterances and appeal for greater attention to the classical legacy:

And to be sure, certain of the recent criticisms of culture gamble rather poignantly for their topicality on an increasingly pervasive disciplinary amnesia, a lack of familiarity with what has gone before. [...] Neither in earlier disciplinary history nor as deployed in recent anthropological writing does the culture concept consistently exhibit the attributes of ahistoricism, totalisation, holism, legalism, and coherence with which its critics selectively reconstitute it. These are invented images of culture, both arbitrary and partial with respect to a much more diverse and versatile field of definition and use. Such images, nonetheless, are rapidly acquiring more authoritative perlocutionary effects. (1995: 540-541)
We should not be duped, then, by the relexification manoeuvres of those authors who blithely attribute to their predecessors what they themselves intend to oppose with their ‘rhetoric of discontinuity’ (Darnell 1995). In Regina Darnell’s eyes, the claim to theoretical novelty by the authors of Writing culture (Clifford & Marcus 1986), a veritable manifesto of postmodern anthropology, largely rests upon a camouflaging of the work of their predecessors. Mintz also expresses surprise that the promoters of transnationalism appear so ignorant both of world history and of the history of anthropology (1998: 120; 131). In the same vein, Marshall Sahlins (1999) denounces the hegemonic tendencies of what he calls ‘afterology’ (postmodernism, poststructuralism, post-colonialism, etc.), and defends Raymond Firth, Franz Boas, Alfred Kroeber, Melville Herskovits, Ralph Linton and Paul Radin against the charge that they regarded cultures as self-sufficient entities closed in on themselves (Sahlins 1999: 411).

Thus, the abandonment of the term ‘culture’ advocated by American authors such as Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) cannot in itself constitute a solution, based as it is upon a very partial (in both senses of the word) reading of the history of anthropology. As to the proposed alternatives, we may doubt whether Abu-Lughod’s ‘ethnography of the particular’, for example, is likely to prove a fertile project, or whether she is right to claim that “culture” operates in anthropological discourse to enforce separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy’ (1991: 137-138). Analytic thought itself is called into question by the attachment of such value to particularity.7 In assailing the generalisations of previous authors, Abu-Lughod herself engages in improper generalisation and simplification; her stereotyped presentation of functionalist-inspired monographs leaves whole swathes of the discipline out of the picture.

Jean-Loup Amselle, in his most recent work (2000), regrets the use that has been made of notions of mixing or creolisation, which he himself helped to popularise.

Starting from the postulate of discrete cultural entities called ‘cultures’, one ends up with a hybrid conception of a postcolonial or post-cold war world. (...) If, as postmodern anthropologists assert, our epoch is radically different from all previous ones, in the sense that it brings all cultures on earth into a relation of total interdependence, there must have been a time in human history when certain societies were closed in on themselves. (...) Contrary to the implicit postulate of the supporters of globalisation, which allows them to reproduce the distinction between primitive and modern societies at the core of the definition of anthropology, we would like to show here that closed societies have never in fact existed. (2000: 209-210; 213-213)
For Amselle, then, we are not witnessing the disappearance of a primitive world of isolated and homogenous societies, because no such world has ever existed. Basing himself on knowledge of West Africa, he forcefully asserts the flexible and historical character of extra-European societies. What distinguishes the contemporary epoch is not contact between cultures or large-scale international migration, nor even the pace of such movement, but rather particular identity reflexes and a redefinition of the role of nation states (Schnapper 2001).

Jonathan Friedman (1994; 2000), an author much interested in relations between the global and the local, also criticises the new tendency in North American anthropology both for its schematic picture of the theories and methods of classical anthropology and for its inaccurate view of world history. The fact that contacts have always existed does not, he stresses, mean that the idea of place loses all meaning. Global contacts must be placed in a wider historical perspective, so that the world is understood as a system in which cultural frontiers undergo cycles of shrinkage and expansion. Unlike the theorists of transnationalism, Friedman tries to draw out the historical, political and social forces that impel people to build exclusive identities. Not content with the moral point of view for which hybridity is a solution to the major problem of essentialism, he does not mince his words about the new ‘transnational vulgate’ (2000: 193). He follows Brightman and Sahlins in lambasting the view that authors such as Appadurai or Malkki have of the history of anthropology: they may think they are reforming the discipline through the deconstruction of old categories, but for the most part they just ‘add the prefix “trans” to the words that used to connote that which was closed’ (Friedman 2000: 194). Some argue that Western colonial expansion imposed uniformity and that the true hybridity of the world is once again manifesting itself in the post-colonial age, whereas a larger group of authors insist that globalisation is blurring what was originally a mosaic of distinct cultural identities. In either case, however, globalisation is seen as having profoundly changed the world.

The point here is not to deny the existence of global flows, but to think of them as the product of specific historical conditions that did not eliminate all local causality. The temptation of seeing societies as isolated entities must be resisted, and ways found to study closure mechanisms and essentialism as social phenomena rather than moral or political transgressions. The construction of local identities should be understood in connection with the encompassing regional systems that have existed since time immemorial. Friedman points out that a new period of ‘economic deglobalisation’ began after 1920 and was reversed only in the 1950s – implying that globalisation is not without precedent but has appeared cyclically in close connection with the dynamics of
the world capitalist system (2000: 203). What we are witnessing is not the emergence of a new world, but a complex historical and economic process made up of periods of expansion and retreat.8

7 Conclusion

My purpose is not to downplay the significance of transnational studies, which are undoubtedly one of the most interesting attempts to tackle the doubts besetting anthropology since the exhaustion of functionalism and structuralism. The different works discussed here contribute to an understanding of transnational (or simply multilocal) phenomena beyond a limited territorial view of culture and society.

The real task is to disentangle what amounts to an intellectual flirtation from a genuine theoretical enrichment capable of leading to a new ethnographic practice. We must beware of stylistic effects. The invention of a new vocabulary does not always regenerate ethnographic practices and very often overlooks the complexity of the history of the discipline. This chapter aims at showing that many anthropologists have been fully conscious that the movement of people to seek work, to escape drought or to flee war was a common experience in large parts of the world in the past. Although states and humanitarian organisations do tend to regard movement as pathological, or at least anomalous (Monsutti 2008), it is an exaggeration to attribute a ‘sedentary metaphysic’ to the whole scholarly literature.

Recent literature in transnational studies has moved beyond the triumphal tone of earlier works and offers a nuanced presentation of the ‘pitfalls and promise’ of this perspective (Portes et al. 1999).9 There is a growing awareness that large-scale migratory and economic circuits spanning state frontiers are not a new development, and they do not dissolve either the places or the existence of social groups. Migratory trajectories may insert themselves into a local framework of self-representation and representation of the life-cycle. There are many interesting examples of ethnographies which are both global and local10 and illustrate how revised classical field methods can contribute in a crucial way to the study of the changing conditions of our time.

Notes

1 This chapter is partly based on the first chapter in Monsutti (2005).
2 For an effort in clarification, see also Van Hear (1998).
3 See also Al-Ali et al. (2001).
‘Ecumene’ is a transliteration of a word that the ancient Greeks used to denote the totality of the inhabited world. It had already been used by Kroeber (1945) to emphasise ancient interregional ties in Eurasia.

This chapter deals primarily with North American literature, though migration studies have also made considerable headway in the French-speaking world. See e.g. works by Bruneau (1994), Ma Mung (1992) and Tarrius (1995; 2001), who are more specifically interested in the circulation of commodities and people.

Rather it is the current moment of capitalism as a global mode of production that has necessitated the maintenance of family ties and political allegiances among persons spread across the globe. (…) We believe, however, that current transnationalism marks a new type of migrant experience, reflecting an increased and more pervasive global penetration of capital. (Basch et al. 1994: 24)

In his remorseless attack on postmodernism, Lindholm (1997) accuses Abu-Lughod of reproducing the moral and logical errors of romanticism.

See also Bright and Geyer (1987).

In the same vein, see also Levitt et al. (2003); Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen (2004); Levitt and Jaworsky (2007); Brettell (2008).

For a subtle methodological discussion dealing with Caribbean data, see Olwig (2003).

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7 New migratory configurations: transnationalism/s, diaspora/s, migratory circulation

Stéphane de Tapia

1 Introduction

This chapter is based on the analyses of Thomas Faist, Alessandro Monsutti1 and other authors developed in this volume. My own participation in international conferences devoted to the conceptualisation and dynamics of diasporas or in the Revue européenne des migrations internationales will also be integrated, along with the reflections of French authors such as Alain Tarrius or Dominique Schnapper (Anteb-Yemini, Berthomie`re & Sheffer 2005; Berthomie`re & Chivallon 2006; Prevelakis 1996).

The questions that social scientists have been focusing on² include that of the definitions and the economy of ideas such as transnationalism, transnational fields, diasporas, migratory circulation, circular migration, co-presence, community and communautarism, migratory spaces and fields and nomad territories. These notions refer to the emergence of new migratory configurations, both in economically developed countries that are generally recruiters of labour and in the less developed countries which are listed among those who send migrants.³ All these notions, sometimes not quite concepts, deserve attention because they will affect the future of democratic societies as they face foretold ‘problems’, which are however recurrent or cyclical, such as those of the unbearable migratory pressure in less developed countries. A new and accurate question emerges in social sciences about the ‘end’ of the nation-state model: are diasporas or transnational constructions able to submerge or to transform the model of the traditional nation state pregnant in all Western countries and somewhat imposed on the entire world?

Globalisation would, in principle, seem to be conducive to a more open, active, fluid and free world. While that is true of capital, goods, tourists and managers from the countries now labelled ‘of the North’, the opening is for the most part quite partial – if not regressive – for
many categories of people from the so-called ‘South’. North and South are two politically correct appellations of the much older notions of developed (and rich) countries and underdeveloped (and poor) countries (Brunel 2004). It can be seen, on the one hand, that the flows of skilled labour within Europe or across the oceans are much smaller than what was expected and, on the other hand, that the migratory flows from the South are increasingly subjected to a priori suspicions and control that clearly limit their scope. Whether the migrants are legal or illegal, refugees or displaced persons, and regardless of the actual reason for the migration – which is sometimes vital in the literal sense – the move is towards tighter closing, based on suspicion that is often more imaginary than real. In any case, this suspicion is largely counterproductive for the global economy of a planet that is blithely heading towards overpopulation and catastrophes that are being predicted with ever greater insistence, if one only looks at the debate about global warming. It is but a reminder that for the best of reasons, the security approach ends up calling into question international agreements that have been reached with difficulty, such as the right to asylum, the Geneva Convention or even the UN Declaration of Human Rights (Legoux 2006; Bigo 1998). But at the same time, it is useful, if not necessary, to remember the fact that each year hundreds or even thousands of human beings are victims of irregular forms of migration between South and North, as shown by the very interesting (and in a way, veritably tremendous!) maps of victims of these migration flows around Europe and of the emerging ‘barricade Europe’.4

2 The language of migration

My experience of the Turkish field in the wider sense has taught me to proceed with methodological caution when it comes to the language used, both by researchers and by the informants responding to surveys. These experiences include not just communities from Turkey – which comprise many migrating minorities such as Anatolian Kurds – but also more distantly related communities such as the Kazakhs of Xinjiang now living in Paris, who came there via Turkey (De Tapia & Akgönül 2007), and recent Azerbaijani refugees from Iran and from the Republic of Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union. An ex nihilo learning of a language – for example, Turkish, which is the national language of a major country of emigration – often makes one cautious. Some of the ideas we use cannot be translated or are only approximations (if not contrary in meaning for the two societies, that of immigration and of emigration), despite all the precautions taken when defining scientific concepts and notions.5 The language of migration, in
spite of all the epistemological precautions taken, must always be contextualised according to the field as closely as possible and clearly established, if we are to avoid a few major mistranslations that can sometimes have major consequences. Because histories and sensitivities are not the same, words cannot always be transferred without misinterpretation; that is so of common notions such as integration, nation, migrant, diaspora, minority, refugee or even nomadic, homeland, heritage, which can have surprisingly diverse meanings depending on the time, place and jurisdiction. Some vernacular or idiomatic expressions relating to a specific culture may have a very rich connotation that can become aseptic when transferred to a scientific language. This is so of the series of words derived from ghorba (Arabic for ‘nostalgia’) or hajr (Arabic for ‘migration’) in Turkish, Persian or the language of the former Ottoman Balkans. Depending on the context, migration may have a strong emotional and religious charge (hajr is also at the root of ‘hegira’), or the migrant and nomad may be one and the same. In Turkish, as in other Turkic languages – or even in Mongolian, which is linguistically related but not similar – the concepts of nation, fatherland, heritage, land and territory, administrative divisions and organisation are clearly linked to the old and traditional nomadic way of life. This is also the case in the history of some nation states, despite a long experience of settlement by nomadic peoples or the strong presence of non-nomadic sedentary populations in the oases and merchant Islamic cities. For instance, ‘ulus’ is a term employed in modern Turkish, as in modern Mongolian, to refer to the ‘nation’; ‘yurt’ is the term used for ‘fatherland’ (‘nutag’ in Mongolian). In Mongolian, as in Turkish, the naming of modern administrative divisions is based on tribal nomadic notions (‘il, ilçe’ in Turkish, ‘aymag’ in Mongolian, ‘oymak’ in Turkish for ‘tribe’). These denominations are in fact recent. They were chosen in reaction against the former names of Arabic origin inherited from the Ottoman period. The recent invention of ‘millet’/‘milliyet’ for ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ and ‘vatan’ for ‘fatherland’ in the nineteenth century are interesting examples. Although these are both Arabic terms, they were used in Anatolian tribes of nomads and peasant communities as well as in distant regions such as those inhabited by Yakuts (Turkish-speaking) or Buryats (Mongolian-speaking) in Siberia in reference to tribal and sub-tribal lineages (Hamayon 1990). In the ‘indigenous thinking’, as our ethnologist colleagues would say, there is more redeployment and re-adaptation here than a clean break.

My work in recent years in the institutions of the Council of Europe only confirmed that observation. While all the documents produced by the Council are at least published in French and English, the two main official languages, the shift from English to French and vice versa is not always easy, especially if the text has to have a legal or diplomatic
connotation! There are other areas where translation – ‘truchement’, as the Quebecois would say – poses problems and requires attention: transdisciplinarity or popularisation.

Transdisciplinarity or pluridisciplinarity, which is very widely invoked, if not really desired by many and certainly useful for researchers, is not easy even within a single language. Through my frequent contacts with historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, I have learned that it is often very easy to misunderstand the meaning of a word from the scientific lexicon, even if it is qualified. The many meanings of the word ‘community’ have been the subject of much comment. Let us just remember the meaning of this word in public health, where santé communautaire in Quebec French refers to health action in the neighbourhood and not, as a French speaker might expect, to the health of minority groups or specific immigrant populations. The same goes of the word ‘diaspora’, which is now the issue of many books and the chief subject of many periodicals familiar to researchers in international migration. In this respect, Migrinter is an excellent example of multidisciplinary work, since it brings together many social science disciplines in addition to geography.

Popularisation is also not an easy endeavour, whether in the media or in the form of transmission of knowledge. The nature of society is to mix numerous diversified elements. That of a language is to live in the society in question. This is why the transmission of ideas relating to migration is not always easy – the difficulty of ‘speaking’ to policymakers has been mentioned, though the challenge is no smaller when it comes to explaining the complexity to a lay public, whether by direct contact or through the media.

I do not intend to make a critique or an exegesis of Faist’s very rich chapter, but to start the discussion from this chapter that has raised many queries. Beyond the main languages used in the scientific community that are English, French, Spanish or even German, for a large part of Europe, I think it is important to go back to the difficulty of sharing a common vocabulary and specialised lexicon in international migration research. First of all, Faist’s references include many titles in German and English, some documents being written directly in English by French speakers and a few English translations. Hence, this observation – which is not a fundamental critique – that these French-speaking authors are often people with close links to Anglo-Saxon research (post-doctoral students, academic stays, research in the UK and the US, etc.), while the French often take little account of findings by researchers from other cultural areas. Of course, such observations are not to be generalised. However, we are sometimes not quite up to judging the quality or relevance of research from other geographical or
linguistic areas. To take as an example, research in Russian or Turkish covers very wide fields and is seldom translated.

3 The idea of ‘transnationalism’: one notion, many uses

My second observation is on both the title and the content of this volume’s contribution by Faist. The use of the term ‘transnationalism’ is not always transparent. Even though it has become quite common, it could be that it is not fully acclimatised in France, except with those colleagues who precisely enjoy a close relationship with the Anglo-American world. Recent PhD dissertations by Monsutti (2004) and Elise Massicard (2005) – one on the widely informal networks of a Shiite population stigmatised in Afghanistan (the Persian-speaking Hazaras of Mongol descent) and the other on the migratory field of Turkish Alevis, another minority population that is often stigmatised for quite comparable reasons – propose a critical discussion of the very idea of transnationalism. In these cases, agents rarely refer to national entities, but rather, to infra-national groups that pay little heed to borders as a result of their own cohesiveness, often in opposition to their country of origin, but that is not always the case either. The nation, as a European concept, is not always a relevant analytical framework. If the issue is currently debated in the case of Turkey – where all politics is geared precisely at creating a Turkish nation in the ‘European’, ‘modern’ and ‘civilised’ meaning of the term – what of Afghanistan, with the very important notion of qawm, or even of the Kurds, where the infra-Kurd entity (tribe, faith, lineage) continues to be the dominant reference (Bozarslan 1995; 2004)? Are the Pashto and the Kurds transnational by essence since they straddle borders that were imposed on them and are particularly resistant to the very idea of nation, other than when it comes to creating their own by moving all the regional boundaries?

3.1 The notion of scale

The idea of scale also seems essential for research in a variety of fields and also for the macro-economic or macro-social analysis of migratory phenomena. Except in specific cases, the individual is part of groups that are more or less interwoven and integrated. The migrant leaves – sometimes alone, sometimes in a group – a specific place in a geographical, historical, social and economic context, to end up in another specific place and context; the migration stricto sensu takes place in specific and analysable conditions. What is the contribution and importance of the local? What is the contribution of the local dimension of
the place of origin and that of settlement in the global? The most decisive contribution of research on migration in recent decades is probably that of the taking into account of all the spaces and all the parameters of the phenomenon. The contribution lies in the understanding that there is a life, a personal path before entering a new legal territory, that previous ties can last and be strengthened (or dissolved), that migration is a comprehensive process in interaction with the whole societies of origin and destination and sometimes of transit. In other words, to paraphrase Tarrius, many people can be at once from here and from there. This situation is in no way exceptional, scandalous or dangerous by essence, and it may even be said that it is quite ‘normal’. The ideas of migratory space/migratory field, migratory channel and migratory circulation used by Gildas Simon (1995) take on all their meaning in this context. The individual, as a social human being and not as a mere statistical unit, may be seen as a subject and an agent in its own right and not as a mere object – changing over time from birth to death (Chaib 2000), in society (i.e. social mobility, upward or otherwise), in space (i.e. mobility and migration). He or she can be understood in a multitude of configurations that are by definition in movement. Therefore, the migrant cannot be confined in a single category (foreigner, underprivileged, with problems, etc.) if one admits the possibility of more complex categories such as small over here – local figure over there or the ability to mobilise non-financial social resources (social capital, cultural capital, mobility capital, mobility culture, etc.). One has to know how to permanently use the different scales of observation and analysis to grasp a complexity which is not always apparent at first sight.

Each person works on a specific community, a particular space, their own subject, but certain notions keep cropping up in the analyses, such as transnationalism, diaspora, network, border, foreign, movement, migrant, emigrant, immigrant, transmigrant, integration, nationality, citizenship, sedentary/nomadic, ghetto, formation of ghettos and first, second, third generations. Each young researcher of course draws on the references that have become classics of the sociology of migration – like Georg Simmel of the Chicago School, which was enthusiastically rediscovered and then fiercely criticised – and builds its own typology adapted to the object of the study, the space in question and the reference population.

In fact, each field (space or territory), population and balance is particular and cannot be easily transposed. Everything depends on the scale of observation and analysis, offering more or less scope for comparisons, bringing out the elements of interpretation and modelling of a global social fact that the human and social sciences are required to ‘dissect’ using the methods specific to each discipline. While the study
of international migration generally relates to the present time – or the recent, almost contemporary past – the time variable must be reintroduced, or at least not be done away with. Excellent works that give an overall picture such as those by Stéphane Dufoix (Les Diasporas, 2003) or Sylvie Brunel (Le Développement durable, 2004) remind us that even words and ideas have a history, and that they often have to be deconstructed if they are to be approached better. But history is itself capable of turning around, which is in substance the warning given by Roger Waldinger (2006) about the ‘transnationalism of migrants and presence of the past’. As a matter of fact, while we can determine the constants and the general laws after several decades of migration science or ‘migratology’ – in reference to the amusing yet appropriate term of Hervé Domenach (1996) – migratology, like other economic and social sciences, will never be an exact science regardless of the opinion of those who favour mathematical modelling. Indeed, human beings can be touched by the irrational, much more than nature and especially because the parameters and variables that come into play in human and social sciences are so many. But what may appear irrational to some in a very familiar cultural context may not be so for others who come from a completely different cultural context with its own specific patterns, derived from their original historicity and culture, and therefore be perfectly consistent in their own context.

3.2 The notion of time

Lastly, as stressed by Waldinger (2006), the time variable must not in any case be neglected. We must avoid the risk of a certain form of amnesia and the rediscovery of facts that seem new but belong to the déjà vu of some migrant populations, who remember them and can mobilise know-how or a way of moving that may seem quite revolutionary when taken out of their context. While the conditions of travel and communication have indeed undergone a true technology revolution, handwritten letters, with the slowness of the olden days, did not prevent the transnational circulation of information, as Waldinger reminds us. To that, I might add that the intelligence and postal services of the Genghis Khan empire (eleventh to thirteenth centuries) could have taught a thing or two to many contemporary organisations. The context (economic, technological and geo-political, etc.) changes, as do the conditions of movement, but maybe the human condition does not change as radically. The social network is certainly not a new invention, but whether one can find sources of studies for older periods or not is another matter. At a history conference on mobility held in Istanbul in 2005, an archaeologist did after all present a plea made by the prince of an Amorite city (Near East, 2000 years BC!) for taking in refugees.
This plea is surprisingly modern, mixed with considerations of compassion and human solidarity (i.e. human rights) and an understanding of how to further economic interests (i.e. skills). Now in this specific case, there is an abundance of tablets in cuneiform, which is not the case of all cultures and all periods (Charpin 2005).

4 French research and transnational studies

Two schools of thought in the field of international migration provide a good sample of the existing ties between transnationalism and other recent notions in French research: the Migrinter research team and the intellectual influence of Tarrius among the youngest generation of sociologists. These social researchers are clearly not alone or isolated; other groups or individuals and members of universities – CNRS, IRD, INSEE, INED, FNSP to mention a few – work on international migration and all forms of mobility.

In the early 1970s, French geographers13 as well as anthropologists, demographers and sociologists14 initiated research on international migration flows of workers and their consequences, in the receiving countries and beyond. Economists like George Tapinos and Yann Moulier-Boutang were equally involved in this research field at that time. The simultaneous creation of Migrinter along with the *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* by Simon in 1985 constituted a milestone in international migration studies. Geographers, who initially founded the institution, were soon joined by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, statisticians, demographers and lawyers who worked with the same understanding of migration as a global sociological pattern. Even though some of the founders are now retired from university, the next generation goes on developing a global and comprehensive approach of international migration studies. Thus, the most significant contribution of the Migrinter School is a globalised approach of the social and geographical dynamics of migration and migrants. Nonetheless, the term ‘transnationalism’, though sometimes referred to, is not the principal notion or concept used by Migrinter. Such notions as ‘migratory (relational) space’ and ‘field’, network, *filière* and ‘migratory circulation’ – not to be confused with circular migration – still have a primary importance in the analysis of migration.15

Tarrius initially conducted research in the field of transportation and mobility and then focused on the sociology of international migration (Alioua 2008; Tarrius 1999). Parallel to the establishment of Migrinter by Simon in Poitiers, Tarrius has created his own sociological school of thought in migration, using key notions such as *territoire circulatoire*, *savoir-circuler*, *diasporique*, *nomade* and *errant*. Once again, it is not so
easy to translate these terms into English: the meaning of ‘territoire circulatoire’ is close to the one of Simon's, champ migratoire. However, both concepts do not refer to the exact same reality. The migrants studied by Simon are certainly more settled than those of Tarrius who focuses on forms of modern nomadic life – somewhat a form of post-modernity – and wanderings. There is no clear distinction between the approach of Simon and the one of Tarrius, as both converge on the idea of a diasporic way of life. Simon and Tarrius have not analysed migrant populations in the same context, even though both populations have a common North African origin. The migrants studied by Tarrius are often more involved in forms of irregular migration, but one form is not exclusive from the other, as people may live in more than one country and a single person may experience both legal and illegal forms of migration in his own life. Savoir-circuler is an interesting expression which could be compared with the sociological concept of capital social: some migrant people, not all of them, are able to use a form of pre-existent transnational or international culture of mobility when crossing borders. They may appropriate nomadic ways of life and thinking without necessarily having nomadic origins themselves. Traditional social and cultural networks are used in industrial and post-industrial societies. Can we say that Tarrius has founded his own school of thought? Surely yes, but this school has emerged from the collaboration with diverse people from different institutions, such as Lamia Missaoui (a former student of Tarrius who now teaches at the University of Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines), Geneviève Marotel, Michel Peraldi, Alain Battegay and Migrinter. Notwithstanding his membership at Migrinter from 1987 until his retirement in 2006, Tarrius worked in places like Toulouse, Perpignan, Paris, and taught and supervised doctoral theses with his own original conceptions of migration.

Even though the concept of transnationalism has been scarcely referred to in the approach of the two schools, it is not unknown. Many volumes of the Revue européenne des migrations internationales have articles in English as well as in French whose titles include the term, but whose authors are not necessarily members of Migrinter. Is there a major contradiction between the American concepts – also shared by English or German scientists – that refer to ‘transnational’ or ‘transnationalism’ and the French concepts of champ migratoire, espace migratoire and territoire circulatoire? Not necessarily. I think that the social patterns they describe and define are quite similar, though they apply to different social, geographic, political, national and cultural contexts. Mohammed Charef (1999), Fanny Schaeffer (2004), Chadia Arab (2007), Jean Pavageau and Philippe Schaffauser (1995) and Stéphane de Tapia (2005), or even Monsutti (2004) and Simon (1979) in other
places and other times have described very similar situations or comparable patterns. These include Morocco in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s, Turkey from the 1960s to the 1990s, Tunisia in the 1970s or Mexico in the 1990s and Afghanistan from the 1980s onwards. Mobility, transnationalism and migratory circulation are contextualised aspects of a similar way of life, where specific and localised but very comparable anthropological forms of movement/mobility are analysed.

5 Conclusion

Similar intellectual and ideological backgrounds of Western societies does not prevent local and national historiographies and political traditions from being somewhat different. For instance, the French trilogy of insertion-intégration-assimilation in relation with the conception of the French Republic as une et indivisible inherited from Jacobinism and Republicanism is sometimes not understood in European countries with a multicultural approach. In fact, economic and social globalisation, and maybe more important, common attitudes of people in some circumstances, account for similar perceptions and attitudes of migrants confronted with difficulties such as tightened border controls, xenophobia and discrimination. Historical circumstances of the birth of a diaspora migration are always unique. The context of the reception of this diaspora may vary significantly, but the definition of the diaspora and the practises of diaspora members can be identified and categorised along a few observed and characterised facts. What matters here is the way we define diasporas and diasporic perceptions and practices in a global context where geographical dispersion takes on various forms. The same holds true for transnationalism: some people are able – or have acquired the ability through history – to live in close contact, or without in-depth ties, to others (e.g. neighbours, foreigners, natives). A parallel can be drawn of the relationship between natives and migrants and historical models of coexistence: is the relationship old and close (in Latin inter), or new and transversal (in Latin trans)? Inter-natio etymologically refers to the relationship between two neighbouring groups, while trans-natio may refer to the maintaining of ties through discontinuous spaces occupied by various human groups, not necessarily neighbours. If we apply this etymological approach to the concept of transnationalism, the term is certainly appropriate in our study. In this case, the definition of the ‘nation’ is still to be clarified.

As a French aphorism says, the joker is in the deck of cards (le diable est dans les détails). It is possible, useful and necessary to describe in detail – and so, in a very interesting and rich way – the experiences of migrants all over the world in relation with the social and historical
context of the study. Improved knowledge on various places, times and contexts is surely propitious to wisdom in social and political sciences. This is to say that this scientific culture on mobility and migration could be a very important source of policy-relevant information. A synthesis of best practices to be promoted – or a guide of bad practices to be avoided – might be proposed to policymakers, urban planners and national and regional developers. Unfortunately, this expertise is hardly used by policymakers. But in a way, this knowledge, despite its relevance, is not easily transferable in practice – as transfer of technology can be. Here, the combination of the notions of scale and time is of the utmost importance. What can be remembered of the past and of the variety of described and studied situations for the management of migration at the national, regional and local levels? What can be the answers and contributions of social researchers to social and political development and management? As migration specialists, we all face this challenge, especially in times of social tensions and political crises.

In spite of all the hardships experienced by migrants today, and maybe because of these hardships, ‘migratology’ is of capital importance, as it has been in the past decades. Not only are migration patterns changing before our very eyes. The precise understanding of migration and mobility make it possible, all at once, to defend the interests of migrants. This thus helps to improve conditions for insertion and integration into the settlement communities, to avoid many social and sometimes political tensions and to offer conditions for a peaceful, democratic existence for all. Attacks on migrants, foreigners and indigenous minorities often herald a general social and political degradation, as shown by many examples in recent history. One might almost say that the knowledge of the causes, consequences and mechanisms of migration and the conscious and voluntary protection of migrants’ and immigrants’ rights are exercises in democracy. Doubtless, they are not the only ones – nor the most important – but they are useful, necessary exercises for the social and political balance of all political entities.

Notes


2 Most unfortunately, these questions do not seem to be of interest to policymakers, other than as sources of material for misinformation or counter-truths designed to obfuscate the reasoning of voters; the French election campaign, as a whole, has been
a true disaster in that respect and its long-term consequences will have to be mea-
sured.


5 When the French speak of ‘integration’, the Turks translate this into ‘adaptation’ (uyum, uyumsallama). The idea of integration can be translated (bütünleşme – a learned term), but it applies to a process that is closer to assimilation, where the one becomes part of the whole (bütün). The real word for ‘integration’ would be türkleşme (‘Turkishisation’ – positive meaning) rather than francızlaşma (‘Frenchisation’ – necessarily negative).

6 For example, the göç radical, which is common to all Turkic languages under various forms, is the source for words connoting both migration and nomadic life.

7 _Truchement_, meaning ‘translator, mediator, person’ or ‘means’, is a French noun derived from Turkish and Arabic. It has a very remote Semitic origin: _tarjumani_ in Akkadian. The Turkish _terciiman_ (_tarjuman_ in Arabic) gave rise to _drogman_ (‘interpreter’ at the Court of the Sultan) and _truchement_ in classical French.

8 The term ‘transnationalism’ is not often used in France, except by researchers familiar with American sociology and universities, as for instance: Jocelyne Cesari or Riva Kastoryano; see Cesari (1995). ‘Les réseaux transnationaux entre l’Europe et le Maghreb: l’international sans territoire’ in _Revue européenne des migrations internationales_ 13 (2): 81-94 and Kastoryano (1994), ‘Mobilisations des migrants en Europe. Du national au transnational’ in _Revue européenne des migrations internationales_ 10 (1): 169-181. The term ‘transnationalism’, which is also the subtitle of the issue, could also be used without critical discussion, simply as general significance, as diaspora could be used for geographical dispersion.

9 Of Arabic origin, _qawm_ has entered Persian and Turkish (kavim) with a very elastic reference to group of belonging, tribe, ethnic group or even nation.

10 This is the case when migration flows have an influence on local balances. A case in point is the situation of irregular migrants who cannot be accommodated in local facilities and are thus placed in refugee camps. Sangatte, Lampedusa, Melilla, Ceuta and many other places are examples of these interferences, which end up having a political impact far wider than the problems of management and logistics that they generate.

11 Also terminology from the Tarrius school of thought.


13 Such as Simon, Michel Poinard or Michelle Guillen in the field of international migration, Roger Béteille and Roland Schwab in the field of internal migration, and second generation of researchers like Emmanuel Ma Mung or Michel Peraldi, just to name a few.

14 Such as Tarrius, Hily, André Courgeau, Alain Battegay, Yves Charbit and many other scholars.

15 In French, the term ‘network’ can be translated as réseau (in its material and technical acceptation) or filière (in its non material acceptation: ‘solidarity’, ‘organisation’). Simon used the expression ‘filière migratoire’ to describe the networks created by migrants themselves. The filière uses the réseau as a framework. These are two aspects
of the same social dynamics. Circular migration is translated as noria (from Abdelmalek Sayad) or migration alternante. For a definition of ‘circular migration’ and its implications see: Içduyuğ (2008), ‘Circular migration and Turkey. An overview of the past and present. Some demo-economic implications’, RCS European University Institute, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes, 10: 18. This reflection is part of a programme managed by the Robert Schuman European Foundation in Florence about circular migration in Europe.

16 Or a dignified return and reinsertion into the source country that would be voluntary.

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Part III

Migration and development
8 Migration and development over twenty years of research: progress and prospects

Ronald Skeldon

1 Background

One of the difficulties of talking about migration and development is that we are dealing essentially with two ‘black boxes’. We know instinctively what both ‘migration’ and ‘development’ mean but when we try to define precisely their dimensions, the meaning begins to slip away. Does migration include short-term or circular movements? How long does one have to be away from one’s usual place of residence in order to be called a migrant? Over how great a distance must one have moved in order to be classified as a migrant? These essentially definitional and methodological issues are central to the volume of migration that is measured by our chosen instruments, censuses and surveys, and they make comparison across time and space problematic. With regard to development, it must surely be more than just economic growth, although that growth is a fundamental part of the process. It must also incorporate social and political development. However, how should these be defined?

As will be seen from the argument in this chapter, I am hesitant to conceptualise migration and development as two separate categories: migration cannot be separated from development. Ideally, we cannot conceive of development without some associated shifts in human populations. Similarly, it is difficult to envisage large-scale migrations without some changes to the level of prosperity, either upwards or downwards, of the people involved. Development is generally seen to be something desirable: a legitimate and essential aim for national and international action. Migration, on the other hand, was until quite recently seen to be undesirable and in some way to be negative for development. These attitudes are reflected in the results of the most recent United Nations enquiry into internal migration in which 90 out of 123 governments in the developing world reported that action to reduce migration to cities in their country was needed (United Nations 2006b).
Yet, more recent thinking about migration, and particularly international migration, has shifted to a consideration of the positive aspects that the movement of people can bring to development. The report of the Global Commission on International Migration reviews the results of much recent research and argues that we have not accepted the potential that migration can have for development (GCIM 2005; see also Tamas & Palme 2006). Similarly, a high-level report from the British government sets out the case for migration working towards the reduction, rather than the creation of, poverty (IDC 2004).

The new viewpoint on migration and development is certainly to be welcomed. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the movement of people is seen to be positive or negative for development, a fundamental danger exists. Migration is seen almost as an independent variable, making migration work for poor people as if migration was in some way a ‘thing’ out there separate from the people themselves. That is, the danger of reification exists. The meaning and the sentiments may be worthy, but the door to analytic confusion is likely to be opened. Shifting to the vocabulary of demography, a danger exists in the current discussions of migration of confusing proximate causes with root causes, and individual behaviour with structural constraint.

The theme of the conference that has produced this volume was about the last twenty years of research into migration, and I will certainly spend most of my time looking at the research on migration and development during that period. However, I would like, at the start, to go back considerably in time to look at the work of two people who have been influential in thinking about migration and development. The first figure is, I think, obvious: Ernst Georg Ravenstein, arguably the father of modern migration studies (Ravenstein 1885; 1889; also Grigg 1977). Ravenstein’s last three ‘laws’ of migration, laws 9 through 11, all relate to migration and development. Law 9: Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce develop and transport improves. Ravenstein saw migration as positively related to development. Law 10: The major direction of migration is from agricultural areas to the centres of industry and commerce. Law 11: The major causes of migration are economic. Perhaps we could even have said ‘economic development’. Thus, an explicit linkage to development was made right at the start of modern studies of population migration.

The second figure to whom reference should be made at the outset of this chapter is perhaps not so familiar to students of migration: Frederick Jackson Turner, whose seminal essay on The Significance of the Frontier in American History appeared in 1893 and quite independent from Ravenstein’s essays that were published in the previous decade (Turner 1961). The core of Turner’s thesis was that ‘the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of
American settlement westward, explain American development: the explanation of American development lay in the process of westward migration across the area that became the United States. The fact that Turner was off-target in many parts of his thesis is largely unimportant. What is important is the idea that, to a large extent, migration creates the nation or the state. I would argue that this iconic image of migration as being important to political development has not figured as prominently as it might have done in our work on migration and development over the last twenty years. Let me give one or two other examples. Could we understand modern China without the iconography of the Long March, or the history of South Africa without the Great Trek, the ‘epic dimension’ in the foundation of Afrikaner nationalism? We could also go on to consider the role of circuits of pilgrimage in forging common identities by taking people out of their communities and giving them a shared experience (see e.g. Turner & Turner 1978).

What we might call the ‘iconography’ of migration and the development of nations and states has been much less studied than the more economic aspects that have evolved from Ravenstein’s approaches. The principal reason for this, I would argue, is that over the last twenty years we have been preoccupied with international migration and its links to development and to a much lesser extent with internal migration and its relations with development. ‘Migration’ has largely come to mean international migration, and yet the number of people who cross international borders represents only about 3 per cent of the world’s population, or some 191 million in 2005, according to the UN (United Nations 2006a). The vast majority of those who move do so within the borders of their own country, some 100-200 million people in China alone, depending upon how we define a ‘migrant’ and perhaps a similar number in that other demographic giant, India. It cannot make sense to be concerned only with the minority of migrants who move from one country to another. Nevertheless, a minority of migrants can and do make a difference to countries of origin and countries of destination and the remainder of this chapter will focus only on the minority of international movers.

Migration has often been regarded as a failure of development: people flee because of poverty and they want to achieve a better life. Over the last twenty years the results of research have shown that the situation is much more complex and several comprehensive reviews of the evidence have already been published (Lucas 2005; Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Tamas & Palme 2006). Given limitations of time and space, this chapter will be much more restrictive and focus critically on what appear to have emerged as the three principal, although interconnected, research themes on migration and development over
the last twenty years: remittances, diasporas, skilled migrations and brain drain.

2 Remittances

The magnitude of the volume of remittances sent back by migrants to their home countries has only relatively recently become widely recognised as a major policy issue by international institutions, despite the early work of scholars such as Sharon S. Russell that was published at the start of our period in 1986 (Russell 1986). Today, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, various specialised international bodies such as the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration and the OECD, as well as national development agencies such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, have all become concerned about remittances and their implications for development. The reason is not hard to fathom. Recent estimates place the volume of remittances to developing countries in 2006 alone at $199 billion, up from $188 billion in 2005 and over double the amount in 2000 (Mohapatra et al. 2006). Remittances now are much larger than the total volume of official aid flows (Maimbo & Ratha 2005).

The above estimates of the volume of remittances refer only to the amount flowing through formal banking channels. If the amounts flowing through informal channels, too, were to be included, the total volume would increase significantly. Studies in Bangladesh, for example, suggest that only about 46 per cent of remittances sent back to villages flowed through formal channels (cited in Siddiqui 2005: 84-85). In the Philippines, where official attempts to facilitate the transfer of remittances appear to have met with success, the proportion that flows through official channels appears to be similar, suggesting that about half of all remittances to the Philippines flowed through the official system. However, perhaps more significantly, the proportion of remittances flowing through the formal channel appeared to have increased from 65 to 76 per cent between 1995 and 2002. A shift towards an increasing proportion of remittances flowing through formal channels was also observed for both Bangladesh and Pakistan. This trend may reflect increased international scrutiny of international financial flows in the post-9/11 world.

Another trend in the flows of remittances is the increasing proportion originating in the developed world, and particularly in the US. However, this trend may be more apparent than real. Taking the Philippines as an example, the volume of remittances sent back from the US grew by virtually 20 per cent from 2003 to 2004. At $2.66 billion
in 2004, these were by far the most significant of the remittance flows back to the Philippines, accounting for 52 per cent of all remittances from land-based migrants (Go 2006). However, that flow need not necessarily have originated in the US. Workers in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Gulf States may increasingly be using American banks to transfer their monies. This appears as a US-to-Philippines transaction rather than a location-of-worker-to-Philippines transaction. Similar patterns in the origins of remittances have been observed for other countries. For example, in the case of Pakistan, from accounting for less than one tenth of all remittances in 1999-2000, the US accounted for over one third in 2001-2002 (see Skeldon 2005b). Thus, great care needs to be taken with origin-destination flows of remittances and they may not accurately reflect the real origin of the monies being transferred.

Other important policy issues implicit in this debate on remittances exist, not the least of which is just how remittances are measured. For example, where is the dividing line between remittances and foreign direct investment? Remittances sent back to China at some $8 billion between 1991 and 1998 are seen to be small compared with a figure seven times larger sent from a smaller overseas Indian population back to India. However, foreign direct investment to China in 2002 was estimated at $48 billion, of which half came from the Chinese overseas (data cited in Newland & Patrick 2004: 4-5). A broader approach to financial flows brought about by current and previous migrations is required.

Some questions about the precise amounts of money sent back by migrants as remittances and about the channels used clearly exist. Although there can be little debate about their importance for the relief of poverty among specific families and individuals in areas of origin of the international migrants, their broader developmental implications are much less clear. The current debate on remittances tends to ignore certain fundamental aspects of the process. 1) Governments may seek to manage or make more productive use of remittances in developing countries. 2) It is generally assumed that remittances are simply country-to-country transactions, but this assumption is misleading. 3) The volume of remittances may influence the future direction of official development assistance.

Much of the debate on remittances has focused on whether they are used primarily for consumption or for investment and whether governments can in some way better manage these significant resources for the wellbeing of their populations. However, there are dangers inherent in this debate. First, any distinction between uses for investment and consumption is largely sterile, as expenditure on consumption for house construction, for example, can have important local multiplier
effects in terms of creation of local employment and a stimulus for local activities. Certainly, where expenditure is mainly for imported goods, negative externalities can result, but expenditure that appears to be directed primarily at consumption can have important positive implications for local development. Even lavish expenditure on a wedding can have positive aspects as it is an investment in the demographic future of a community. Thus, any clear distinction between consumption and investment is likely to be spurious at best, and the consensus of micro-level studies of remittance use is that ‘the average migrant worker spends his money prudently’ (Gunatilleke 1986: 15). Second, current discussions on managing remittances by governments and international agencies miss a critical aspect of the financial flows. Remittances are essentially a person-to-person or family-to-family transaction: money is put directly into the pockets of individuals and families being supported by the migrants. Any attempt by governments to influence the use of these monies is likely to prove counterproductive and migrants are likely either to resort more to informal channels or to cease to remit altogether if they see that their monies are going to general government-sponsored development objectives. Thus, attempts to regulate or otherwise manage financial flows along more developmental paths may achieve precisely the opposite result to that intended. Great care will be needed in the design of any policy with this objective in mind.

The second area that does not seem to attract much attention in the discussions on remittances relates to the origins of the migrants. The assumption is that the remittances flow back to the countries of origin as a whole. While true at a very general level, this assumption does not recognise the highly localised nature of migration. Migration is not a random event with communities of origin distributed evenly throughout a country. Similarly, migrants are not spread evenly across destination countries. They tend to be concentrated in the largest – often the ‘global’ – cities of the developed world and in centres of commercial agriculture or resource exploitation in the developing world. From the point of view of remittances, however, migrants’ areas of origin are arguably more important than their destinations. Some 95 per cent of migrants from Bangladesh to the UK, up until the late 1980s, for example, came from a single district in Bangladesh, that of Sylhet (Gardner 1995: 2). The majority of Pakistani migrants, also to the UK, came from the district of Mirpur in the north of the country (Ballard 1987: 24). Much of the migration from India to the Middle East has been from the southern state of Kerala (Zachariah, Kannan & Rajan 2002). Migration from China has been dominated by three southern coastal provinces, Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, and from very specific parts of these provinces. Thus, the huge volumes of remittances...
flow back to a very small number of villages and districts in countries of origin. While this concentration of wealth is likely to have an impact on migrations internal to the respective countries, the immediate effect is to increase inequalities. Thus, unlike aid or official development assistance, which can be targeted at particular groups and specifically towards the eradication of poverty, remittances are flows of an entirely different nature. They are focused on the specific areas of origin of emigration that might involve neither the poorest areas nor the poorest people within those areas.

The concentration of remittances in specific areas leads directly to the third cautionary point made here: donor countries are looking at the volume of remittances flowing back to some countries and comparing it with their aid. It is possible – though somewhat speculative at this stage – that countries will be tempted to reallocate their official development assistance on the basis of the observed flows. As emphasised above, remittances make up a very different type of financial flow compared with aid and it would be a dangerous move to influence the allocation of aid on the basis of remittance flows. Some areas and particularly vulnerable groups that do not participate in migration may be deprived of assistance in countries receiving substantial remittances if official flows of aid are in any way to be channelled away from countries that receive remittances.

3 Diasporas

Diaspora has become one of the most prominent terms in the vocabulary of international migration in the early twenty-first century. In the past, the word referred to very specific expulsions of people in which the majority of the inhabitants were expelled from their homeland, and migrants lived with the idea of going home. The Jewish diaspora was the classic example, but other examples such as the Armenian case appeared to fit this model. Today, we have the Chinese diaspora (Ma & Cartier 2003; Wang & Wang 1998), the Indian diaspora (Jayaram 2004; see also Wong 2004), the African diaspora (Hamilton 2007) and even the Scottish diaspora (Kay 2006), among others. The word ‘diaspora’ has come to encompass all population movements, voluntary and forced, irrespective of the number of migrants relative to the population of origin. Arguably, it has come to replace ‘international migration’ itself and we now talk of ‘diasporas’ as readily as we would of international migration from any country of origin. In this debate, French social scientists have played an important role (see e.g. Chaliand & Rageau 1991; Ma Mung 2000; Bordes-Benayoun & Schnapper 2006).
It is not difficult to see why diaspora has risen to such prominence. The word ‘migration’ gives the impression of a definitive move: a movement to a destination where the migrant will stay and eventually become a citizen of another country. Diaspora, on the other hand, draws attention to looking back, to the importance of linkages between origins and destinations and to the fact that the migrants may return or at least continue their involvement with their countries of origin. Diaspora becomes closely associated with another term that has come to prominence in the migration literature, the ‘transnational community’: migrants maintain close links with their origins and may even operate or live and work in two or more states. Diaspora also brings together, under a single umbrella, migrants and co-ethnics who may have been born in the destination society.

It is but a small jump to the idea that development can be associated with the diaspora. In any migration system, the most innovative and educated individuals tend to leave first. Hence, in a diaspora many of the best and brightest that a country has to offer are to be found. If an origin country can take advantage of its overseas population, then these people should be able to contribute to ‘development’ in the country of origin.

The role of the diaspora has been significant in the development of East Asia. The overseas Chinese have, for decades, been supporting the construction of infrastructure in southern China, and in Vietnam today the Viet Kieu play a significant role in the current development of the country. Their investment is much more than remittances, it is foreign direct investment, although as discussed above a clear distinction between the two seems elusive. The diaspora plays a much greater role than just financial investment. In the context of East Asia we have seen the return of many from the diaspora. Just looking at the highly skilled, we know that, in the 1960s, very few of the highly educated returned to Taiwan, Province of China – perhaps 5 per cent. However, that proportion had increased markedly by the 1970s. Today, the Taiwan Province of China, as well as the Republic of Korea and many other economies in the region, including China, have emerged as nodes in the global training of the highly skilled. The role that the returned student has played in Asian economies is remarkable. In the late 1940s, the father of modern Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, wrote an article on the role of the returned student. If we look at the composition of the parliaments in the Asian tiger economies, and at senior servants in the administrations of all those economies, many, perhaps even the majority, of the officers and members have been trained or have experience overseas. Return migration and the democratisation of political systems in eastern Asia are more than just coincidentally

Two critical points need to be borne in mind when we look at the role of the diaspora and development in East Asia. First, there was something for the migrants to return to. It would be simplistic, if not just downright wrong, to attribute the development of East Asia to return migration or to the role of the diaspora. Return migrants certainly did contribute to that development, but they did not cause it. Any thinking that all we need to do is to bring the highly skilled home and development will automatically come to Ghana, Chad or Burkina Faso is according a primacy to agency that seems totally misplaced. The underlying structures need to be in place in order for the agency of the migrants to function. Where the structures are non-existent or weakly developed, the return of the highly skilled is likely to be ineffective. Development drives migration, not the other way round, although clearly migration can support development.

The second point to bear in mind is that the diaspora migration back to East Asia was part of a wider migration of the highly skilled from the developed world. The diaspora was not acting in isolation from other migratory currents. Skilled people from Europe, Australasia and North America were also involved. But this point brings me to another strength of the diaspora concept, although one with perhaps sensitive implications. It does not deal just with migrants but with ethnic groups including descendants, first, second or later generations of children of migrants who may return to their ancestral home. For example, one of the largest concentrations of ethnic Korean international migrants in the world is to be found in Seoul itself. These are mainly American Koreans who have returned to the land of their parents to participate in the economic dynamism of that country, an economy that is experiencing labour shortages. But there are also BBCs (British-born Chinese), ABCs (American-born Chinese), CBCs (Canadian-born Chinese) and American-born Vietnamese who are returning to live and work in their ancestral lands. However, are they Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese or are they Americans, Canadians or British? The concept of diaspora raises all kinds of difficult questions of identity and loyalty.

The diaspora is highly heterogeneous in terms of skill, education and class, but also in terms of origins and political persuasion. What is the Chinese diaspora, for example? A uniform transnational cultural grouping or a series of overlapping subnational Chinese ethnicities (see Skeldon 2003)? The diaspora cannot be thought of simply in terms of a resource to be easily mined. Many in the diaspora will not have the interests of current rulers in areas of origin in mind – in fact they may work to depose them overtly or covertly. Hence, diaspora becomes associated with security and geopolitical issues.
Ultimately, when we are dealing with development and the ways through which the millennium development goals are to be achieved, the emphasis must be placed on structures, on establishing the kinds of institutions that will lead to improvements in human well-being. Once these are in place, migrants or the diaspora will participate and can play a significant role in the development. Trying to give primacy to the diaspora without first addressing the root causes of a lack of development is unlikely to bring success.

4 The skilled and issues of brain drain

The question of structures relative to agency brings us to the issue of skilled migration and brain drain. The emigration of the highly skilled was, and to a large extent still is, seen as negative for the countries of origin as they lose the people most likely to be able to generate their development (see e.g. Schiff 2006; also Kapur & McHale 2005). A revisionist view has emerged in recent years, arguing that the brain drain can be positive for countries of origin. Perhaps best expressed in the ideas of Andrew Mountford (1997) and Oded Stark (2003), this view focuses on the idea of perceived benefits to international migration being diffused through the population of a potential country of origin in the developing world. Individuals in those countries see a career in a certain skill as likely to lead to a position overseas and choose to be trained in that skill with the view to migrating abroad. However, increasing numbers of individuals choose this path that, together with the filtration process of immigration policy acting as a barrier, means that not all people trained in the skill will be able to migrate successfully. Hence, the country will be left with more people trained in that skill at the end of any period than at the beginning of the period. However, it is possible that the newly skilled are not productively utilised in the origin area and it has been argued that the actual possibility of migrating overseas might encourage them to remain as educated unemployed (Stark & Fan 2006).

Evidence to support the hypothesis that the possibility of emigration might influence the choice of training seems weak (Kangasniemi, Winters & Commander 2004; Lucas 2005). Nevertheless, the skilled do remit funds back to their families in origin areas and some return to contribute to the development of their country of origin. Thus, the skilled living abroad can be encouraged to return and, according to studies carried out by the World Bank, countries can ‘leverage’ diasporas of talent (Kuznetsov 2006). Thus, brain circulation and the return of the highly skilled have become important themes in recent research into issues associated with brain drain. More generally, interpretations
of the migration of the highly skilled have become associated with the ideas of remittances and of the diaspora discussed above.

However, again the danger exists that primacy is accorded to the role of human agency rather than of structure: that the skilled can be effective agents to promote development irrespective of economic, social and, most critically, political structures back home. Skilled migrants will generally only return home if something exists for them to return to that will allow them to prosper or make a profit. Recent research into the movement of the highly skilled has allowed us to look at certain groups that may have been overlooked in previous research and, in particular, students. Thus, over the last twenty years, research into brain drain issues has shifted away from the idea of loss of skilled personnel and issues of compensation to training. Where is the training carried out? Not all is carried out in countries of origin and there is brain creation or the refinement of brains in overseas destinations. Who is paying for the training? The government of origin; of destination; a private foundation; or the migrant him or herself? What type of training should be given, particularly in the country of origin? Training that provides a global marketable skill or one that can only be sold in local markets? Or do we need to think of dual or even multi-level training systems always with the possibility to upgrade from one level to another? These are complex questions and ones that highlight the complexity of the brain drain issue. It is not a simple question of developing country loss and developed country gain. To attempt to deny the right of the skilled to migrate is almost certainly going to force these innovative people to seek alternative channels through which to migrate. These channels may be irregular, which may mean that the migrants enter illegally into the labour markets of destination economies and cannot utilise the skills they have, thus leading to brain waste.

Most of the skilled originate in a relatively small number of countries, among which India and China figure prominently. However, this pattern does not mean to imply that small numbers of skilled migrants cannot have an impact on small economies of origin. Small island countries are a case in point. Still, their loss always has to be balanced against whether they could have been productively absorbed into the economy of origin. This brings us back to the question of structure: institutions, economic and political, need to be in place in origin economies before skilled migrants can be productively absorbed and this is often not the case. Once these structures are in place, migrants will return, as we have seen in the economies of East Asia, from which large numbers of the highly skilled left. Yet, would these economies have developed any faster had their skilled stayed at home? Our hypothesis is that they would not and that it was their open attitude, as far as
emigration to developed economies was concerned, that supported, rather than slowed, their development.

5 Looking forward

Where is research into migration and development likely to go? It is always difficult to predict accurately what is likely to happen. However, a few pointers may exist. As indicated earlier in this chapter, internal migration will need to be re-incorporated into the migration and development debate. Hence, research on urbanisation and development will again come to prominence. However, perhaps more to the point, the whole migration and development debate is likely to shift. At the outset, it was suggested that a danger existed of trying to reify migration as something separate from development. In effect, a danger lies in making the migration tail wag the development dog. For example, migration is not one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), although a move exists to give migration a much higher profile through a continuing high-level dialogue through the Global Forum. Giving migration a higher profile can be welcomed, but we also need to be well aware of the limitations. Elsewhere, I have argued that migration should not be an MDG as it is not amenable to target setting (Skeldon 2005a).

Migration is essentially a response of populations to changing development conditions and what governments need to do is to lose their fear of population migration. Migration needs to be accepted as an integral part of the development process, not feared as something unusual. Migration is certainly not new, but if our present time is indeed an ‘Age of Migration’ (Castles & Miller 2003), it is so as much because of rising, although unequal, levels of development around the world. Rising prosperity brings increased population mobility and migration, which essentially brings us back to Ravenstein’s original proposition. The Philippines is often seen as the country of emigration par excellence with about 8.1 million migrants overseas in 2005 (Go 2006) or just under 10 per cent of the population in the Philippines. Recent research suggests that some 5.5 million migrants from the UK – or 9.2 per cent of the nation’s population – are currently overseas (IPPR 2006). Clearly, the types of migrants from these two economies are very different. Nevertheless, the basic point is that migration does not cease with development and part of our future research will be to chart how the types, as well as the volume and directions of human movement, vary through ‘migration’ or ‘mobility’ transitions (Zelinsky 1971; Skeldon 1997).
The preoccupation with international migration has tended only to see migration as somehow separate from, rather than an integral part of, development. It is not so much that migration can be used to promote development but that we need to be prepared for the kinds of population migration that development generates. Thus, accommodationist policies or those that seek to respond and accept the kinds of migration that are likely to occur in any particular development scenario are likely to be more appropriate than proactive policies that seek to channel migration in a particular direction to promote development. Generating migration impact statements for the various types of development policies being promoted seems a logical way forward for applied research in the migration area. Hence, attempts to influence the volume and direction of population movement must start with development, not with migration or direct attempts to control the movement. The history of migration control, irrespective of whether the movements have been internal or international, has largely been a history of unintended consequences, at best (Castles 2004), or failure, at worst.

Our research over the last twenty years has drawn attention to two critical aspects of migration and development. First, that migration is not necessarily negative for development. However, care must be taken that we do not go too far the other way so as to be blinded by the positive aspects and, by so doing, overly promote the idea that by facilitating certain types of population mobility we will promote development. Second, attempts to slow migration by promoting development in areas of origin are almost certain to fail (see e.g. De Haas 2006). Migration is an integral part of all societies and those that have little movement of their populations are also likely to be stagnant economically. Developed societies are based upon systems of high mobility that are different from those in the developing world. More theoretically, we are likely to see a change in emphasis from research on migration and development towards migration in development – a small but nevertheless subtle shift in focus.

References


9 International migration and territorial (re)construction: the place and role of migrants as ‘frontier runners’ in development

Patrick Gonin

1 Introduction

In the field of migration, public policy mainly consisted of separating issues of living and working conditions in the host country and in the country of origin. Separation was the necessary condition for organising migratory circuits and setting up forms of domination of some countries over others. It would seem that that is no longer entirely the case. Nowadays, the issue of migration is connected to the development of the country of origin. Is that change good news, and does it mean that recognising this relationship would induce true progress?

Such a ‘dissociated’ approach to international migration induced migration policies that were also legitimised by the dominant categorisations: emigrant in the country of departure and immigrant in the country of arrival. This separation in the political approach to migration confronts migrants with a real dilemma, being required to ‘integrate’ in the country of arrival while always being reminded of the debt they have towards those who stayed in the country of origin. While Abdelmalek Sayad opened the way for research on the consequences of such separation, a dual question remains: how do migrants (re)construct a social position that enables them to affirm their presence in another country and be recognised by the local people while, at the same time, maintain a link with those in their country of origin that is not limited to remittances?

For several years now, the very nature of international migration has been radically changing. Migration categories are particularly challenged by migratory practices. It is no longer as easy to oppose temporary or seasonal migration in favour of permanent migration, or to oppose economic migration over forced migration. Nor is it easy to oppose migration for work in favour of migration for studies, or regular migration in favour of illegal migration. There are a variety of reasons for the changes that have occurred in recent decades, including a
change in public policy and reinforced border controls, shifts in the employment market, generalised job insecurity in many countries, economic downturns, a rise in unemployment, the globalisation of the economy, the spread of information across the planet, development of modes of transport and others. These sweeping changes affect source and destination countries as well as circulation patterns. Many factors explain the increase in the number of potential international migrants: work and circular migrations; flight from endemic violence in some parts of the world, particularly Africa; a stated will to learn from diversified experience and use mobility as a resource; to assert oneself as a youth without having to oppose elders or relatives; a desire to move; a rite of passage between age groups and matrimonial status; and a will to serve a collective interest are some of the possible profiles that make it possible to understand the migratory projects of candidates for international migration. The migratory experiences are thus diversified and many. Reducing them to just one category would only obscure the debate about migration policies and the reception of candidates for international mobility.

Similarly, the classifications that distinguish countries of origin and countries of destination are less efficient than they used to be. Many countries are now both and that is at least true of Ireland, Italy and Spain – three European nations that used to be emigration countries. But similar situations have been observed in Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea. Another major change is that those who leave do not necessarily come back. They do not, however, lose contact with those left behind, as can be seen by the multiplication of call shops or the use of the internet in the countries in the South. Thanks to improvements in transport and communication systems, migrants create links between the various locations within their migratory field. Changes can also be observed for those benefiting from family reunification. Long-term settlement in a host country or the birth of children allows people in some cases to obtain the nationality of the children's country of birth, thus giving parents incentive to multiply their links with the country of origin, either by teaching the mother tongue or by organising journeys that cannot be reduced to tourism alone. Thus, the dual cut-off between source countries and destination countries, on one side, and between first-generation migrants and their descendents, on the other, is no longer the main characteristic of current migratory systems.
2 How many are they?

There were 100 million international migrants in the world on the eve of the first oil crisis. Today, their number has doubled, but their relative share in the world population is nonetheless still below 3 per cent.¹ A third of these 200 million migrants have moved from one developing country to another, whilst another third have moved to a developed country: ‘those moving “South-to-South” are about as numerous as those moving “South-to-North”’ (United Nations 2006: 7). What is to be made of these figures, which give rise to divergent comments? To put it over-simply, two opposing conceptions emerge: this number of international migrants may be considered to be equivalent to the potential population of a country that would come just after China, India, the United States and Indonesia (Guilmoto & Sandron 2003: 8); or it could be stressed that 97 per cent of the world’s inhabitants are sedentary.

The number of international migrants² was an estimated 191 million in 2005, including 115 million residing in developed countries and 75 in developing countries (United Nations 2006: 13). A report of the United Nations Secretary-General specifies that:

> [t]hree quarters of all migrants in the world lived in only 28 countries in 2005, with one out of five of the world’s migrants living in the United States of America.

Among the countries that receive the highest numbers of migrants, the first one is indeed the US with 20.2 per cent of migrants (15 per cent in 1990), followed by the Russian Federation with 6.2 per cent, Germany (5.3 per cent) and France in fifth rank with 3.4 per cent (3.8 per cent in 1990). The increase in the number of migrants is mainly due to the expansion of migration flows with the dismantling of the Soviet Union and, only for a smaller part, to their intensification. Instead of separating origin, destination and transit countries, this chapter is based on an approach of migratory balances (see Maps 8.1 and 8.2). The geography of the international migration system reveals the polarisation of the major economic powers and that of the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. The most important countries of destination are concentrated in three or four regions, with North America (the US and Canada) being the prime destination. Thus, the US receives two million people every year. European countries are a second pole of immigration, with a variety of situations that are mainly due to the diversity of their history.
Map 9.1 Countries with a negative net migration rate between 1990 and 2000
Countries with more migrants going out than coming in


Map 9.2 Countries with a positive net migration rate between 1990 and 2000
Countries with more migrants coming in than going out

At the global level, an increase in the stock of migrants has mainly benefited high-income countries, whether they are developed or developing nations. Reversely, the stock has dropped in low-income countries. Women currently account for almost half the migrants (49.6 per cent in 2005), with an increase that is mainly due to family reunions and the demand for qualified migrants. In that respect, the UN report specifies that in 2000:

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\text{there were about twenty million highly skilled migrants aged 25 or over living in OECD countries, while the figure was only twelve million in 1990 (Docquier & Marfouk 2006). The eight million increase represents 46 per cent of the total growth of migrants aged 25 or over from 1990 to 2000. (United Nations 2006: 58)}
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This first approach of international migration through net immigration can be supplemented by another that considers net emigration. Other poles thus appear in countries of the South, namely, those in Central America – Mexico and the Caribbean, in particular – Africa and Asia with China, the Philippines and Indonesia. Map 2 points with even greater relevance to the weight of the colonial past. It informs on the possible existence of ‘migratory pairs’ that link source countries with destination countries and transit zones.
3 Migration and development patterns in countries of origin

The relation between the notions of migration and development is not an easy one. Such notions are loaded with ideological and political presuppositions leading to passionate debates. Very often, their approach depends on the place from where they are seen – from the countries of origin (emigration) or the countries of destination (immigration) – and on who is analysing them – the ‘developer’ or the ‘developed’. It is therefore necessary to scrutinise these objects in greater detail from the viewpoint of the agents concerned by this connection, and especially migrants on the one hand and policymakers on the other.

As mentioned briefly earlier on, departures are guided by needs and/or desires. The decision, however, to legally accept a candidate for immigration solely depends on the policy of the settlement country, and on its demographic or labour needs. Such a decision never takes account of the candidates’ needs for mobility or the concerns of their country of origin. The will or need to maintain a high economic growth leads to the fiercest competition between countries, whether they are rich or poor. In such a context, the North-South concept must indeed be redefined:

The internationalisation of financial, commercial and migratory flows has diluted that cleavage – some countries benefit from the neo-liberal system, whilst others sink into poverty. As a result, the South has become a very composite set of states, some of which are very rich like the Arab Emirates while others are very poor, like the least advanced countries of sub-Saharan Africa. (Damn Jime- 2006: 7)

Different economic theories have been put forward to explain this state of poverty, generally imputed to a lack of development, but seldom connected to international migration. In the early 1980s, some analysts recommended developing the countries of the South so as to maintain economic growth in the North. More recently, a new suggestion has emerged, that of connecting the issue of development with international migration. In order to limit the departure of the less qualified, the countries of the North and international institutions recommended developing those countries ‘exporting’ unskilled workers.

While the free movement of goods and capital is regularly mentioned as an indispensable factor for economic development, liberal economic theories do not recommend the free movement of people. From that standpoint, international migration and development could oppose each other. But they are inseparable, whether the relationship is analysed from the position of the developed countries or developing
ones. An ever larger number of developed countries need migrants, precisely to maintain their level of development. This is either because they have to make up for the insufficient increase or the ageing of their population, or to meet their needs for unskilled and/or highly skilled labour. Only international migration can help meet the requirements in the two areas in an accelerated manner.

A diachronic analysis using a sufficient long-time increment would also show that the development of some areas in the world has led to major population movements. Why should that not be so today? Differences in revenue and social, economic and political inequality give an incentive to the mobility of goods and capital and that of individuals. International migration and development, both, are subject to concentration phenomena; for instance, despite the apparent dispersion of international migrants’ destination countries, three quarters of them reside in only 28 countries. The theory of economic convergence, according to which poorest areas or countries would catch up with the richest ones, does not immediately lead to a decrease in international migration. On the contrary, as the living standard grows, international migration becomes easier.

On the basis of long-run studies of migration dynamics at the national level, the spatial and demographic patterns of international migration may be paralleled with a ‘migration hump’ comprising three phases. The first cycle is that of setting up internal and interregional flows, followed by international migration. Such a migratory change is made possible by another – economic – change involving less protectionism. The second phase of the cycle becomes possible with the establishment of migratory channels and the reduction of the financial cost of international travel. Economic growth in countries of departure would contribute to a reduction in the number of international migrants. As such, the introduction of the third phase – that of the import of labour – would then be supported. This model has been observed in many European countries and would also apply to the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, etc. (Guilmoto & Sandron 2003).

International migration and the development of countries concerned by that form of mobility are thus indeed closely linked. This model may partly apply to the Kayes area in Mali, from where people have been migrating to France for over half a century. In this region of Africa, departures were encouraged by the existence of ‘bridgeheads’ in France (former Senegalese soldiers or sailors), the knowledge of the language and the relations of dependence dating back from the colonial period and a demand for labour in France, where the government, after the Algerian war of independence and the Evian agreement, was looking for a substitute for Algerian migration. The arrival of greater numbers of sub-Saharan Africans began in the 1960s. During the
second phase, from the 1970s to the 1990s, migratory channels were consolidated, diversified and contributed to the intensification and geographical diversification of the flows (Spain, Italy, US, etc.). Today new candidates for international migration also come from areas adjacent to initial places of origin. They are no longer only Soninkes, but also Khassonkes, Bambaras and Haalpulaars. They no longer only come from rural areas, but also from cities. They are no longer only young men, but also women. Even though the last phase of the cycle has been observed for several years, it cannot be said that the region has sufficiently developed so as to limit or even stop departures. On the contrary, a demand for workers is emerging in the Soninke villages from where migrants have left for France:

It is not rare to see small vegetable growers of the neighbouring Khassonke villages travelling several dozens of kilometres every day to sell their produce in Soninke villages, ‘where there is money’. It is also ironic to note that after farming, masonry is often the second activity of Khassonke families. This comes as no surprise – since the climate allows farm work for only six months a year, the other six months can be devoted to masonry work for Soninke families who want to build a permanent house with remittances. (Gubert 2003: 10)

The ‘migratory hump’ de facto connects international migration and the development of destination and departure countries. During the migratory cycle’s various phases, migrants send money to their families and develop individual or family projects. They take advantage of their overseas stay to save money, discover and transfer what they learnt while integrating and transforming it. The second phase of the cycle, an intensification of departures and an increase in the number of migrants in any one country of arrival, fulfils the conditions required for the emergence of collective projects for the development of the country of origin. During the third phase, one notes indeed fewer departures though not necessarily returns. Meanwhile, movements between the different poles of the migratory space intensify, bonds are consolidated and new practices appear, including dual residence. Social and spatial interactions become possible and contribute to changes in societies affected by these movements that, in turn, are factors for social and economic development.
Migratory projects and migrants as ‘frontier runners’

Could one then propose another approach that would recognise the connections between origin and host countries as a possible factor supporting a different form of positive presence in the host country? Can migrants build that position by developing initiatives to link their presence overseas and have those who stayed behind accept their absence? Could a situation be created whereby the function of those who left would not be reduced to sheer remittances? Such an analysis of the relation between international migration and the development of origin countries relies on the notion of ‘migratory field’. This links areas of departure and of arrival, thus allowing for spatial interactions to be fully taken into account. The analysis gives predominance to the new role of the migrant, as someone who mobilises know-how acquired by circulation. It aims at understanding modes of territorial location based on networks constituted for another form of mobility, namely, social mobility. It allows us to consider migrants as ‘frontier runners’ for whom the to-and-fro movement between areas of departure and arrival entails a need to envision long-term settlement and to remain long enough in migration while not giving up what ties them to their country of origin.

The decision to leave and the direction of flows, which are all too often reduced to the supply and demand of labour, are presumably guided by the search for greater profit, the implicit model being then that of economic growth. But another type of explanation is required, formulated by migrants – one can then see that these individual acts are rarely decided alone and imply collective strategies and reasoned choices.

Imagined and well thought-out before departure, the migratory project evolves during the overseas stay. However, it can only materialise through the connection between diverse social levels of the migrant’s group belonging – those created during journeys to, and sojourns in, the country of arrival, that of the kinship group (Boyer 2005: 58-59). Individual or collective migratory projects, migratory contracts between those who leave and those who stay, migratory networks used for travelling, but also settling down in the country of arrival all combine to produce a complex system made up of social control, collective incentive and solidarity, sometimes ascribed and constrained. While these three elements smooth out circulations, they also organise different forms of dependence, both in departure and arrival countries. Stabilised migratory networks are one of the required conditions for the appearance of development projects initiated by a group of migrants from the same village, town, region or, more rarely, the same country, as well as from different countries (Soumaré 2001).
If financial transfers improve the living conditions of family members who stayed at home, migrants do not always control the use of such remittances. In countries such as Senegal, Mali and Mauritania – and generally in all countries where social control and expenditure choices are decided only by elders – collective projects have been a way of ensuring that sent cash was used appropriately. Purchase groups, village or neighbourhood cooperatives, irrigated areas and wells help meet food needs. Dispensaries, maternity clinics, health centres and schools have been funded by migrants so as to ensure health care and to enable, if not improve, children’s schooling. Other individual projects have also emerged, such as the construction of houses in the place of origin, in nearby towns, in capital cities or by the sea for holidaying, which enables the family to meet during the to-and-fro movements between migrants’ diverse residences (El Hariri 2003). These individual and collective projects contribute to the social and economic development of the regions of origin.

Migrants have often been criticised for not investing sufficiently in productive sectors, but one could also wonder why they ought to, especially since the conditions for actual efficiency are not necessarily met. Individually, the available amounts depend on the migrants’ ability to save; they remain insufficient in many situations, and banking systems that would support such transfers and projects are not readily willing to offer their services on the best of terms (e.g. too high a rate for loans). More generally, in too many countries in the South, institutions do not live up to the migrants’ expectations in this sector. In terms of migrant development organisations, the situation could be very different. It must be remembered that this voluntary act is also accomplished under constraint, that aiming at being a development organisation is in many cases a social necessity before it is an economic calling. Through collective action, these migrants are primarily looking for the skills acquired during migration to be recognised by those who stayed behind. What is at stake is making them understand that migration cannot be reduced to the mere sending of cash alone. Reversely, such an organisation can become a partner for other development agencies – states of origin and destination – and bi-national cooperation schemes, supranational organisations and multinational cooperation projects, local authorities and decentralised cooperation schemes, NGOs and, more generally, all potential partners including corporations.7

There are many reasons for such initiatives involving migrants and other partner organisations not yet to be fully developed – or to be developed only in some regions of the world. Described as ‘local development’, it is, more than anything else, a specific approach and state of mind. Its aim is to emphasise local potentialities by mobilising a
variety of agents who are ready to contribute. It also requires discussions, shared decision-making and a clear will to cooperate so as to avoid the feeling that handouts are being distributed. Some migrant organisations dealing with their origin country’s development have clearly come to understand this, once they have submitted their interventions to the formal involvement of communities affected by them. Such an involvement is rarely financial, but it can be tangible, i.e. having a building constructed to house a purchase group, or using collectively a piece of land so as to supply a ‘corn bank’. Meanwhile, if local communities are closely involved in development (presence of village development organisations, local organisations launching community initiatives, major involvement of governmental agencies, private entrepreneurs, etc.), relationships between migrant development associations and these local agents can become complex, tense or even conflictual.

5 Public policies: from assisted returns to the notion of ‘co-development’

A major contradiction emerged in the 1970s. While migrants were effectively involved in development projects so as to manage in a different way the relation between their presence elsewhere and their place of origin, public policies were implemented to organise their return ‘home’, under the pretence of supporting development. Such policies were then going against the meanings with which these migrant groups were endowing their practices. Such policies of assisted return were, however, launched in Germany in 1972, in the Netherlands in 1975 and in France in 1977 (Blion & Rigoni 2001: 13). Others followed these early attempts, always with the same logic. Developing international migrants’ countries of origin was meant to slow down uncontrolled migration, something that would be accomplished by relying on migrants as development agents in their ‘home countries’. A central question is raised here: what interests are converging, between departure and arrival countries, when migrants are ‘selected’ and when family reunion is made virtually impossible and the acceptance of a candidate for immigration depends on the sole economic needs of the arrival country?

Other policies are associated with these (new) migratory ones – for instance, fighting poverty so as to limit migratory flows, and thus considering the act of migration as a mainly economic phenomenon. Such a mechanical understanding of international migrations is now being challenged. A UN report notes that:
At the beginning, deepening poverty does not automatically translate into a rise of migration. The poorest people generally do not have either the required resources to bear the costs of migrating nor the possibility to run the risk of such a venture. International migrants usually come from middle-income households. (...) Low-skilled migration has the largest potential to reduce the depth and severity of poverty in the communities of origin. (United Nations 2006: 14)

The same report supports the notion of co-development, a concept developed in France in the 1970s by pro-Third World circles considering possible alternatives to the various forms of cooperation, which they considered as perpetuating post-colonial fiefdoms. Such a conception of international cooperation was referred to by Delegate Minister for Cooperation and Development for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Pierre Cot. In 1981, he wished to transform the Ministry of Cooperation into a so-called ministry of development and thus introduced the idea of co-development to supplement bilateral cooperation. This French cooperation and development policy aimed at Third World countries, particularly those in Africa, could not be implemented and Cot had to resign in 1982. While it did not have as an explicit agenda to link development and international migration, development aid was already aimed at strongly reducing migratory flows (Lacroix 2005: 182). Later on, the French government tested this formula with a local development-migrations programme, but amounts allocated to support migrants having a development project were less than €3,450 and few migrants were able to benefit from them. Despite the very inconclusive results of such an experience (Gonin 2005: 264), the French government did not give up. Home Minister in 1997, Jean-Pierre Chevenement appointed Sami Naïr for an inter-ministerial mission on migration and co-development, asking him to suggest directions for a development policy connected to migratory flows (Naïr 1997). This new conception explicitly connected inter-state cooperation with the control of migratory flows and the integration of migrants. If such a conception combining cooperation, development and migration is still at work, it has gone through a variety of changes, the latest being proposed by co-development ambassador Christian Connan. This French invention has since been adopted by the European Commission and very recently by the UN, and it remains connected to the control of migratory flows.

This linking together of international migration and development of countries of origin is one of the new managing strategies of migratory flows. But political decisions that might be geared to them are not replacing migratory policies designed by states; they only supplement
them and offer new justifications for deportations, heightened border controls and tighter selection of candidates for international migration. Such a series of measures makes it possible for Northern countries to limit issues of international migration to the sole economic sphere, thus confining all other dimensions to that of humanitarian aid.

Europe is not the only part of the world where such initiatives develop. Mexicans abroad – over eleven million people with remittances worth $11 billion in 2005 – also play a considerable part in their state of departure. In 1999, the Federacion de Zacatecanos, founded in 1985 in Los Angeles, gathered 43 village organisations. Since their actions towards communities of origin were upsetting the local social and economic balances, successive Zacateca state governors helped institutionalise this form of international solidarity and supported some migrant projects from 1986 onwards (Le Texier 2003: 4). For each peso invested by migrants, the state was allocating an additional peso, which gave the programme the name Dos por Uno. From 1992 onwards, the Mexican federal government joined the programme and added the same amount (Tres por Uno). Cooperation between the state of Zacateca and migrant associations, visits by mayors ‘selling’ their projects to their fellow nationals in the US led to many achievements (in water supply, public lighting, building or renovating of schools, etc.).

It would be an illusion to think that such combination between migrant initiatives, cooperation and development of the countries of origin can be applied to all regions of the world affected by international mobility.

In regions where international migration has now become a dominant form of constitution of individual and family income, the relation between migrants and their communities of origin is a key for development, particularly at the local and regional levels. (Faret 2005: 273)

It requires the existence of a migratory flow fed with people, material goods (remittances, objects) and immaterial ones (information, exchanges, dissemination of innovation, etc.), linking two or more societies involved in regular circulation. It therefore requires settled and long-term ‘migratory pairs’ as well as spatial contiguitities in both departure and arrival countries. It also requires establishing a dynamic migratory field with regular to-and-fro travels and a circular migratory system that includes dual residence for some migrants. But such a combination also has adverse effects, including a stronger dependency of those who stayed behind on those who left, family splits and inflation in departure areas. It can even become an incentive for more
departures since it creates new disparities between areas with high migration and those where such types of mobility are not taking place.

6 The other co-development

In the case of places like Mexico, Kerala, Morocco (Lacroix 2005) and the Senegal River Valley, a dynamic of development involving migrants has been observed. Hundreds of projects have been launched thanks to the savings of a few, the support of diverse organisations and the will of those who have migrated. These projects include purchase groups, dispensaries, maternity clinics and village pharmacies, schools, village electrification, hydraulic and domestic systems, kitchen gardens and irrigated areas. These ‘development entrepreneurs’ behind them are an exceptional example of economic agents with a specific profile, at the crossroads of the social and the political spheres. Other regions of the world are also concerned by achievements of this type. The Panos Institute, for one, has largely contributed to publicising these ‘voices of immigration for plural development’ (Blion & Mecknache 2005; Blion & Rigoni 2001).

Such a collective involvement, which is specific to some regions of the developing world, often flows from customary requirements maintained in migration. It is supported by forms of collective organisation of a transnational type, which make it possible to combine the involvement of those who did not leave and of those who live overseas. At the origin of such projects are small groups of migrants who worked alone to find solutions to improve the living conditions of their family members in the country of origin. They later asked for support from NGOs and, more recently, they have been benefiting from measures taken by some states in the North.

Moving is an experience in itself and migrants gain new information, discover other ways of life and practices. However, they do not spontaneously become developers: they must first want it and go through the three stages that separate the migrant and his or her remittances from the migrant who has become a development entrepreneur in his country of origin. The first stage would be that of the acceptance by the concerned societies of the economic, social, cultural and political changes introduced by their mobility and circulation. In order to adopt that position, migrants must be able to access information and training in the settlement country, and to transfer what they have learned or acquired. Besides, their original community must accept the changes they propose to introduce. The second stage calls for the multiplication of exchange between the different poles of the migratory field. Holiday stays of the migrant – and ‘the movement of
families and relatives in the opposite direction, that is in the same di-
rection as work migration’ (Faret 2005: 281) – contribute to the estab-
lishment of such a dynamic migratory field. But this is not enough:
the number of persons concerned must be sufficiently large to initiate
social change. When the bonds between the countries of departure and
arrival have strengthened, collective investment for the country of de-
parture may be envisioned. The third stage, with explicit economic pro-
jects, then becomes possible and migrants can contribute to it.

Development projects launched by migrants are only possible to the
extent that they settle in a position that goes beyond categorisations as
emigrant and immigrant. This implies changing positions as to the
meaning of being away either for a relatively long time or with no in-
tention of going back. For the migrant, this relation between migration
and development of the country of origin could be summed up in two
stages. First, there is a ‘doing’ phase. This entails sending funds for
themselves (in preparation of their return) and for their family. If all or
almost all do so, the money is not aimed at funding development. In
some areas of the world, migrants have done so because of their gov-
ernments’ inability to develop and plan, but they wish not to do it for
long. Such a financial commitment is costly and a burden on their
budgets. Second comes the ‘helping to do’ phase. This is all the more
acceptable if a local development dynamics has been initiated. In this
case, migrants support what is being done in their country of origin,
under the condition that their family benefits from it. By their contribu-
tion, they only assert they still belong to that part of the world.

Ultimately and after a certain time, the doing stops when agents
think that after all, it is the responsibility of governments to improve
everybody’s living conditions.

It remains to be understood why some migrants have individually
embarked on this adventure of development. Individual or collective ac-
tions by migrant development associations are not disconnected from
more personal intentions. By funding projects, migrants try to gain
their independence from their family so as to be released from the obli-
gation to meet the debt incurred when leaving. They can also hope to
limit the departure of their brothers or even their children. That was
what was attempted in the 1990s by people from the Senegal River Ba-
sin (Gonin 2001). Funding projects is also a way to work for their own
social promotion. The completion of a development project in the
country of origin is a means of social mobility different from those
they are ascribed to by both source and destination countries. These
different reasons for individual commitment unavoidably introduce
frictions between constituted groups (of migrants, youth and elders, vil-
lagers and leading local figures, etc.). They are indeed the contradictory
realities of any development process.
Public policies carried out under the aegis of local development and with the aim to mobilise the ‘other co-development’ lead to the reorganisation of public intervention. Thus, decentralisation in Mali or remittances of Moroccan nationals living abroad in the Kingdom of Morocco are always described as one of the conditions for the implementation of economic, social and environmental development strategies. Since the aim is local development, decisions are made locally or by the communities, including their overseas members. It is generally considered that the choices made will, on the one hand, be wise and realistic and, on the other, have greater chances to succeed since the support of local communities will be more easily obtained. As a result, the issue of local development often goes hand in hand with that of communities’ involvement. In the specific situations presented here, those who fund or suggest development actions are also located thousands of kilometres away from the place of implementation. The locations where projects are developed are as often voluntary organisations of fellow nationals, traditional decision-making forums such as village meeting trees, local voluntary groups and elected officials. The circulation of information and negotiations between these many places have become particularly complex and are a prerequisite for success. This minority of migrants, partners in development, creates a form of territoriality that can no longer be limited to a single place, but encompasses several settings. This is how the elite group contributes to the definition of that ‘other co-development’ – a minority of migrants no longer excluded from source and destination countries. It is one that does not just endure passively, but contributes to the social, economic and political development of the various locations of the migratory space. This state of mind reflects other forms of integration and insertion in countries of origin and settlement and breeds political impertinence by making it possible to go beyond insertion policies and obligations of allegiance to a single state. A possible claim about their citizenship, made up of cooperation, movement and commitment, can thus emerge.

7 Conclusion

The relation between international migration and development has all too often been approached as a ‘problem’. Would it not be wiser to recognise that it brings hope? It is not that of ending international migration and bringing about a development similar to the dominant model, but a hope to improve the living conditions of those who move and their families? The ‘frontier runner’ migrant, like the professional of local development, is a person carrying collective intentions who pays little heed to borders so as to negotiate political recognition on the
basis of economic and social commitments. Migrants involved in development projects – or merely contributing to improving the living conditions of those who have stayed behind – have become intermediary agents, to the extent that they have joined ranks with professionals and/or volunteers responsible for building consultation forums. These migrants are intermediary agents in that they identify, rely on and build resources for development in their discourse and practices. They are also ‘frontier runners’: they cultivate a way of being in several locations linked through their ability to change places in the space they occupy. In the lapse of twenty or 30 years, they have acquired the ability to change their way of seeing things from the place where they are on the basis of what they have obtained from other places.

Approaching the ‘reciprocal’ relations between migration and development thus requires one to locate the migrant in a larger setting that includes development NGOs, governmental agencies and of course the communities concerned by these actions. Isolating these agents would result in locking them into a position they deny – assimilate or integrate into the settlement country or go back to the country of origin. These migrants contribute to know-how transfers. Though, above all, they cultivate an ability to be from several places, and by connecting them, they aim to improve their living conditions. From this original position, the migratory space is viewed as a living space in its own right, a space made of multiple places in more than one country (often two, sometimes more). These migrants have become circulating people with multiple and accepted territorialities. This wealth is territorial, but it is also connected to networks, those of migration and those allowed by commitment in the different locations of the migratory space. In the country of origin, the aim is still to be accepted, while being freed from the constraints of debt. In the settlement country, it is to be recognised socially so as to benefit from the support of NGOs, decentralised cooperation and even some public policies that recognise the benefits of international migration. But co-development has also become a market, and diverging conceptions of these reciprocal relations emerge. For some, it is made of cash and skills transfers for investment, so as to reinforce the zones of influence of some states in another way. For others, it consists in taking part in public decisions, exchanging information and building social, economic and political achievement. The frontier runner migrants have only one aim: being better settled in the host country so as to be more effective when contributing to the development of their country of origin and, through that contribution, to be recognised as useful where they live.
Notes

1. It is noticeable how, on the global scale, there are fewer international migrants today than there were in the early twentieth century, when fewer countries were concerned by such mobility.

2. International migration is a movement of persons that implies crossing a state boundary and a long-term change of residence. On the basis of these two criteria, all those living outside their country of birth are counted. This definition does not include temporary moves and only takes into account one main residence. Thus, international migration refers to a change of residence for a given period.

3. The definition used here is that of Gilbert Rist:
   ‘Development’ is made up of a series of sometimes apparently contradictory practices, which make it necessary, in order to guarantee social reproduction, to generalise the destruction of natural environment and social relationships, so as to ensure a growing production of merchandises (goods and services) meant, through exchange, for solvent demand. (Rist 1996: 27-34)

4. However, existing migratory systems are characterised by their great inertia, and derive their regulations from the depths of history: colonial legacy, habits, geographical proximity, regional political and economic configurations and other opportunities.


6. As Pumain & Saint Julien (2001: 5) put it: ‘...what happens or is in a place is not indifferent to what is or is happening in other places.’

7. ‘EDF and Total launched the joint venture Koraye Kurumba (meaning ‘new light’ in Soninke), aimed at carrying out rural electrification projects in the north of the Kayes region, together with Malian migrants in France. Migrants pay about 70 per cent of the subscriptions of their relatives back home, who benefit from the electrification. (see La lettre du codeveloppement, 1 July 2005: 6)

8. Overall, studies have shown the limits of that link between assisted return (including voluntary return) and the action initiated by migrants.

9. From that point of view, proposals of ‘zero immigration’ – or of controlling it by setting up obstacles in the form of laws, tightening border controls or walls like those in Ceuta, Melilla or along the Mexico-US border – will not affect international migration candidates’ determination.

10. According to Christian Connan:
    Co-development means any development aid action, whatever its nature and the area in which it intervenes, in which migrants living in France are involved, regardless of the modalities of such participation (…). Co-development may concern immigrants who wish to return ‘home’ to set up an activity or those (particularly business people, academics, doctors, engineers) who, while being settled in France for the long-term, either wish to make an investment in their country of origin so as to promote productive activities and carry out social projects (schools, health centres, etc.) or want their country of origin to take advantage of their skills, know-how and connections (…) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 January 2005: 1)

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PATRICK GONIN
Part IV

Forced migration
On 30 December 2005 a horrifying massacre took place in Cairo. The Egyptian police were subsequently held responsible for the death of Sudanese nationals, the number of whom varied from the official figure’s count of 27 people, including seven children, to over 150 people, according to some lawyers and organisations. On that day, there were 1,000+ people who had been occupying a park, situated in the compound of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For the past three months, UNHCR had been refusing to meet their demands for resettlement. All the refugees declared they had experienced anti-black racism by the Arab Egyptian population and were unable to go back to their country as it was still partly at war, which provided the two justifications required for demanding transfer to a third country. However, at the same time, UNHCR announced its objective to repatriate 60,000 Sudanese nationals from neighbouring countries (including Egypt) during the first half of 2006, even though it was generally accepted that the situation in southern Sudan and Darfur was not secure. In fact, it was so insecure that at the beginning of January in the same year, UNHCR had decided to reduce its representation in the Darfur region in western Sudan, as armed conflict with neighbouring Chad was thought to be imminent. Despite that, the repatriation operations went on. That perspective was a frightening one for the Sudanese refugees and illegal immigrants. They knew that everywhere in Africa, when UNHCR announces repatriation, it is first followed by a period of individual voluntary returns. They also knew that this period of voluntary returns is generally followed by a period of so-called ‘collective return’, which, to them, means the start of the organisation of ‘non-voluntary return’. In this case, the representatives of the agency were far removed from the sweetened image of UNHCR that prevails in European countries. It must be said that in Africa, UNHCR essentially acts as the head of a humanitarian government. Its system controls refugees by putting them in camps and organising flows, for which it uses at least 500 NGOs with contracts across the world every year (Agier 2008).
The Sudanese demonstrators who were killed by the brutal charge of a regiment of 6,000 policemen were killed after the regional representative of UNHCR had declared that their files had been processed. The Egyptian government was asked to ‘take, as a matter of urgency, all the appropriate measures to resolve the situation’ although to do so ‘with peaceful means’.¹ A few weeks earlier, already exasperated by four weeks of unorganised camping at their doors, the UNHCR representative had clearly expressed its disengagement from the Egyptian government:

Even though we do not have accurate information [sic], we have every reason to think that the majority of the demonstrators are not refugees holding the UNHCR card. (…) Most of them are failed asylum seekers and not within the remit of the UNHCR.

The letter concluded by saying that ‘The situation must not last any longer’. Moreover, it called for an intervention by the Egyptian authorities while, at the same time, asking in the end for the ‘humane treatment’ of the problem.² Clearly, the Sudanese exiles – considered successively or alternately as ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘illegal migrants’ – had become only a problem of urban nuisance around UNHCR offices.

The massacre was thus one of ‘failed asylum seekers’ (the term used in this case is ‘closed files’) as well as of stateless citizens. The target of their protests was not the Egyptian government, but precisely UNHCR, the only party to whom they were entitled to forward their demands and the party that had turned down those demands. As de facto failed asylum seekers, they were demonstrating their right to ask for asylum and resettlement. More generally, they demonstrated their right to ask for protection following an absent or failed state’s failure to protect them.

The case of the Sudanese refugees in Cairo is not isolated. The situation of refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers in the world today contains the dual particularity of being a situation of extreme relegation and the backdrop for political emergence in forms that are as extreme. The non-acknowledgment of refugees and persons looking for help leads to the creation of ‘failed’ seekers everywhere. They ask for the enforcement of their right to live, but are up against a state in which that minimum human right is not guaranteed. This situation logically leads to illegal action, which is aimed at finding the way to live in economic and political illegality. The issue of the ‘stateless’, which Hannah Arendt identified over 50 years ago as being the crux for rethinking citizenship and the nation state, is posed in its entirety; the
founding of UNHCR in the early 1950s was intended to be a solution to that issue.

The cold war made the Western world, which was willing to receive the ‘good’ victims of communism, create an ad hoc institution that was – at least at the start – temporary, and yet had a universal message (Brauman 2000: 49). When the UNHCR was founded in 1951, the organisation could have been expected to create the conditions of a space of acknowledgment and speech. At the same time, it could have been something that would guarantee protection (physical and legal) and the upholding of human rights for those who had lost those rights from their state of origin but not re-won them back. Subsequent events have borne out what was known since France’s nineteenth-century measures for receiving foreigners began: any policy of assistance simultaneously serves as a verification instrument used on the very persons entitled to such assistance (Noiriel 1999).

‘The Nation State, which is unable to provide a law for those who have lost the protection of a national government, hands the problem over to the police’. This was how Arendt characterised the fate of those she called the ‘Stateless’ (Arendt 1951: 166). The political issue – being deprived of state protection – was denied as early as the 1930s by the apparently technical and demographic appellation of ‘displaced persons’, which is still in use today. Further, internment camps (e.g. of Spanish refugees in southern France) had already been the systematic response to what was reduced to being a mere ‘residence problem’ for ‘displaced persons’ (Bernardot 2002; Peschanski 2002; Filhol 2004; Temime & Dreyfus-Armand 1995; Temime & Degigne 2001). Plunged in the pain of exile and the risks of anonymity, the complaint of refugees remains inaudible: ‘Nobody knows who I am’. By leaving, they have had to give up their citizenship, which is the name of a dual political relationship – both acknowledgment of, and protection by, a state. They become stateless de facto.

In the world of exile, individual conditions (that of the refugees) or collective conditions (those of minority stateless peoples) represent identity categories produced by rejection by the nation state and its inability to integrate them, from the dual point of view of protection (legal, security, social) and acknowledgment (political right). Their existence ultimately makes it necessary to rethink the very definition of the nation, which can be found in the historical or current questioning about national identity.

Arendt has shown that the question of the stateless is not historically summarised by the Jewish question alone. In addition, she argued at the start of the 1950s that the emergence of the Jewish state does not do away with the issue of the stateless. I would add that while the issue has historically taken the most obvious form of large minorities
without territories – and sometimes in the form of diasporas, raising the question of the state through that of autonomy (Jews, Inuit, Kabyle, Somalis, Palestinians, etc.) – it is also posed as an effect of the forced movement of individuals, either in isolation or in large groups. Only an existential community brings these anonymous crowds together in a life story made of violent breaks, in an administrative identity category and in differentiated and depoliticised treatment in spaces that are ‘out-places’. At present, the use of specific identity categories to approach and manage individuals grouped in these spaces raises the question of their bases. Thus, confined ‘out-place’ spaces and the conception of individuals as dissonalised bodies together form a representation of the person centred on the humanitarian model. That representation is closer to that of the illegal immigrant than that of the citizen. The illegal immigrant has characteristics similar to that of the victim, body incarnate of vulnerability – loss of rights, movement in border areas or extraterritorial areas. Additionally, the shift from the status of victim (the basis of humanitarian action) to that of illegal immigrant (the basis of police action) is frequent and random for the subjects. It relates to the political and moral choices of governments that lead to variable official interpretations – national or by the UN – despite the social or mobility conditions that may be equivalent in the life in exile of refugees.

What ought to alert us is the de facto similarity between police action and humanitarian action, much like the possible analogies between the status of victim and that of illegal immigrant, both placed outside the common nomos of humans. It should compel us to build a critique of the statistical, political and communicational changes relating to the current treatment of refugees and foreigners in the world and particularly in Europe.

At the start of the twenty-first century, about 50 million persons have been qualified as ‘victims of forced displacement’ by the UN. Of these, some thirteen to eighteen million, depending on the year, are refugees in the strict sense, i.e. living outside their country. These refugees are massively concentrated in Asia (over six million) and Africa (seven to eight million). They are in addition to the three million Palestinians who have taken refuge since the 1940s and 1960s in several Near Eastern countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Palestinian Territory). What is more, a little over three million people are considered by UNHCR to be returnees, or persons ‘being repatriated’. Lastly, 25 to 30 million, depending on estimates, are internally displaced persons (IDPs).

All these figures are approximate and disputable. They do not include the large (innumerable) amount of exiles who are not declared refugees and are considered as illegal immigrants. These include, for example, the 130,000 Afghan refugees said to have become ‘invisible’
following the American attacks of October and November 2001 in Afghanistan. It was in a last minute, that the UNHCR had the Pakistani government acknowledge them as ‘refugees’ in order to put them in the camps it had rushed to build along the Afghan border. This number also includes some of the Somali, Ethiopian and Rwandan refugees said to have ‘self-settled’ in the bordering countries. Some do this because they prefer to try their luck in illegality and the informal economy rather than be locked up in camps. Others are forced to wander because their refugee status has not gained official acknowledgment.

The generally observed decrease in the number of refugees in the strict sense during the 2000s is accompanied by a regular increase in the other categories – IDPs, territorial asylum, humanitarian asylum, etc. In early 2006, UNHCR claims stated that there were only nine and a half million refugees. In fact, over the decades, the dominant image of exile changed and has come to take the successive forms of refugee, internally displaced person, subsequently failed asylum seeker and therefore, finally, illegal immigrant. Refugee, displaced person and failed asylum seeker are three historical category identities that can thus apply to the same person within a few years or a few months in their biography of displacement. The biographies go through these identities, with categories and parts of the world acting as communicating vessels.

Management of so-called undesirables is growing and becoming evermore precise in the area of the production of categories and appropriate spaces. More and more regularly, it mobilises a paired humanitarian-police response as can be seen in the treatment of sub-Saharans in Morocco, where many NGOs have responded to calls for tender from the Moroccan and European governments to take charge of the holding of illegal entrants. Humanitarian action is thus increasingly ‘trapped’ and its solutions for protection are included in the policies for control. For example, the concept of ‘internal asylum’ – introduced in the discussions between European states as part of strategies to outsource the asylum procedure – seems to perfectly echo the experience internally displaced persons have in camps that are managed or created by international NGOs in countries in the South. In the European intergovernmental policy, it represents the ideal of dual removal – in camps and in African countries. The strategy aimed at preferring ‘buffer’ states, particularly in North Africa, to contain and screen ‘foreigners’ is also based on the same principle of removal and detention of undesirables.

This strategy of control and the rejection can go so far as territorial quarantine and, ultimately, death. The number of refugees and asylum seekers put into danger of death rose in the last quarter of 2005. The
context has been one in which policies are increasingly taking the form of a global police force that hunts undesirables.

In early October 2005, ten hunger strikers in Kabul asked UNHCR to regularise their position. UNHCR gave in to some of their demands when the media began to take an interest in their strike. Nearly two months later, two strikers attempted to burn themselves in front of the UN offices after UNHCR stopped its aid and refused to grant them resettlement. In June 2003, exiles from Sierra Leone living in Conakry, Guinea, demonstrated in the street, asking UNHCR for acknowledgment and aid. UNHCR responded by giving in to the demands of the Guinean government, settling the issue as a law-and-order problem. The refugees were asked to go to camps in the forest region, 600 km away, failing this they would be considered as illegal residents. On 7 July 2003, an official memo of the UNHCR representative in Conakry stated that ‘after the date of the transfer [to the camps], the refugees that remain in Conakry run the risk of being rounded up by force’ by the Guinean police. UNHCR gave up responsibility for their protection de facto.

Out go refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers waiting to be given documents. What is more, out goes the recognition of the situation of stateless persons. The dominant figure today is that of the ‘failed asylum seeker’, the last level in the scale of remedies imaginable. It has been produced in collaboration with UNHCR and represents the last stage in abandoning the stateless. After that point, civilians may be killed. This right is taken on in all freedom by the most advanced states in the hunt for undesirables using all means, legal or otherwise. Eleven failed asylum seekers and illegal migrants died as a result. On the night of 28 September 2005, on the high fences that mark the border between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Ceuta (where a three-metre-high barrier has been put up), Spanish and Moroccan police exercised the right to shoot at the crowd. According to different organisations, others were taken to the desert in southern Morocco and left there, while others still were taken near the Algerian border, from where they disappeared.

One might wonder today if UNHCR is not abandoning its founding mission to protect the stateless. One wonders if the agency is not turning into a vague humanitarian, moral intention annexed to policies for controlling the flow and rejection of undesirables – one whose policies have taken form in recent years across the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. That is how the recent changes in UNHCR may be read. By putting itself increasingly at the service of European and African policies that call into question the rights of refugees and asylum seekers – generally the rights of foreigners – UNHCR is clearly leaning towards the control of flows and the holding of undesirables. This has
come at the cost of protecting the stateless, which was the agency’s initial mission. Has that mission become irrelevant, as its initiatives in recent years seem to demonstrate, particularly in respect to African irregular migrants and refugees? Some states would probably be glad to see UNHCR let its international protection mission dissolve into a simple, possibly ‘peaceful’ or ‘humane’ supplement to current European and African policies in the area of migration control. While it no longer mentions ‘forced’ migration, the control of populations in displacement is being substituted for it and is included in an overall policy that is being redefined. That policy tends to do away with the right to protection of the stateless as provided in the Geneva Convention of 1951.

‘Stateless persons’ and ‘persons without papers’ are minimalist categories when it comes to acknowledging the presence of non-nationals. At least those designated as such can be acknowledged by voluntary organisations and obtain sub-identity documents (receipts of applications for cover, etc.), thus sustaining them within a minimal sphere of law. Being a truly stateless person is to have no acknowledgment by, or protection from, any institution, just as being without papers is to be beyond all traces of legality, including that given by groups of persons without papers.

Now more than ever, the political question of the stateless is relevant, even if the terms have changed significantly since the founding of UNHCR 58 years ago. Even today – regardless of the legal and identity categories that have for decades graced paths to exile – those who are called ‘refugees’, ‘internally displaced persons’, ‘immigrants who have been turned away or deported’ or ‘illegal immigrants’ are still sent back to the essential issue of their citizenship. This issue, alone, opens the discussion of the ‘right to have rights’. The vicious circle of categorisations segments and constrains individuals for their movements on the basis of pre-calibrated reasons (‘economic’, ‘family’, ‘humanitarian’). But departures can never be attributed to just one cause. For instance, even in a war-torn region, the inability to work and therefore to feed oneself can trigger a family to leave their homeland. All the interrogations that detect ‘bogus’ refugees deny the first reason for exile, which is the failure of a state to offer protection from distress or violence, a lack of balance, the impossibility of staying. Instead of a policy rejecting undesirables, it is imperative to think of building true international co-responsibility to maintain the citizenship of all those who have lost the acknowledgment and protection of their state.
Notes

1 Letter of 22 December 2005 from the UNHCR representative to the Egyptian government.
2 Letter from the UNHCR representative to the Egyptian government, 27 October 2005.
3 I have developed that analysis in Aux bords du monde, les réfugiés, (2002), Paris: Flammarion.
4 See, in particular, UNHCR’s last two publications (UNHCR 1997, 2000).
5 The Palestinian refugees are ‘managed’ by a special UN body, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA).
6 According to the UN definition, IDPs are a category of people entitled to support. They have left their region of origin because of violence or internal war but have remained within the borders of their country.
7 In 1999 in the EU, only a quarter of the refugees had refugee status, i.e. came under the Geneva Convention of 1951 on refugees. The others had been given temporary asylum. In France, the rate of acceptance of so-called conventional asylum applications dropped from 80 to 20 per cent from 1981 to 1999 (see Daphné Bouteillet-Paquet (2002), ‘Quelle protection subsidiaire dans l’Union européenne?’, Hommes et Migrations 1238: 73-87.
8 See Migreurop’s online map ‘Carte des camps d’étrangers en Europe et dans les pays méditerranéens’, regularly updated at www.migreurop.org.

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11 Forced migration in Africa: a new but overlooked category of refugees

Véronique Lassailly-Jacob

1 Introduction

I would like to draw attention to a new but overlooked category of refugees that has emerged in Africa subsequent to the mass repatriation programmes that have been conducted since the 1980s. In January 2006, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was helping over twenty million persons around the world, including 8.6 million refugees and 6.6 million internally displaced persons. The top-ranking continent was Asia with 8.6 million, including 3.2 million refugees. Europe ranked third with 3.6 million, of whom 1.7 million were refugees. Finally came Latin America with more than two million.

Africa ranked second with a ‘population of concern’ comprising more than five million: 2.7 million refugees, 1.7 million internally displaced persons, 281,000 repatriates, 252,000 asylum seekers and 100,000 affected local persons (UNHCR 2006a). The major image of sub-Saharan Africa, an impressive one relayed by the mass media, is of warfare. Whether in Western Africa (Western Sahara, Casamance, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea), the Horn (Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan), the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi) or Central Africa (Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic), zones of conflict and tension evoke the image of a ‘dislocated Africa’. According to Roland Pourtier and Vincent Thébault (2006: 21-22):

the violence exerted by political forces, the lack of respect for human rights, have, since independence, produced a large number of migrants who are restricted to living in neighbouring lands.

Most of UNHCR’s ‘population of concern’ comes from developing countries, and remains there. Most do not leave their area of origin (they are the internally displaced) or have sought refuge in
neighbouring lands. Despite this fact, much attention is being paid to the migratory flows from these countries towards Europe, even though this migration is small compared with movements inside the African continent. Nonetheless, it has received the attention of governments, journalists and social scientists, as borders are being closed and immigration policies tightened. Headline-making current events present us with migrants and asylum seekers trying to reach Europe.

Academic studies and public debates have mainly focused on policies of asylum and immigration in industrialised countries. The resettlement of refugees or the integration of migrants in the West has been studied much more often than the local integration and settlement of refugees in Africa. Attention has been devoted to the point of view of host countries, with emphasis on ‘the vision of those who receive and have to manage the consequences of population movements in their country’ (Tandonnet 2007: 7). Meanwhile, studies of emigration – from the point of view of the country of origin – are poorly developed. As a consequence, our view of the phenomenon is far from complete.

The study of forced migrations in Africa has been developing, yet outside of France. We still know very little about migration flows in Africa, mainly because they have not been adequately studied. Even though industrialised countries want to help African countries develop legal frameworks for handling refugees and stopping the flow of asylum seekers, not much attention has yet been given to the situation in the country of first asylum. What is at stake in African asylum policies? More and more, we often hear how

asylum exclusively in the South has become the dream of countries in the North that want to avoid that these persons, once uprooted, be attracted by the North’s wealth and respect for human rights, and try to obtain protection there. (Legoux 2009: 9)

If we fail to take into account personal itineraries and the socio-economic and political conditions in the countries of origin and of first asylum, we risk mis-appraising the effects of migration flows from the South towards the North.

Here, I would like to shed light on the situation of refugees affected by repatriation programmes in two countries of first asylum: Sudan and Zambia. These persons represent a new but overlooked category of refugees in Africa, namely, those who stay on in asylum countries after repatriation has been officially conducted. What are the consequences of refusing to return to one’s homeland and thus losing, upon repatriation, the status of refugee in the country of asylum?

After presenting the current state of research on repatriation, I shall attempt to show how the asylum policies of countries of first asylum
affect former refugees. Drawing on my fieldwork in Zambia, I shall present the case of Mozambicans who were settled in an agricultural camp there but became ‘ex-refugees’ upon refusing to return home. Comparisons with the case of Eritreans in Sudan will then be made based on my reading of the literature (Asfaha 1992; Kibreab 1996; Le Houérou 2004, 2006).

2 The state of research on repatriation

UNHCR has been active in Africa since the Algerian War of Independence, when it helped set up repatriation programmes for Algerian refugees who had fled to neighbouring lands. Its assignment is to assist and protect those considered a ‘population of concern’. Since classifications are necessary to make a policy operational, UNHCR has divided this ‘population of concern’ into categories. At first, it took in its charge only statutory refugees and asylum seekers, i.e. persons who had crossed a border. In the late 1980s, however, it expanded its mandate to cover the increasing number of internally displaced persons and repatriates. The countries of origin were thus brought within its scope.

UNHCR advocates three lasting solutions for refugees: 1) resettlement in a third country; 2) repatriation to the country of origin; and 3) local integration in the host country. Since the early 1990s, it has considered voluntary repatriation to be the best way to handle a refugee crisis. Accordingly, it has supervised mass repatriation programmes, for instance, towards Namibia in 1989 and Mozambique in 1994. Other operations are underway. Following the Luena Peace Agreement in April 2002, at least 300,000 refugees and four million internally displaced persons in Angola have gone back home. Nearly five million refugees returned to Sierra Leone by the end of 2004 (UNHCR 2006b).

There is, however, a growing body of literature on the repatriation of refugees in the Third World. It has raised questions about ‘voluntary repatriation’ and the repatriation process. According to UNHCR and the OAU Convention, the willingness of refugees to return to their homelands is essential. People should not be repatriated against their will to a country where their freedom, security or safety are at risk. But how can we be sure that all individuals are willing to return under an officially conducted mass repatriation programme? John Rogge (1994) has raised the issue of the desire to return, which depends on how refugees identify themselves in relation to their home areas:

Length of time in exile, degrees of integration in the area of asylum, the pressures exerted by authorities for the refugees to re-
turn, the measure of physical disruption in home areas and the extent to which political change has occurred in their country of origin are the principal sets of variables affecting attitudes regarding repatriation. (Rogge 1994: 32)

The question of voluntariness is also related to conditions in the refugees’ country of origin and to the causes of displacement. According to Gaim Kibreab (1996), a distinction should be made between those who flee due to personal persecution on account of their political opinions and those who flee out of fear of violence.

Khalid Koser (1993) has laid emphasis on ‘self-repatriation’ and the disposal of information. He postulates that self-repatriation is a rational decision made by an individual. Among the three types of repatriation that he has identified (official, self- and forced), too much importance has been given to official repatriation programmes, even though they might not be based on individual consent and might be conducted before problems in the country of origin have been settled. Barry Stein (1994: 68) argues that most returns now ‘take the form of repatriation under conflict without a resolution of the political issues that originally caused an exodus’.

Repatriates should be viewed as return migrants. If UNHCR sees repatriation as the end of the refugee cycle, Koser (1993: 171) wonders whether repatriation might also be ‘the beginning of a new cycle of social, political and economic reintegration, and regional development’. Repatriation should be seen as a form of migration, according to Oliver Bakewell (1999: 1), who

highlights the contrast between the discourse of external agencies, who perceive repatriation as a return to normality and an end to the refugee problem, and villagers, for whom cross-border migration is a normal part of life and a way to improve their livelihoods.

3 Mozambican refugees in Zambia

Owing to the civil war that broke out just after the proclamation of independence in June 1975 and raged on for sixteen years (1976-1992), an estimated 1.7 million Mozambicans had, by 1993, crossed the border in search of asylum. This included 1.1 million to Malawi; more than 300,000 to South Africa (mostly in KaNgwane, Gazankulu, Lebowa and KwaZulu); 264,000 to Zimbabwe; 72,000 to Tanzania; 20,000 to Swaziland; and 25,000 to Zambia (US Committee for Refugees 1993: 67). According to this source, 3.5 million persons were
internally displaced in Mozambique itself. Mozambicans represented the largest registered refugee population on the African continent in 1993.

Asylum policies vary widely from one country to another depending on national asylum laws and on whether or not various UN instruments about the refugee status have been ratified. For instance, Mozambicans fleeing from the war to South Africa were never recognised as refugees and were massively deported (Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2002). About 30,000 Mozambicans from Tete Province sought refuge in the Eastern Province of Zambia. The 25,000 of them who registered were placed in Ukwimi, an agricultural settlement set up in 1987 in a relatively isolated, sparsely populated location in Petauke District (70 km north of Petauke, Eastern Province, and more than 100 km from the Mozambican border). Policies for placing refugees on agricultural settlements took shape in Africa during the early 1960s with UNHCR’s assistance (Rogge 1987). Between the 1960s and 1980s, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan and Congo-Kinshasa accepted large numbers of refugees, provided them with land and helped them become self-reliant. Very few other countries have implemented this sort of policy. Most countries prefer setting up transitory camps, where refugees are placed for short periods and receive humanitarian aid.

Ukwimi agricultural settlement counted about 29,000 inhabitants by 1993. This included 25,000 Mozambican refugees in 73 villages; more than 3,000 local Zambians in nine villages and several hamlets; and about 500 staff persons concentrated in the headquarters. Part of the arable land was divided into farm blocks. Each refugee household was allotted two hectares of maize and groundnuts that were cultivated as staples. Self-sufficiency was achieved.

During the two years following a peace agreement signed in Rome in October 1992, UNHCR organised a mass repatriation by bus of Mozambican refugees from Mozambique’s six neighbours, including Zambia. Many refugees returned by their own means, usually before official repatriation. As Ken Wilson and Jovito Nunes (1994: 172) point out, refugees’ ‘own strategies were clearly central to the process, and they were not simply “beneficiaries” of UNHCR, governmental or other agency initiatives’. The official repatriation ensued from the ‘cessation [of hostilities] clause’ of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which was applied to the more than one million Mozambicans who had fled before 1990. The refugees were informed that they were no longer eligible for international protection, since they could return home safely without fearing persecution. From July to December 1994, bus convoys commissioned by UNHCR repatriated 17,400 people from Ukwimi to Mozambique.
Just before repatriation, Mozambican politicians came to Ukwimi to urge refugees to come back to vote in the first multiparty elections, scheduled for October 1994. The refugees were promised amnesty. UNHCR provided free transportation to transit camps established in various districts in Tete Province, Mozambique. Refugees were allowed to bring their personal belongings along. Upon arrival, each family received food, seeds and tools for starting a new life.

Zambian authorities, too, exercised pressure to make refugees return. They declared that Ukwimi would no longer be a refugee camp under UNHCR supervision. In fact, the government turned Ukwimi into a resettlement scheme. Refugees who refused to go back were told that they would be transferred to Maheba, a camp located farther west for refugees from Angola. For the Mozambicans, this amounted to a threat given the distance and the strangers at the new location.

The local population in Zambia was eager for the refugees to leave since it wanted to take back the land ‘lent’ to them. Locals wanted to recuperate the 73 villages equipped with wells, the seven primary schools, the four clinics and the shops, not to mention the hundreds of hectares of cleared land. Despite the pressure to return, approximately 30 families refused to leave Ukwimi.

4 Eritrean refugees in Sudan

A similar situation arose in Sudan during the Eritrean War of Independence (1962-1991). In the early 1990s, when fundamental political changes were taking place in Eritrea, there were an estimated 591,000 Eritrean refugees in the eastern and central states of Sudan and in Khartoum (Kibreab 1996). Eighty thousand were housed in 26 agricultural settlements in the Kassala area in eastern Sudan (Le Houérou 2004), where they were granted plots of land, tools and seeds to become self-supporting. Most of these Eritreans had received refugee status on a prima facie basis. Under this status, the host country recognised them as a group of refugees given the objective circumstances in their homeland that had made them flee. ‘Prima facie refugees’ enjoy all the rights of refugees under the 1951 Convention and other legal texts. After a tripartite agreement among Sudan, Eritrea and UNHCR, Eritreans who had arrived in Sudan before 1991 fell under the aforementioned cessation clause. In 2002, following a peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, UNHCR helped the Eritreans go back. However, many of them refused to leave the settlements.

Although repatriation should be voluntary, the pressure to return was strong. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention assumes that refugees want to return home and explicitly refers to repatriation. As UNHCR
and NGOs withdrew, camps were closed and humanitarian aid dried up. Water pumps were demolished, the dispensary and schools were closed and, of course, relief food stopped arriving. The camps were desolate for anyone who refused to leave (Le Houérou 2006).

5 After repatriation, what becomes of those who refuse to go back?

Why did a few hundred persons – deprived of their status as prima facie refugees and of the international protection and assistance derived from it – decide to stay in the country of asylum despite so much pressure? Quite simply, because they were afraid of being persecuted if they went back.

In Sudan, the Eritreans who refused to return home belonged to the Bani Amer, an ethnic group persecuted by the new Eritrean authorities. Some of them, now old, did not want to go back because returning implies, in their minds, reliving the drama that made them leave; and it makes them feel as if they are becoming refugees a second time. This suffering, though left unsaid, can be heard in the refusal to go back to the country of origin. It has never been taken into consideration by UN experts involved in repatriation. (Le Houérou 2004: 172)

In Zambia, some of those who refused to return had worked for the Portuguese or served in the Portuguese army during the War of Independence. Others were political opponents of FRELIMO, the ruling party. These were genuine refugees who feared retaliation if they went back home. Others had witnessed atrocities and been traumatised. Still, others had married Zambians or were young people born in Zambia whose parents had decided to stay. For these former refugees, both Eritrean and Mozambican, staying behind entailed becoming an illegal alien, an undocumented foreigner. They lost their refugee status under the Geneva Convention. According to UNHCR, they could have applied individually for refugee status by presenting themselves at the agency’s office in Lusaka or Khartoum, a trip they could not undertake because of the distance and costs. For Mozambicans in Zambia and Eritreans in Sudan, mass repatriation put an end to their temporary refugee status and to their authorisation to stay in the country of asylum legally. They were not being expelled, but host governments were pushing them to leave.

In Zambia, these ex-refugees lost the status acquired as a prima facie group. They had become individuals who could not legalise their
situation and were no longer protected. The Zambian Refugee Control Act provided that prima facie refugees were to return home once peace was restored. It contained no provision for naturalising them. Though no longer considered to be refugees, these persons cannot become immigrants unless they go back and, from their country of origin, request a residency permit, an expensive document they cannot afford. As a consequence, they are living as undocumented immigrants from day to day in a state of ‘limbo’ owing to the fear of sudden deportation. These former refugees form a community ‘on hold’. Though unable to build their future in Ukwimi, they stay there where they have built their lives. Though having lost their refugee status, they are stigmatised as refugees. Inhabitants and other settlers still see them as outsiders, and they still see themselves as foreigners since they are unable to obtain official ‘documents’. During an interview, a Mozambican residing in Ukwimi had this to say about the national registration card:

Having a registration card means no longer being called a refugee because it’s an insult, and it means being different. I want to be one of them. Having a registration card means security because I’m afraid of being chased. I want to be free and belong to this place. I want to stop being a visitor without any rights. I’m not a visitor anymore; I’ve stayed here too many years.

The problem of status-less former refugees is cropping up all around Mozambique’s borders. Some former refugees are now willing to go back, but where? After all these years, they no longer have a dwelling in Mozambique; nor have they kept up ties with the family there. Some do not have the means to go back. UNHCR refuses to help them, since they no longer belong to the ‘population of concern’. This leads us to raise questions about African asylum policies and, in particular, about the meaning given to the prima facie refugee status.

6 National asylum policies versus prima facie refugee status

Several African countries, such as those in the Southern African Development Community (the SADC to which both Zambia and Mozambique belong), are parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention. Furthermore, they have their own laws on asylum. These refugee acts lay down the conditions for entering and staying in the country. By comparison with immigrants who encounter many restrictions, refugees – though arriving in large numbers – benefit from an open door policy. National asylum policies have little, if anything, to say about the conditions for entering the country,
but very much to say about staying (Klaaren & Rutinwa 2004). In Zambia, the Refugee Control Act stipulates that refugees have to reside in camps or agricultural settlements and that they may not circulate, let alone work, outside these locations without due authorisation. In Sudan, the 1974 Regulation of Asylum Act stipulates that refugees have to reside in agricultural settlements in order to become self-reliant; but they are not allowed to own land or real estate in the country or to leave their place of residence without a travel permit. As Kibreab (1996: 48) has pointed out:

...according to the country’s law, refugees will only be allowed to settle until a return to their country of origin becomes possible, irrespective of the length of stay. Until then, they will not be allowed to integrate and become part of Sudanese society.

The prima facie refugee status granted to a group lapses once a peace agreement is signed and repatriation starts. Though easily obtained, this status amounts to a temporary residency permit. Refugees are seen as passing foreigners who have to work for the host country during a period that will come to an end when the international community stops providing assistance.

Host countries and UNHCR skirt around restrictions against forcible repatriation by suspending relief in the camps, as we have seen in the two cases examined. Many other examples could be cited. In 2003, claiming that relief had been cut in half, Tanzania threatened to repatriate by force more than 530,000 refugees from the Great Lakes region. At stake was domestic security. Food thus served as a weapon for dissuading people from staying behind.

Underlying these asylum policies, which allow people to enter the country, albeit for a limited time and in restricted places, is a lack of willingness to integrate beneficiaries. By settling refugees on the land and granting them a temporary status, the Zambian government expropriated customary chieftaincies and extended its control over the countryside. Refugees were seen as temporary migrants who had to participate in the development of the countryside during their stay.

Apart from South Africa, few countries on the continent have provided for naturalising refugees. The South African Refugee Act allows refugees to request an immigration permit and, after five years of residence, to apply for naturalisation (Klaaren & Rutinwa 2004). Despite pressure from UNHCR, countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have little to say about naturalisation. They have adopted a policy of temporary protection while waiting for conditions to be met for repatriation. What we observe is the host country’s unwillingness to integrate refugees.
Moreover, when conditions in the country of origin remain critical for a long time, refugees are left with no alternative but to move on. This is the finding of a study on Somali refugees by the Swiss Refugee Forum and UNHCR (Moret, Baglioni & Efionayi-Mader 2006). Faced with restrictions on employment, education and health care as well as confined to camps, Somali refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen are deprived of legal protection and forced to move elsewhere in a quest for legal and socio-economic security. They thus enter into patterns of ‘irregular secondary movements’.

According to Fabienne Le Houérou (2006), these examples show how legal rules shut human beings up inside categories defined by the international community. They also illustrate how host countries circumvent restrictions against forcible repatriation.

7 Conclusion

The case studies presented here shed light on what asylum entails in the country of (first) asylum, and bring to light the unforeseen consequences of the prima facie refugee status. Refugees are too often seen as a homogeneous category, as though they all have the same background and have fled for the same reasons. They are protected and assisted as a group, and they have to return home as a group. Even though peace has been restored and international protection is no longer needed, some refugees in this group might have valid legal grounds for not returning home, as we have seen in the case both of the Mozambicans who fled because they were personally targeted as a result of their wartime activities and of the Beni Amer who were political opponents of the new Eritrean government. A new category of refugees has arisen out of these mass repatriation programmes.

The many gaps in existing policies make it impossible for ‘obvious’ – prima facie – refugees to legally integrate in the host country. There is the gap between international policies and guidelines (UNHCR and OAU) and national asylum policies. Applying their national refugee laws, governments extend the refugee status to masses of arriving refugees on a prima facie basis. This status is lost when hostilities cease, a situation entailing repatriation. Under Article V of the OAU Charter, however, repatriation must be voluntary: ‘the essentially voluntary character of the repatriation should be respected in all cases, and no refugee can be repatriated against his will’ (Beigbeder 1999: 37). What happens to those who refuse to repatriate?

There is also a gap between the host country’s laws on asylum and on immigration. Neither the Zambian Refugee Control Act nor the Sudanese Regulation of Asylum Act contains provisions for legalising
the situation of former refugees who want to remain. Refugees are to leave the country to apply for entry – from their homeland – and then a residence permit, much like any other economic immigrant. It follows that repatriation is compulsory instead of voluntary.

Most host governments are inclined to accept refugees but not to integrate them. At issue is local integration, a possible solution recognised by UNHCR. Refugees who refuse to repatriate either have to seek local integration – but unofficially – or else leave the host country and move on. In conclusion, the prima facie status does not lead to recognising the rights of genuine refugees who are personally menaced if they return to their homeland. What is more, national immigration laws overlook the case of refugees who want to legalise their situation.

Notes

1 This chapter is partly drawn from two earlier writings (Lassailly-Jacob 2003, 2008). It has been revised in English and parts of it were translated from French by Noel Mellott at the National Centre for Scientific Research in Paris.

2 Since the 1980s, research centres have been set up in North America (e.g. Centre for Refugee Studies at York University in Toronto in 1988), the UK (e.g. Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford in 1982) and a few English-speaking African countries (e.g. Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme at the American University in Cairo and the Forced Migration Studies Programme at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg).

3 I have been acquainted for a long time with these Mozambicans, owing to my fieldwork in Zambia, where I made six trips to the field between 1993 and 2007 (thanks to support from the Centre for African Studies in Paris, the French Institute of South Africa in Johannesburg and Migrinter).

References


Conclusion

12 International migration in the twenty-first century: towards new research perspectives

Cédric Audebert and Mohamed Kamel Dorai

1 Introduction

Besides the comprehensive state of the art presented in many chapters, setting the latest theoretical development in the broader context of twenty years of research on international migration, this book presents localised case studies articulated with in-depth theoretical reflection. The wide range of areas analysed – North America, Europe, Asia, Africa – together with the diversity of disciplines represented – anthropology, geography, sociology – provide a unique comparative perspective.

As noted by many of the contributors, migration patterns have greatly changed since the 1970s, when migration studies developed in most of the main immigration countries. Development of restrictive entry policies in the countries of the European Union since the mid-1970s, as well as the globalisation of international migration flows, have led to a reorientation of the research agenda. First, while the international migration system has traditionally been based mainly on migration dyads (e.g. France-North Africa, Germany-Turkey, Gulf countries-Arab countries), we now witness the geographical diversification of migration flows. Previous European emigration countries became host states (e.g. Italy, Spain, Ireland) for a growing number of immigrants. Second, migration flows have experienced a profound qualitative change. While most migrants were non-qualified workers in the industrial sector, the set of activities developed by more recent migrants diversified, ranging from the service sector to small business activities (like ethnic business) and highly qualified workers. Third, the evolution of the legal framework has led to the inflation of categories (legal vs. illegal, refugees vs. asylum seekers, etc.) that have been aptly discussed in many chapters.

The geography of international migration has profoundly changed over the last twenty years, leading to new concerns in migration studies. While most approaches have focused on migration and migrant
communities in industrialised countries, the development of South-South or East-West migration challenges some of the studies centred on the North. The fall of the Soviet Union has reopened old migration routes connecting former Soviet republics to the Middle East and mixing pilgrimage, forced migrations and commercial activities. Different modes of circulation have been developed and new migration poles have emerged – or re-emerged – such as Dubai and Damascus. These migration flows have contributed to the development of a new research agenda that explores the articulation of different notions: circular migration, transnational religious networks, pilgrimage and ‘suitcase trade’. Along with question of integration, more attention is paid to the social and spatial dynamics of migration itself. The Arabic Peninsula, one of the most important migration systems in the world, is also a challenging case study. In the Gulf Cooperation Council States, the twelve million migrants represent more than one third of the total population, and more than 80 per cent in the United Arab Emirates. The strict migration policies based on the *kafala* system (e.g. sponsorship) do not allow any debate on notions such as citizenship, integration or participation. Africa hosts more than nine million refugees and internally displaced persons in response to the persistence of conflicts and poverty. Forced migrations often lead to economic migration as a coping strategy, thus challenging classical theories that oppose forced and voluntary migrations. Consequently, traditional categories and theories have appeared less and less relevant in the analysis of the new trends in international migration.

2 International migration and the challenge of social cohesion

In the first part of this book, the question of international migration and social cohesion was analysed in the light of recent changes in international migration movements. Even if mobility and circulation are increasing, the settlement of large migrant communities, mainly in urban areas in industrialised countries, has contributed to the social change of the last decades. The research agenda has evolved to include long time and intergenerational perspective in the receiving societies. To quote Rinus Penninx’s chapter in this volume:

to put it ironically, migration research has looked more at the societal effects of the ‘absence of migrants’ in sending countries than at the societal effects of the “presence of migrants” in receiving ones. But if we really want to make sense of the difficult terms integration and social cohesion [...] we must include in our analysis
the effects of migration on the societal structures in Europe as well.

Migration should be conceived as one of the key elements to understand how host state societies have evolved, despite the tensions that immigration can generate in host societies as analysed both by Roger Waldinger and Sari Hanafi. The presence of new immigrant communities contributes to reshaping the debate on identity formation in the European context, but also in many other regions. For example, the durable presence of Asian workers in the Middle East and the emergence of a second generation such as in the Gulf countries or Israel question the notion of citizenship and national belonging. The restrictive immigration policies developed by the states of the EU have turned transit countries such as the Maghreb States into immigration countries, raising the question of the economic and social statuses of these recently arrived populations.

One of the most important challenges that research on international migration is facing is probably the shift from migration-centred studies to a broader analysis that focuses on the international migration-host society nexus. As long as migrants were considered as guest workers, the question of integration was not posed, either by government or by researchers. The control of immigration movements in the mid-1970s in most European countries has led to family reunification processes. Permanent settlement has been seen as a threat and/or a challenge by segments of the receiving societies, raising the question of social cohesion and the development of anti-migration attitudes. This kind of attitude has also developed recently in new immigration countries all over the world. The notions of integration or social cohesion are still the object of an intense debate in the academic world, partly linked to the diversity of migration movements that have developed since the 1980s.

3 From immigration to circulation?

New approaches to migration have been developed in the last twenty years to take into account the multiplicity and the diversity of actors and institutions involved in the migration process. While most studies have long been focusing on immigration policies and the modes of integration of the immigrants in receiving societies, research perspectives have been widened in different fields. Thomas Faist notes in his chapter in this volume that, although the issue of globalisation (cross-border exchanges, such as financial transactions, the exchange of goods and services) has been widely discussed:
much less attention has been devoted to conceptualising cross-border social and symbolic ties and their concatenation, such as the life-worlds of persons and the organisational activities of associations who move around and maintain ties in a cross-borderised world.

The classical distinction between departure and host countries is becoming less relevant, as a growing number of countries have simultaneously become departure, transit and host countries in one. It has a deep impact on the question of the relation between migration and social cohesion. This relation has to be conceived not only from the point of view of the sending and receiving countries, but also from the perspective of the transit countries. For example, the Barcelona Process launched in 1995 and the different association agreements signed between governments of the EU and third countries – considered as transit countries – often include a section on the control of migratory flows. With the development of restrictive migration and asylum policies, migration routes also become more and more complex. Transit countries play an increasing role in the analysis and the understanding of migration movements. Research includes this third dimension and integrates the whole migration itinerary, including transit countries.

As noted by Alessandro Monsutti in his chapter:

it is becoming increasingly clear that this mainly causal framework cannot do justice to the complexity of today’s global migration flows. We have to go beyond anthropological conceptions in which cultures and communities appear as spatially located phenomena; we should no longer think of migration as movement from one place to another [...].

Circulation is a paradigm that leads to blurring the distinction between sending and receiving spaces and the notions of settlement and return. Migration does not always mean to leave a place and to settle somewhere else, but rather, to circulate between different locations.

The debate on transnationalism is still controversial. If circulation and back-and-forth movements are developing, the settlement of migrant communities within the context of nation states is still the dominant model. The links created and maintained between migrants and their community of origin are connected by two main aspects. First, migration is often the result of a communal or family strategy to increase their income or to minimise risk of fluctuation of their incomes. Thus, the need for strong bilateral contacts between migrants and non-migrants is necessary to ensure social control and the sending of remittances back home. Secondly, the execution of such goals requires a
constant flow of resources, information and migrants, to ensure the op-
eration and the continuity of the system. The development of transna-
tional networks thus needs strong local anchorage, in both sending
and receiving societies. Resources are often first developed locally and
then shared in a transnational framework. Migration develops when
social capital does not function only on a local scale, but also as a trans-
national transmission belt. Forms of settlement of migrant commu-
nities are then required to develop transnational activities.

On the one hand, solidarity networks play a major role in the adapta-
tion of migrants, due to the multiplicity of weak ties developed be-
tween the migrants already settled and the host society. On the other
hand, the solidarity networks cannot deal with all the problems faced
by the newcomers, especially legal restrictions. In a European context
where the policies of asylum and immigration are increasingly restric-
tive, the development of transnational networks is becoming more dif-
ficult. A growing number of newcomers reside in Europe with a pre-
carious and provisional status that marginalises them. Differential ac-
access to resources tends to reproduce social inequalities for those who
cannot benefit from transnational networks, such as young isolated wo-
men or undocumented migrants. The role of migrants in development
projects in their country of origin is one aspect of this increasing circu-
lation, as developed in the third part of this book.

4 The migration-development nexus

The relation between migration and development has gained more and
more importance in migration studies over the last twenty years. It has
contributed, together with the development of transnational studies, to
an analysis of migrants as agents in the migration process in both
sending and receiving societies. Even if the migration issue has been
seen as an important parameter in the development process by re-
searchers in migration studies since the early 1980s, it is only in the
1990s that development organisations like the World Bank, the IMF
and the OECD began considering migration, mainly through remit-
tances, as one of the elements of the development equation – along
with foreign direct investment, trade liberalisation, aid and improved
governance.

For developed countries, instead of trying to control ‘unwanted mi-
gration’ (i.e. unwanted immigration), the idea is to prevent migration
by targeting international development aid in order to reduce potential
conflicts and to reduce poverty in the main sending countries. Develop-
ment is then considered as a means to diminish ‘unwanted migration’
by reducing demographic and economic differences that are supposed
to generate economic migration. Development is seen as something that increases political stability, respect for democracy and human rights so as to minimise the number of refugees and asylum seekers. The developed countries aim at initiating demographic, economic and political changes through their development programmes but also through globalisation – free trade, investments and liberalisation of the economy, among other processes. The idea that underlies the discussion on the migration-development nexus is oriented towards a drastic reduction of migration, especially the so-called ‘unwanted immigration’. Even if the developmental process leads to an increase in migration in the short and/or middle run – the so-called migration hump – the whole reflection is based on the hypothesis that migration is a result of inequalities in standards of living in relation with development issues and geopolitics.

Some states and international organisations aim to use migration as a tool of development that could substitute to the more classical forms of development aid. This oversimplified perception is criticised by Ronald Skeldon in his chapter, stating that:

> our research over the last twenty years has drawn attention to two critical aspects of migration and development. First, that migration is not necessarily negative for development. [...] Second, attempts to slow migration by promoting development in areas of origin are almost certain to fail [...]. Migration is an integral part of all societies and those that have little movement of their populations are also likely to be stagnant economically.

In this respect, other criticisms can be addressed. First, more than half of migration movements occur between less developed countries (i.e. South-South migration) and not between LDCs and developed countries (i.e. South-North migration). Second, migration is not only driven by economic inequalities, but also by a wide range of socio-historical factors and transnational networks. Third, economic development does not mean reducing poverty everywhere in the country of origin. Economic development often increases inequalities and does not reduce or abolish poverty. Fourth, remittances tend to modify modes of consumption in the sending societies, leading to enhanced emigration in order to maintain or access the new consumption standards.

In his chapter, Patrick Gonin emphasises the role of ‘go-between’ migrants as agents of development in their country of origin, creating a new social category of migrants whose activities are developed through the interaction between host and departure countries. Migration and migrant activities can no longer be considered only from the point of view of host or origin countries but, rather, in the relation between
both spaces. Migration studies can help us think about development in a more comprehensive way. It can do so by challenging more classical macro-economic analyses and shedding light on the role of networks established by new agents such as local organisations, families and local communities.

5 Bringing refugee studies and migration studies back together?

Early attempts to build a general theoretical model on refugee issues have focused mainly on push factors to explain refugee movements. More recent studies have emphasised the role of international relations in the production of refugee flows. If push factors as well as international politics are key issues for the understanding of refugee movements, little attention has been paid to the dynamics generated by the refugees themselves. The duration of exile and the different kinds of interactions with host societies have also generated specific settlement patterns and secondary movements.

Since the 1970s, refugee studies have produced a wide range of categories to describe refugee flows or settlement, such as urban refugees, camp dwellers or self settled refugees. Recently, researchers have shown growing interest in the issue of urban refugees all over the world, pointing out the problematic lack of protection and access to services they face in the big cities of the Third World. The differences between urban refugees and camp dwellers have been analysed, but the transformation of refugee camps into urban areas has not been studied as such, except for a few cases. The classical distinction between refugee camps dwellers and urban refugees is mainly an operational one produced by international organisations. This categorisation has fallen short of adequately understanding the evolution of refugee camps and the practices developed by refugees themselves. Refugee camps are not closed areas even when they are geographically isolated. They can be connected to a wider environment through mobility or transnational connections such as remittances. The categories of urban refugee and camp dweller are often linked to the place of settlement and not thought of in relation to the short-term and/or long-term spatial practices of refugees. Mobility is a key practice to take into consideration because it reveals the complementarities of different urban spaces, and the different kinds of relations they have. Refugees who live in camps experience different scales of mobility – daily movements, temporary and long-term emigration, forced displacement, etc. – and develop a wide range of practices (economic, political, cultural and/or social activities) that cross the camp’s boundaries.
Mobility and migration have to be understood in their different temporalities. In the long term, refugee camp population changes, some refugees leave the camp to settle elsewhere and newcomers settle in the camp for a variety of reasons. When exile lasts (such as in the Afghan or Palestinian cases), each generation of refugees has a specific relation to the camp, in relation to specific socio-historical conditions. Individual paths also contribute to blurring the distinction between urban refugees and camp dwellers. Many refugees alternately reside inside and outside camps in their lifetime, as a way to access different kinds of resources. Refugee camps themselves host temporarily or more permanently different waves and groups of refugees. New immigrant communities also settle in the camps and/or around the camps.

In recent years, the relation between refugees and transnationalism has been the subject of investigation. Studies conducted on refugee transnational activities have contributed to address in a more comprehensive way the role of the state in shaping migrants’ networks, and bringing the state back into most of these analyses. State policies towards refugees remain one of the most important elements in the understanding of refugee movements, their socio-economic status and the viability of migratory networks both in sending and receiving countries. The chapter of Véronique Lassailly-Jacob clearly shows how state policies towards refugees remain one of the most important elements to understand refugee movements, their socio-economic status and the viability of migratory networks both in sending and receiving countries. Exploring the categories of dismissed refugees and non-recognised refugees, she shows that these policies are incentives to generate secondary migration movements for people in search of a better life. The distinction between forced migration and voluntary migration is not always relevant, as a first forced displacement often leads to a labour migration as a coping strategy.

Whether in Africa, Europe or the Middle East, a growing number of migrants find themselves between categories: refugee vs. economic migrant, urban refugee vs. camp dweller, legal vs. illegal. These blurred categories challenge both refugee studies and migrant studies.

Research on international migration is facing many challenges for the future. First, the development and the diversification of migration combined with restrictive migration and asylum policies in most of the major immigration and transit countries lead to the development of a category of illegal/undocumented migrants. This category of migrants in a precarious and marginalised position is challenging most of the migration theories on integration, assimilation and social cohesion. Second, the increasing circulation, the profound changes in the geography of international migration and the development of transnational networks have blurred distinctions such as sending vs. receiving
countries, permanent settlement vs. temporary migration, and lead the researchers to reconsider other notions such as return or transit countries. Third, migrants or migrant organisations have developed their own socio-economic strategies in their host states (e.g. ethnic business) and in their country of origin (e.g. development-oriented NGOs). This contributes to the emergence of a new category of migrants, including small entrepreneurs and new socio-political actors such as NGO leaders and political activists. Fourth, the huge increase of refugee movements during the last two decades has generated a set of various refugee situations, ranging from UNHCR-recognised refugees and asylum seekers to unrecognised refugees and migrants in refugee-like situations escaping generalised violence or political instability. Secondary migratory movements as coping strategies have contributed to blurring the classical distinction between forced and voluntary migration. This book is a contribution to the development of a future research agenda that might integrate these different – though not irreconcilable – research orientations.

Note

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