The Immigrant Organising Process
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The Immigrant Organising Process

Turkish Organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese Organisations in Amsterdam, 1960-2000

Floris Vermeulen

IMISCOE Dissertations

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1 Introduction

Introduction

Organisations are characterised as the building blocks of modern societies and the basic instruments for collective action (Aldrich 1999: 5). They constitute the social infrastructures and through them people pursue goals too broad to be accomplished by individuals. It is difficult to think of any field in the public sphere in which organisations do not play vital roles.

Organisations are equally important in the lives of immigrants. Immigrants themselves are often active organisers, and immigrant associational life has thrived throughout history and across different continents (Moya 2005). Interestingly enough, the appreciation for immigrant organisations is often ambiguous in the host society, in which many people question their relevance and contribution. And while immigrants may need organisations as much as anybody else (or even more), whether this should automatically lead to the establishment of separate organisations is open to discussion. This, along with the question why do immigrant organisations exist at all, will be a primary subject of this introduction because these concerns are central to our study on the immigrant organising process.

The relevance of immigrant organisations has been effectively demonstrated in many different studies. These generally approach the subject from two different angles: the importance of immigrant organisations for the immigrant groups themselves, and the importance of the incorporation of immigrants in the host society. The first approach stresses the fact that immigrant organisations produce valuable ‘products’ for their immigrant constituency, such as acting as advocates for their clientele (demanding better treatment from the authorities for their group) or providing a secure environment in which immigrants can meet, see familiar faces and speak their own language. This cushioning function eases the shock of transition caused by the immigration process and is especially salient in the first phase of the settlement process (Jenkins 1988; Cordero-Guzmán 2001; Schrover 2002; Lucassen 2004). These group-related functions of immigrant organisations can only be produced by organisations that derive from the immigrant
population themselves, because they possess the knowledge and access to the group that is needed to adequately serve the immigrant constituency.

As for the second approach, immigration scholars have increasingly realised the importance of immigrant organisations for the participation and integration of immigrants in the host society. This has led to some promising research findings in a number of fields. Sociologists have used immigrant organisations as indicators for cultural and ideological structures within the immigrant communities. For instance, immigrant groups with a high percentage of religious organisations are fundamentally different from groups with mostly secular associations. The nature and objectives of all organisations of a particular immigrant group tell us something about the nature of that community and the ways it interacts with the host society (Sassen-Koob 1979; Kwong 1984).

Immigrant organisations also play important roles in the political system of the host society, especially at the local level. Immigrant organisations act as mouthpieces for their ethnic constituency or are used as such by local authorities (Kasinitz 1992; Jones-Correa 1998; Bousetta 2001; Penninx & Schrover, 2001). Moreover, immigrant associations have a specific function in generating ethnic identities. By forming an organisation, immigrants can fence off their ethnic or national identity from other groups (Marquez 2001). Political scientists have shown that participation in ethnically based civic organisations can foster political integration, as reflected in greater political trust and confidence and more frequent voting behaviour. Conversely, immigrant groups that are less inclined to civic participation may exhibit some degree of political deprivation (Williams, Babchuk & Johnson 1973; Fennema & Tillie 2001; Stoll 2001).

Yet the civic participation of immigrants need not necessarily be based on their ethnicity, and the question thus remains whether ethnic-based organisations are a boon or a bane for the integration of immigrants (Vertovec 1999; Penninx & Schrover 2001). Organisational segregation, voluntary or not, would appear to have negative consequences for integration, at least in an ideal situation in which everyone would join mainstream organisations. If one defines integration as a process, in which old ethnic traits are lost and immigrants become totally absorbed in the host society, then ties or loyalties with the country of origin are unwelcome. Immigrant organisations play a key role in this debate, especially because many of them are essentially transnational in character, or may even be seen as breeding grounds for divided, trans-state loyalties (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004).
These varied research perspectives not only reflect the wide-ranging possibilities for studying immigrant organisations, they also show that such organisations are at the centre of many debates about the nature of integration and the ways immigrants can achieve it. It also must be pointed out that the actual influence of immigrant organisations on the integration of immigrant groups should not be overstated, since most of the organisations are small and the level of participation in them is often low (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak 2004; Schrover & Vermuelen 2005). Furthermore, immigrant organisations and their leaders may even reproduce the political powerlessness of the immigrant group, as authorities may use immigrant leaders to neutralise the political activity of the group (Martiniello 1993). Still, immigrant organisations can and often do constitute a vital element in the settlement process of immigrant groups in the host society.

Studies on immigrant organisations, whether they discuss the relevance of immigrant organisations from the perspective of the immigrant population or from the host society, mostly do not explain why such organisations exist at all. This is one of the basic questions formulated by the critics of separate organisations for immigrants. If immigrant organisations serve valuable functions they are considered legitimate institutions, but most of the functions mentioned above (except perhaps for the few very specific cultural or cushioning functions) can also be provided by more general native organisations. The question why immigrant organisations exist at all and why they often persist over a long period is not answered in these studies. In addition, we remain in the dark as to why some immigrant groups establish many strong organisations and other groups remain almost completely unorganised. Studies have shown that even within the context of one city, a wide range of organisational degree can be found among different immigrant groups (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Waldrauch & Sohler 2004). So far, the origins and long-term development of these differences have not been the subject of serious study.

It is our contention that it is important to consider the origins of immigrant organisations carefully, because without knowing this background it is difficult to analyse the role the organisations play presently and their importance in the on-going immigrant integration process. Furthermore, since organisations tend to be highly resistant to change (Stinchcombe 1965), the founding phase of an organisation sets the stage for its further development. This results in organisational formations that often have outdated characteristics that are no longer very useful from a functional point of view, yet these may still remain the basic model for future organisations over a long period.

Take, for instance, the first immigrant organisations of guest workers in Western Europe. Many of these were founded by political acti-
vists. These organisations engaged in political activities both toward the countries of origin and the host countries, demanding equal rights and better working conditions for their members and immigrants in general. Some of these organisations became well established in the host society and were seen by local authorities as representative of the immigrant community. Because of this, they became important actors in the immigrants’ integration process. However, the current position of these guest worker organisations cannot be separated from their political past, and the degree of integration of these organisations is very much related to the extent to which the leaders of the organisations remain attached to the initial political goals.

In many other cases it makes a significant difference if immigrant organisations are established for certain explicit reasons by a specific group of people. If, for instance, an immigrant organisation is founded with direct financial support from the host state this will influence its position in both the immigrant community and host society. Furthermore, it will determine the performance of the organisation in a number of fields. In other words, the historical origins of immigrant organisations play a major role in the contemporary debates. Without knowing why immigrant organisations were founded we lack vital information.

A number of studies have indeed considered the history of immigrant organisations. Most of these are closely related to ethnic community studies and their analyses remain at the level of a specific immigrant group (Rogler 1972; Kwong 1984; Nadel 1990; Kasinitz 1992; Minghuan 1999). These community studies tell the immigrants’ story ‘from below’ and provide important insights into the history of Chinese, German and Caribbean organisations and the way they are intertwined with the development of an ethnic community. But these studies fail to explain whether the reasons given for the emergence of immigrant associations can be applied to other groups as well. This ethnic approach focuses on one immigrant group at a time. The main problem with these studies, apart from their often short-term analysis, is their fixation on unique characteristics of specific immigrant groups. Furthermore, this fascination with ethnicity obstructs the analysis of more structural features in the history of immigrant associations (Lucassen & Lucassen 1999: 22; Diner 2000: 36). There are no comparative studies that look at the organisations of different immigrant groups and in different locations in order to find the more general processes at work. Or as Olzak and West state: ‘Despite the apparent consensus on the importance of ethnic organizations, no theory has satisfactorily explained what conditions encourage their founding or what factors support or inhibit their continued existence’ (Olzak & West 1991: 458).
This study attempts to overcome this theoretical void by choosing explicitly for a comparative approach, as suggested by Nancy Green (1999: 68-70). Green distinguishes two types of comparisons: the divergent and convergent. The divergent comparison takes the immigrant group as constant and looks at similar groups in different settlement places. In this type of comparison, differences are found and explained at the level of the host environment (as the immigrant groups do not differ). The second type of comparison takes the host environment as constant and compares different immigrant groups in one place or city. This implies that differences will be found (and explained) at the level of the immigrant groups themselves. We will use both types of comparison in this study. Different immigrant organising processes will be compared in order to evaluate and assess the factors that support or inhibit the emergence and continued existence of immigrant organisations. The comparative approach enables us to then move beyond the individual cases and to distinguish the common and the specific traits among immigrant groups and their associational behaviour (Lucassen & Lucassen 1999: 25). But before we move towards the more practical elements of the comparison (which groups are included in the research and in which cities we analyse their organising processes), we need to define the main elements of the immigrant organising process.

The immigrant organising process

The immigrant organising process is characterised by six key elements, which will be described briefly. These are:
1. The number of formal organisations
2. The types of organisations
3. The organisational activities
4. The organisers (the active members)
5. The members
6. The organisational networks (external and internal).

The organisations themselves constitute the first and foremost element of the organising process. Without formal organisations there is no organising process among immigrant groups. Immigrant groups without any formal organisations are therefore (according to this definition) unorganised (the difference between informal and formal organisations will be discussed later, as it is possible that unorganised immigrant groups have an extended informal organisational network). For this first element we are interested in the changing number of formal immigrant organisations over the years, including the number of newly
founded organisations per year and the number of organisations per year that dissolve.

The second element concerns the types of organisations. What sorts of immigrant organisations are founded and which ones appear more frequently than others? Some immigrant groups, for example, have founded predominantly religious organisations and very few interest organisations, while other groups have established a relatively high number of sports organisations. This distribution in types of immigrant organisations relates to what Breton (1964) calls ‘institutional completeness’. The institutional completeness of immigrant groups is an essential element in the immigrant organising process because it reveals to what extent immigrant groups are able to fulfil organisational activities themselves (Fennema 2004). Breton defines an immigrant group as institutionally complete when they are able to provide all major organisational activities with their own separate organisations (hospital, schools, voluntary organisations, etc.). Completely institutionalised immigrant groups are of course rare; perhaps only those immigrant groups that are completely isolated from the host society come close to this description (for instance, Jewish immigrants in Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Penninx & Schrover 2001: 21-22). Most immigrant groups will not come anywhere near this type of completeness, however immigrant groups can vary enormously in the extent to which they are institutionally complete. In the first phase of the settlement process immigrant groups are mostly institutionally incomplete, but the degree of completeness increases as their presence in the host society continues and more different types of immigrant organisations are established.

The third element deals with the products of organisations: the activities. This refers to the day-to-day performance of the immigrant organisations. What is it that the organisations do, how often and for whom do they organise activities, and are they successful in fulfilling their mission statement? Organised activities are important to the immigrant organising process. An immigrant group can have many organisations of many different types, but if these organisations are functioning badly and provide little or no associational products, the immigrant group can still be considered unorganised. Data on the day-to-day activities is however difficult to obtain, as many voluntary organisations do not keep adequate records of their activities. Especially the smaller organisations often fail to provide an overview of their activities over a longer period.

The fourth and fifth elements concern the people involved in the immigrant organising process: the active and the common members. The organisers are the active members of the organisations. In most cases these people are to be found serving on the boards of the organisa-
tions. They have established the organisation and often remain actively involved for many years. Studies of immigrant organisations in Germany and the Netherlands have found that the average immigrant organisation has around twenty active members (De Graaf, Penninx & Stoové 1988: 220-22; Schwarz 1992; Gitmez & Wilpert 1987: 111). We will discuss these active members in Chapter 5.

Members make use of the work of these active organisers by engaging in the activities of the organisations. The number of members of any immigrant organisation determines to a large extent its influence and position within the immigrant community and within the host society. An immigrant organisation with more than a thousand members has evidently more standing than a small local organisation with just over a dozen members. The number of immigrants out of the entire immigrant group who participate in organisations tells us to what extent the group itself is organised. These membership numbers are difficult to obtain (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), especially if we want to compare groups over a long-term period.

The sixth element deals with interorganisational relationships. Voluntary immigrant organisations do not function autonomously; they are dependent on other organisations (ranging from large host state institutions to small voluntary organisations). This dependent position leads to the formation and persistence of links between various organisations. These can be highly formal (consider, for instance, the member organisations of an umbrella organisation), or informal (such as sporadic social contact between two organisational leaders). Either way, formal or informal interorganisational relations are considered to be the engine for the development and persistence of any organising process, as they are vital in the process of founding new organisations and expanding already existing ones. Interorganisational relationships between organisations of the same population are referred to as internal organisational links, and relationships between organisations from different populations constitute external links. We will deal in this study with the internal relationships and explain their role and function in the immigrant organising process.

To study the complete immigrant organising process we would need information on all six elements that characterise it. This should run from the establishment of the group’s first organisation to the networks of organisations that exist currently. In practice it is not feasible to obtain this kind of detailed information, especially if we want to compare different immigrant organising processes over time. As already mentioned, information on specific elements of the immigrant organising process is often difficult to acquire, mainly because not all organisations have kept records and updated their archives. In this study we have therefore chosen to focus on four elements of the immi-
grant organising process: the number, the type, the organisers and the internal interorganisational network. The next section describes how the study is structured; after that, we discuss the research design and the methods of data gathering.

**Structure of the study**

This work is structured around the three steps that Howard Aldrich (1999) proposes in his book *Organisations Evolving* for studying organisations, regardless of the organisational type (business, voluntary or ethnic). The first step is to include the entire *population* of organisations in our research. This means that we are equally interested in the very small, short-lived organisations as in the large, influential, older ones. Both are part of the organising process of the group and if the smaller organisations are neglected, we miss an important element of this process in our analysis.

Second, Aldrich points to the importance of looking especially at the *emergence* of organisations. Most studies consider organisations as if they were always there, focusing on the organisational form (the population) once it has been established. But the founding phase has important implications for the further development of the organisational population. Aldrich therefore gives special attention to the early days of the organisational form of a particular group.

Aldrich’s third step deals with the *process* through which new organisations maintain the organisational population. He states that ‘[b]y ignoring the question of origins, researchers have also avoided the question of why things persist’ (1999: 1). He argues that there should be more attention paid to the so-called evolutionary approach, which treats origins and persistence as inseparable. The evolutionary approach (also known as the organisational ecology model) plays an important role in this study. In the next chapters we will explain this model, here we just mention that it requires data on the whole organisational population over a long-term period. Organisational ecologists look at the *demography of organisations*, which basically concerns the founding and disbanding rates of all formal organisations in a particular organisational population (Hannan & Freeman 1989: 14). These founding rates can be compared over time, but also with other populations in the same environment or in other localities. It is crucial for this comparison to have data that relates to all formal organisations of a given organisational population over a long-term period (again, we need to know about all organisations including the insignificant ones). There are very few existing studies on immigrant organisations that have used such an evolutionary approach; this book will therefore occa-
sionally step on new ground, combining ethnic and immigration studies with more general theories of organisation.

**Research design**

This study attempts to identify and assess the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process by using (and combining) three different approaches to the organising process of immigrants: the immigration model, the political opportunity structure model and the organisational ecology model. In the following two chapters we will elaborate on these three approaches; here we will briefly introduce their main features.

The immigration model explains the emergence and persistence of immigrant organisations primarily by group-related factors. These group-related factors refer to characteristics of a particular immigrant group, such as position, background, skills and resources. It is these factors that determine whether or not members of the group will establish their own separate organisations in the first phase of an immigrant organising process. Adherents of the political opportunity structure model, on the other hand, explain the emergence of immigrant organisations by factors related to the receiving society. They believe that the extent to which host authorities are receptive to organisational demands of immigrant groups determines the associational activity of immigrants in a host society. Those who apply an organisational ecology model take a different approach. They emphasise the fact that primarily internal dynamics determine the organising process of any group of organisations. These internal dynamics affect the resources available for organisers to establish formal organisations. Internal selection and competition processes within the group of organisations determine the structure of the organisational populations (in terms of the number of organisations and the activities). Once this structure is firmly established external factors have little impact on the further development of the immigrant organising process. Chapter 3 focuses almost entirely on the ecology model, as it needs more explanation than the other two models (primarily because it is less familiar and more complicated than the other two).

This study intends to show that a combination of the three models provides the best way to understand the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process. It is this combination of models, which has not yet been done by other scholars, which determines the value of this study and the contribution to a better understanding of the immigrant organising process. The comparative method is used to explain the way in which the three explanatory models can be combined in
one coherent explanation. Applying both a convergent and divergent comparison enables us to assess the changing influence of group-related factors, factors related to the receiving society, and ecological factors.

This study focuses on the organising processes of three immigrant groups in two different cities for the period 1960-2000. The three groups are: the Turks in Amsterdam, the Turks in Berlin and the Surinamese in Amsterdam. The comparison between the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin provides the opportunity to evaluate the influence of the host society on the immigrant organising process since the Dutch and German context for immigrant organisations has been characterised as fundamentally different (Koopmans & Statham 2000). The Turks have been chosen because they are the only substantial immigrant group that has settled in both Amsterdam and Berlin. In addition to this divergent comparison, we also conduct a convergent comparison by focusing on two groups in one city (to assess the influence of group-related factors on the immigrant organising process). As a comparison to the Turks we have chosen the Surinamese, because they are the largest and oldest immigrant group in Amsterdam. The Surinamese immigration to Amsterdam is completely different from the Turkish immigration (the first is a colonial immigrant group and the second a guest worker group). These different immigration characteristics will allow us to better distinguish the influence of group-related factors and to utilise the ecological model.

The following table illustrates how we intend to combine the comparisons of immigrant groups with the three explanatory models. The convergent comparison between Turkish and Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam is used in assessing the explanatory power of the immigration model in the beginning of the immigrant organising process and the role that ecological forces play in later phases. The divergent

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comparison between Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin is primarily used in assessing the influence of the political opportunity structure model on the Turkish organising processes in both cities.

**Research questions**

By comparing the organising processes in Amsterdam and Berlin we want to answer the following questions:

1. Which factors determine the emergence, persistence and development of the immigrant organising process?
2. Does the influence of the explanatory factors change over time as the settlement process of the immigrant groups evolves?
3. To what extent do the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes described in this study differ and how can we explain these differences?

Before we describe the manner in which we have gathered information to answer these research questions, we first need a more precise description of the nature of an immigrant organisation.

**Definition of an immigrant organisation**

Formulating a definition for an immigrant organisation is easier said than done as opinions about the character of such an organisation vary widely (Moya 2005). The most important distinction to be made is between organisations established by immigrants and organisations established for immigrants (mostly welfare organisations providing social services for immigrants founded by helpful natives). In this study we will focus only on the first category, as organisations for immigrants are not part of the organising process of the immigrants themselves. Furthermore, we will only consider immigrant organisations to be those founded by immigrants, which means that organisations founded by natives but eventually taken over by immigrants are also not regarded in this study as genuine immigrant organisations.

Another important question relates to whether associations founded by second- or third-generation immigrants can still be regarded as immigrant organisations. These organisations are generally defined as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘immigrant’ associations (consider, for instance, Jewish organisations in the United States which once were immigrant organisations but now are regarded as an example of ethnic organisations). It is difficult to define the exact moment at which the shift from immigrant to ethnic organisation occurs (Moya 2005). We will there-
fore still consider organisations from the second generation as immigrant organisations, although some of them will be more difficult to detect than the organisations of their parents.

These two important distinctions lead us to the definition of an immigrant organisation used in this study. An immigrant organisation is defined as a formal non-profit organisation (officially registered), of which at least half of the board members originate from one single immigrant group (first or second generation). Every formal non-profit organisation founded by members of a single immigrant group is included, regardless of the mission statement of the organisation or the ethnic composition of its members. A strong emphasis is given in this definition to the active organisers, mainly because we are of the opinion that they are the ones who build the organising process of the immigrant group. The organisations need not have affiliates or members. If the organisation has members it is called an association, if not it is called a foundation (Fennema 2004: 440).

Data gathering: The Chambers of Commerce/Associations

Following Fennema & Tillie (Fennema & Tillie 1999; 2001; Fennema 2004; Tillie; 2004) we have chosen to gather information on immigrant organisations from the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam (Kamer van Koophandel) and the Chamber of Associations in Berlin (Vereinsregister). This enables us to define the population of organisations more precisely, and we avoid the problem of sampling from a hidden population (Fennema 2004: 440-441). A very important additional advantage is that the Amsterdam and Berlin Chambers follow similar registration procedures. Every immigrant organisation in Amsterdam or Berlin that wishes to (1) receive state subsidy, (2) rent a building, (3) open a bank account or (4) be a legal entity needs to be registered in the Chamber of Commerce/Associations. In other words, for even the least ambitious immigrant organisation, registration in the Chamber of Commerce/Associations is required to be able to function effectively (Sunier 1996: 71).

We have collected data from three different archival databases. In Amsterdam we have used for the period 1960-1976 the National Archive in The Hague (Archief voor de Registratie van Stichtingen en Verenigingen: afdeling Amsterdam) and for the period 1976-2000 the electronic database of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam (Kamer van Koophandel). In Berlin we have used for the entire period (1960-2000) the archives of the Chamber of Associations in Berlin (Vereinsregister: Amtsgericht Charlottenburg).
The data of the Chambers of Commerce/Associations indicates the year an immigrant organisation was founded (and the year the organisation was dissolved, if applicable). It further includes the name of the organisation and the names, birthdates (only in Amsterdam), birthplaces (only in Amsterdam) and nationality (only in Berlin) of its board members and founders. The information on the board members is used to determine the ethnic base of an organisation and to assess whether the organisation is a genuine immigrant organisation. In Berlin we have also gathered information on the occupation and gender of all board members. The last crucial element provided by the Chamber of Commerce/Associations’ data is the mission statements of the immigrant organisations. The name of the organisation in combination with the mission statement is used to categorise the organisation into a certain type (in some cases the Chambers of Commerce/Associations have also categorised an organisation into a certain type; this information was also gathered if applicable).

To identify immigrant organisations in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel, Amsterdam) and the Chamber of Associations (Vereinsregister, Berlin) we have used a method that works with catchwords and existing lists of immigrant organisations (Van Heelsum & Tillie 1999: 10-11). First we gathered lists of all known formal organisations established by the different immigrant groups between 1960 and 2000. Four sources were used to collect this information: (1) the existing scholarly literature, (2) publications from local authorities, (3) publications from immigrant organisations and (4) the local press. The files of these known organisations could then be accessed through the archives of the Chamber of Commerce/Associations. This method does not, however, provide a complete list of all formal immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. It provides only the names of the best-known formal immigrant organisations. To complete these partial lists we have used the Chambers’ archives. As the three archives used in this research each have a different character, we have used different approaches for each to come up with similar results. We will describe these different approaches below and explain to what extent we have indeed come up with similar results for each archive. The main goal for these search methods is to be as thorough as possible. If certain search methods are impossible for a certain archive, other more time-consuming methods are needed to eventually come up with similar results for each city, time period and group.

For the National Archive in The Hague (Stichtingen en Verenigingsregister, Ministerie van Justitie) (used for finding Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam for the period 1960-1976) we have looked at the names of all non-profit organisations that were established in Amsterdam between 1960 and 1976. If the name of the organisation
suggested in any way a possible immigrant organisation we looked at the file and determined if indeed this was one and if so, to which group it belonged. This search method is time consuming, but provides a complete picture of all existing formal immigrant organisations in Amsterdam during that period. As the number of formal non-profit organisations in Amsterdam was still manageable then, we were able to use this method.

For the archive of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam for the period 1976-2000 (Kamer van Koophandel Amsterdam) (used for finding Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam for the period 1976-2000) it was impossible to look at all the non-profit organisations that existed at that time. The total number of organisations is much higher than before 1976 so it was not feasible to go through the names of all formal non-profit organisations. We had to use another search method to identify Surinamese and Turkish organisations. Because the archive of the Chamber of Commerce for this period is an electronic database accessible through the Internet, we were able to identify immigrant organisations by using different catchwords. By using a large number of catchwords we were able to identify a great majority of all the formal Surinamese and Turkish organisations that were established between 1976 and 2000. A list of the catchwords that we have used to identify the Surinamese and Turkish organisations is presented in Appendix I. Notice that for the Surinamese organisations we had to use many more catchwords than for the Turkish organisations (597 for the Surinamese and only 58 for the Turks). Turkish organisations are much more easily recognised and identified by looking at their names (most Turkish organisation names make an explicit reference to their group’s ethnic background). Surinamese organisations, on the other hand, are made up of different ethnic Surinamese groups and are not so easily identified with just a few dozen catchwords.

The search method using catchwords is less encompassing than the one used for the period 1960-1976, however we are able to illustrate the effectiveness of this method by comparing our results to another database used in the overall research project. One of the other Ph. D. studies within the project, conducted by Boris Slijper has access to the complete database of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce for the years 2000-2001, providing all formal associations and foundations in Amsterdam that existed in that year (including all board members and their countries of birth) (Slijper forthcoming). This has enabled Slijper to identify every formal organisation of Turkish and Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam that existed in 2000 by looking at the countries of birth of all active board members. We have compared our historical database of Turkish and Surinamese organisations with Slijper’s complete database for the year 1999 to see to what extent the method of
identifying Turkish and Surinamese organisations used in this study can be considered accurate. We found that our historical database contains 75.1 percent of all Turkish organisations and 71.9 percent of all Surinamese organisations that existed in 1999. These numbers indicate that the method used in our research provides a high percentage of all organisations and, furthermore, the percentages of the two groups are comparable (which indicates again that we need many more Surinamese catchwords in comparison to the Turkish catchwords, and still we find relatively more Turkish organisations than Surinamese organisations. But if we do use many Surinamese catchwords, the results for both groups are almost similar).

The archive of the Chamber of Associations in Berlin (Vereinsregister, Amtsgericht Charlottenburg) (used for Turkish organisations in Berlin for the period 1960-2000) is more difficult to use, because you cannot search the organisations yourself. After much deliberation we finally got permission to submit twenty-six different catchwords, which were used by the administrators of the archive to identify possible Turkish organisations (the list of these catchwords is presented below). For all the organisations that had any link with one of the twenty-six catchwords we received the complete files, which could then be used to identify whether or not this was a genuine Turkish organisations (as defined in the first chapter). This resulted in a long list of formal Turkish organisations in Berlin. However, because we used fewer catchwords in Berlin than in Amsterdam we continued searching for Turkish organisations in other ways. A Turkish student assistant did another round to identify possible formal Turkish organisations by contacting all major Turkish organisations and organisers in Berlin and asking them for lists and/or names of Turkish organisations that to their knowledge had existed since 1960. In addition, she also looked again for public reports and other official documentation that referred to Turkish immigrants and their organisations in Berlin to gather as many names of Turkish organisations as possible. All the names of Turkish organisations that she derived from these efforts were submitted to the Chamber of Associations to identify whether or not these were officially registered and whether they were indeed authentic Turkish immigrant organisations. This provided us with many more formal Turkish organisations that did not have a specific relationship to the twenty-six catchwords submitted before. The large number of additional Turkish organisations and the comprehensiveness of the alternative lists of Turkish organisations convince us that we have identified the large majority of existing formal Turkish organisations in Berlin, although we have not had the opportunity to compare our results with other databases.
The data available for the three immigrant groups is not completely similar. The information on the Turkish groups is most extensive. We have gathered for the Turks in both cities information on the number of Turkish immigrant organisations, the types of Turkish immigrant organisations and the active organisers (board members). For the Surinamese we have data on the number and type of Surinamese immigrant organisations.

The next section describes the main downsides of using data from the Chambers of Commerce/Associations as the central source of information.

**The use of formal organisations: possible downsides**

*Paper' and 'sleeping’ organisations*

One of the possible disadvantages of using the Chambers of Commerce/Associations for research on immigrant organisations is the danger of considering so-called ‘paper’ organisations as genuine immigrant organisations. A paper organisation is an organisation that only exists on paper and does not produce genuine organisational activities (Van Heelsum 2001: 51; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 270). Reasons to establish a paper organisation can be to receive state subsidies or to hide illegal activities. In this study, paper organisations are considered to be formal immigrant organisations as long as they are officially registered with the Chamber of Commerce/Associations. There are three reasons to proceed this way: (1) these organisations can be assumed to have some function, otherwise the founders would not have taken the trouble of registering them and including their names as the founders of the organisation; (2) the examination of paper organisations can provide useful information related to the immigrant organising process (the founding year, the mission statement and the names of the founders); (3) our impression is that paper organisations do not form a significant part of the organisational population of the groups studied in this research.

Paper organisations do become a problem when they continue to exist for a long period. The paper organisation becomes then a ‘sleeping’ organisation. Sleeping organisations are not necessarily paper organisations: also formerly active organisations can become sleeping organisations. Sleeping organisations are organisations that have dissolved, but nobody has informed the Chamber of Commerce/Associations of this fact (we found several Turkish organisations in Berlin that had been sleeping for more than twenty years). The main problem with sleeping organisations is that they reduce the dissolution rate and therefore have a distorting influence on the total number of organisations within...
a population. When a relatively large number of sleeping organisations exist, a high total number of organisations remain registered, whereas in reality the total number of active organisations has been decreasing. We have decided to tackle this problem by defining an organisation that sleeps for more than five years as dissolved. That means that at least every five years there has to be a board election or official statement that the board of the organisation is still functioning, otherwise the organisations is considered to be dissolved. The information on board revisions can be found in the files of the Chambers of Commerce/Associations.

Informal organisations

Another important downside to utilising formal registered organisations is the fact that we then completely ignore the informal immigrant organisations. Informal organisations are by nature difficult to track, as they leave few traces in archives. Formal and informal organisations do not have the same goals, the same continuity or the same leadership (Schrover & Vermeulen 2005). However, several studies have shown that informal immigrant networks (especially those based upon regional descent) can be very important in the lives of immigrant groups. Small informal associations represent a common form of immigrant sociability outside the family, primarily in the first phase of the settlement process (Moya 2005). Informal networks can also be significant for the manner in which subordinate social groups engage in political and collective activities (Cloward & Piven 1975; Singerman 1996).

But perhaps the greatest problem with the absence of data on informal organisations is the danger of loosing sight of the organisational activity of women (Penninx & Schrover 2001; Deekman & Hermans, 2001: 84; Lucassen 2001). Immigrant women play vital roles in informal organisations. When women participate in formal organisations they are frequently more active in the background, not in serving on the boards. This means that although the role of immigrant women is often crucial for the functioning of the organisation (for example, they form central links between the leaders of the organisations and the immigrant constituency; Van Wetering 1986), their informal role does not emerge out of the archival data. Consider for instance the fact that only fourteen percent of all Turkish board members in Berlin are women, whereas their percentage in the entire Turkish population is almost fifty percent. We know that Turkish women have participated at a rate of more than just fourteen percent, however this is not reflected in the number of board positions. Similarly, studies on Turkish organisations in the Netherlands found that the percentage of female board members is extremely low (Van Zuthem 1994).
Because the Chambers of Commerce/Associations’ data downplays the role of women in the immigrant organising process, we cannot claim that the formal organisations reflect or represent the entire immigrant community. However, we can state that these formal organisations do play important roles in the lives of all immigrants, including women. We know that women participate in these organisations and that women have important functions in their day-to-day performance. It is therefore also not correct to evaluate formal immigrant organisations as completely unrepresentative for their group. We will use the data on formal immigrant organisations at least as an indication of the associational behaviour of immigrant women (keeping in mind the important downsides). We also will pay special attention to information on the activity and participation of women in formal organisations when this is available. In addition, we will look at the relationship between the number of women in the immigrant population (the gender composition) and the development of the formal immigrant organisations to see whether we can assess some of the more general influences by immigrant women on the immigrant organising process.

Individual organisations

A last possible downside of the approach used in this study is that it offers little information on the history of individual organisations. For those interested in the complete history of Turkish and Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam or Turkish organisations in Berlin, the data in this book will probably be disappointing. There will be no elaborate descriptions of the main organisations or extended biographies of the main organisers. Instead, we will illustrate how the number of new immigrant organisations has evolved over the years and how this development reveals essential information on the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process.

One of the main reasons why a more quantitative method has been chosen is that we need more insight into the general processes at work. The existing studies have identified a number of possible factors that either stimulate or hamper the immigrant organising process. We, on the other hand, want to formulate a model that explains the emergence and development of the immigrant organising process. This model includes the main factors that influence the process as well as hypotheses regarding the direction that the organising process takes. Following construction of this model, the hypotheses are assessed by looking at the emergence, persistence and development of all formal Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam.
Outline of the book

The next chapter, Chapter 2, focuses on explanatory factors that can account for the emergence and development of the immigrant organising process. These factors are derived from the existing literature on immigrant organisations and the political opportunity structure (POS) model. We formulate hypotheses on how these factors may determine the organising processes of the various immigrant groups. In Chapter 3, the organisational ecology model is introduced and explained and we illustrate the way the ecological model can be used for analysing the organising process of immigrants.

The fourth and fifth chapters compare the organising processes of Turks in two cities, Amsterdam and Berlin. Chapter 4 describes the character of the Turkish immigrant groups in both cities and explains how the context for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin is fundamentally different. It also describes how the official approaches toward Turkish organisations have changed over the years, and discusses the number and distribution of types of Turkish organisations in both cities for the period 1960-2000. The fifth chapter focuses entirely on the very important role played by interorganisational networks in the development and maintenance of organisational populations (which are described in Chapter 3). Here we pay special attention to the interorganisational relationships of Turkish organisations in both Amsterdam and Berlin. This chapter not only illustrates the importance of these relationships for the Turkish organising process, but also describes their development over time. The inclusion of a network approach in the study of the immigrant organising process is not often done (Fennema & Tillie 1999). The advantage of analysing these networks for the scope of this study is that it not only illustrates an important feature of the Turkish organising process but also allows for a better understanding of the way in which the explanatory factors (ecological, political and group-related) actually influence the Turkish organising process in both cities. Chapter 6 compares the Surinamese and Turkish organising processes in Amsterdam to make better sense of the group-related and ecological factors; the immigration and ecological models are therefore most salient in this chapter. Here we discuss the similarities and differences between the organisations of both groups in Amsterdam. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, returns to the explanatory factors of Chapters 2 and 3. It discusses the phases in which the factors appear to be most influential for the organisations of the groups described in this study and explains why the influence of the factors changes over time.
2 The explanatory factors of the immigrant organising process

Introduction

We are interested in understanding the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process and believe that a comparative approach will yield the best results. To reveal the determinants we need to construct a model in which the main factors influencing the emergence and persistence of the immigrant organising process are integrated. Two things are needed for such a model: (1) identifying the explanatory factors of the immigrant organising process and (2) identifying and explaining the mechanisms that drive the organising process. In the following two chapters we will elaborate on both issues by looking at three different models: the immigration model, the political opportunity structure (POS) model and the organisational ecology model.

As described in Chapter 1, one of the goals of this study is to combine the existing models to make better sense of the immigrant organising process within a host society. Immigration model proponents are primarily interested in the factors that explain the behaviour of immigrants. When they consider immigrant organisations, they therefore focus on those factors that can explain the associational behaviour of immigrants in a host society. POS theorists, on the other hand, emphasize the fact that resources for the immigrant organising process are to be found outside the immigrant group. And organisational ecologists, in turn, focus on the more general features of organising processes. They avoid the specific backgrounds and traits responsible for the founding and development of a particular group of organisations. The main advantage of combining the three models is to be able to deal with the specific character of immigrant organisations, while at the same time illustrating to what extent more general organisational processes are influential in their emergence and persistence. This chapter deals with the explanatory factors derived from the literature on the immigration and POS models. The next chapter does the same for the organisational ecology model.

The combination of the immigration and the POS models provides two sets of factors that explain the reason why immigrants establish their
own organisations: (1) factors related to the receiving society and (2) factors related to the immigrant groups themselves (group-related factors). The first set of factors is used by scholars emphasising external resources. For example, numerous studies have stressed the fact that American society has been a unique stimulator for the associational activities among immigrants. Italians, Germans, Jews, Syrians and many other immigrant groups have shown an obsession for founding immigrant organisations, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This can be explained by the active American civic culture that has influenced newcomers to form their own associations. Civic participation in the United States has been among the highest in the western world; immigrants simply have adapted to their new environment as they establish their own organisations (Skocpol & Fiorina 1999). In other words, these immigrants have made use of available opportunities to set up their own groups.

The other set of factors used to explain the emergence of separate immigrant organisations refers to elements directly related to the immigrant group. Scholars who use this perspective distinguish three different group-related factors responsible for the emergence and persistence of the immigrant organising process: (1) the immigration process, (2) the character of the immigrant group and (3) influences from the country of origin. We will describe these three types of group-related factors further in the following section.

In order to illustrate the ways in which both sets of factors may influence the immigrant organising process it is useful first to distinguish between the supply and demand sides of the immigrant organising process. Immigrant organisations are a product of their constituency; they are in this regard comparable to other creations of the immigrant population, such as immigrant shops or ethnic enterprises. For these products the ‘law of supply and demand’ is applicable, which is not the case for other issues in the field of immigration (such as employment levels, generational successions, changes in family structure, and even the more general assimilation or integration processes). A model that explains the formation and maintenance of organisations in general and immigrant organisations in particular needs to focus on both the supply and demand side of the immigrant organising process, as the availability of resources for organisational action may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for immigrant organisational activity (Minkoff 1995: 80-81). The level of demand among immigrant groups is at least as important as the availability of resources. The following figure illustrates the areas and direction in which we would expect to see the group-related factors on the one hand, and factors related to the receiving society on the other hand, influencing the supply and demand for immigrant organisations.
In general, we can state that the two main group-related factors (the immigration process and the character of the immigrant population) influence the demand side of immigrant organisations. The supply side is determined by influences found in the host society and in the country of origin. The dotted arrows represent the exceptions to this general statement, as the host society can also influence the demand side (arrow 6), the organisational influence from the country of origin also has an effect on the demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 4) and the character of the immigrant population can also influence the supply side (arrow 3) of the immigrant organising process. Notice that it is quite possible that some immigrant groups may show a strong demand for organisations, but if there is no supply, in the form of immigrant organisational activity, then the immigrant organising process will not emerge. On the other hand, some groups may easily acquire the basic resources for immigrant organisations but feel no need to organise, because of the characteristics of their population or the manner in which the immigration process has developed. This means that a positive element in one set of factors does not necessarily lead to the emergence of immigrant organisations or an increase in their number. We will describe the explanatory factors derived from the immigration model more elaborately and illustrate how these may influence the supply and/or the demand side of the immigrant organising process. First the group-related factors are explained, then the factors related to the receiving society.
**Group-related factors**

*Immigration process (arrow 1)*

The first group-related factor illustrated in Figure 2.1 is the immigration process itself. According to several studies, a high degree of associational activism is a general feature for many immigrant groups (Moya 2005). The immigration process can be expected to influence the immigrant organising process in two ways: (1) it shapes the collective identity of immigrant groups, which increases the demand for separate organisations and (2) it causes disruptions in the lives of immigrants, which increases the demand for a more secure environment (which also increases the demand for separate immigrant organisations). Both possibilities will be described briefly.

The process of immigration tends to intensify and sharpen the collective identities of immigrants based on their national or ethnic descent. The immigration process causes immigrants to reconsider their own identity, not only because they come in contact with the native population but also with other immigrant groups. Perceived threats to the immigrant population, or to the home country itself, can further stimulate a sense of group identity among immigrants. Especially those aspects of a group's cultural origin that come into conflict with the existing institutions of a host society can become issues around which ethnic institutions, consciousness and identities are formed (Jones-Correa 1998: 143). Ethnic conflict in general encourages group solidarity and cohesion, and this will encourage the foundation and maintenance of ethnic (immigrant) organisations (Olzak & West 1991: 459).

In addition, the process of immigration causes certain disruptions in individuals' lives that become a motivation for the establishment of immigrant organisations. The so-called ‘cushioning’ function of immigrant organisations has already been discussed in the first chapter, but here we are referring directly to the disruptive character of the immigration process. It is particularly the cushioning function of immigrant organisations that has been cited in the literature as the main reason why certain immigrant groups establish separate organisations (Thomas & Znaniecki [1918-1920] edition 1984: 239-249); Bosworth Treudley 1949; Sassen-Koob 1979: 327-328; Jones-Correa 1998: 99-102; Schrover 2002; Lucassen 2004). Immigrant organisations try to offer a safe environment in which newcomers are protected from the hostile host society; they also provide activities and products that help newcomers to endure the first difficult period of settlement.

The way in which the immigration process influences the demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 1) is therefore twofold. In general, immigration tends to intensify the ethnic (or ethno-religious) identity of the group, especially if the immigrant population feels threatened.
This will stimulate the demand for more immigrant organisations. Secondly, the recent immigration causes certain disruptions in the lives of newcomers for which immigrant organisations can offer solutions or provide assistance. As the settlement process evolves, the literature expects a decreasing and shifting demand for immigrant organisations (Kwong 1984; Minghuan 1999; Kasinitz 1992; Jones-Correa 1998; Penninx & Schrover 2001). The connection with the country of origin becomes weaker, the collective identity of the immigrant group declines and the emergence of the second generation constitutes a different (less ethnically based) organisational demand. The immigrants become more incorporated into the host society and the disruptions caused by the process of immigration slowly fade as time goes by. This results in a declining demand for separate immigrant organisations (as the cushioning function of these organisations is less needed).

In other words, according to the literature the immigration process is expected to have a strong influence in the first phase of the immigrant organising process, and the influence weakens as the settlement process evolves.

Character of the immigrant population (arrows 2 and 3)

The second explanatory factor illustrated in figure 2.1 is the character of the immigrant population. The key characteristics of this factor are (1) the size of the group, (2) its demographic composition (residential segregation, the sex ratio and average age within the group), (3) the group’s socioeconomic status (including occupational structure and educational skills) and (4) its cultural attributes (language, ethnicity, religion). These four key characteristics generate a certain demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 2), which will be explained below.

The total size of the ethnic group is frequently used as a first indicator of the degree to which the immigrant group has an organisational need. A larger migrant community delivers a larger potential constituency and therefore more organisations can be expected, although this relationship is not necessarily linear (Schrover & Vermeulen 2005). There needs to be a certain number of immigrants present in the settlement to start an immigrant organising process. One of the first studies on immigrant organisations states that 100 to 300 immigrants need to be present in a city in order for the establishment of the first ‘society’ (an informal immigrant organisation) (Thomas & Znaniecki, [1918-1920] edition 1984: 245). For the first formal immigrant organisation, then, we would need a somewhat larger immigrant constituency. The type of formal organisation also makes a difference. An immigrant newspaper, for example, may not be able to function with only a few hundred subscribers, whereas a social/cultur-
al organisation could manage perfectly well with less than a hundred members.

In terms of residential characteristics, the literature does not provide a clear picture. If an immigrant group lives segregated in an ethnic immigrant neighbourhood (as, for instance, in the many well-known ethnic immigrant neighbourhoods of New York City) we can expect a strong ethnic identity and extensive social networks among the members of this immigrant group. Strong ethnic identity and social networks can be an incentive for the emergence of formal immigrant organisations. If this is the case, we would expect that residential segregation leads to more immigrant organisations. On the other hand, if strong social networks are in place within an immigrant population, we can also imagine that formal immigrant organisations are less needed. The ethnic neighbourhood can function as a substitute for one of the main sociocultural purposes of formal immigrant organisations: the reconstruction of the old way of life (again the cushioning function). If an immigrant group lives together in one neighbourhood this cushioning will be less needed as the neighbourhood itself offers plenty of opportunities to restore the social environment of pre-migration. Immigrants can easily speak their own language, visit their own shops and businesses and see familiar faces without attending the formal surroundings of an immigrant organisation. This would mean that residential segregation decreases the demand for formal immigrant organisations.

The age and sex ratios in the immigrant population (the main demographic characteristics of the group) have also a distinct influence on the number and types of immigrant organisations. Immigrant groups with a relatively high percentage of women, for example, will display a different organisational demand than the male-dominated guest worker groups in Western Europe. If the average age and sex ratio of the immigrant population changes because of the process of family reunion (and the number of women and young children among the group increases), more specific organisations for these subgroups will probably emerge.

Similarly, we expect the occupational structure and the educational skills of the immigrant group to influence the immigrant organising process. When an immigrant group is overrepresented in specific occupational niches we expect to see the emergence of formal organisations related to this profession. Or when an immigrant group has a relatively high number of university students among its members, we expect to see more student organisations, or even specific organisations related to educational issues. Generally speaking, the founders and leaders of immigrant organisations are mostly the ones who have attained an above-average level of education (Gitmez & Wilpert 1987: 107). This
means that as the number of educated people in an immigrant population increases more potential organisers will be available, which can have a positive effect on the establishment of formal immigrant organisations.

The cultural attributes of an immigrant population, most importantly language and religion, can also be a decisive element in the emergence and development of the immigrant organising process. Language can be an important denominator for the establishment of separate immigrant organisations, such as an immigrant newspaper or a cultural organisation that wants to preserve the immigrant language by organising activities around literature from the country of origin.

There is currently a debate over whether the extent of the difference between the cultural attributes of the immigrant population and the cultural attributes of the host society is a decisive factor in the immigrant organising process. Breton stated forty years ago that ‘the more different the people of a certain ethnicity are from the members of the native community, the easier it will be for them to develop their own institutions’ (1964: 204). Moya believes that this statement seems so obvious that most scholars have mistakenly accepted it as an indisputable fact. The Spaniards in Buenos Aires, for example, established more immigrant organisations than their Italian neighbours in the same city, even though they are more similar in culture to the host society than the Italian immigrants (Moya 1998). Obviously, an immigrant group needs to perceive itself as different from the host population in order to organise separately, but the extent of the difference does not cause a linear reaction in the number of immigrant organisations (Moya 2005).

In terms of religion, the difference between the immigrant population and the host society does seem to have a positive effect on the number of religious immigrant institutions. Immigrant churches, mosques or other religious organisations are often one of the first immigrant organisations to emerge, especially when the religion is different than that which is found in the host society (Orsi 1999). If the immigrant group has a religious affiliation similar to the majority of the host society, however, it is possible that immigrants will make use of the existing religious infrastructure of the host society and refrain from establishing their own religious organisations (for example, the majority of the Afro-Surinamese Christian immigrants in Amsterdam joined the Dutch religious institution with which they were familiar in their country of origin (described in Chapter 6).

The manner in which the character of the immigrant population influences the demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 2 in Figure 2.1) is complicated because a wide variety of different elements is involved. It is therefore impossible to formulate the exact influence of
each element on the organising process of the group. What we can state is that to assess the influence of this arrow, we need to have an idea of the overall character of the immigrant group. In addition, we can formulate certain expectations, for instance the larger the size of the population the more organisations are needed (increasing demand). The other elements (demographic, economic and cultural) have more of an influence on the types rather than the number of immigrant organisations (specific organisations for women, for immigrant youth or for specific occupations, etc.).

Arrow 3 concerns the influence of the character of the immigrant population on the supply side for immigrant organisations. We can imagine that a higher percentage of women in an immigrant group leads to a smaller supply of formal immigrant organisations (as women usually play a less prominent role on the boards of these types of organisations). We can also expect that the higher the educational level among an immigrant group the more formal organisations will be established, as those who are educated are able to supply the immigrant group with more organisations.

Influences from the country of origin (arrows 4 and 5)
The third group-related factor deals with the influence the country of origin has on the immigrant group’s tendency to develop organisations in the host country. Scholars have shown that immigrants coming from well-developed civic societies have created many organisations in their new environment. German immigrants in the nineteenth century, for instance, were very familiar with voluntary organisations in general and it is no coincidence that German immigrants around the world have founded numerous associations. They were used to the idea of setting up an organisation and of spending time within the walls of a social club, sports association or cultural institute. In host countries they would seek the company of fellow Germans to revive their German civic culture. The German tradition of associational activity (brought to the host society) can be seen as a factor that stimulated the formation of German immigrant organisations (Panayi 1995; Schrover 2002).

Other studies have shown that the country of origin can have a more direct influence as well. For example, many Turkish organisations in Germany and the Netherlands were founded in the 1980s with financial backing from the Turkish state to strengthen their position in immigrant communities and resist oppositional groups. There are other cases throughout history of sending states that have built and actively supported immigrant organisations and established churches and mosques (Lucassen 2004). The influence of the sending society on the sup-
ply side of immigrant organisations (arrow 5) is mainly determined by whether the state of origin displays an active or passive attitude toward the associational behaviour of their citizens abroad (a positive attitude increases the supply side).

The sending society can also be influential in creating a demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 4). Consider, for instance, the Turkish organisations that were founded in Western Europe in reaction to political developments in Turkey. This competition among different Turkish groups increased the demand for Turkish organisations in the Turkish immigrant communities around Europe.

Factors related to the receiving society

*Influence of the host society (opportunity structure) (arrows 6 and 7)*

Host societies can have a decisive influence on the associational behaviour of immigrants. Many studies consider the opportunity structure of a host society and the various ways it affects the behaviour of immigrants. The economic opportunity structure, for instance, can largely shape the labour position of newcomers at the local level within the host society (Waldinger 1996; Morawska 1996; Lucassen & Vermeulen 1999; Schrover 2002).

Opportunity structures refer to the opportunities available to immigrants to participate in the host society. Morawska illustrates, for example, how in the United States the Jewish organising process shows different patterns in small towns and big urban centres. The number of Jewish immigrant organisations was much larger in the cities, yet Jewish participation in high status American organisations was more likely to occur in small towns (Morawska 1996: 186-187). In other words, small towns provided more opportunities for Jewish immigrants to participate in American organisations, so the demand for separate immigrant organisations there was less. There were more opportunities for Jewish immigrants to establish separate organisations in large cities, in part because other immigrant groups had already established their own organisations, which made it easier for all groups to found organisations. So, because American organisations were less accessible to Jewish immigrants in the metropoles, the need (or demand) to establish their own Jewish organisations was increased. We can say that there were more opportunities for Jewish immigrants to participate in American organizations in small towns, but there were more opportunities to organise separate Jewish organisations in big cities.

This last element, the degree to which the main host society institutions (churches, labour unions, welfare organisations, etc.) are accessible to immigrants, appears to be a major factor in whether or not an
immigrant organising process emerges (Penninx & Schrover 2001; Lucassen 2004). If these native institutions are willing to include newcomers, immigrants will be less inclined to establish their own organisations. However, this accessibility is difficult to measure as all kinds of barriers, visible and invisible, can exist. If newcomers (or certain groups of newcomers) are officially forbidden membership in certain native organisations the barrier is easily detected. But different forms of racism within native organisations can also cause immigrants to feel unwelcome. These implicit barriers are less easy to detect but can be as powerful as the more explicit ones. This should alert us to not underestimate the less explicit obstructions to immigrants joining native organisations.

Another important element that affects the opportunity structure in a host society is the approach of the authorities toward immigrants in general and their organisations in particular: the political opportunity structure. Authorities in host societies may forbid, condone or stimulate immigrant organisations or some of their activities by the implementation of all kinds of policy measurements (Penninx & Schrover 2001; Schrover & Vermeulen 2005). This attitude is strongly related to the institutional position of newcomers in the host society. Some countries conceive of immigrants as temporary foreign residents (as in Germany until recently). In these countries, immigrants remain foreigners and the state restricts its integrating role to legal procedures. Organisational activities of immigrants will be mostly conceived as undesirable or irrelevant. In contrast, there are countries that consider themselves to be multicultural societies. Immigrants here have easier means of identifying with their nationality and the organisational activities of immigrants will be regarded as helpful in the process of integration and are therefore actively supported (financially or in other ways). The Netherlands has been (also until recently) an example of this more liberal multicultural approach.

The political opportunity structure has been used extensively by scholars engaged in social movement research. The POS model has also been successfully used to explain the collective action and associative behaviour of immigrants. Several studies have shown that the political opportunity structure is probably the most important explanatory factor for the emergence, persistence and development of immigrant organisations (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 31-36; Koopmans & Statham 2003: 207-208; Rijks Schroeff & Duyvendak 2004: 26-27). We will therefore describe the POS model further in the next section in order to explain the extent and direction in which the political opportunity structure in host societies may influence the immigrant organising process.
The political opportunity structure (POS) model

The political opportunity structure model assumes that collective action is governed by external events, by the availability of external resources and opportunities for group action. This model was developed by social movement researchers who became interested in the important role of formal organisations in the development of insurgent consciousness (Minkoff 2001). Groups with many formal organisations were found to be more ready for collective action than less organised groups. The question then became how to explain the different levels of formal organisation among these groups. In answer, POS theorists have focused on the resources needed for collective action: organisational founders must acquire the basic resources in order to establish a formal organisation. These basic organisational resources are, according to Stinchcombe (and we follow his suggestion in this study): wealth, power and legitimacy. Without these basic resources, an organising process will not take form (Stinchcombe 1965: 146-147).

Political opportunity researchers believe that the main organisational resources are found outside the direct circle of the mobilizing group. Insurgent groups need to draw resources from their environment as a precondition for mobilization, particularly those groups which tend to control few resources of their own (as is the case for many immigrant groups that have arrived recently) (McAdam 1982; Koopmans & Statham 2000). The political opportunity structure approach places social movements within their political context. External opportunity structures are directly related to the extent to which powerful groups, including governments, are vulnerable or receptive to new claims made by groups marginal to the political system. The primary determinants of any group’s mobilization are its degree of organisation, its interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current opportunities for such interactions and the amount of repression to which the group is subjected (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duuyendak and Guigni 1995; Tarrow 1998).

The political opportunity model predicts that the level of group mobilization (and organisation) will be a direct outcome of the structure of political institutions and the configuration of political power in a given society. Changes in the external opportunities or constraints to mobilize can spur or inhibit group action, as changes in the external political opportunity structure provide external incentives for people to create, develop or dissolve an organisation. These external incentives directly affect the expectations for success or failure among people, and this will either increase or decrease their associational behaviour (Tarrow 1998: 76-77; Koopmans & Statham 2000: 32).
According to the POS model, organisations are created to take advantage of political and institutional opportunities. In other words, if powerful groups change their attitude toward politically marginal groups and become more receptive to their claims, the marginal groups will respond to this opportunity by stepping up group action and founding more organisations. Or the other way around: if powerful groups become less receptive to the claims of marginal groups, fewer organisations will be founded.

In the political opportunity model special emphasis is given to the role of the state and important institutions, such as labour unions, churches, and the main native organisations, in the organising process. A major concern is whether or not these large social structures include outsiders and newcomers in their organisations or provide opportunities for outsiders and newcomers to organise themselves. To illustrate this with an example related to immigrant organisations we can look at the different approaches of the German and Dutch authorities toward immigrant organisations in recent history. German politicians have not taken an active approach to supporting immigrant organisations or to including them in the political system, which reflects their general approach toward immigrants in their country. The Dutch government, on the other hand, has officially recognised immigrant organisations, introduced state subsidies for immigrant organisations and given their leaders an important role in shaping and implementing integration policies. This approach has positively influenced the external resources for immigrant organisations in the Netherlands. Scholars using the political opportunity structure model would strongly expect that, due to the increase in external resources, immigrants will show a much higher level of organisational activity in the Netherlands than in Germany. The external opportunity to organise in terms of money, state recognition and policy influence is much greater in the Dutch context than in the German. Especially important is the point at which the Dutch state changed its attitude toward immigrant organisations, as this can be seen as an opening up of the political opportunities for immigrant organisations. This change in the political environment positively affected the expectations for organisational success among immigrant groups and therefore more organisations would be expected right after this external shift. According to the POS model, opportunities for collective action stem from the attitude of the elite rather than from the immigrants themselves.

In other words, the political opportunity structure in a host society (arrow 7 in Figure 2.1) increases the supply of immigrant organisations if the authorities in the receiving society display a positive attitude toward immigrants and their organisations; on the other hand, a nega-
tive attitude on the part of the authorities will decrease the supply of these organisations.

The way in which a host society influences the demand for immigrant organisations can also be rather powerful (arrow 6). Politicians from the host society can stimulate ethnic mobilization by defining the legitimate actors or by discussing sensitive political issues (for example, whether or not Muslim girls are allowed to wear headscarves at schools). By doing this, they increase immigrant constituencies and increase the demand for immigrant organisations. Another example is related to the accessibility of the main native institutions for immigrants. If this accessibility is great, the demand for immigrant organisations decreases. This process is also referred to as the ‘crowding out effect’ of host society institutions (Schover & Vermeulen 2005). If host society institutions display strong attention for immigrant issues, the demand for immigrant organisations may decrease, as immigrants may assume that their concerns are being addressed satisfactorily by established public institutions (Minkoff 1995: 81). On the other hand, if the barriers to entering established host society organisations are high and these organisations do not show any consideration for immigrant issues, the demand for immigrant organisations may increase.

While it is important to consider all the factors and relationships involved, some factors appear to be more influential than others according to the existing literature. We will therefore focus in this study on five relationships (arrows 1, 2 and 5, 6, 7). In other words, we will look at how the immigration process and the character of the immigrant population influence the demand for immigrant organisations (arrows 1 and 2), analyse the influences of the host and sending societies on the immigrant organising process (arrows 5, 6 and 7) and look at ways in which the political opportunity structure in the host society influences the demand for immigrant organisations (arrow 6).

In this chapter we have identified the main factors of the immigrant organising process as they are laid out in the literature on immigration. This body of literature is, however, inconclusive about the relative importance of the various factors and how their influence changes over time (mainly because of a lack of comparative research). In order to assess these influences, including the time dimension, we need more theoretical reflection on the emergence and persistence of organisations and to compare the organising processes of different groups. The next chapter provides this additional theoretical reflection by describing the organisational ecology model. After that, we will formulate a model that captures the complete immigrant organising process.
Introduction

The previous chapter describes the approaches taken by immigration studies and the political opportunity structure model in analysing the origins of the immigrant organising process. This has led to the identification of two sets of explanatory factors: factors related to the immigrant group (group-related factors) and factors related to the receiving society (political opportunity structure in the host society). This chapter introduces a third set of factors: ecological factors. The organisational ecology model looks at the more general processes that shape the existence and structure of organisations. In addition, it considers how these processes vary over time, making it an appropriate starting point for a model that explains the emergence and persistence of the organising process among immigrant groups (Minkoff 1995: 3).

Ecologists believe that the organising processes of groups are not just influenced by external factors (such as group- or host society-related factors), but that internal dynamics play an important role, too. Internal dynamics are the ways in which organisations and organisers influence each other. According to the ecological model, organisations are not isolated entities but can only exist and develop because there are other organisations like them. This applies to all types of organisations: business, institutional, federational, and also small voluntary organisations like immigrant associations. Organisational ecologists are especially interested in the emergence of new types of organisations, which are unfamiliar in a society. As immigrant organisations are by definition new organisations in a host society, the ecological model offers many useful concepts and insights to help us to better understand the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process. This chapter introduces the ecological model and then explains how this study intends to combine this model with the explanatory factors derived from the immigration and POS literature, as described in the previous chapter.
The organisational ecology model

Organisational ecologists study the changing effects of environmental selection processes on organisational populations, or as one of the main organisational ecological studies explains:

An ecology of organisations seeks to understand how social conditions affect the rates at which new organisations and new organisational forms arise, the rate at which organisations change forms, and the rate at which organisations and forms die out. In addition to focusing on the effects of social, economic, and political systems on these rates, an ecology of organisations also emphasizes the dynamics that take place within organisational populations. (Hannan & Freeman 1989:7)

This statement shows that organisational ecologists focus on several key characteristics of organisations and are especially interested in rates of change. So they not only consider the total number of organisations but also the founding and dissolving rates per year because these provide crucial information on the development of organising processes. Secondly, ecologists study the population of organisations; they are not interested in the process of change at the individual level. Thirdly, the organisational ecology model takes a different approach from other organisational models by focusing primarily (though not completely) on the dynamics within groups of organisations rather than on the external conditions that might influence the emergence and persistence of new organisations. In addition, they differentiate between new and older, more established organisational populations.

Ecologists believe that the establishment of a new organisational form, which is completely new and therefore unfamiliar in society, has a particular dynamic. Two problems are most urgent for completely new organisational populations. First, organisational founders must develop effective routines for their new organisations under uncertain conditions; there are no role model organisations that can serve as an organisational template. Second, new organisations must establish ties with an environment that may not understand or appreciate their existence (Aldrich 1999: 228). The founders of these new organisations have to prove that society has a specific use for their organisations, in other words they have to prove the legitimacy of their organisational form (as mentioned in the previous chapter, legitimacy is one of the three basic organisational resources). This legitimisation process applies to voluntary organisations, but also to business organisations (shops, industries) and to large institutions. For example, when the first car factories were founded, managers had to find ways to convince the public that their products were valuable. Some people perceived automobiles as danger-
ous and useless. It was difficult to set up additional factories as long as automobiles were not recognised as a viable and safe means of transportation, and it was hard to find investment money, get permission to build factories or sell products through established outlets. However this all changed as soon as the value of the product was recognised by a substantial number of customers. Automobiles became popular and familiar, which then made it easier to set up new factories, mainly because the legitimacy of the product had been established. This legitimisation process plays an important role in the ecological model.

Ecologists believe that internal dynamics determine the founding rate of future organisations in any organisational population. They mean by this that the total number of organisations within a particular organisational population will determine the possibility of people establishing a new organisation. The total number of organisations in a population is referred to as the ‘density’ in the population (Hannan & Freeman 1989: 129-131). Density has important implications for the degree to which organisations are considered legitimate in society. If there are few organisations in a given population (low density), because the organisational population has just recently been established, new organisations within this population have to struggle to gain legitimacy. This has everything to do with the fact that society is not yet familiar with this organisational form (as illustrated in the example of the automobile factories). New organisations foster the legitimacy of the entire group of organisations. This means that the pioneers of the automobile industry were pleased when others joined them by opening a new factory; this increased the familiarity of the product and therefore the legitimacy of their own organisation improved. Once the number of organisations increases, the struggle for legitimacy becomes less intense and the cost of starting a new organisation becomes lower. This clears the path for more similar organisations. To stick with the example, when people became used to cars and interested in buying one, factories no longer had to convince customers or investors of the usefulness of their product.

Organisational ecologists therefore believe that the founding rate of new organisations is strongly related to the total number of existing organisations in the population (the density). The higher the total number of organisations, the more new organisations will be founded. However, at the same time, growth in the number of organisations will also intensify competition. At first this has no effect on the organisations, but eventually the competition increases to the point that founding rates decrease and more organisations are dissolved. The term ‘carrying capacity’ is introduced here to describe this process. The carrying capacity is the number of organisations a population can sustain under given environmental conditions.
One of the main hypotheses of the ecological model is, therefore, that in the first phase of the organising process of any new form, new organisations help to establish legitimacy, but in later phases new organisations become a threat to other organisations because they heighten competition. The ecological proposition is therefore that density increases founding rates at a decreasing rate. Depicted in a diagram, the failure rates of organisations plotted against the density within the population takes the shape of an upside-down U over the history of any population (Hannan & Freeman 1989: 272).

In relation to the process of creating new organisations, there is also the matter of ‘the liability of newness’, a concept that Stinchcombe introduced in his essay in 1965. He is referring to the general phenomenon that new organisations fail at higher rates than older organisations. The most important reason for this is that it costs time and energy to build a solid organisational structure. An organisation needs coordination skills and routines, which are only developed by repeated interaction (North 1990: 74). However participants in a new organisation are often strangers to each other, skills cannot be learned from more experienced members, and routines have yet to arise. Furthermore, the element of trust is more complicated and fragile in a new organisation than in older ones. It takes time to build trust with other participants, but also with customers of the organisation. All these points are reasons why new organisations show higher failure rates than older organisations (Stinchcombe 1965: 148-150; Aldrich 1999: 228-231).

Because routines develop slowly, the chance that internal change will occur within organisations is low. Moreover, once standards of procedure have become established in an organisation the costs of change increase greatly (Hannan & Freeman 1989: 138). Ecologists claim therefore that organisations tend toward inertia, which makes them more likely to disband rather than to change. This implies that change in an organisational population occurs through the competitive replacement of less successful organisations by more successful ones and not by an older organisation changing its structure or goals (Minkoff 1995: 6).

Change also does not come so easily at the level of the organisational population. Again, once the population is established, the cost of change increases greatly. This means that the founding phase of an organisational form sets the stage for its further development. The organisational forms tend to incorporate and retain packages of characteristics that were common in society when the form emerged (Stinchcombe 1965: 153; Hannan & Freeman 1989: 16). This can cause organisational forms to have often outdated characteristics which are not very useful from a pragmatic point of view yet are retained because
of their past success. As Stinchcombe points out: ‘If the YMCA were organised now, it would very likely be a secular agency more similar to the mental health movement’ (Stinchcombe 1965: 160).

**Immigrant organisations and the ecological model**

American sociologist Debra Minkoff has used the ecological model to analyse the emergence and development of minority and women’s organisations in the United States. She demonstrates that minority organisations (including immigrant associations) are indeed influenced by interorganisational dynamics of competition and legitimisation. The number of active organisations (density) is related significantly to the founding rate of new minority organisations, as predicted by the organisational ecology model. Her analysis of women’s and minority organisations in the United States shows that density dependence is an important mechanism that drives the process of legitimacy:

Just as organisers have a tendency to adopt successful organizational forms, so, too, do sponsors have a tendency to support them. Initial growth in the organizational population can thus be determinant in setting up the legitimacy of the organizational form. In addition to a straightforward modeling effect, legitimation may be related to the visibility of specific organizational forms. The more prevalent organisations are, the more likely they are to be noticed and accepted as valid actors. (Minkoff 1995: 123)

In fact an ecological dynamic comes into effect in which organisational efforts become less vulnerable to changes in external conditions. This means that, although individual organisations may come and go, the organisational structure of the group remains to a large extent stable. As Minkoff puts it: ‘The density of activity protects organizers from shifts in the institutional winds’ (Minkoff 1995: 124). In the beginning of the organising process the structure of an organisational population is decided by selection processes (the most successful organisations are used as a template for future organisations). Once the structure of the organisational population (in terms of types of organisations, interorganisational networks, etc.) is established it becomes very difficult to change the shape of the organisational population through the influences of external factors. This means that external forces are most influential in the beginning of an organising process. During the next phases ecological dynamics become stronger and prevent external factors from having an effect. For immigrant organisations this means that in the beginning of the organising process the different explana-
tory factors (described in the previous chapter) determine the emergence, structure and first phase of the immigrant organisational population, but as the settlement process evolves, the influence of these factors becomes weaker. Internal dynamics cause the immigrant organisational population to remain constant in terms of the total number of organisations, the distribution in types of organisations and the interorganisational relationships. Once the legitimacy of the most successful organisational form in the immigrant organisational population is established things do not change as quickly.

Minkoff also states that although these ecological processes set the context for the emergence and rate of expansion of minority organisations, ecological dynamics do not completely govern the ability of groups to mobilise resources and start new activities. Institutional and political opportunities, and the ways groups utilise them, must not be ignored. In fact, Minkoff asserts that it is precisely the combination of institutional and ecological factors that explains the complete development of minority organisations in the United States. ‘Institutional and organizational processes of legitimation are central to the logic of both organizational formation and survival’ (Minkoff 1995: 122). Our study uses a similar combination of ecological and institutional factors and predicts that processes of legitimisation are also central in the formation and survival of immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin.

Other scholars have argued that because of the institutional embeddedness of immigrant organisations, they are very vulnerable to the recognition, both official and unofficial, of national and local authorities. Political and institutional events bear strongly on the development of these immigrant organisations. The host state often acts as a catalyst for ethnic mobilisation. State policies may unintentionally stimulate ethnic mobilisation by triggering a resurgence of ethnic markers or by assigning a status to immigrant groups (Olzak 1983). The state defines to a large extent the legitimate actors within the field of organisations and has therefore the power to provide legitimisation to certain immigrant groups or specific immigrant organisations (Kasinitz 1992). This means that to understand the complete immigrant organising process we cannot simply refer to the internal organisational dynamics but must include external factors as well. By external factors we mean the explanatory factors described in the previous chapter: the group-related factors and the political opportunity structure in a host society (although again the influence of these external forces will be probably most strong in the beginning of the immigrant organising process).
Legitimacy and competition

In the ecological model (and the POS model) the concepts of legitimacy and competition play an important role. We will therefore briefly elaborate on the definition of legitimisation and how we intend to approach the concept of legitimacy and competition for the study of immigrant organisations.

Legitimisation is the generalised belief that the actions of an organisation are desirable, suitable and appropriate within a social system (Suchman 1995; Aldrich 1999: 229-230). As Suchman explains: ‘When one says that a certain pattern of behaviour possesses legitimacy, one asserts that some group of observers as a whole, accepts or supports what those observers perceive to be the behavioural pattern, as a whole − despite reservations that any single observer might have about any single behavior’ (Suchman 1995: 574). Aldrich (1999: 229-230) distinguishes two types of legitimacy: ‘cognitive legitimacy’ and ‘sociopolitical legitimacy’. Cognitive legitimacy refers to the acceptance of a new kind of organisation by the general public as a taken-for-granted feature of society. As more organisations of a certain type emerge and the public becomes faithful consumers of the products of the organisations, the cognitive legitimacy for this organisational type increases. People perceive the organisations not only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable, and more deserving of trust (Suchman 1995: 195). Cognitive legitimacy − the taken-for-granted type of legitimacy − is the type mostly referred to in ecological studies (Barron 1998: 209).

Sociopolitical legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the acceptance by ‘key stakeholders’ in society (such as government officials, public opinion and opinion leaders) that a certain type of organisation represents an acceptable and appropriate organisational form (Aldrich 1999: 247-256). In order to increase sociopolitical legitimacy, organisers must find ways of adapting to existing norms and laws and at the same time win the approval of the powerful groups. This can be achieved through strategic action by which organisers attempt to alter generally accepted norms and values. Sociopolitical legitimacy is rarely won by new organisations acting on their own. Organisers must cooperate with other organisations in the emergent population to increase sociopolitical legitimacy, which will allow them to speak with one voice and strengthen their claim. This type of legitimacy is the one most referred to in political opportunity studies.

Applying this framework to a population of immigrant organisations one can state that these types of organisations must, on the one hand, increase their cognitive legitimacy as a group by expanding the total number of immigrant organisations, thereby making the organisations
known to a larger public. This will enhance their visibility in the host society as a new type of organisation that should be accepted and eventually appreciated. In addition, immigrant organisations have to win the recognition of their own immigrant community members since they are the anticipated clients for their activities. It is by expanding the total number of organisations and making clear that their products are useful to immigrants that the organisations can increase their cognitive legitimacy within the immigrant community. The enhancement of sociopolitical legitimacy, on the other hand, asks for a different strategy. Immigrant organisations must collaborate and engage in collective action to win the acceptance and approval of host state authorities. By creating a strong coalition they can persuade authorities that their activities are useful and appropriate within the existing social-political system.

Cognitive legitimacy is most important for new organisations in the first phase of an organising process. Sociopolitical issues arise in later phases when organisational activities break cultural frames or collide with laws and policy regulation (Aldrich 1999: 259). Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or directly exchanged but is more a condition of the organisational population. However, legitimate organisational activities can be exchanged by organisations and organisers.

Some organisational populations have more difficulty acquiring cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy than others. Business organisations, for example, may produce useful products that almost immediately grant them cognitive legitimacy; people recognise the usefulness of the products, which can be easily integrated into daily life. Other types of organisations are less able to produce such clear results. Consider for example public schools or hospitals which cannot easily demonstrate objectively what the end results of their activities are (a healthier community or better educated pupils?). These institutions will therefore adopt the façade of modern bureaucratic design to project visible evidence of their trustworthiness (as a way to acquire and maintain cognitive legitimacy) (Knöke 2001: 50).

In addition to legitimacy we must also consider the concept of competition. Competitive dynamics among voluntary organisations are different from those seen among business firms, mainly because organisations generate a different kind of product than firms. Voluntary organisations compete primarily for people’s time, as people can belong to more than one organisation. In addition, not all types of organisations compete for the same members. A youth association, for instance, does not recruit among the same members as an organisation for the elderly while a sports association does compete heavily with a youth organisation. In general, specialist organisations do not compete intensely with
other organisations, and the larger more general organisations do. For example, a church organisation competes for the time of its members with almost all other types of voluntary organisations (youth, elderly, female, sports and social); elderly organisations, on the other hand, recruit members from such a specific niche in the community that they compete almost with no other organisation (McPherson 1983: 525-527). The work of McPherson illustrates that in some cases an increase in the total number of voluntary organisations does not automatically mean more competition. It depends on the goals and activities of the organisations.

A general question that follows is how to structure the activities of an organisation. Should organisations provide many activities themselves or should they specialise? The answer (according to transaction cost theory, which addresses this issue) depends on the real or perceived transaction costs. In a competitive market the most efficient production process takes place within organisations: they lower the costs of doing business. It is valuable for individuals to establish a firm or to work for one as this allows them to do business more effectively than if they were to carry out the transactions or activity alone. The additional value provided by the organisation overrides the trouble of having set up the organisation. Transaction cost theory explains that organisations tend to expand in size until the cost of conducting a transaction exceeds the cost of acquiring the same exchange in the open market. This means that if an organisation becomes too large it becomes too costly because all the different parts of the organisation need resources to function properly. Smaller organisations will be able to compete with these large organisations because they can provide specific services with fewer and lower costs. Consider, for example, a large car assembly factory, in which spray-painting the car must precede installing car windows. Because these activities should be done separately they are actually segregated socially and spatially into different work units (Knoke, 2001: 59-61). Other operations can be handled by completely different organisations (for instance, manufacturing and installing the car radio). An organisation that wants to produce everything itself will become so large and uncontrollable that smaller organisations will be able to produce parts of the product for less cost.

For immigrant organisations similar reasoning can be applied. An immigrant organisation exists because it offers something that individual immigrants are not able to provide. This additional value should be greater than the costs of establishing the organisation. The immigrant organisation needs to have a clear functionality for its founders and users, otherwise it would not be beneficial to start the organisation. The organisational surplus must also be large enough to overcome the ‘free rider’ problem which all organisations participating in
collective activities face. Free riders benefit from the organisational efforts of others without themselves contributing much to the situation. What is important to note here is that setting up organisations does cost something and if there are no beneficial results, immigrant associations will not emerge. However, if an immigrant organisation becomes too large (providing a wide variety of different services) smaller immigrant organisations will be able to compete and more of these can be expected to develop.

One of the main problems of looking at legitimisation and competition dynamics is that they are difficult to measure. How can we, for instance, determine the level of legitimacy (cognitive or sociopolitical) of a certain population of organisations? Ecologists assume that legitimacy can be measured by looking at the mere density in an organisational population (the more organisations exist, the higher the degree of legitimacy for the entire organisational population). Critics regard this as an imprecise measurement that fails to capture the full complexity of legitimisation and competition processes (Zucker 1989). In this study we will not attempt to provide precise measurements of the degree of organisational legitimacy but rather find it more useful to look at the factors that may influence cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. Which external (changes in the political opportunity structure) or internal (increasing the total number of immigrant organisations) factors may influence the legitimacy of immigrant organisations and do we see the expected results in the development of the immigrant organising process? In other words, we avoid precise measurements of the level of legitimacy but focus instead on mechanisms that may influence the legitimacy of immigrant organisations and on phenomena that are influenced by organisational legitimacy (higher founding rates, for example).

**Interorganisational networks**

The description of the organisational ecology model also indicates that ecologists emphasise the importance of resource acquirement for the establishment of organisations, or as Hannan and Freeman state: ‘Creating an organization means mobilizing several kinds of scarce resources’ (Hannan & Freeman 1989: 71). In this sense, the ecological approach is similar to the political opportunity structure model, in which the resource mobilisation process also plays a crucial role in the emergence and persistence of organisations. Organisations mobilise the main organisational resources (wealth, legitimacy and power) in many ways, however both models affirm that interorganisational rela-
tionships play a crucial role in this process. Interorganisational relationships are the engine of an expanding organisational population. They make sure that new organisations provide the necessary resources and that legitimate activities can be used by organisations other than just the large and powerful ones. Through interorganisational relationships, resources are exchanged, successful routines are transferred, communication networks are established and trust can spread throughout the organisational population. All these elements are needed if the organisational population is to expand and persist.

In addition, Knoke (2001: 63) states that an organisational network analysis has the potential for bringing together many dimensions of organisational behaviour (and theoretical models) into one comprehensive perspective. We support this view and believe that an organisational network analysis enables us to better illustrate the way in which the different explanatory factors (derived from the immigration, POS and ecology models) can be brought together into one model that explains the immigrant organising process. Chapter 5 of this study focuses explicitly on the interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and there we will explain the nature and meaning of these relationships further. Below we briefly introduce the importance of such relationships for any organising process, according to the ecological and political opportunity structure model.

Ecologists position interorganisational relationships at the centre of legitimisation and competition processes. Organisations are dependent on other, similar organisations in order to increase the cognitive legitimacy of the entire organisational population. As soon as more organisations of a certain type appear, an internal dynamic between them comes into effect. Organisers meet each other, they may help in establishing other organisations with which they feel an affinity, or they may compete with those organisations for which they feel resentment (either way, an interorganisational relationship is established). Organisational populations in which the members are more closely interconnected may experience faster growth rates and higher carrying capacities, mainly because they are better able to allocate resources throughout the entire population. Ironically, although individual organisation’s growth opportunities may be hindered by interorganisational relationships, these same relationships may expand the growth of the entire organisational population. Weaker organisations are assisted by the larger and stronger (often older) organisations thereby improving their survival chances, which eventually results in a higher carrying capacity for the whole population (Knoke 2001: 71). In addition, strongly interconnected organisational populations may be better able to acquire socio-political legitimacy as they are better able to speak with one voice (Aldrich 1999: 321).
The political opportunity model also finds interorganisational networks to be crucial elements in resource mobilisation processes for collective action. The political opportunity model considers the degree of organisation, including the number of interorganisational relationships, as one of the primary determinants of any group’s mobilisation. This means that groups that have an extended and connected organisational structure are more inclined to political protest than unorganised groups. Consider, for instance, the black protest movement in the United States in the sixties. The black church was the main institutional force behind this movement: nearly all black protest organisations were closely associated with the church. The church supplied the protest organisations with communication networks, organisational leaders, organised masses, finances, legitimacy and a safe environment in which to operate (Morris 1986). In other words, small black protest organisations could only survive through their relationships with other black organisations, and these relationships functioned as a way to acquire basic organisational resources. In fact, the population of black protest organisations emerged and developed thanks to these interorganisational relationships.

Knoke (2001: 65) distinguishes four functions of interorganisational relationships, which also can be used in the study of the immigrant organising process. The first function has already been described: it facilitates the allocation of resources throughout the population. Secondly, these relationships function as information and communication networks between organisations. Thirdly, interorganisational relationships indicate power relations between the organisations of a population: asymmetrical interactions allow one organisation to control another organisation’s behaviour. Finally, he mentions sentimental attachments as an originator for interorganisational relationships. Emotional affiliations among individuals may create solidarity among the organisations, which results in obligations of mutual assistance and support. In Chapter 5 we will focus on these four functions of interorganisational relationships to make better sense of how the group-related factors, political opportunity structures and internal ecological dynamics influence the organising process of Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin.

**Toward a model for the immigrant organising process**

Ecologists and political opportunity theorists would both claim there is nothing specific about immigrant organisations and that it is the availability of organisational resources that determines whether or not immigrant organisations are established. Once the population of immigrant organisations has been set up, either internal or external dy-
namics then determine the founding and dissolving rates of new immigrant organisations and the distribution into types of organisations or interorganisational networks. Both these perspectives (including the work of Minkoff) neglect the fact that immigrant organisations do indeed have a specific character and background. These organisations are founded by people who come from a society in which the social and cultural environment is often different from their new host society. Group-related factors are, as described in Chapter 2, one of the main impetuses for the emergence and persistence of the immigrant organising process. In other words, the theoretical models described so far deal primarily with the supply side (acquiring the basic organisational resources) of immigrant organisations and have neglected somewhat (though not completely) the demand side. These models presume that the associational demand among immigrants is rather predisposed and therefore static. The previous chapter has illustrated however that the demand for immigrant organisations evolves during the settlement process and that the main group-related factors are responsible for this changing demand. A model that captures the immigrant organising process needs therefore to combine the explanatory factors mentioned in immigration studies with the more theoretical organisational models, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. This figure looks very similar to the figure presented in the previous chapter. The only difference is that the box *internal organisational dynamics* (ecological factors) is included.

Figure 3.1 illustrates that the three sets of explanatory factors (group-related, host society and ecological factors) each influence the immigrant organising process in their own way. The ecological factors influence the organising process independent of the supply and demand side. Internal organisational dynamics do influence the resources for the immigrant organising process (for example, an increasing density can cause an increase in legitimacy – one of the basic organisational resources), however this does not necessarily mean that the supply or demand for immigrant organisations is directly influenced. The ecological factors start working only after the immigrant founders have established their first immigrant organisations (at that time the supply and demand sides had already been influenced by the other explanatory factors, otherwise the immigrant organising process would not have originated). The group-related factors mainly influence the demand for immigrant organisations, and the supply side of the immigrant organising process is primarily determined by the political opportunity structure in the host society.

We expect that group-related factors are the most determining factor in the first phase of the immigrant organising process. The immigration process results in an increasing demand for separate immigrant
organisations. The collective identity of the immigrant group is strong and encourages the establishment of new immigrant organisations. In addition, immigrants are in need of a safe environment that guards them from hostility within the host society. Immigrant organisations offer this secure surrounding, which is another motivation for the establishment of new immigrant organisations. As the settlement process evolves we expect a decreasing and shifting influence from these group-related factors. The connection between the country of origin and the immigrant community becomes weaker and the second generation displays a less ethnically based organisational demand.

We expect that the political opportunity structure in the host society is most influential in the second phase of the immigrant organising process. At first the immigrant organisations and the authorities in the host society will ignore each other as much as possible. As the immigrant group stays longer in the host society, more political and social issues arise, and this will cause a reaction from host state authorities. The manner in which host authorities react determines the degree of political opportunity for immigrants to organise.

We expect that ecological forces will become more and more influential as the organising process progresses. In the beginning the results of internal organisational dynamics will perhaps not be very visible.
even though they start to influence the immigrant organising process right after the establishment of the very first organisation. As the immigrant organising process evolves ecological forces become increasingly stronger, and eventually they will protect the organisational population from the external shifts in the supply and demand sides. This will result in a continuing development of the overall structure of the immigrant organisational population (in terms of number, types and activities). The continuation and persistence of the organisational form is contrary to the assumption derived from immigration studies that the immigrant organising process slowly changes as the settlement process develops.

There is one other element in Figure 3.1 that needs to be discussed to understand the model for the immigrant organising process. This concerns the influence of the presumed relationships, depicted by the arrows in the figure (only the six bold arrows will be discussed as these relationships are the focus of this study). As mentioned in the previous chapters, we are interested in the influence of the explanatory factors over time. The immigrant organising process is not constant but changes as the settlement process evolves. The character of the explanatory factors also changes, thereby changing their influence on the immigrant organising process. To make this changing character of the factors more understandable it is useful to distinguish between constantly changing factors and factors that change once in a while, in the form of external shocks.

Factors 1, 2 and 6 can be considered factors that change slowly but continuously. Consider, for example, the size of the immigrant group. This is not fixed but changes as time goes by. The same goes for the density of the organisational population. Organisations come and go all the time, so the density of the population is also regularly changing. In contrast, factors 3, 4 and 5 also change over time, but in the form of external or exogenous shocks. A shifting political opportunity structure may mean that the authorities suddenly take a different stand on immigrant organisations, thereby changing the environmental circumstances for these organisations. But these shifts occur at once, as an eruption, and not slowly day by day. In order to understand the influence, both steady and shifting, of the explanatory factors on the immigrant organising process, we need to take these different patterns into account.

To conclude this chapter we need to ask ourselves what can we do with this model. The model makes visible the independent variables and potential relationships that make up the immigrant organising process. It provides the opportunity to explain why immigrant organisations
emerge, persist and evolve. It also allows for comparing the organising processes of different immigrant groups and explaining differences and similarities concerning their organisational behaviour. In this study we use the model to explain the influences of the different factors and organisational models. To what extent do we see (1) ecological dynamics, (2) the opportunity structure in the host society or (3) the immigrant group-related factors determining the organising process of immigrants? And how does the presumed influence change over time? The model developed for this study enables us to compare the organising processes of different groups in different contexts. The model provides a clear structure that allows for a comparative research method as suggested by Nancy Green (1999). We will use both a divergent and convergent comparison to assess the influence of the factors on the organising process and evaluate the presumed relationships over time. Eventually, the comparison will be used to make better sense of the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes.
4 The Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin: numbers and types, 1960-2000

Introduction

In the following two chapters we will compare the organising process of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and Berlin over the period 1960-2000. This divergent comparison takes the group-related factors of the Turks (character of the immigrant group, immigration process and the influence of the country of origin) as constant. Differences between the Turks in both cities are explained by the different local opportunity structures in Amsterdam and Berlin. When similar organisational patterns do occur, these are explained by the influence of group-related factors on the Turkish organising process (Green 1999: 68-69). In addition to assessing the influence of the local opportunity structure and the group-related factors on the emergence, persistence and development of formal Turkish organisations, we also evaluate the explanatory power of the ecological model on the Turkish organising process in both cities, in relation to the shifting influence of the external factors.

The description and analysis of the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin is divided into two chapters. This chapter focuses on the emergence and development of the number and types of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The next chapter deals with the interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations in both cities. In the two chapters the comparative element is the central focus of attention. Less information is provided on the specific organisational histories of the Turkish organisations and more on the differences and similarities between the Turkish organising processes in both cities.

The character of the Turkish immigrant group in Amsterdam and Berlin

In a divergent comparison it is assumed that the character of the immigrant groups is similar. This section discusses the Turkish populations in Amsterdam and Berlin to see to what extent both groups indeed have comparable characteristics.
Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and Berlin have come for similar reasons. Since the beginning of the Turkish immigration in the early 1960s economic reasons have been the most important. The Turks arrived in Western Europe predominantly as ‘guest workers’. Later on, political motives increasingly became more important, although economic motives remained dominant. The arrival of Turks in Berlin started relatively late in comparison to the rest of Germany, but occurred in the same period that Turkish immigrants began to arrive in Amsterdam (1964-1968). Until the late 1960s Berlin was in less need of foreign workers, mainly because of the city’s geography. Until 1961 numerous refugees had been using Berlin as an entry to Western Europe, and a large number stayed in the city after finding work. The construction of the Berlin wall ended this situation, however there was not an immediate shortage of labour. The wall negatively affected the economic situation of Berlin and diminished the demand for workers, including foreigners (Kleff 1990). It took several years, until 1968, before Berlin experienced the first real period of labour shortage. In response, local authorities established an immigration policy supporting the arrival of guest workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece (Schwarz 1992: 121-124). This policy quickly resulted in the strong growth of the Turkish population in Berlin, which increased to more than 100,000 by the end of the 1970s and is now the largest immigrant group in the city.

In terms of numbers, the Turkish population in Amsterdam was significantly smaller than the Turkish population in Berlin throughout the entire period under investigation. In Amsterdam the Turks are the third largest migrant group in the city, after the Moroccans and the Surinamese. Turks migrated to the Netherlands, just as in Germany, to help satisfy the demand for labour in the booming economy of the 1960s. The influx of guest workers was officially halted in 1973 when, during the economic recession, the Dutch government, just like in Germany, imposed an immigration ban targeting all guest worker countries. However, guest workers already in the Netherlands were entitled to send for their families, and many of the Turkish workers did. Family unification turned the Turks into a sizeable migrant population. In 1972 around 3,000 Turks lived in Amsterdam, but the figure surpassed 11,000 eight years later. Another consequence of family unification was that more Turkish women and children arrived in the 1970s and early 1980s, modifying the group’s demographic composition (as illustrated in Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.1 illustrates how much larger the Turkish population is in Berlin than in Amsterdam. Until 1968 the size of the populations was comparable, but in the seventies the difference sharply increases. In 1980 the Turkish population of Berlin was eight times larger than in Amsterdam; twenty years later this difference has decreased to less than four
times. However if we consider the percentage of Turks relative to the total population of Berlin and Amsterdam, the difference between the cities is less substantial. Figure 4.2 illustrates that until 1990 the percentage of Turks in the total population of Berlin was somewhat higher, but not as much as the difference in the total size of the Turkish population would
suggest. After Berlin was reunited in 1990 the percentage of Turks in the total population of both cities converges.

The percentage of women within the Turkish population in Berlin is notably high. In the 1970s, twenty-eight percent of the guest workers in Germany were women, however in Berlin the figure was more than forty percent. This was the result of Berlin’s economic structure, in which Turkish women could easily find jobs in the early seventies (Schwarz 1992: 123). Figure 4.3 compares the demographic composition of the Turkish population in Berlin and Amsterdam by looking at the percentage of women in the Turkish population between 1974 and 1998. It shows that until the end of the seventies relatively more Turkish women were present in Berlin, but the difference between both cities is certainly not as large as between Berlin and other German cities. As the process of family reunion unfolded the percentage of women in the Turkish population in Amsterdam became higher, making the demographic composition of the Turkish population in both cities increasingly similar. In fact by the end of the nineties the number is exactly the same.

Another important issue concerns whether immigrants come from a rural or urban region in Turkey. Immigrants from urban areas are assumed to have higher educational and occupational skills than those from the rural areas. Because of the lack of reliable data it is difficult to provide a precise comparison between the Turkish population in the Netherlands and Germany. However it is assumed that Germany has recruited Turkish immigrants with higher educational and occupa-
tional skills than the Netherlands (Böcker & Thränhardt 2003: 37). Research in Berlin in the early seventies showed that fifteen percent of Turkish immigrants had been employed in some sort of civil service before departure, primarily as schoolteachers. In addition, there was a relatively high percentage of Turkish students in Berlin, studying at one of the numerous universities there. An above-average percentage of Turkish immigrants had more than nine years of schooling. Then in the 1980s, the percentage of low-skilled workers increased considerably with the arrival of Turkish immigrants from the rural areas who were participating in the process of family reunion (Gitmez & Wilpert 1987: 90-92).

Another important characteristic of the Turkish immigrant population in both Berlin and Amsterdam is the percentage of Kurdish people. An accurate figure is difficult to obtain because Kurds are not registered as such, but we can make an educated guess. For Amsterdam we have only national figures. It is assumed that around sixteen percent of the Turkish population in the Netherlands is of Kurdish descent (Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 12). We can assume that the percentage in Amsterdam will not be higher than this, since the main Kurdish communities are to be found in Dutch cities other than Amsterdam (Van der Wal & Tax 1999: 47). The size of the Kurdish population in Berlin is estimated to be around 35,000 people (Greve & Çinar 1998: 22), which would be around twenty percent.

So far our comparison of the Turkish populations in Amsterdam and Berlin show the communities to be generally similar. The most important difference is size: especially in the seventies, the Turkish population in Berlin was much larger than in Amsterdam. To conclude this comparison of group-related factors we need to look at the third element, as described in the model in Figure 3.1: the organisational influence from the country of origin. As both immigrant groups originate from the same country, we expect that these influences also will be similar in Amsterdam and Berlin.

**Political and religious Turkish movements in Western Europe**

The influence from the country of origin on the associational behaviour of Turkish immigrants is related primarily to the main political and religious movements in Turkey. A number of recent studies describe the influence of these ideological movements on the emergence and development of Turkish immigrant organisations in Western Europe (Doomernik 1991; 1995; Den Exter & Hessels 2003; Sunier 1996; Penninx 1980; Penninx & Schrover 2001; Gitmez & Wilpert 1987; Bilgi

The first Turkish immigrant organisations in Western Europe, founded in the late sixties and early seventies, were mainly leftist and rightist political workers’ organisations that were strongly focused on Turkey and on each other. The left-right political polarisation was imported from Turkey, which suffered serious political upheaval in the sixties and seventies. Violent conflicts between the left and the right were claiming an average of twenty lives a day by the end of the seventies (Toprak 1996: 94). This violent and polarized situation reflected the unique character of Turkish civil society. Turkey is one of the few countries in its region with a secularised legal system, democratic elections and a vibrant civil society. At the same time, it is a country with a strong, influential military that does not hesitate to exert its power, as in the interventions of 1960 and 1980. Traditional Turkish politics is bound up with clientelism and network ties. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, there was strong growth in political parties, interest groups and civic associations. The military coup of 1980 stifled such developments. Civil society was sharply curtailed, many groups were banned, and organisational leaders and other public figures were jailed. The highly politicised society became depoliticised within a few years (Toprak 1996: 88-94; Zürcher 1995: 313-16). Turkish immigrants originating from this society were therefore very much used to social and political issues being a serious and significant fact of life.

When civic organisations were banned in Turkey in 1980 oppositional and marginal groups set up organisations abroad to resist the power of the Turkish state. A wide array of political and religious movements jockeyed for power in the growing Turkish communities in Western Europe. The major polarities were radical left versus radical right, Turkish versus Kurdish, Sunnis versus Alevis, and religious versus secular. In all the organisational disputes arising from these struggles, representatives of the Turkish state played significant roles. The Turkish state founded and supported pro-state organisations, and opposition movements set up groups of their own (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 63-66).

This ideological rivalry had a dramatic impact on the establishment of new Turkish organisations in Western Europe. No group could afford to stay behind, hence the number of new Turkish organisations exploded. There were left-wing political movements and oppositional Turkish Islamic movements (of which the most important were banned in Turkey) as well as Islamic organisations that were supported
by the Turkish government. The emerging oppositional Islamic movements in Turkey set up their own branches in Western Europe, furthering the proliferation of Turkish religious immigrant organisations. This competition among religious groups influenced the Turkish organising processes in both Amsterdam and Berlin at that time. Between 1979 and 1983, twelve new Turkish Islamic associations were established in Amsterdam and ten in Berlin. In the first phases of the Turkish organising process, it was possible to categorize almost all Turkish organisations within one of the two extreme political poles of Turkish society. They were either linked with the leftist Turkish workers organisations or they were more religiously oriented, some aligned with the extreme right parties (Gitmez & Wilpert 1987: 107; Fijalkowski & Gillmeister 1997: 119). Later on, more moderate organisations were founded on both the left and right side of the political spectrum.

The main groups active in establishing organisations in Western Europe can be categorised into several political and religious movements, representing the whole spectrum of Turkish party politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 49-63; Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 5-13). In the following section, we will describe the main political and religious Turkish movements, which also have been the main actors in the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin.

The Oppositional Left-Wing Movement

Turkish leftist groups are made up of both radical and more liberal groups. The radical side consists of many different communist splinter groups, some of which followed the ‘Moscow-line’ and are related to the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and others that have been influenced more by other forms of communism. For instance, one of the largest and oldest Turkish left-wing organisations in Amsterdam is the Hollanda Türküyeli İşçiler Birliği (HTIB) which initially had strong links to the Turkish Communist Party. In Berlin, we find the Türkiye Halk Kültür Merkezi, a Marxist-oriented association with international ties to other Turkish communist organisations in Western Europe. One of the main Turkish liberal leftist organisations in Germany is the Sosyalde-mokrat Halk Dernekleri (HDF). This umbrella organisation, representing today more than forty Turkish organisations from all over Germany, was founded in Berlin in 1977 and has strong connections with the Turkish Social Democratic Party.

Right-Wing Organisations

Right-wing organisations can, just as the leftist organisations, be categorised into a radical and more moderate wing. The moderate group is
organised in Ḥüṛ-Türk organisations, which are closely linked to the Turkish Adalet Party and in Germany with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 54). The extreme right-wing organisations are better known as Grey Wolves organisations. The term Grey Wolves refers to the militant and violent wing of the Turkish political party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), led by Alparslan Türkes until his death in 1997. The Grey Wolves movement strongly opposes Turkish leftist organisations, which in the seventies meant especially the Turkish communists and in the nineties the Kurdish Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). In Germany the Grey Wolves organisations have been watched intently by the authorities and since the early eighties several bans have been declared on them by the German Ministry of the Interior (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 73). The Dutch authorities, on the other hand, have taken a more liberal approach toward these organisations. Grey Wolves organisations in Amsterdam have even received state subsidies at times, as described in the next chapter.

Kurdish organisations

The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has a long history in Turkey, but since it became more violent in the 1980s it has been a major factor in the organising process of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in Western Europe as well. One of the main demands of Kurdish organisations is for recognition of the Kurdish people as an independent nation. Apart from this clear political agenda, Kurdish organisations are also engaged in celebrating Kurdish cultural events and studying the Kurdish language. Waves of violence issuing from Kurdish organisations in 1993 led to the German authorities banning some of the most radical of them (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 72). Despite strong pressure from the Turkish government, Kurdish organisations have not been banned in the Netherlands where the authorities have employed a laissez-faire attitude toward these types of political organisations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 275).

Religious organisations

After the first phase of the Turkish organising process in Western Europe ended, religion replaced the left-right ideological polarisation that had dominated immigrants’ associational behaviour (Doomernik 1991). As the process of family reunion evolved Turkish immigrants began to develop an extensive religious organisational structure. Most Turkish immigrants were affiliated to one of the main Islamic denominations. Socially and politically these religious groups have organised separately and they support different political parties in Turkey.
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 55). In Germany approximately two-thirds of the Turks are Sunni Muslims, divided among different Sunni movements, and one-third are Alevi. The breakdown in the Netherlands is not as clear. Alevi started their organising process in Western Europe relatively late. Only in the early nineties do we see the emergence of the first Turkish Alevi organisations; until then Alevi were mainly active in Turkish left-wing secular organisations (Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 9). The smaller number of Alevi organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin may be due to the fact that they have a more individualistic perception of Islam. There are two Alevi organisations in Amsterdam and five in Berlin, compared to about forty and sixty Sunni organisations, respectively.

The main purpose of Turkish religious organisations is to make it possible for immigrants to practise Islam. They have established mosques, appointed imams, provided Koran lessons for Turkish children, organised pilgrimages to Mecca and set up funds for burial costs. The religious organisations in Germany have a significant additional goal: the recognition of Islam as an official religion in Germany. This has been an increasingly debated issue over the last two decades (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 57-58).

Most Turkish Islamic immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin belong to one of the three main Sunni movements known in Turkey: the Diyanet movement, the oppositional Milli Görüs movement and the more spiritually guided Süleymancilar movement. While there are still a significant number of independent mosques in both cities (in Berlin, for instance, about half of the Turkish mosques are independent [Gesemann & Kapphan 2001: 402]), these three Sunni movements have dominated the development of a religious network in both cities. Following is a short description of the character of the three movements.

The Diyanet is named after the Presidium for Religious Affairs in Turkey. The organisations affiliated with the Diyanet are in direct control of this presidium and are advocates of a state-controlled, fairly moderate but nationalistic form of Islam. The imams in the Diyanet mosques are sent and paid by the Turkish state for a period of five years. In the Netherlands the Diyanet is by far the largest Turkish federation with more than 140 affiliated mosques around the country. In Germany the Diyanet has also developed into a very large federation with more than 750 affiliated members (Lemmen 2002: 34-36; Den Exter & Hessels 2003: 6-7). Initially the Diyanet was not as influential in Germany as in the Netherlands, mainly because the oppositional Milli Görüs and the Süleymancilar group were much more active there, attracted by the bigger population. Since the Diyanet began to actively organise in Western Europe somewhat later than the other two (in 1984),
they had to face stronger competition in Germany than in the Netherlands (Doomernik 1991: 97-98).

The Milli Görüş movement has been one of the most important oppositional forces against the influence of the Diyanet. It is considered a conservative movement strongly linked to the dominant religious party in Turkey, the Refah Party, which for the last two decades has been in conflict with the Turkish authorities over the future direction of Turkish Islam. The German authorities are very critical toward the activities of Milli Görüş organisations as they consider them to be fundamentalist (Lemmen 2002: 46; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 57). In the Netherlands, Milli Görüş has developed somewhat independently from political and religious influences from either Turkey or Germany. Especially the groups in Amsterdam and other northern cities in the Netherlands have been characterised as relatively open and modern religious associations. However, this movement has two sides. While the leadership is open for dialog with the authorities and expresses modern opinions on integration and religious matters, there is a large portion of the Milli Görüş constituency that is far less modern and relates more to the original conservative ideas of the movement (Den Exter & Hessels 2003, 7-8).

The Süleymanılar movement attempts to avoid being linked to Turkish politics and rejects the state’s control over Islam (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 56). The movement can be characterised as more spiritual and focuses on the teachings of the Koran and mystical gatherings in mosques. The Süleymanılar group was one of the first Turkish groups to establish religious organisations in Western Europe but they are now significantly smaller than the Diyanet or Milli Görüş movements in both the Netherlands and Germany (Lemmen, 2002: 49; Den Exter & Hessels 2003). In Berlin the Süleymanılar have never been as influential as the other two religious groups. A 1983 survey revealed that sixteen percent of the Turks in Berlin said that for them the Süleymanılar group represented Islam in Berlin (Blaschke 1985: 311-312).

Each of the movements has established a large number of organisations in both Amsterdam and Berlin. The general sequence detailing when the successive political and religious Turkish movements became active is similar for both cities: The first Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin were mainly left and right-wing organisations. The first religious organisations were affiliated with the Süleymanılar group. Then Milli Görüş organisations emerged, followed by the Diyanet organisations. In the late eighties many Kurdish groups were established and finally some Alevi organisations were founded. Within each movement additional organisations were set up for specific groups or activities, such as women’s and youth associations, sports organisations
(mainly soccer) and social-cultural organisations. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) notes that the landscape of Turkish political, ethnic and religious movements in the Netherlands and Germany is remarkably similar despite the apparent differences in their political opportunity structures.

Since both Turkish populations show similar group-related factors, we expect differences in the Turkish organising process to be explained by differences in the local opportunity structure of the two cities. A similar organisational pattern among the Turks in both cities would then indicate that the group-related factors are most influential for the Turkish organising process. The next section discusses the extent to which the local political opportunity structures in Amsterdam and Berlin are indeed different.

**Amsterdam and Berlin: two different opportunity structures**

The political opportunity structure model, as described in Chapter 2, explains collective action by looking at incentives in the political environment that motivate people to take action, and what it is that affects their expectations for success or failure (Tarrow 1998: 76-77; Koopmans & Statham 2000: 32). For immigrant organisations, the political environment refers to the receptivity of national and local authorities toward their demands. Authorities can display a receptive attitude toward immigrant groups by providing easy access to citizenship, offering financial support to immigrant organisations and including immigrant organisations in the policy-making process. Within this pluralistic approach a high degree of organisational activity is expected. The Netherlands is usually used as an example of this type of policy regime. In contrast, an unreceptive attitude toward immigrant groups is reflected in an absence of immigrant policy and a hostile or indifferent attitude toward immigrant organisations, as they represent an expression of unwanted immigrant culture. This approach is expected to have a negative effect on the organisational behaviour of immigrants. Germany is often used as an example of such an exclusive approach, as they deny (until very recently) immigrants and their descendants’ access to the political community by setting high standards for naturalization and have refused to provide financial support for their organisations (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 19; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001: 261).

In addition to these formal opportunity structures, informal opportunity structures also have a large effect on the incentives for people to take collective action. These informal structures relate to strategies of elite groups that have emerged historically to cope with political chal-
lengers and cultural diversity (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 34). The Netherlands and Germany also differ to a large extent in this informal domain. In the Netherlands we find a pillarised system, which will be discussed further, in which political elites attempt to incorporate the elites of marginal groups into the political system in order to decrease the chance of social upheaval. The German elites do not engage in these strategies of inclusion. New or marginal groups remain to a large extent on the periphery of the political system unless they succeed in gaining a position of power.

In Germany, more so than in the Netherlands, labour unions and churches play an important role in relation to immigrant organisations (Penninx & Schrover 2001: 9). They provide services that may lessen the need and demand for separate immigrant organisations. In Berlin, however, this is not the case and local authorities dominate issues related to immigration and integration (Blaschke 1996: 19; Schwarz 2001: 127). In this way Amsterdam and Berlin are similar: in both cities the local administration determines both the content and implementation of local integration policy.

The next section provides a more detailed description of the formal and informal opportunity structures for immigrant organisations and focuses especially on the development of the local opportunity structures in Amsterdam and Berlin. Organisational activity is a very specific form of collective action. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the basic resources for starting and developing any formal organisation are wealth, power and legitimacy. How have formal and informal opportunity structures affected these organisational resources? In terms of wealth, we are interested in the extent to which immigrant organisations are supported financially by authorities. In terms of power, we are interested in the access of immigrant organisations to the local political system. And in terms of legitimacy, we are interested in the manner in which authorities attempt to improve the perception that immigrant organisations are a desirable contribution to the host society. For instance, financially supporting immigrant organisations or including them in the political process improves their legitimacy.

The Dutch context: national and local integration policy in the Netherlands and Amsterdam, 1960-2000

The development of the Amsterdam opportunity structure cannot be fully understood without a description of the national situation. We start here by looking at the emergence of Dutch multicultural policy in the early eighties.

Dutch authorities in the sixties and early seventies initially tried to avoid implementing a specific policy for the growing immigrant popu-
lation. Some policies were developed concerning housing facilities and welfare arrangements for colonial migrants from Indonesia (Willems 2001) and the Caribbean, but on the whole Dutch minority policy can be characterised in this period as ambiguous and noncommittal. The result was that by 1980 the Netherlands had become an immigration country with a diversity of ethnic groups, but with little minority policy. Colonial migrants had a head start over guest workers; they held Dutch nationality and were more familiar with the Dutch language and culture. The Dutch authorities also approached colonial migrants far more inclusively than they did the guest workers (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 28-29).

The number of immigrants in Dutch society grew so fast that structural immigration and integration policy became inevitable. By the end of the 1970s, the authorities could no longer sustain the notion that the migrants would only be staying temporarily. In 1980 the Dutch government introduced a new policy that was more in keeping with the situation they were facing. It officially classified the main immigrant groups as ‘minority target groups’ whose socio-economic position in Dutch society needed improvement. The minority policy had two principal objectives: first, the social and economic conditions of immigrant groups in Dutch society were to be improved. This would require active public interventions in the labour market and the education system to ensure equal access for all groups. And secondly, the Netherlands was to become a tolerant, multicultural society where every immigrant culture would be accepted, respected and valued (Lucassen & Penninx 1994: 148).

In practice, the first objective, which is rooted in the idea of the welfare state, was to become the focal point of Dutch minority policy. The second objective, though, has been equally relevant for the attitude toward immigrant organisations in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam in particular. This objective has often been referred to as a way for immigrants to integrate into Dutch society while retaining their own cultural identity. Politicians argued that group-specific services would be needed to accomplish the establishment of a tolerant multicultural society. The basic idea was that organisations run by immigrants themselves provided sufficient opportunities to ‘maintain and develop their own ethnic immigrant culture and identity’ (Lucassen & Penninx 1994: 148). Even though policy remained vague on this point, and even though the second objective never received the same attention as that of equal opportunity in education and employment, migrant organisations found a new source of legitimacy in the changing minority policy of the 1980s.

In 1985 the authorities granted resident aliens the right to vote at the municipal level in a further attempt to integrate them into Dutch
society, this time not culturally or economically but politically (Tillie 2000). Such rather progressive measures to integrate migrants while strengthening their group structures can perhaps best be understood in terms of the traditional Dutch system of pillarisation (verzuiling). Originally developed to cope with the traditional Dutch religious minorities, pillarisation was based on the idea that each group should provide its own organisational services (hospitals, schools, newspapers, broadcasting networks, trade unions and voluntary associations). Cooperation existed mainly at elite levels (Lijphart 1968; Duyvendak 1997). The system of pillarisation largely collapsed during the 1960s and the 1983 revision of the Constitution terminated a number of financial commitments of the state toward churches (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meijer 1999). However, traces of pillarisation can still be found at almost every level of Dutch migration policy and these tend to reinforce group structures (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak 2004: 29). Especially if we look at the manner in which Islamic groups are treated by the Dutch authorities we see the on-going significance of the pillarisation structures.

Muslims can and have used legal structures that originated from the heyday of the period of pillarisation. Because of this specific context very few Islamic claims have been categorically denied by Dutch authorities (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk & Meijer, 1996: 242). The educational system is perhaps the best example of this inclusive Dutch informal structure. Every religion in the Netherlands, whether Christian or not, is entitled to establish their own school, which will be fully financed by the national government (Duyvené de Wit & Koopmans 2001). In 1989 the first Islamic school in the Netherlands was founded and by 2002 there were already thirty-five Islamic primary schools, illustrating the way the Muslim community indeed took advantage of this political opportunity structure (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy 2005). In Amsterdam there are currently ten Islamic primary schools. As immigrants are only allowed to establish schools in the Netherlands on the basis of their religion and not on their ethnicity these schools cannot be considered Turkish or Moroccan, nor are there schools that are primarily Surinamese. It remains unclear what percentage of the pupils in these Islamic schools are of Turkish descent although it is known that a significant number of Turkish children do attend them (DMO 2004).

In the 1990s Dutch integration policy entered a new phase. Politicians and the public were disappointed with the results of ten years of multicultural policy. The social and economic deprivation of immigrants seemed to have increased rather than declined, in spite of the fact that so much money and policy-making had been directed at changing this situation. Politicians argued that because of the higher unem-
ployment rates among immigrants more attention should be given to this and less to emancipation and cultural expression. The most important message of the new integration policy was therefore more emphasis on the participation of immigrants in the educational system and the labour market and less on cultural diversity. Government programmes became less multicultural and more integrative (Thránhardt 2000: 172). As a result of this shift in policy, the political opportunity structure for immigrant organisations, which are seen as an expression of immigrant culture, became less positive in the 1990s, although more informal opportunities, which were an extension of the system of pillarisation, remained intact.

Local policy toward Turkish organisations in Amsterdam

Local minority policy in Amsterdam broadly resembled national policy; the same development described on the national level can be seen in Amsterdam, with similar shifts at similar points in time (Musterd, Ostdorf & Breebaart 1998: 42). In the beginning of the eighties we see the emergence of local multicultural policy and in the beginning of the nineties the focus of the policy shifts from cultural diversity to social and economic integration. Since the pattern is similar we will focus in this section on specific Amsterdam characteristics and on the practical implications of the development of Amsterdam integration policy for the organisations of Turkish immigrants.

Until the end of the 1970s the settlement of guest worker groups in Amsterdam did not lead to the formulation of a specific local integration policy. Of course the authorities dealt with the social issues related to the growing guest worker communities in their city, but they saw the presence of these groups as temporary and it was therefore not necessary to formulate structural policy for them. All social and cultural services for Turks were provided by one large Dutch ethnic welfare organisation, which terminated its activities in 1980 due to internal strife. Turkish organisations had no structural position and no influence in the local political system (Platform 1982). By the end of the 1970s Amsterdam authorities changed their policy according to the policy shift taking place on the national level and revised their standpoint on Turkish organisations. Just as on the national level a multicultural policy was installed in 1980, primarily to increase the socio-economic position of immigrant groups in Amsterdam, but also in support of the immigrants’ cultural expression within their own community. All the main political parties backed this policy shift. Just as on the national level, issues related to minorities and integration were not at all politically contentious in the 1980s; in fact these issues were highly depoliticised (Berelving 1994: 99; De Beus 1998).
The new multicultural policy meant that from 1981 onward the different minority target groups (of which the Turks were one) became eligible for direct subsidies for establishing and developing their own organisations (Gemeenteblad 1985: 8). The city council envisaged three primary tasks for such organisations: to promote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituencies and to represent community interests (Raamnota 1989: 16). In principal, political or religious organisations were not entitled to subsidy funding, however the Amsterdam authorities insisted that all segments of the guest worker communities be included, so as not to isolate certain groups or associations. The authorities explicitly called upon religious organisations to found additional social-cultural organisations so that the city would be able to financially support these groups (Gemeenteblad 1985: 11-12). Focusing on the Turkish organisations, we see that a broad range of associations received subsidy. In the 1990 summary that reports on the six Turkish associations that were given structural financial support, the diverse approach of the Amsterdam authorities becomes visible: three left-wing Turkish associations, two conservative Turkish organisations and one Turkish Islamic centre received a yearly subsidy from city hall (Gemeenteblad 1989: 122). The Islamic Centre continued to receive a subsidy until 1997, which shows that the funding for religious organisations was indeed structural.

Left-wing Turkish associations reacted with frustration and resentment to this inclusive attitude of the Amsterdam government. It was for them proof that local authorities, which in Amsterdam were predominantly left-wing politicians, did not and never had taken them seriously as the official policy partners for the Turkish community in Amsterdam. The 1984 May Day celebration, for instance, ended in scuffles between leftist Turkish (and Moroccan) immigrants and leftist Dutch party activists, a sign of the prevailing tension and distrust between left-wing Turks and Dutch local politicians. Local politicians on the other hand complained that guest worker organisations showed no willingness to collaborate with local authorities, and that their plans were almost always guided by the desire for money.\(^1\)

The tension between the left-wing Turks and Dutch politicians went against the popularly held view that leftist Turks were the only ones who had access to local politicians in Amsterdam. It illustrates how the policy toward guest worker organisations in Amsterdam was indeed inclusive of all segments of the Turkish community. Still, there was support for Turkish organisations from groups outside of the local authority structure that did focus only on left-wing guest worker organisations. Social activists supported these organisations in the city with personal, financial and other resources in the 1970s (Van Twist 1978: 104-108). This kind of support was not available for the Turkish
religious organisations, which had to rely on their own resources. In effect, it was just a small and particular group of Turkish organisations that was able to take advantage of the fact that Amsterdam was a city full of organisations and action groups.

In 1985 the Amsterdam government decided to establish several minority advisory councils to advise the local authorities on new policies and to evaluate existing ones. The Council for the Turkish Community was established in 1986 and represented a broad range of Turkish organisations, left- and right-wing and religious (TDM 1992). One year earlier, four large Turkish federations had established a national Turkish Advisory Council (IOT), in which different political and religious Turkish movements collaborated on several issues. (IOT 1987; Van Zuthem 1994). The official status of these advisory councils improved the position of the appointed organisations and enhanced the sociopolitical legitimacy of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in general. It also resulted in a more structural collaboration between Turkish groups that were previously engaged in virulent struggles over funding, constituencies and influence, but which were now obliged to work together on many issues. Although the political influence of the Amsterdam Council for the Turkish Community was often questioned in local policy reports and the organisations never really cooperated harmoniously (Raamnota 1989: 48-49), to an extent it did strengthen the networks between Turkish organisations by getting them to work together. In addition, research on the development of Amsterdam minority policy in the nineties indicates that these advisory councils did play a role in the formulation of minority policy; at least their role was much bigger than that of any individual Turkish organisation (Raamnota 1989: 40; Berveling 1994: 279).

At the end of the 1980s Amsterdam followed in the shift that was taking place at the national level. After much delay and political pressure the Amsterdam government published the outline of the minority policy for the nineties in an elaborate report in 1989. The report stated that the policy effects of ten years of multiculturalism were disappointing; now more attention was to be given to the poor social economic position of most immigrant groups in the city (Raamnota 1989). The report did not fully renounce the role of immigrant organisations in the integration process, but during the nineties politicians became more and more dissatisfied with the part they played. After 1994 the multicultural policy with specific minority target groups was abandoned and immigrant organisations to a large extent lost their role in the policy system (Musterd et al. 1998: 41-42; Kraal 2001). The subsidy system also changed. Structural organisational subsidies were increasingly denied to immigrant organisations, and only certain activities were eligible for state subsidy. Although the policy shift in the nineties
did not immediately influence the amount of local state funding for Turkish organisations (as illustrated in Figure 4.4), it did change the other two basic resources for the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam: power and socio-political legitimacy. In 1999 local authorities officially changed their policy intentions toward immigrants from a minority policy to a policy of diversity. Within the diversity policy framework the focus is on social problems of the entire Amsterdam population and not just those of the target groups. The central aim of diversity policy is that all inhabitants of Amsterdam feel at home in their city and everyone has equal opportunity to participate in society (Kraal 2001: 23-24).

**Figure 4.4** Total amount of local state funding to Turkish organisations in Amsterdam, in guilders, 1974-1999

![Graph showing the amount of local state funding to Turkish organisations from 1974 to 1999](image)

Sources: Gemeenteblad 1983-99, HTIB archive; number 134, 334, 370-75, and author’s calculations

Figure 4.4 illustrates the amount of subsidy Turkish organisations received yearly from the local Amsterdam authorities. It shows the large increase in the early eighties and eventually a sharp decrease by the end of the nineties. The steady pattern between 1990 and 1998 is to some extent misleading. As mentioned, the conditions for receiving a subsidy changed significantly around this time. In addition, the average subsidy per year for all formal Turkish organisations decreased. In 1985 every Turkish organisation received an average of more than 1300 guilders a year. By 1990 this had decreased to 865 guilders a year; five years later it was only 497 guilders and in 1999 the average amount of subsidy for every Turkish organisation was just above 400 guilders a year (a decrease of almost seventy percent compared to 1985).

The German situation developed quite differently than that in the Netherlands. Germany is considered to have an exclusive integration regime. Immigrants in Germany are under more pressure to assimilate and adjust to the host society than those in the Netherlands, and they are in a much weaker position to demand certain cultural or religious rights (Duyvené de Wit & Koopmans 2001). Unlike in the Netherlands, federal policy in Germany does not make specific reference to immigrants as ‘minority groups’ or provide special collective provisions for them (Soysal 1994: 41). However, the federal German structure makes immigrant policy and its implementation different in each state. It is therefore less important to provide a description of the developments on the federal level. Rather, we will focus on the developments in Berlin and refer to the national level when needed.

Local integration policy in Berlin has been very ambiguous, mainly because it contains a mix of conservative and more multicultural elements. On the one hand, Berlin is known in Germany for its progressive stand toward immigrants and its inclusive attitude toward immigrant organisations. On the other hand, local politicians have used very restrictive measures to control the growth and integration of the immigrant population in their city. It is also fair to say that immigration has been a highly politicized topic in Berlin, especially in the 1980s, which makes it already very different from Amsterdam (Hunger & Thranhardt 2001: 111).

Berlin has formulated an integration policy since the early 1970s, when the number of Turkish guest workers in the city increased sharply. This early policy attempted to address the social problems among immigrant groups at that time (Schwarz 1992: 125-126). Increasing immigration into the city at the end of the seventies, as a consequence of both family reunion and a high number of asylum seekers, caused serious social problems in Berlin including segregation, racial violence, unemployment, and housing problems. The political significance of immigration and integration issues increased accordingly. It was clear that the cautious integration policy of the seventies was now totally inadequate; there were no political answers to the crisis Berlin faced in these years on immigration and integration issues (Schwarz 2001: 129-130).

The Christian Democrats (CDU) won the 1981 local elections proposing strongly restrictive and sometimes even xenophobic measures for the growing immigrant population in Berlin (Hunger & Thranhardt 2001: 109). After the election a new policy was introduced which was supposed to prevent a further increase in the immigrant population
and at the same time further the integration of those immigrants already living in Berlin. The slogan used to characterise the policy programme was ‘integration or departure’ (Schwarz 2001: 131), which is very different from the Amsterdam slogan ‘integration while retaining one’s ethnic identity’. The Berlin motto illustrates the two sides of integration policy in the eighties very well. On the one hand, there was an emphasis on restrictive measures to ensure a decreasing number of immigrants in the city and, on the other hand, there was a focus on a more integrative regime: to incorporate newcomers into the host society and not leave them behind. The restrictive side of the policy was formulated and implemented by several conservative CDU senators of whom Heinrich Lummer (1981-1986) is best known (Gesemann 2001: 16). The integrational aspect of the policy was to be implemented by a new bureaucratic institution, the Ausländerbeauftragte, established in 1981 by the new Christlich Demokratische Union / Freie Demokratische Partei CDU/FDP government.

The founder of the Ausländerbeauftragte was Barbara John, a moderate CDU politician, who served in her position for more than twenty years. She was definitely the main actor in the field of integration in Berlin throughout the eighties and nineties. There were several similarities between John’s policy and her institution and the policies in Amsterdam. The Ausländerbeauftragte policy emphasised naturalisation, very different from the German national policy. In 1981 a successful campaign was launched around naturalisation, focusing especially on second- and third-generation Turks. Naturalisation rates in Berlin are now much higher than in other German states (Böcker & Thranhardt 2003: 123). The second element in the Ausländerbeauftragte policy was the explicit support for immigrant organisations. This support was certainly not as straightforward and structural as in Amsterdam, but it has been very important for the development of Turkish organisations in Berlin.

From 1982 onward the Ausländerbeauftragte financially supported a wide range of immigrant organisations. Parallel to this, other social programmes and self-help voluntary groups were set up. Initially this support was intended for the numerous German left-wing action groups that existed in Berlin, however immigrant organisations were also eligible. Part of this support was meant for specific groups within the immigrant population, such as women’s and youth organisations (Blaschke 1996: 14). This system of different sources of financial support existed throughout the eighties and nineties and it is now virtually impossible to discover the precise subsidy amounts that Turkish organisations received in Berlin over the years. Using the available data, Marc Uiterwaal presents an educated guess of the subsidy amounts for Turkish organisations in Berlin for the period 1983-2000 (Uiterwaal
2004). He shows that, contrary to the idea that the total amount of support decreased substantially in the 1990s as the financial situation in Berlin worsened after Wiedervereinigung (reunification) (Blaschke 1996: 18; Gesemann 2001: 16), subsidies for Turkish organisations in Berlin show a rather stable pattern and even an increase in the early nineties. Figure 4.5 illustrates the average amount of subsidy for Turkish organisations for every Turkish immigrant in Amsterdam and Berlin. This allows us to compare the subsidies provided in the two cities. The figure illustrates that, relatively speaking, the Turks in Amsterdam received more subsidies for their organisations than in Berlin (per immigrant), although by the end of the nineties this difference is not as significant as before (illustrating again the negative impact of the new Amsterdam minority policy in the nineties on Turkish organisations). The figure further shows that the average subsidy for Turkish organisations per Turkish immigrant in Berlin shows a remarkably continuous pattern. This also would be the case if we would present the actual amounts of subsidy per year. In the eighties, the Ausländerbeauftragte remitted about 350,000 DM to Turkish organisations every year and in the nineties about 850,000 DM a year (Uiterwaal 2004: 20).

Figure 4.5 Local state funding to Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, per capita amount per Turkish immigrant for the period 1980-99, in euros

Comparing the subsidy policy for immigrant organisations in Berlin with Amsterdam we find some important differences. In Amsterdam the subsidy for Turkish and other immigrant organisations was integrated into the city’s minority policy. The municipal government stated
explicitly in their reports that Turkish organisations would be helpful
in the emancipation of the Turkish population and should therefore re-
ceive state money. In Berlin the integrational side of the Ausländer-
beauftragte and its accompanying support for Turkish organisations
was not completely structured into the local immigration policies. The
policy of the Ausländerbeauftragte was limited by both the exclusive in-
tegration approach at the federal level and by the restrictive measures
of the conservative wing of the local CDU (Gesemann 2001: 16). The
subsidy policy for Turkish organisations was therefore less straightfor-
ward in Berlin than in Amsterdam. For example, many organisations
that were financially supported within the framework of self-help
groups were, for instance, not genuine Turkish organisations, but
rather organisations for Turkish people (mostly with German board
members). The Ausländerbeauftragte did, however, financially support
several ethnic Turkish organisations. This was not so much a political
decision but a practical strategy to sustain the position of the Auslän-
derbeauftragte within the local political field. Since the political pres-
sure exerted by the more conservative wing of the CDU on the Auslän-
derbeauftragte was strong and the issue of integration was an unpopu-
lar theme in the CDU, Barbara John had to look for other groups
outside her party to secure the political position of her institution. Pro-
viding money for organisations would improve the relationship with
the immigrant communities, which in turn would ensure the political
legitimacy of the Ausländerbeauftragte over a longer period (Schwarz
2001: 133).

Turkish organisations in Berlin were thus not so much supported
for their activities but for pragmatic reasons. John stated that too many
Turkish organisations in the city would jeopardize the integration of
the Turkish population (Schwarz 2001: 135). The Ausländerbeauftragte
did not support the Turkish organising process as a whole (as was the
case in Amsterdam), but rather supported the major Turkish organisa-
tions, which offered best access to the Turkish community.

The third difference between the subsidy policy in the two cities is
that the subsidy for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam was most of-
ten structural and generally continued for a long period of time (only
in the second half of the nineties was more emphasis given to subsi-
dies for individual projects). In Berlin, subsidies were normally given
to individual projects; structural financial support to Turkish organisa-
tions has been rare.

To complete the comparison between the Amsterdam and Berlin po-
licies we look briefly at the position of Turkish religious organisations
in Berlin. The political environment for these organisations is very
much influenced by the ambiguous status of Islam in Germany. Since
Islam is not recognised as an official religion in Germany it is very dif-
ficult for Turkish religious organisations to participate in the local political system of Berlin. Unlike Amsterdam where Islamic organisations have received subsidies and have participated on advisory councils, Turkish Islamic organisations in Berlin are basically ignored as partners by local authorities, receive no financial support and have no official contact with politicians. The financial support given to religious Turkish organisations in Amsterdam would be unthinkable in the German and Berlin context (Gesemann & Kapphan 2001: 412-413).

Islamic education is a highly debated topic in Berlin, not only among German politicians but also among Turkish organisations themselves. The debate focuses on which religious organisation or movement should be regarded as the legitimate voice for Turkish Islam in Berlin (Ausländerbeauftragte 1998: 18). Since the local authorities in Berlin avoid contact with Islamic organisations, the establishment and development of Turkish religious organisations is mostly influenced by the Turkish immigrant community itself or by sources outside Germany, such as in Turkey.

This section has described the fundamentally different political opportunity structures for Turkish immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The next compares the number and types of Turkish organisations in both cities to see whether we can assess what influence the political opportunity structure has had. We start with the number of Turkish organisations that have existed over the years. After that, the types of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin are considered.

The number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin

The following figure displays the organisational activity of Turkish immigrants in both cities between 1970 and 2000, showing the relative total number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin.

The value of the opportunity model is immediately revealed by this figure. The implementation of multicultural policy in Amsterdam in the beginning of the eighties seems especially to have had a strong effect on the organisational activities of Turks in Amsterdam. The figure further shows that relatively few organisations were founded in the seventies, although it is also clear that the seventies marks the beginning of the Turkish organising process in both cities: after 1974 there is a significant increase in the relative number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. Until 1980 the patterns in both cities are almost identical, indicating that group-related factors were most important in this period. In the early eighties the Turkish organisational ac-
Activity in Amsterdam takes a sudden turn and the patterns quickly diverge. The implementation of multicultural policy in Amsterdam clearly increased Turkish organisational activities in the city, as expected by the political opportunity model. The number of available Turkish organisations increases from 0.96 in 1980 to 2.57 in 1986; hereafter the pattern becomes stable for a few years until 1990 when the number starts to increase again, to 3.5 in 1993 and to 3.9 in 1996.

The largest increase in the relative total number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam is in the beginning of the 1980s, parallel to the emergence of Dutch minority policy and the introduction of structural subsidies for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam (1983). Interestingly enough, the second half of the eighties does not show such impressive growth, although two important policy measures were taken around 1985 (granting of local voting rights and the establishment of a Turkish advisory council). These measures enhanced the legitimacy and the power of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam, but apparently these increasing external resources were not used to increase the organisational activities among Turks in Amsterdam. The policy shift in the second half of the 1990s, affecting the local opportunity structure for Turkish organisations negatively, does not have the expected negative effect on the number of Turkish organisations in the city. The relative total number increases until 1998 and seems to stabilize afterwards.

Figure 4.6  *Number of ethnic organisations per 1000 Turks in Berlin and Amsterdam, 1970-2000*®

Sources: Dutch National Archive; Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Chamber of Associations; Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics (O+S) and Statistisches Landesamt Berlin
The difference between Amsterdam and Berlin is impressive and evolves rapidly. In 1980, before the introduction of Dutch minority policy, both cities had a similar relative number of Turkish organisations. Five years later there are two and a half times more Turkish organisations in Amsterdam than in Berlin and by 1995 this has increased to four times. In the eighties an average of more than six new associations a year is registered in Amsterdam (the average of 13.4 new formal Turkish organisations a year for the period 1990-1996 is even higher). In the 1990s the Turks in Amsterdam each year establish more new organisations than the Turks in Berlin, although the Turkish population in Amsterdam is around four times smaller.1

Despite the large difference between the cities we can also see some opportunity structure effects in Berlin, as the establishment of the Ausländerbeauftragte did affect the number of Turkish organisations there. The number steadily increases in the first half of the eighties to almost one Turkish organisation for every thousand Turks in 1986.

The political opportunity model seems to have a high explanatory value for the development of the total number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. However, there are some developments that are less expected, mainly the slower increase in the number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in the second half of the eighties and the increasing number of organisations in the first half of the nineties (when the local opportunity structure in Amsterdam took a negative turn for immigrant organisations). The next figure (showing the founding rates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin) illustrates that ecological forces play a role in explaining this pattern.

Figure 4.7 displays the number of newly founded Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin between 1960 and 2000. It shows that the largest increase in the founding rates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam does not occur in the early eighties (when the implementation of Dutch multicultural policy opened the political opportunity structure for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam), but in the early nineties. In fact between 1990 and 1995, eighty-one formal Turkish organisations registered with the Chamber of Commerce, which is forty-three percent of all Turkish organisations that were established between 1970 and 2000. It seems that the increasing density in the Turkish organisational population (in combination with positive environmental circumstances of the eighties) raised the Turkish founding rates year by year until the carrying capacity was reached. The Turkish pattern in Amsterdam shows the upside down U-shape as predicted by the ecological model. In the middle of the nineties the Turkish organisational population in Amsterdam reached its carrying capacity, after which founding rates strongly decreased probably due to the heightened competition.
In Berlin the upside down U-shape does not occur. Here the founding rates do not appear to be a function of the total number of Turkish organisations (density). The pattern shows three peak years (1978, 1986 and 1995). Group-related factors are most important in explaining the pattern of the number of newly founded Turkish organisations in this city. As the size of the Turkish group in Berlin grew extensively in the period 1973-1979 (Figure 4.1) the demand for Turkish formal organisations in Berlin strongly increased. Turkish organisers increased their organisational activities to fulfil this demand, which resulted in the first peak around 1978. The second peak is almost completely caused by the establishment of many new Turkish Islamic organisations. As the establishment of an Islamic organisational structure was in full swing in these days (described in the next chapter), the main Islamic denominations founded a high number of new local associations and mosques around 1986. The third peak consists mainly of secular organisations. The emergence of two large umbrella organisations in Berlin in the early nineties changed the Turkish organisational field. Around these two umbrella organisations many new Turkish organisations emerged (also described in the next chapter), which explains the high number of new Turkish organisations around 1995 (together with the increasing organisational activities of Kurds and Alevi in Berlin in this period).

The large difference between the number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin is mainly explained by the different local po-
litical opportunity structures. If we include the founding rates in the analysis, it appears that ecological factors (in Amsterdam) and group-related factors (in Berlin) have also exerted an influence. The next section compares the types of Turkish activities in the two cities. We will see that the picture is reversed from that described above. Group-related and ecological factors are most important here, and the different political opportunity structures in each of the cities has much less influence on the emergence and persistence of the types of activities that Turkish organisers provide.

The activities or types of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1970-2000

Immigrant groups vary in their social organisation. The types of organisational activities often differ from one immigrant group to another and the distribution of types varies over time. Religious, educational, political, sociocultural and welfare activities are all examples of the extended assortment of immigrant organisations. As the population of organisations becomes more differentiated, the immigrant group shows a higher degree of institutional completeness (Breton 1964). Before presenting the comparison of types of Turkish organisations in both cities we first summarize the expectations that follow from the three models we are using on the emergence and development of types of Turkish organisations.

The political opportunity structure model would expect that, since external resources, especially for religious immigrant organisations, are more available in Amsterdam than in Berlin, we would see a higher percentage of religious activities in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In addition, it expects that the percentage of social-cultural organisations is higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin, given that the Amsterdam authorities advised Islamic organisations to set up such organisations in order to provide subsidies for Islamic organisations. Thirdly, the POS model would expect more interest representation among Turks in Amsterdam than in Berlin. Koopmans (2004) shows that immigrants are more engaged in demanding equal rights if the opportunity structure is profitable for them.

The immigration model expects to see several different developments. First, the model indicates general changes in the demand for types of immigrant organisations as the immigration process evolves (Kwong 1984; Minghuan 1999; Kasinitz 1992; Jones-Correa 1998; Penninx & Schrover 2001). Not surprisingly, the first organisations that emerge are closely related to homeland matters. The foundation of these associations reflects the strong emotional ties that most immi-
grants still have with their country of origin during the first phase of
the settlement process. The organisations founded in this phase are
closely related to the specific organisational demands of immigrant
groups (religious, interest, social-cultural), and group-related factors
are most influential in this period. In the next stage of the settlement
process the composition of the immigrant community changes, and
the older organisations no longer represent the community’s organisa-
tional demands. New organisations are established to fulfil these chan-
ging needs. In general these organisations are much less focused on
the country of origin and more on the problems and needs of immi-
grants in the host society. Closely related to this change is often the
emergence of the second generation, whose demands are more often
focused on a better social position in the host society (Sunier 1996).

The precise effect of this process on the distribution of organisational
activities is not entirely clear. We might expect a decrease in the
percentage of organisational activities directly related to the country of
origin (for instance supporting a local school or hospital, or specific
groups such as children, or disappearing cultural traditions). Or we
might expect a decrease in the percentage of cultural activities, since
they preserve the culture and customs of the immigrant population
and are less focused on the position of (second generation) immi-
grants, especially the second generation, in the host society. The most
significant expectation is that there will be a clear shift in the activities
as soon as the character of the immigrant population changes. For the
Turkish population in Amsterdam and Berlin this shift would be ex-
pected in the nineties as the second-generation Turks become old en-
ough to be involved in organisational activities and the immigrants be-
come more settled in the host society.

Secondly, the immigration literature expects to see a process of dif-
ferentiation over time. As the settlement process evolves more different
types of organisational activities are offered. As the size of the immi-
grant population grows, the differences within the immigrant group
also increase. A small-sized immigrant group does not have enough
members or resources to establish many different types of organisational
activities. Larger immigrant populations are able to sustain dif-
ferent fractions within the immigrant community and reach for a more
institutionally complete status. A number of small-sized specialised or-
ganisations will emerge (Kasinitz 1992: 118-19). Instead of one organi-
sation that symbolically reflects the whole immigrant community,
many different types of organisations are founded, reflecting its frag-

The ecology model predicts a strong continuation of organisational
activities over time. Stinchcombe (1965: 153) argues that organisational
types have a history and that this history determines the future struc-
ture of the organisational field. In the founding phase of any new organisational form, the structure is determined by the available organisational resources at that time. As soon as the organisational structure is established, change no longer occurs so easily. Organisational ecologists have explained this path dependency by referring to the process of legitimisation and the visibility of early organisational activities. In the founding phase, organisers are looking for successful forms of activities. The more numerous specific organisational activities are (and therefore the more common), the more these types of organisations will be accepted as legitimate means of organising by the organisers themselves and by others. Others will copy these successful activities, which results in a continuation of the organisational structure of the form in later phases. Once the structure of the organisational field is established, external forces (such as changes in the political environment, or shifts in the demographic structure of the immigrant population) are less consequential for the development of the organisational form, simply because legitimacy already exists. In other words, the density of the organisational activity protects organisers (and the overall structure) from external shifts (Minkoff 1995: 123-124). This is why the founding phase of an organisational type is so important. In terms of the Turkish organising process it predicts that once the Turks have established their legitimate activities, others (for instance, the second generation) will follow in this tradition. It also predicts that since Turkish movements are so important in establishing the first Turkish immigrant organisations (as described in the previous chapter) these movements will determine the Turkish organising process for a long time.

Table 4.1 illustrates the organisational activities of Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s by showing the distribution of the main activities of those organisations that existed in the respective decades. Table 4.1 reveals two interesting features. First, the differences between Amsterdam and Berlin are much less pronounced than we have seen with regard to the number of Turkish organisations. Comparing the total distribution in both cities reveals a rather similar picture, in which the percentages of the different types of activities are to a large extent comparable. This similarity indicates a strong influence of group-related factors, as the groups are similar in this divergent comparison and the place of settlement is different. Second, the strong continuation in both cities over time supports the ecological point of view concerning the development of types of activities.

Although there are some interesting (but relatively small) differences between the cities (which will be discussed later) the overall picture reveals more similarities than differences, especially if we compare this result with the huge difference in the number of Turkish organisations.
in both cities. The total distribution of the activities in Amsterdam and Berlin is fairly comparable: interest representation, religion, sociocultural and cultural activities are the main and most legitimate activities for Turkish organisations, and they appear in similar numbers in both cities (even the number of Kurdish organisations is comparable). The overlap between the cities suggests that there is a general demand for specific organisational activities, and it appears to be independent from the host society and its opportunity structure. Group-related factors determine this organisational demand, which is especially strong in the first phase of the Turkish organising process.

The less important types of Turkish organisational activities are also the same in both cities. Very few organisations are explicitly established to support projects in Turkey (type: country of origin). This is not to say that the focus of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin is not directed towards their country of origin since most Turkish organisations in both cities do have direct links with organisations and movements in Turkey, as described earlier. However, as these links also appear to be independent from the opportunity structure in the host society, the similarity between the two cities remains. Other less frequent forms of Turkish organisational activities appear in similar numbers in Amsterdam and Berlin (organisations for women, educational activities or media initiatives).

### Table 4.1 Percentage distributions of Turkish immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin by the activities of the organisations, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Amsterdam %</th>
<th>Berlin %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest representation</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocultural</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>142.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N. of associations = 189 7 69 174 231 58 140 204

Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Chamber of Associations
There are four types in which some differences can be found. These tend to follow the predicted opportunity structure pattern. The larger percentage of sociocultural activities in Amsterdam, for instance, is most likely directly related to the local minority policy (although the difference between the cities is the largest in the 1990s, even though the policy to support sociocultural organisations, including religious ones, was introduced in 1985 and diminished during the 1990s. The larger percentage of interest representation in Amsterdam in the 1980s can also be explained by the positive political opportunity structure in Amsterdam. The higher percentage of welfare organisations in Berlin relates to the fact that Turkish Islamic organisations in Berlin often explicitly mention welfare activities in their mission statement, whereas the Turkish Islamic organisations in Amsterdam also provide these activities but do not present this as one of their main organisational activities. Lastly, the very high percentage of cultural activities in Berlin (the most available Turkish organisational activity in Berlin) reflects the fact that Berlin is considered the cultural capital of Turks outside Turkey (Gitmez & Wilpert 1987: 111). Since the beginning of the seventies Berlin has attracted many successful Turkish artists, resulting in a wide variety of cultural expression, such as literature, theatre, music and painting (Greve & Çinar 1998: 51-57).

The development of the distribution of Turkish organisational activities over time also delivers clear results. The patterns found in both cities support both the differentiation thesis and the ecological expectations. The general rule that a growing community generates a more differentiated organisational structure appears to hold true for the development of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The first Turkish organisations in both cities mainly functioned as a safe haven for the first-generation Turkish guest workers (De Graaf 1985; Abadan-Unat 1997). As soon as the Turkish population in Amsterdam began growing during the seventies and early eighties, a wider variety of organisational activities emerged offering more diverse activities for more target groups. Since the Turkish population in Berlin in the seventies was much larger than in Amsterdam, the process of differentiation had already started there (however, if we were to go back to the sixties we would see similar development). In addition, we see that the distribution in Berlin becomes more equally divided among the different types in the eighties, which indicates that the process of differentiation was continuing.

Once the process of differentiation is completed and the structure of the Turkish organisational activities is established, things appear not to change so easily. In Amsterdam the Turkish organisational structure basically emerges in the eighties, and in Berlin we see the contours of
the structure take its form in the seventies. As soon as the most successful (and therefore legitimate) types of Turkish organisations are established (interest representation, religion, sociocultural and cultural activities) the distribution of activities remains strikingly similar (except perhaps for the Kurdish organisations, but these emerge in both cities only in the late eighties). The continuation in Turkish organisational activities is not a result of the fact that there are relatively few new Turkish organisations in the nineties (which would also result in a continuation of the distribution) but that the founding and decreasing rates of Turkish organisations are high in both cities (in Amsterdam 118 new Turkish organisations and in Berlin eighty-three new Turkish organisations are established in the nineties). The fact that this does not affect the overall distribution structure of the Turkish organisations shows that new organisations follow in the footsteps of their predecessors. Newcomers copy legitimate and successful organisational activities.

Interestingly, the shifting demographic composition of the Turkish population in the eighties and the emergence of the Turkish second generation has no visible effect on the distribution of types of activities. The settlement process apparently does not influence the overall supply of Turkish organisational activities (there is also no expected decrease of certain types of activities). Of course new organisations for women and second-generation Turks do emerge, but they have adjusted to the existing structure. Additional data support this argument. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of women on the boards of Turkish organisations in Berlin and the percentage of second-generation Turks on the boards of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam. Both groups constitute just a small percentage of the boards of Turkish organisations (14.1 and 13.6 percent, respectively), illustrating that Turkish organisations are primarily led by older males.

Table 4.2 All women and second-generation board members of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin between 1960 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage of all Turkish board members</th>
<th>Percentage of organisations in which active</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Chamber of Associations

However, if we take the number of organisations into account in which Turkish women in Berlin and second-generation Turks in Amsterdam have been active, a different picture emerges. Turkish women have
been a board member in 103 different Turkish organisations in Berlin, which is forty-three percent of the total number of Turkish organisations. Second-generation Turks in Amsterdam have been on the board of eighty-six different Turkish organisations (or forty-five percent of all Turkish organisations). Both groups have apparently been involved in a much larger number of organisations than we would expect, considering their share in the total number of Turkish board members. This means that a relatively high number of Turkish boards have included one woman and one member of the second generation. By doing so, they have tried to incorporate both groups into the existing structure of their organisations.

Summary

It appears that the three main factors (opportunity structure of the host society, group-related factors and ecological factors) all have a significant influence on the development of elements of the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin, but that their influence changes over time since they are most powerful in different stages of the Turkish organising process. In addition, the explanatory factors have a different influence on the two elements of the Turkish organising process that are the subject of this chapter: the number and types of Turkish organisations.

In the first phase of the Turkish organising process, group-related factors are responsible for the emergence of a demand for separate Turkish immigrant organisations. The number and types of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin are fairly similar in this period. The overlap in the distribution of types of Turkish organisations between the cities suggests that there is a general demand for specific organisational activities. This demand appears to be independent from the host society and its opportunity structure and emerges because of group-related factors. All three main elements in the group-related factors are influential in creating an organisational demand in this period (the influence from the country of origin, character of the Turkish group and the immigration process).

In the second phase of the Turkish organising process the political opportunity structure in the host society begins to influence the number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The description of the different local minority policies in Amsterdam and Berlin illustrates a significant difference in the opportunity structure for Turkish organisations in both cities. Although Turkish organisations in Berlin did receive support from the local authorities, Turks in Amsterdam had more external resources than in Berlin. The introduction of Dutch
multicultural policy caused a significant shift in the political opportunity structure for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam. Turkish organisations in Berlin, on the other hand, often found themselves in a more hostile environment. German authorities heavily contested the establishment of Islamic primary schools. Political Turkish organisations were distrusted by the German authorities and were banned several times. The different opportunity structures in Amsterdam and Berlin had the expected effect on the number of formal Turkish organisations in both cities. As soon as the minority policy was introduced in Amsterdam the number of Turkish organisations in that city increased substantially, whereas the relative number in Berlin increased only slightly in the same period. However, the different political opportunity structures did not have a significant influence on the other important element of the Turkish organising process: the distribution in types of Turkish organisations.

Ecological forces also began to influence the Turkish organising process in this second period, although compared to the other factors the impact of the ecological factors is not very visible yet. Nevertheless, the increasing founding rates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in the eighties appear to be a function of the growing total number of Turkish organisations in that city (increasing density). The increasing legitimacy of the organisational population lowers the cost of founding new Turkish organisations, which means more and more new Turkish organisations in Amsterdam, as expected by the ecology model.

The third phase of the Turkish organising process in both cities is dominated by ecological forces, both in terms of number and types of Turkish organisations. The relative total number of Turkish organisations in both cities reached its highpoint in the nineties and remained stable afterwards. Shifts in the local political opportunity structure did not have any effect on this pattern. Group-related factors also lost their influence to a large extent. The only significant influence of these group-related factors in this third phase was accounted for by the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in the early nineties, which increased founding rates especially in Amsterdam (we will return to this in the next chapter). However, the fact that the demographic character of the Turkish group in both cities changed slowly (more women and the emergence of the second generation) did not significantly influence the relative number of Turkish organisations in either Amsterdam or Berlin.

In terms of types of Turkish organisations, the ecological forces were even stronger. Just as predicted by the ecology model the distribution in types of Turkish organisations showed a remarkably continuous pattern in the eighties and nineties (although the founding and dissolving rates of Turkish organisations were high in these decades). The density of the organisational activity protected Turkish organisers and the over-
all structure of the Turkish organisational population from external shifts, whether related to the immigrant group or the opportunity structure in the host society, which also explains why the founding phase of the Turkish organisational type is so important (the structure of the population is established in this period and does not change easily afterwards). The shifting sex ratio of the Turkish group and the emergence of the second generation had no visible effect on the distribution of types of activities, contrary to the expectation of the immigration literature.

The next chapter looks at how the different explanatory factors have influenced the emergence, persistence and development of Turkish inter-organisational relationships in Amsterdam and Berlin.
5 Interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1970-2000

Introduction

The previous chapter describes the number and types of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin between 1960 and 2000. The different local opportunity structures significantly affected the total number of Turkish organisations, as predicted by the political opportunity structure model. Turks in Amsterdam increased their organisational activities as soon as the external opportunities for ethnic organisations improved because of the introduction of Dutch minority policy in the early eighties. In terms of types of Turkish organisations the situations in Amsterdam and Berlin appear to have been comparable. Group-related and ecological factors appear to be more important in this regard. Group-related factors generated a general demand for certain types of Turkish organisations, which determined the first phase of the Turkish organising process in both cities. Subsequently, ecological forces became stronger and protected the Turkish organisational population from external changes.

This chapter looks at a different aspect of the Turkish organising process: the interorganisational relationships between the Turkish associations. The aim in this chapter is twofold. The first objective is to assess the influence of the three explanatory factors (group-related, political opportunity and ecological dynamics) on the emergence and development of these interorganisational relationships (which is one of the basic characteristics of the immigrant organising process as described in Chapter 1). Interorganisational relationships among immigrant organisations provide an indication of the extent to which these organisations are able to join forces. Strong competition can jeopardize the efficacy of Turkish organisations: it makes the immigrant group itself less powerful. In order to enhance the influence of their organisations, organisational leaders need to collaborate to create a stronger and more powerful organisational structure. When they succeed in doing so, the Turkish organisers are better able to represent the interests of their members and of the Turkish community in general. It also allows them to increase the overall sociopolitical legitimacy of the population of Turkish organisations.
The second objective of this chapter is to make better sense of some of the more important mechanisms related to the Turkish organising process. As explained in Chapter 3 interorganisational relationships are the engine for an expanding organisational population. They provide new organisations with the necessary resources and allow legitimate activities to be used by other organisations than just the most powerful ones. In addition resources can be exchanged, successful routines can be transferred, communication networks are established and trust may spread throughout the organisational population. By looking at Turkish interorganisational relationships we gain important information about these crucial mechanisms. It also allows for a comparison of the main mechanisms present within the Turkish organisational population in Amsterdam and Berlin.

The Chamber of Commerce/Associations data provides interesting research possibilities to analyse interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations. The key in this analysis is the overlapping board membership, which occurs when a person affiliated with one Turkish organisation also sits on the board of another organisation at the same time. He or she creates thereby a link between the two organisations. By focusing on these interorganisational links, we can map and analyse the network of formal relations between Turkish organisations in both cities and we can see how these relations have evolved over time. It also allows for a study on the behaviour of the local Turkish organisers, since we can see to what extent organisational leaders were active in establishing connections between Turkish organisations and how these connections caused the emergence of new Turkish organisations. We have gathered the names of all Turkish board members in Amsterdam and Berlin for the period 1960-2000, which enables us to look at overlapping board memberships at different points in time. The research on overlapping board membership, also known as interlocking directorates, is a method often used to study interorganisational relationships and elite networks (Mizruchi 1996; Fennema & Tillie 2001; Fennema 2004). However for the study of interorganisational relationships of immigrant organisations over time this type of analysis has not been extensively used. It is therefore important to explain the method carefully and elaborate on how we intend to approach the analysis of interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations in this study.

Interorganisational relationships between immigrant organisations also play an important role in the discussion of whether immigrant organisations are a boon or a bane for the integration process of immigrant groups in a host society. The internal linkages of immigrant organisations are often seen as an indicator of the degree to which the
immigrant group is open or closed towards the host society. A high number of interorganisational relationships between immigrant organisations would hinder the integration of the immigrant group, because it stimulates the organisations to be focused on their own community and not on the host society. On the other hand, scholars have argued that interorganisational relationships can promote social and political trust among groups, which leads to a more civic community (Putnam 1993; Fennema & Tillie 2001; Fennema 2004). In this view internal organisational linkages are essential in transferring social trust from one organisation to the other and eventually throughout the entire community. Emphasis is given to the horizontal interorganisational relationships (as opposed to the vertical hierarchical relationships), which are the most productive links in producing a civic community. This generates more civic-minded people, which will be more inclined to political participation in the host society (and therefore more politically integrated into the host society).

The discussion on the integrational element of immigrant organisations is beyond the scope of this study. The two other dissertations within the general research project (of which this study is a part) deal explicitly with the complicated relationship between immigrant organisations and the political and social integration process of immigrants in a host society (Berger forthcoming; Slijper forthcoming). This study will not use the analysis of Turkish interorganisational relationships as a way to measure or explain forms of integration. However, some of the results of this chapter can be used for this discussion. The analysis in this chapter provides long-term data on the number of Turkish interorganisational relationships, the influence of the host society on these interorganisational relationships and the percentages of isolated Turkish organisations. This chapter also deals with the type of interorganisational relationships (horizontal or vertical). In other words, we will not take up which Turkish population is best integrated into the host society (the Turks in Amsterdam or the Turks in Berlin), but the data presented in this chapter provides empirical data to further develop such a discussion.

Two different types of analysis: synchronic and longitudinal network analysis

The Chamber of Commerce/Associations data enables us to conduct two different types of analysis on overlapping board membership. We can analyse the development of interorganisational relationships at different points in time using a network analysis of all active board members in several succeeding years (a synchronic analysis) or we can con-
duct a longitudinal network analysis. Longitudinal interlocking directorates occur when a person is active on the board of more than one voluntary organisation over a longer period than just one year. The person does not necessarily need to be active in more than one organisation at the same time, but can be active in different organisations one after another within a certain period of time (five years, a decade, thirty years).

An example of a longitudinal network analysis can be found in the work of Rosenthal et al. (1985). They have analysed the organisational affiliations of nineteenth-century women reform leaders in New York State as a case study of historical relations among social movement organisations. They apply a longitudinal network analysis to map the interconnection between women’s organisations and to measure the intensity and direction of those interrelations. With this method they are able to identify groups and organisations that are central to the population of women’s organisations in the United States in the nineteenth century. Several other researchers have also studied longitudinal interlocks but from a different angle, as they were interested in the reconstruction of so-called broken-ties. Broken-tie studies are based on the assumption that if an interlock is significant to an organisation (mainly business organisations) it will most likely be reconstructed if the interlock is accidentally disrupted (for example, if the person that constructs the interlock retires) (Mizruchi & Stearns 1988: 195). In order to conduct a broken-tie study the interlocks between organisations have to be analysed over a longer period, similar to a longitudinal network analysis.

In this study we use the longitudinal analysis as a method to identify the nature of Turkish interorganisational relationships and to reveal the reasons why these links exist. Longitudinal network analyses provide a subtler picture of the Turkish interorganisational relationships, as they reveal links between organisations that are often difficult to detect. Consider for instance a person who sits on the board of a Grey Wolves organisation in Amsterdam for the period 1988 until 1996. This same person founds a new organisation in 1997. Most likely these two organisations have something in common. They probably have the same ideology and the founder uses the experience gained in the previous organisations to set up a new organisation. The link between the organisations would be lost if we would use a standard network analysis for only one year (for example 1995 or 2000) since the person has never been a member of the two organisations at the same time. If we look at the longitudinal interlocks of this person for the entire 1990s the link between the two organisations appears. Since formal links between Turkish organisations are fragile and have a high turnover rate, a longitudinal network analysis brings more continuity into the picture,
allowing us to see the underlying relationships between Turkish organisations (and the behaviour of the local Turkish active organisers) more clearly.

One of the disadvantages of focusing on longitudinal interlocking directorates is that it can provide interlocks between organisations that are mainly coincidental. If for instance a person sits on the board of a certain Turkish organisation in Berlin between 1976 and 1981 and is also a board member of another Turkish organisation in Berlin between 1989 and 1991, a longitudinal network analysis will display a longitudinal interlocking directorate between these two organisations for the eighties. It is however possible that this person has completely changed his or her ideology between 1981 and 1989. The presumed interlock can in that case not be considered as a genuine ideological interorganisational relationship. However, the person does transfer skills and knowledge to the second organisation that he or she has gained in the previous organisation (so the interlock is not without meaning).

Aligned and strategic Turkish interorganisational relationships

Interconnected organisations can be natural partners (for instance a left-wing Turkish interest organisation and a left-wing Turkish women’s organisation) in which case the interlock is not surprising but still provides important information (the link can be part of a left-wing communication network, or it can provide an exchange of resources for a left-wing organisation that has just been established, etc.). On the other hand, the connected organisations can also be competitors or opponents, which creates a different meaning to the interlock. We define the first type of interlock as an aligned interlocking directorate and the second type as a strategic interlocking directorate. To be able to determine the type of interlock we need information on the ideological background of the Turkish organisations. We use the political and religious movements described in the previous chapter as a means to determine the type of the Turkish interlocks. For instance, an interlock between a Diyanet and a Milli Görüş organisation is considered a strategic religious interlock, as both organisations belong to a different ideological denomination. Strategic interlocks are expected in times of uncertainty (for instance when the sociopolitical legitimacy of the Turkish organisational population needs to increase). Consider, for instance, the Amsterdam policy that stimulated and initiated Turkish interorganisational relationships and communication networks by establishing advisory councils. We expect that because of this policy the different Turkish ideological movements are more connected in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In Berlin we expect to see more isolated organisations as the resources are scarcer and the authorities have been more repressive to-
ward extreme Turkish organisations (because of which certain organisations may refrain from establishing formal links with other aligned organisations).

Before the networks of Turkish interlocking directorates in Amsterdam and Berlin are presented, we need first some theoretical reflection on the emergence and persistence of interlocking directorates in general. What can we expect from the description of Turkish interlocks? To what extent have the ecological and political opportunity models formulated hypotheses for this type of research? Unfortunately these theoretical models have not focused extensively on the emergence and persistence of interlocking directorates. Both models have been less occupied with the question of overlapping board membership than with the number and type of organisations. However, if we consider overlapping board membership as itself a form of formal interorganisational relationship, we can distil a few significant premises from the literature.

The emergence and development of overlapping board membership according to the political opportunity and ecological models

The political opportunity model

As mentioned in Chapter 3 political opportunity theorists emphasise the importance of interorganisational relationships. These relationships function as a communication network to mobilise the constituency or as a way for social movement organisations to be connected with more influential elite institutions (McAdam 1982: 46-47; 54-56). The political opportunity model considers the degree of organisation, including the number of interorganisational relationships, as one of the primary determinants of any group’s mobilisation. This means that groups that have an extended connected organisational structure are more inclined to collective action than unorganised groups. However, the question why some groups have a more connected organisational structure than others has received less attention. Nevertheless, the existing literature does offer some insights into the manner in which the local institutional opportunity structure can influence the development of interorganisational relationships. Here we are primarily interested in the possible consequences of the different opportunity structures in Amsterdam and Berlin, as described in the previous chapter. In other words, to what extent has the more positive Amsterdam opportunity structure had a negative or positive influence on the number and type of Turkish interorganisational relationships?
When organisations exist within a positive environment, as is the case for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam (compared to the situation in Berlin), a larger number of interorganisational relationships can be expected. As resources are more available (in terms of money and legitimacy) organisations are better able and more inclined to express their ideological distinctiveness and look for formal collaboration with similar organisations (Knoke 1990: 79). If the opportunity structure is more closed, organisations will be more hesitant to express their ideology and remain, at least on the formal level, independent or isolated. In terms of the number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin, this would mean more Turkish overlapping board memberships in Amsterdam (between organisations from the same political or religious movement) than in Berlin.

There are more reasons why we would expect the positive opportunity structure in Amsterdam to have an encouraging influence on the number of Turkish interlocks. The Dutch political system of pillarisation has always stimulated interlocking directorates among the political elite and civil society (Lijphart 1968). In other words, in the Dutch context it makes sense to establish a formal elite network in order to adapt to the Dutch political system. There is also a more direct influence to be expected from the Amsterdam policy on Turkish interlocks. The establishment of immigrant advisory councils has practically forced Turkish organisations to collaborate and to establish formal contacts. This could have stimulated the number and type of Turkish interorganisational relationships in this city. In addition, providing state subsidy for immigrant organisations will in itself influence the emergence of interlocks. Subsidised organisations attract other organisations seeking their collaboration in order to increase their own resources. This results in an increasing number of interlocks and simultaneously in a centralised network (Tillie & Fennema 1998: 234). Figure 5.1 illustrates this development.

*Figure 5.1  Interlocks between organisations if one organisation (A) is subsidised*
Again this will probably have influenced the number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam more than in Berlin, although some of the larger Turkish organisations in Berlin did also receive state subsidy from the Ausländerbeauftragte. We can assume the emergence of a small network around these larger subsidised organisations. Finally, influence on policy in Amsterdam can be expected from the fact that Islamic organisations there were stimulated by authorities to establish social-cultural organisations in order to be able to provide subsidies for religious organisations. This was implicitly a request for the emergence of Islamic front organisations. Front organisations, being dependent on other organisations, usually have enduring interlocks with their ‘mother’ organisations (Fennema 2004: 431). Therefore a high percentage of interlocks between Turkish Islamic and social-cultural organisations can be expected in Amsterdam.

On the other hand, studies on business organisations have shown that formal interorganisational relationships sometimes emerge as a way to overcome an uncertain environment. Organisations in trouble will look for strong and viable partners and interlocks with these more powerful organisations will emerge (Pennings 1980). McAdam discusses a similar process in which social movement organisations establish formal interorganisational relationships with elite institutions to formalise resources as a way to protect against the uncertainties of the environment they confront (McAdam 1982: 27). These types of interlocks have a more strategic character and often disappear as soon as the environment becomes more certain. We do not expect these types of linkages to be very numerous among Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, since we restrict ourselves to interorganisational relationships between Turkish organisations and not to external linkages with native institutions. If these types of strategic interlocks were to occur, they would be more likely to emerge in Berlin during difficult periods between competitive Turkish organisations. This means that in terms of numbers these types of interlocks will have probably no effect on the comparison Amsterdam and Berlin, perhaps only on the content of interorganisational linkages (in the sense that two competitive organisations are linked because of an uncertain environment).

The ecology model

In the ecology model interorganisational relationships play a role, as explained, but also in this model the origins of interlocks have not been at the centre of attention. Voluntary organisations, so the argument runs, do not function independently from each other; they operate within a population of organisations. This dependent relationship may lead to actual interorganisational relationships. In the ecology model
there are two forms of interorganisational relationships possible: cooperative or competitive (Minkoff 1995: 102). We can assume that in times of cooperation formal links between organisations will emerge and in times of increased competition formal links will disappear. The organisational ecology model stipulates when competition and cooperation can be expected. First of all, competition is expected in the beginning, as the most appropriate form of organisation is to be decided in a competitive process among the first organisers. Few formal links between organisations are expected in this competitive period (Aldrich 1999: 235). After this first phase collaboration is expected. To develop the organisational form further, the distribution of organisational routines and legitimate action becomes essential. Interorganisational relationships function as a route through which successful and legitimate routines are transferred from one organisation to the other (Pennings 1980; Mizruchi 1996: 276-277; Aldrich 1999: 236). We therefore an increase in the number of interorganisational relationships in this second phase. The end of this maturing phase is characterised by more centralisation and less new interlocks. After the maturing phase, the stagnation phase sets in. Increasing competition results in a decreasing number of interlocks (Fennema 1974: 139-140). The more powerful organisations are expected to reduce their interlocks and focus only on those interorganisational relations that are most important to them. We will see the emergence of large coalitions, federations and umbrella organisations in this period.

The overview described above provides some interesting hypotheses that can explain the emergence, persistence and development of Turkish interorganisational relationships in Amsterdam and Berlin. We will use both a standard and longitudinal network analysis in this chapter. The standard network analysis will be used mainly to provide information on the number of Turkish interlocks and less on the type of interlocks (aligned or strategic). The longitudinal network analysis is used to provide more information on the types of interlocks and less on the number of interlocks.

In terms of the number of interlocks we expect more interlocks among Turkish organisations in Amsterdam than Berlin because of the more positive Amsterdam opportunity structure. In terms of development over time (ecological model) we expect few interlocks when the Turkish organisational population emerges, an increasing number of interlocks in the first phase (as organisations establish links to improve the performance of their organisations) and a decreasing number of interlocks as the carrying capacity of the population is reached (because of heightened competition). In terms of the types of interlocks, the expectations are more ambiguous. We expect to see more aligned inter-
locks in Amsterdam (as the resources are more available there), but we expect also to see more strategic interlocks in Amsterdam than in Berlin (because of the fact that the Amsterdam policy has stimulated cooperation among Turkish organisations). Strategic interlocks to overcome an uncertain environment are mostly expected to emerge in Berlin.

**Turkish interlocking directorates: the example of Nihat Karaman**

An analysis of interlocking directorates allows us to study the formal relationships between organisations within a certain population, which is difficult to do with any other method. However, there are many other forms of interorganisational relationships, such as informal ones, which are equally important and easier to establish. For the most part, these extended informal relationships cannot be traced with the analysis of formal interlocking directorates. We can illustrate this with a concrete example and see to what extent this creates significant problems for the analysis that we want to conduct in this chapter. The following section describes the formal and informal network of Nihat Karaman, the former chairman of *Hollanda Türküyeli İşçiler Birliği* (HTIB), the largest Turkish left-wing organisation in Amsterdam.

Nihat Karaman immigrated to the Netherlands in 1970 and soon after became involved in establishing and leading the HTIB. The HTIB became well known in the Netherlands for its active engagement in improving the working conditions of Turkish labourers in Dutch society in the seventies. The organisation was linked to the Turkish communist party, of which Karaman was also a member. Karaman is described as someone who could uniquely overcome the ideological differences that characterise Turkish organisational populations. He was a strong supporter of collaboration between different Turkish political groups and Dutch organisations. During his years as president of the HTIB he curbed the more extreme elements in his own organisations. Karaman was one of the main instigators of the establishment of the national Turkish advisory council, IOT, in 1985, which is regarded to be a milestone in his career as a Turkish activist (*Algemeen Dagblad* 1988; *Groene Amsterdammer* 1988; Van den Meerendonk & Tilburg 1988).

In 1988 Karaman was murdered, which sent a tremendous shock through Amsterdam and the Dutch Turkish community. Countless messages of mourning appeared in the Dutch newspapers for several days, with dozens of organisations from all over the country expressing their grief over his violent death (*Volkskrant* 1988). Among these were Turkish organisations from different ideological backgrounds, Dutch organisations and organisations from other immigrant and ethnic groups. The huge number of messages illustrates the extent of Karaman’s influence and the breadth of his support.
man’s informal network, which he had built up over his years as chairman of the HTIB. His visits to numerous voluntary organisations all over the country had created a large informal network, in which the HTIB played a central role (Van Meerendonk & Tilburg 1988).

If we look at the interlocking directorates of Karaman in our database the extensiveness of his informal network is completely lost. Karaman was active in two different Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and therefore creates just one interlocking directorate. In other words, if we would merely look at the formal interlocks of Karaman in Amsterdam we would not understand the importance of his work as a bridge builder in the Turkish community. This could lead to the conclusion that formal interlocks of the Turkish organisers do not provide the information we need to analyse Turkish interorganisational relationships. This is, however, not the case, as the formal interlocks of Karaman do tell us a great deal about his position within the Turkish community.

As a prominent left-wing Turkish activist Karaman would not have been able to sit on the board of, for instance, a conservative Turkish organisation; this would have been unacceptable to both sides. Karaman collaborated with other Turkish leaders within the boundaries of advisory councils and national federations, but not on the boards of voluntary organisations. At first the collaboration on the elite level did not prevent Turkish organisations on the local level from opposing and competing with each other, but eventually the elite collaboration did help to pacify the situation (Van Zuthem 1994). A network analysis of Turkish interlocking directorates in Amsterdam in the eighties does not show any sign of collaboration between left- and right-wing Turkish organisations. Ten years later, however, this completely changes as interorganisational links between left- and right-wing Turkish organisations slowly emerge because of the activities of Turkish leaders.

In other words, the interlocking directorates of a prominent Turkish leader like Karaman do not reveal his extensive informal network. The strategic actions of a local civic leader are not easily captured by such a formal analysis. But the network analysis in this chapter is not used to describe the strategies of individual Turkish leaders. We are more interested in the eventual impact of these strategies on the population of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The example of Nihat Karaman does, however, illustrate that we need to be careful not to draw quick conclusions from an analysis of the formal networks of Turkish organisations. If a network analysis concludes that there are no formal interorganisational relationships, this does not necessarily mean that there are no relationships between organisations.

To summarize the main advantages of a network analysis of Turkish organisations for the study of the Turkish organising process: Formal linkages and informal relations tend to run parallel unless we have cir-
cumstantial evidence that this is not the case, as in the example of Ni-
hat Karaman. In addition, interlocks reveal important information
about the character and development of the Turkish organising pro-
cess, such as the interconnectedness of the organisations and the beha-
vour of Turkish organisers. It also allows for the study of important
mechanisms that drive the organising process, such as increasing so-
ciopolitical legitimacy and the allocating of resources among new and
vulnerable organisations.

The analysis of interlocking directorates provides a feasible means
for comparing the interorganisational relationships of an entire popula-
tion of Turkish organisations in two cities; no other analytical method
applied to interorganisational relationships offers similar opportunities.
By looking at the more than 5,000 board positions of the 231 Turkish
organisations in Berlin and 189 organisations in Amsterdam we are
able to say how and why Turkish organisations have collaborated and
what shifts there are in their interorganisational relationships. In addi-
tion, the way in which Turkish organisers have reacted to the host so-
ciety and organisational demands of their constituency can be distin-
guished. Perhaps the analysis of interlocking directorates provides only
a small and specific picture of all the Turkish interorganisational rela-
tionships that have existed, but it still tells us something about an im-
portant issue that is often neglected.

The number of interlocking directorates between Turkish
organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1970-2000

For the period 1970-2000 we have conducted network analyses for the
years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Figure 5.2 shows
the average number of interlocks per every Turkish organisation, which
enables us to compare the patterns in Amsterdam and Berlin.

The figure shows that since 1975 the relative number of Turkish in-
terlocks in Amsterdam is higher than in Berlin. According to the politi-
cal opportunity structure model we would expect a higher number in
Amsterdam since the opportunity structure for Turkish organisations
is more positive there. However, the pattern does not completely con-
firm the opportunity model. First, the number of Turkish interlocks in
Amsterdam was already higher in 1980, although the policy towards
Turkish organisations in both cities was rather similar at that time.
Probably this higher number in 1980 is caused by the fact that very
few Turkish organisations existed in Amsterdam at that time, which
distorts the comparison of the relative number of interlocks (the same
goes for the number in Berlin in 1970). Second, the difference in
2000 is certainly not as large as expected. If we compare this result
with the difference in the total number of Turkish organisations in both cities (as described in the previous chapter), the different opportunity structures appear to have less influence on the number of interlocks than on the number of organisations.

Figure 5.2 also partly confirms the expectations of the ecology model. Ecology theorists would expect a low number of interlocks in the seventies, since the Turkish organising process is emerging in this decade. The number of interorganisational relationships increases during the eighties, as the second phase of the Turkish organising process sets in. Interorganisational relationships are established to further develop the Turkish organisational structure in both cities. This second phase continues in both cities until 1995, after which the number of formal interorganisational relationships among Turkish organisations decreases, due to heightened competition. Described in these abstract terms the development of the relative number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin follows the predicted ecological line, although the increase of Turkish interlocks in Berlin in the eighties is very moderate. In Berlin the process of reallocating organisational routines, the interorganisational relationships that function as a route through which successful and legitimate routines are transferred from older organisations to new ones, has not resulted in a large increase of formal interorganisational relationships among Turkish organisations. We could state that for Amsterdam the ecology model has more explanatory power than for Berlin (which was also the case in terms of the found-
ing rates of Turkish organisations in the previous chapter). It is furthermore doubtful whether the development of the Turkish interlocks (as illustrated in Figure 5.2) is only driven by legitimisation and competition processes. We will therefore elaborate on the development pictured in Figure 5.2 and look for other explanations or a better understanding of these legitimisation and competition processes.

As mentioned, Figure 5.2 shows that in the 1970s the number of Turkish interlocks in both cities is still low. This is probably related more to the strong competition between Turkish right- and left-wing organisations at that time than to the initial ecological competition that all organisational forms encounter. The Turkish political conflict reached its highpoint in 1980 and violent confrontations between Turkish organisations became a serious problem in the Netherlands (Penninx 1980). In Berlin the violent confrontations between left- and right-wing organisations led to the murder of a left-wing Turkish teacher by members of the fundamentalist Milli Görüs Mevlana Mosque in Berlin in 1980 (Blaschke 1985: 333). Under these circumstances we would not expect to see many overlapping board memberships among Turkish organisations in either city.

Figure 5.2 further illustrates that in both cities the number of Turkish interorganisational relationships increases during the eighties, although the increase is clearly higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In Amsterdam the relative number increases from 0.2 in 1980 to 0.4 in 1985 and goes back to 0.3 in 1990. In Berlin the relative number increases slightly from 0.1 in 1980 to 0.2 in 1990. The development in Amsterdam can partly be explained by the improving opportunity structure. The introduction of Dutch multicultural policy seems to have initiated the establishment of Turkish interorganisational relationships in the first half of the eighties. Islamic and left-wing organisations were especially active in this period in establishing interlocks among the organisations that were affiliated to their respective movements. However, the influence of the improved opportunity structure did not continue after 1985, when, contrary to the expectations derived from the political opportunity model, the relative number decreases again until 1990.

In the nineties the relative number of Turkish interlocks in both cities becomes more divergent. Figure 5.2 illustrates that for Amsterdam the relative number of Turkish interlocks increases from 0.3 in 1990 to 0.8 in 1995 and falls back to 0.45 in 2000. In Berlin the relative number of Turkish interlocks remains fairly equal (0.17 in 1990 to 0.2 in 2000). There are two things that explain the sudden increase of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam in 1995. First, the heightened Turkish-Kurdish conflict and second, the large number of Milli Görüs organisations that were founded after 1990.
The Turkish-Kurdish conflict resulted in the founding of a large number of new Turkish and Kurdish organisations in Amsterdam that were directly involved in this conflict. An unusually high number of Grey Wolves and Kurdish organisations were registered in Amsterdam between 1990 and 1995. To facilitate the establishment of so many new organisations, interorganisational relationships were established at the same time. The interconnected Grey Wolves organisations of 1995 illustrate the range of this process: in that year forty-six overlapping board memberships connect twenty-five Grey Wolves organisations (almost all founded after 1990). The interlocks between Kurdish organisations in 1995 are less numerous. Eight organisations and nine overlapping board memberships formed a small Kurdish network. These organisations were also mainly established in the period 1990-1995.

In Berlin the Grey Wolves and Kurdish organisations were not able to express their identities so openly and therefore refrained from establishing formal interlocks. For this reason there is a large difference in the number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin in 1995. If we were to not count the interlocks between Grey Wolves and Kurdish organisations, which are included in Figure 5.2, the relative number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam becomes significantly lower and approaches the level in Berlin in 2000 (0.3 in Amsterdam and 0.2 in Berlin). However, the 1995 level in Amsterdam remains high, even without the more radical Turkish organisations (0.6). Apparently other organisations also established a high number of interlocks in Amsterdam in the first half of the nineties. This can for a large part be explained by links between a number of new religious Islamic organisations. Especially Milli Görüs organisations were very active in Amsterdam between 1990 and 1995; a large number of new Milli Görüs organisations was founded and many of these were linked to each other by overlapping board memberships, again as this facilitates the founding process when so many new organisations are established in such a short period.

The fact that after 1995 the relative number of Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam decreases sharply is probably related to the increasing competition between Turkish organisations, as predicted by the ecological model. Also for Berlin we see a decreasing number of Turkish interlocks after 1995, which indicates a more competitive environment for Turkish organisations in this period.

To summarize the main results of Figure 5.2 we can state that (1) there have been more Turkish interlocking directorates in Amsterdam than in Berlin in the period 1980-2000, however the difference is less than expected; (2) the pattern in Amsterdam displays more fluctuation, mainly because of the activities of the more extreme Turkish political
movements that were able to more openly express their identity in Amsterdam than in Berlin; (3) the ecological model that predicted development over time is more in line with the Amsterdam pattern than with the pattern in Berlin; (4) the interlocks in Amsterdam often connect organisations of one movement in a small network of affiliated organisations (Grey Wolves, Kurdish, Milli Görüş, left-wing). In Berlin the interlocks display a more blurred picture of individual organisations connected with one or two other organisations. This leads to the conclusion that, generally speaking, in Amsterdam interlocks between Turkish organisations are an expression of ideological proximity while in Berlin they seem to be more an attempt to overcome an uncertain environment. This conclusion is in line with one of the main premises of the opportunity model, which states that when resources are more available, organisations are more inclined to express their ideological distinctiveness and look for formal collaboration with similar organisations. If the opportunity structure, on the other hand, is more closed, organisations will be more hesitant to express their ideology and remain more, at least on the formal level, independent or isolated.

Table 5.1 displays an interesting difference between the Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin, which is related to this last conclusion. It shows the average age of the isolated and linked organisations in the succeeding years in both cities. If the linked organisations are older than the isolated organisations, it means that among the organisations that established overlapping board membership a majority of older organisations is present. If, on the other hand, the isolated organisations are older than the linked organisations, then it is mostly the newly founded organisations that have established interlocks. In this latter case we expect the interlocking directorates to be a vital resource for new organisations and a reaction to an uncertain environment. If new organisations immediately establish overlapping board memberships, they look for external resources to make their new organisations viable. If new organisations can survive without the immediate establishment of links we can assume that organisational resources are sufficiently available to make the organisations viable.

Table 5.1 shows that the interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin display a different character.

In 1980, 1985 and 1990 the linked Turkish organisations in Amsterdam are older than the isolated organisations (indicating sufficient resources in Amsterdam due to the introduction of Dutch integration policy) and in Berlin it is the other way around. In the period 1980-1990 newly founded organisations are overrepresented among the linked organisations in Berlin, indicating an uncertain environment for new Turkish organisations in Berlin. After 1990 the average age of the linked and isolated organisations in Berlin converges, which would
suggest that in this period the situation for new Turkish organisations improves. This is probably due to the better financial circumstances as described in the previous chapter.

The linked organisations in Amsterdam, on the other hand, after 1990 display a younger average age than the isolated organisations, which suggests that organisational resources have become more scarce after 1990 (which can indeed be explained by the policy changes in the nineties, but also by increased competition as the ecology theorists indicate). Table 5.1 shows that the situation in Amsterdam in the year 1995 is unusual, for two reasons. It is the only year in which the average age of the linked organisations decreases in comparison with five years before (which indicates an unusually high number of newly founded organisations among the linked organisations in 1995). In addition, this is also the only year in which the total number of linked Turkish organisations is higher than the isolated organisations (sixty-four linked and fifty-two isolated). We can explain both points by the fact that several Turkish movements were extremely active in this period (Grey Wolves, Kurds and Milli Görüş): in total eighty-one new Turkish organisations were founded between 1990 and 1995 in Amsterdam (forty-three percent of all Turkish organisations in Amsterdam that were established between 1970 and 2000). As so many new organisations were founded in such a short period of time, resources for new Turkish organisations must have decreased sharply. Under these circumstances formal interorganisational relationships become indispensable for new organisations to be able to survive, which explains the low average age of the linked organisations.

So far we have mainly discussed the number of Turkish interlocking directorates. The next section focuses on the nature of these interlocks by determining which organisations were connected with one another.

### Table 5.1
Average age of linked and isolated Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000, number of organisations per year in brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Linked</th>
<th>Isolated</th>
<th>Linked</th>
<th>Isolated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.0 (3)</td>
<td>1.6 (8)</td>
<td>3.7 (10)</td>
<td>5.5 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5.3 (14)</td>
<td>2.0 (23)</td>
<td>5.1 (27)</td>
<td>7.9 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6.9 (26)</td>
<td>3.8 (36)</td>
<td>7.8 (37)</td>
<td>9.2 (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5.3 (64)</td>
<td>6.1 (52)</td>
<td>11.3 (57)</td>
<td>11.1 (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.9 (60)</td>
<td>8.8 (70)</td>
<td>14.3 (55)</td>
<td>13.2 (141)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce; Berlin Chamber of Associations
Longitudinal Turkish interorganisational relationships in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s

This section discusses the longitudinal interlocking directorates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin in the last three decades of the twentieth century.

The seventies

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display all the longitudinal Turkish interlocks in Amsterdam and Berlin in the 1970s (one in Amsterdam and nine in Berlin). The low number of longitudinal interlocks indicates again that the Turkish organising process in both cities was still in its nascent phase during this early period and that polarisation within the Turkish organisational landscape was strong (Penninx 1980; Van Zuthem 1994: 17). The nine longitudinal Turkish interlocking directorates in Berlin produce four different small networks of organisations, illustrated in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.3 The longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in the 1970s

The first component includes five Milli Görüs associations, clustered around the Islamischer Kultur- und Solidaritätsverein. The notorious Mevlana Mosque (from which several members were convicted of the murder of a Turkish left-wing teacher in 1980) is also part of this component. Both the Islamischer Kultur- und Solidaritätsverein and the Mevlana Mosque were founded by Ali Özdemir, who also founded one of the first Islamic food stores in Berlin. Özdemir was affiliated with the more fundamentalist wing of the Milli Görüs movement. In the beginning of the 1980s he was forced to leave the Islamic (Milli Görüs) Federation in an attempt by local Islamic Turkish leaders to reduce the fundamentalist influence among Turkish Islamic organisations in Berlin. After the murder of the Turkish teacher in 1980 German public opinion blamed Turkish Islamic organisations for the left-right polarisation that had been transplanted from Turkey to Berlin. Turkish Islamic leaders in Berlin reacted to this hostility by reducing the most extreme elements in their organisations in an attempt to pacify the tense situation. They eventually succeeded in doing so, by the end of the eighties (Blaschke 1985: 326-331; Kleff 1990: 116-119).
Figure 5.4  The longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish organisations in Berlin in the 1970s

1. Mevlana Moschee
   Islamisches Zentrum Berlin
   Verein der Arbeiter aus der Türkei in Berlin
   Verein zur Förderung der türkischen Theaterwerkstatt
   Türkiye Halk Kultur Merkezi (THKM)

2. Büyük Ülkü Derneği
   Türkischer-Islamischer Kulturverein

3. Putte e. V. Ausländer- und Sonderprojekten im Wedding
   Verein türkischer Arbeitnehmer in Berlin
   Emir Sultan Moschee

4. Türkisch-Zentrum Berlin
   Türkischer Lehrerverband Berlin
The second network in Figure 5.4 shows an interlock between the first Grey Wolves organisation in Berlin, Büyük Ülkü Dernegi, and an Islamic association (similar to the only longitudinal Turkish interlock in Amsterdam in this period). The third and fourth networks include several left-wing organisations, of which the THKM, a communist organisation, is best known in this period. The two Turkish poles in Berlin at the time (conservative religious and left-wing) are therefore clearly visible and equally divided in Figure 5.4.

The eighties

The longitudinal Turkish interlocks of the 1980s show that the Turkish organising process was by now in full swing in both cities. More than half of all Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin had one or more board members in this period who were also active in other Turkish organisations, indicating that the Turkish organisers had become more actively involved in a number of different groups. To some extent they crossed the strict boundaries of their ideological movements, as longitudinal connections between the different religious and political Turkish groups emerged. There are several signs that the Islamic leaders in both Amsterdam and Berlin had worked together to support the establishment of a Turkish religious organisational structure, although the different Islamic denominations in Turkey were still engaged in serious competition in this period.

Figure 5.5 displays all the longitudinal interlocks between Islamic organisations in Amsterdam. It shows clearly that two of the main Islamic denominations (Diyanet, Milli Görüş) are linked through a number of longitudinal interlocks. The Grey Wolves Mosque Ulu Camii is also included in this religious component. Almost all of these interlocks between the different Islamic denominations disappeared by the end of the eighties, indicating that these interlocks were merely strategic and lasted only as long as they provided additional resources for the Turkish Islamic organisations. As already mentioned, the Turks constructed an extensive religious organisational network in Amsterdam during the 1980s, which provided religious services for the growing Turkish community in Amsterdam in this decade. Figure 5.5 illustrates that Turkish organisers from different Islamic affiliations helped each other to establish this extensive religious organisational structure. They temporarily joined each other’s boards to exchange resources, skills and organisational routines. Only the Süleymanılar organisations remained separated from the other religious movements during the eighties, as illustrated by the small separate component in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 *The longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish religious organisations in Amsterdam in the 1980s*

Stichting Turks Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Oost

Musluman Gençler Teskilati Welzijns Belangen — Milli Görüs Vereniging

Cemiyeti-Nisa

Hicret

Islamitisch Wereld-Centrum

Darul Envar Islam Vakfi

Turks Publicatie-en informatiecentrum

Darul Envar Islam Vakfi Centrum Birlikte Gucluyuz

Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp

Amsterdams Turkse Jongeren Vereniging

Begrafenisfonds Muratdede Koyu Koy
Figure 5.6 The longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish left-wing organisations and among Kurdish organisations in Amsterdam in the 1980s

Stichting Turkse Bewoners Organisatie 'Bos en Lommer'

El Kapisi Toneelgezelschap

Stichting Toerismeproject Turkse Jongeren

Amsterdam Turkiyeli Isciler Gencler Dernegi

Sanat Tiyatrosu Turks Toneelgezelschap

Stichting Turkse Jongeren Turk Halkevi

Amsterdam Turkiyeli Isciler Dernegi

Jongerencentrum Alternatief

Vereniging van uit Turkije Afkomstige Vrouwen in Amsterdam (ACTK)

HTIB

Vereniging tot Solidariteit met de Strijd voor de Democratie in Turkije en Noord-Koerdistan

Democratie Turkse Kulturele en Solidariteits Vereniging Amsterdam

Stichting Kulsan

De Vereniging van Politieke Vluchtelingen uit Turkije en Turks Koerdistan in Noord Holland
Figure 5.6 shows that the Turkish left-wing organisations in Amsterdam were organised into their own components, completely separated from the religious organisations. The first leftist component is clustered around the federation of left-wing organisations in the Netherlands HTIB and the women’s organisations, the ACTK. This component also includes two Turkish theatre organisations (toneelgezelschap) and three youth organisations (Turkse jongeren). In the second smaller left-wing component, one Turkish interest organisation is connected to two Kurdish organisations and one Turkish cultural organisation, Kulsan. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate that the left-right polarisation in the Turkish community in Amsterdam was still in place during the eighties; no formal contacts between the two parts had been established. Leaders of both parts, however, did meet in the Turkish advisory council, established by the Amsterdam authorities. This had not yet resulted in bridging the different parts of the Turkish community in Amsterdam.

The longitudinal Turkish interlocks in Berlin in the 1980s are illustrated in Figure 5.7. Several Turkish movements are connected in one large network of Turkish organisations. This network is too large to be completely represented in one figure, so we have focused only on the main longitudinal interlocks.

This network (the complete network includes forty-eight organisations and fifty-five longitudinal interlocks) shows that the left-wing organisations (clustered around the Türkischer Kulturrat and the student organisation BTBTM) are connected to the main religious organisations of both the Diyanet and Milli Görüs movements. A longitudinal interlocking directorate between the BTBTM and the Muslimen Treff-und Kulturzentrum constitutes this connection. Mustafa Cevik, who was secretary of the BTBTM between 1980 and 1982, produces the interlock. Seven years later he became chairman of the Muslimen Treff-und Kulturzentrum, a position he held until the organisation dissolved in 1997. It is possible that Cevik changed his political and religious attitude after he left the university; this interlock is therefore not necessarily a reflection of a genuine ideological interorganisational relationship (strategic or aligned). The left-wing component does not display any surprising elements. The central position of the student organisation BTBTM illustrates the importance of this organisation for left-wing Turkish organisations in Berlin. Left-wing students learned organisational skills at the BTBTM and used this experience later in other left-wing organisations. This process continues in the nineties when many former BTBTM members become active in the left-wing umbrella organisation TBB.

The religious longitudinal interlocks in Berlin in the 1980s display relationships between organisations from different Islamic denomina-
**Figure 5.7** The main longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish organisations in Berlin in the 1980s

- Sport Gemeinschaft Anadolu Spor
- Fussball Club Berlin Göztepe
- Türkisch-deutscher Akademiker Bund
- Vakif Moschee
- Das Islamische Werk
- Mehmed Akif Moschee
- Türkisch-Islamischer Kulturverein (Diyanet)
- Türkisch-Islamischer Kulturverein Yunus Emre Moschee
- Ayasofya Moschee (Milli Görüş)
- İslamische Ummah-Gemeinschaft Berlin (Sufi)
- Mevlana Moschee (Milli Görüş)
- Islamischer Kultur- und Solidaritätsverein (Milli Görüş)
- İslamische Föderation in Berlin (Milli Görüş)
- Islamischer Frauenverein - Cemiyet-i Nisa
- Progressive Volkseinheit der Türkei in Berlin (HDF)
- BTBTM Muslimen Treff- und Kulturzentrum
- Berlin Türkspor
- Türkischer Kulturrat in Berlin
- Föderation der Volksvereine Türkischer Sozialdemokraten
- DITIB-Merkez Türkisch Islamische Gemeinde zu Kreuzberg
- DITIB-Anadolu Türkisch-Islamische Gemeinde zu Schöneberg
- Türkisch-Islamischer Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein
- Mehmed Akif Moschee

**INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TURKISH ORGANISATIONS**
tions (similar to the picture in Amsterdam in this period). Figure 5.7 shows that Diyanet and Milli Görüs mosques are directly related in several ways. The main links are: the Diyanet Aksemsettin Mosque with the Milli Görüs Mevlana Mosque; two Sufi organisations Islamische Ummah-Gemeinschaft and Islamisches Zentrum Berlin with the Milli Görüs Islamischer Kultur- und Solidaritätsverein; and the link between the Milli Görüs Ayasofya Mosque and the Diyanet Sehzade Türkisch-Islamischer Kulturverein.

Figures 5.5 and 5.7 lead to the question, to what extent was it unusual for Turks to be affiliated with different Islamic denominations at the same time? Since we see the same development in Amsterdam and Berlin in the eighties we could conclude that it was common for religious Turks to be active in different types of Islamic organisations. Many new Islamic organisations were founded in this period and we can imagine that active religious Turks would support the establishment of any Islamic association in these days. Similar to the development in Amsterdam, the interlocks between the different Islamic denominations in Berlin also disappear by the end of the eighties, most likely because also in Berlin the Islamic organisational structure was now firmly established and old dividing lines between the religious groups reappeared again.

The nineties

The longitudinal Turkish interorganisational relationships in the nineties show for the first time a diverse development in both cities, influenced by the different opportunity structures. In Amsterdam the number of connected Turkish organisations is impressive (as already illustrated by the fact that only twenty percent of the organisations can be characterised as completely isolated in this decade). The Amsterdam policy stimulating the collaboration between different Turkish movements finally pays off: left-wing, religious, Kurdish and even extreme-right organisations are all in one large network.

Figure 5.8 shows the main longitudinal interlocks of this extended and inclusive network. It consists of 113 Turkish organisations and 255 longitudinal interlocking directorates, which means that sixty-five percent of the existing Turkish organisations in the nineties are included in this one network. Figure 5.8 shows that there are two different paths from the Grey Wolves organisations to the left-wing organisations, which indicates a high degree of convergence among Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in this period. Two non-political organisations provide the connection from left to right: the soccer association Amsterdam Gençler Birliği (AGB) and the city-district interest organisation Stichting Turkse Algemene Belangengroep Amsterdam-Noord. Turkish organisational
Figure 5.8  The main longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in the 1990s

Amsterdamse Sportclub ‘Turkiyem’ (Grey Wolves)

Turks Nederlandse Vriendschapsvereniging

Musluman Gencler Teskilati Welzijns Belangen (Milli Görüs)

Stichting Hilal (Grey Wolves)

Stichting Turks Platform Bos & Lommer en de Baarsjes

Kayseri Sosyal Dayanisma ve Kultur Dernegi

Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp

Stichting Turkse Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Noord (Diyanet)

Stichting Turkse Algemene Belangengroep Amsterdam-Noord

Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi Fatih Amsterdam (Diyanet)

Stichting Revolutionaire Comite Koerdistan (RCK) (Kurdish)

Hollanda Turkiyeli Isciler Birligi (HTIB) (Left-wing)

Vereniging van uit Turkije Afkomstige Vrouwen in Amsterdam (ACTK) (Left-wing)

Stichting Turkse Jongeren Turk Halkevi/Turks Volkshuis
leaders of the different movements met in more neutral organisations and created a communication network that included all different parties of their community. Interestingly, the organisations of the different Islamic denominations are not directly connected as they were in the eighties but now connect through other secular organisations. These neutral welfare organisations, such as Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp, Stichting Turks Platform Bos & Lommer en de Baarsjes or Turks Nederlandse Vriendschapsvereniging operated mainly at the city-district level and provided neutral ground for the competitive religious leaders.

The longitudinal Turkish interlocks in Berlin in the nineties provide a completely different picture from that of the longitudinal interlocks of the eighties. Two major developments in the nineties (the establishment of two major umbrella organisations and the increased competition among Turkish Islamic groups over the issue of Islamic education) completely changed the structure of the Turkish longitudinal interlocks in Berlin.

Figure 5.9 displays the main longitudinal interlocks and illustrates how the two new umbrella organisations (TBB and TGB) dominate the inter organisational relationships in Berlin in the nineties. The complete network is larger than ten years ago (but not as large as in Amsterdam): forty-four organisations (or twenty-two percent of all existing Turkish organisations in the nineties) are included in this network that is produced by fifty-seven longitudinal interlocks. Besides this there are four other smaller networks (not displayed in Figure 5.9): two Milli Görüs (now separated from the Diyanet organisations), one Kurdish component and one Grey Wolves network. In 1998 the court decided to recognize the Milli Görüs federation Islamische Föderation in Berlin as an official Religionsgemeinschaft, which allowed them to provide Islamic education in public schools (Jonker 1999: 70).

The old dividing lines between Diyanet, Milli Görüs and Süleyman- cilar organisations re-emerged because of this court decision (Gesemann & Kapphan 2001: 408-410). As a result of this heightened internal competition, the longitudinal interlocking directorates between the main Turkish Islamic organisations completely disappeared in the nineties. The more extreme movements in Berlin (Grey Wolves, Kurds and Milli Görüs) were isolated in their own components.

The major network of longitudinal Turkish inter organisational relationships reveals several interesting elements. First, there is the central position of the TDU (Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung in Berlin- Brandenburg), an organisation for Turkish entrepreneurs that has played a vital role in combining the secular left-wing Turkish umbrella organisation TBB (Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg) with the conservative and religious organisations of the conservative umbrella organisation TGB (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin). The link between the
Figure 5.9 The main longitudinal interlocking directorates among Turkish organisations in Berlin in the 1990s

* This is the national organisation of the TGB; interestingly they have not established an interlocking directorate with the TGB but with the TBB.
TBB and TGB was produced by two Turkish leaders, Hüsnü Özkanli (founder of both the TGB and the TDU) and Bahattin Kaya (founder of the TDU, board member of TBB from 1996 until 1999 and founder and president of BETÜSAB, an organisation for Turkish travel agencies). These two people are examples of successful Turkish businessmen in Berlin. According to our analysis they were the two most influential Turkish leaders in Berlin in the 1990s, as they brought the left and right segments of the Turkish community in the city together.

Notice that the linking of the extremes within the community was not due to the Berlin opportunity structure, but rather came from the Turkish community itself. The TDU is not a state-sponsored association but an organisation of the more successful Turkish immigrants in Berlin. However, the fact that the TBB and TGB play such a central role in this network is a direct result of the Berlin opportunity structure. The Ausländerbeauftragte financially supported both umbrella organisations in an attempt to gain a better foothold in the Turkish community. Subsidised immigrant organisations will generally attract other organisations seeking their collaboration in order to increase their own resources and legitimacy. As expected, this will result in an increasing number of interlocks and simultaneously in a centralised network (Tillich and Fennema 1998: 234). The centralised network around the leftist TBB consists of more than a dozen people. Many TBB board members were active in one other Turkish organisation at the same time. The centralised network of the conservative TGB is created by just four people holding several positions at the same time.

What do these figures tell us about the behaviour of the local Turkish administrative elite in both cities and the influence of the local opportunity structure on this behaviour? At first the situation in both cities was rather similar. Up until 1980 a high degree of polarisation and violent competition between left-wing and extreme right-wing organisations dominated the strategies of all Turkish organisational leaders. Their main goal was to establish an organisational structure for their own political or religious movement. Most leaders were occupied with only one organisation. Then, during the eighties, this situation changed in both cities as many longitudinal interorganisational relationships emerged. Surprisingly, the development in the two cities is again fairly similar in this decade, although the opportunity structure in Amsterdam and Berlin had become completely different. If we disregard the unreliable link between the leftist student organisation and an Islamic centre in Berlin, we see in both cities a relatively large left-wing network and an Islamic network, in which different Islamic denominations actively collaborate. Religious leaders in both cities held positions in other types of Islamic organisations at the same time in order to
support the establishment of a Turkish religious organisational structure. The Islamic network in both cities connected the more liberal Diyanet organisations with the more fundamentalist and controversial Islamic organisations such as the Grey Wolves Mosque ULU Camii in Amsterdam and the Millî Görûş Mevlana Mosque in Berlin. In both cities the collaboration between local Islamic leaders ended in the second half of the eighties, as the Turkish religious organisational structure is then firmly established and old religious dividing lines appear again due to increasing competition.

In the nineties the behaviour of the local Turkish elite in both cities becomes very different, as a result of the different circumstances in Amsterdam and Berlin. In Amsterdam we see more collaboration between left-wing and religious and conservative groups. One of the main goals of the Amsterdam policy had been to stimulate internal cooperation among Turkish organisations. Amsterdam authorities were a bit apprehensive to include all different parts of the Turkish political and religious spectrum in their programmes but they did. They provided subsidies for all groups (even the more extreme organisations, which were mostly banned in Berlin) and established advisory councils, in which almost all movements were welcome. At the same time, the Turkish community itself was taking the opportunity to collaborate with leaders such as Nihat Karaman actively attempting to construct bridges within the divided Turkish community.

Apparently it took about ten years until city policy and the activities of the Turkish leaders became visible in the structure of the Turkish longitudinal interlocks in Amsterdam. The Turkish leaders of the different movements collaborated in the nineties on the boards of neutral, non-aligned Turkish organisations. These organisations often operated at the city-district level and were engaged in welfare programmes for the youth or protecting the interests of Turks in a certain neighbourhood. Because the more extreme Turkish organisations were included in the integration programmes it became acceptable for others to collaborate with them as well. Kurdish leaders established interlocks with left-wing leaders; left-wing leaders established links with the Islamic leaders of the Diyanet; and the Diyanet leaders were in close contact with the more conservative religious movements, such as Millî Görûş and Grey Wolves mosques.

In Berlin a different development is visible. Here the authorities were not interested in including all parts of the Turkish community. The Ausländerbeauftragte chose basically two umbrella organisations with which it was willing to collaborate and for which it would provide financial support. The two largest Turkish umbrella organisations in the nineties, the Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and the more conservative Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB), then took con-
control of the Turkish organisational field in the city. The left-wing leaders of the TBB came mostly from the left-wing student organisation BTBMT (which had been the most influential Turkish left-wing organisation in Berlin in the eighties). They established strong relationships with numerous other leftist Turkish groups. The leaders of the TGB came mostly from religious Diyanet organisations and established relationships with the more conservative organisations. This situation could easily have resulted in polarising the left-wing and the religious sides. However, leaders of both blocks collaborated in founding a Turkish association for entrepreneurs TDU (*Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung in Berlin-Brandenburg*). It was through this organisation that the Turkish elite in Berlin were connected and a network of communication was established. However, several important movements and organisations were not included in this large network, and because of this the polarisation in the Turkish community in Berlin increased in the nineties. Milli Görüş, the Grey Wolves and Kurds established their own networks of interlocks, completely separate from the rest of the Turkish organisations. In addition, the number of Turkish organisations that did not establish any longitudinal interlocks at all also increased during the nineties. Apparently some Turkish organisational leaders who were excluded from the main network became completely isolated.

In Amsterdam in the 1990s we see a more equal distribution of longitudinal interlocks than in Berlin. There are no central organisations in the main component, which is characterised by its inclusiveness. In Berlin, three organisations dominate the entire organisational population in this period: the TBB, TGB and TDU. These are large professional organisations that have no counterpart in Amsterdam, where the main Turkish organisations are much smaller and less professionalised.

**Summary**

In Chapter 4 it became clear that each of the explanatory factors of the model formulated in Chapter 3 had a significant but different effect on the emergence, persistence and development of the number and type of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin. This chapter, on Turkish interorganisational relationships, shows something similar at work in the development of Turkish interlocking directorates, although the sequence of influential periods is different.

When immigration has just occurred the influence from the country of origin is still strong. In terms of Turkish interorganisational relationships in Amsterdam and Berlin this means that the strong polarisation
brought over from Turkey to Western Europe prevented the emergence of formal links between Turkish organisations at the beginning of the immigration process. The Turkish organisational founders in both cities were only active in one organisation and were busy attempting to increase the influence and improve the position of that organisation. The number of completely isolated organisations in both cities was very high in the seventies.

In the decade of the 1980s, the second phase of the development of Turkish interorganisational relationships, ecological and group-related factors determined the emergence of new Turkish interorganisational relationships, which were largely independent from the political opportunity structure. Turkish left- and right-wing organisers founded a number of new organisations in this phase and the establishment of interorganisational relationships facilitated this. In addition, these relationships enhanced the sociopolitical legitimacy of the Turkish organisational population and furthered the resource allocation process.

It was predominantly the religious Islamic organisers that were responsible for the increase of interorganisational relationships in both cities in this period. These strategic links connected the organisations of the main Islamic denominations in order to build and enhance a Turkish Islamic organisational structure in Amsterdam and Berlin. Again, these interorganisational links were needed to smooth the process of founding new organisations in an environment that was at least unfamiliar with this type of religious organisation or, as in Berlin, was even hostile. In Berlin, Turkish interorganisational relationships were to a large extent a reaction to an uncertain environment that did not provide many resources for new organisations, and the percentage of young organisations that established interlocking directorates in this period was high. In contrast, in Amsterdam the opportunity structure provided more external resources for these new Turkish organisations in terms of legitimacy, wealth (structural subsidies) and power (a position within the policy making process). Formal links were therefore less needed. In this sense, the political opportunity structure did have an influence on the emergence of interlocks, but the overall pattern in both cities during the eighties shows more similarities than differences.

This completely changes in the nineties as especially the type of Turkish interorganisational relationships becomes diverse, because of the differences in the local opportunity structures. The Amsterdam policy had stimulated internal cooperation among Turkish organisations. Local authorities had included all different parts of the Turkish political and religious spectrum in their policy and subsidy programmes. In Berlin, on the other hand, the authorities did not stimulate internal cooperation and refrained from contact with the more radical Turkish po-
itical and religious elements. The result of these different approaches is clearly visible in the content of the Turkish interlocking directorates of the nineties. In Amsterdam we see a large Turkish network, in which basically all Turkish political and religious movements are included. In Berlin we see a much smaller network clustered around the two main umbrella organisations (one left-wing, the other conservative) and all other ideological movements are completely isolated in their own small component.

Because of the more inclusive attitude of the Amsterdam authorities to the most extreme Turkish political organisations, these movements (mainly Grey Wolves and Kurdish) were able to establish many formal organisations in the first half of the nineties. In order to be able to do this in such a short period of time, interlocking directorates were inevitable. In Berlin, these extreme organisations completely refrained from involvement in interlocking directorates as the authorities were repres- sive toward these movements. Interorganisational relationships between their organisations are therefore only visible in the longitudinal network analysis. In the second half of the nineties, the Turkish organisational population in both cities reached its carrying capacity; competition between the organisations increased and the relative total number of Turkish interlocks decreased because of that, just as predicted by the ecological model. Competition means less cooperation and the end of many formal interorganisational relationships.
6 Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam, 1960-2000

Introduction

In Chapters 4 and 5 we discussed the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin, comparing two similar immigrant groups in two different cities. This divergent comparison takes the immigrant group as the constant and identifies differences between the Turkish groups based on the different opportunity structures in the two cities. Similarities, on the other hand, are explained by referring to the influences of group-related factors. In this chapter we use a different approach and conduct a convergent comparison: comparing the associational behaviour of different immigrant groups in one city. In a convergent comparison the city is taken as a constant. Differences are therefore explained by group-related factors and similarities by the influence of the local opportunity structure, in particular the political opportunity structure (Green 1999: 68-69).

In this chapter we will compare Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam between 1960 and 2000. One of the main problems of a convergent comparison is that it assumes that the city is a constant environment for all immigrant groups during the time period of investigation. However, this is not always the case. The political opportunity structure in a city can differ for different groups and this is partly the case for Turks and Surinamese in Amsterdam. Until 1980 the Amsterdam policy toward the Surinamese was more inclusive than toward Turkish immigrants, which resulted in a different political opportunity structure for both groups in the same city at that time (Vermeulen 2005). The introduction of Dutch minority policy in the early eighties ended this situation of unequal treatment and created a comparable political opportunity structure for both groups. In other words, until 1980 the comparison between Surinamese and Turkish immigrants is a double comparison, as both the group and the environment are different, which makes it impossible to draw any conclusions. From 1980 onward, however, both groups face an equal political opportunity structure in Amsterdam and we can perform a convergent comparison. The comparison between these groups will therefore be conducted from 1980 onward.
Does this mean that the development of a Surinamese organising process before 1980 is therefore not pertinent to this chapter? Not quite: an examination of this period allows us to analyse the first important phase of the Surinamese organising process and also to see to what extent the inclusive Amsterdam policy of the seventies has influenced the emergence of Surinamese organisations in the city. We will therefore start with a description of the Surinamese organising process and the local political opportunity structure before 1980.

**Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam and the first phase of their organising process, 1945-1980**

Surinam has been characterised as one of the least known countries in the Western Hemisphere (Hoefte & Meel 2001: xiii). This small Caribbean country, located on the Northern border of Brazil, was a Dutch colony for several centuries until its independence in 1975. The Dutch colonizers never showed great interest in this typical plantation economy, as the profits from Surinam were far less attractive than those from the main Dutch colony, Indonesia. Because of its colonial history the population of Surinam is made up of several distinct ethnic groups, almost all brought there by the Dutch. The largest are the Afro-Surinamese or ‘Creoles’ (descendants of African slaves) and the Indo-Surinamese or ‘Hindustanis’ (descendants of contract labourers brought mainly from India to Surinam after the abolition of slavery in 1863). Other ethnic groups include Javanese, Chinese, Jews and native Indians.

Surinamese immigration to the Netherlands has a long history and is intimately tied to the colonial relationship between the two countries. Before the Second World War, Surinamese immigrants were predominantly children of the colonial elite or the Afro-Surinamese middle class, studying or working in the Dutch capital (Cottaar 2004). After the war this pattern changes slowly, as Surinamese migration in this decade becomes more ethnically diverse and more driven by economic factors. Administrative personnel, teachers and nurses arrive, still in small numbers, to work in the booming Dutch economy (Van Niekerk 1994: 47; Cottaar 2003; Lucassen 2003: 330).

The history of the Surinamese organising process in Amsterdam began as far back as 1919, with the establishment of the Bond voor Surinamers, later known as Vereniging Ons Suriname (Association Our Surinam). However, the actual start of the first phase of the Surinamese organising process was not until after the Second World War, when Afro-Surinamese students became active in establishing several associations in support of the emerging nationalist movement in Surinam.
Although Surinamese independence was the primary goal of such organisations, their organisational activities also worked to foster a resurrection of Afro-Surinamese culture. These students, studying in Amsterdam and confronted with Dutch society, founded nationalist organisations in an attempt to understand and articulate their national identity (Oostindie 1998: 225-28; Jansen van Galen 2000: 33-34). Such organisations were relatively few in number and their reach was mostly limited to Afro-Surinamese students. Most of these organisations ended their activities in the sixties when the leaders returned to Surinam to expand the nationalist movement there (Jansen van Galen 2000). New Surinamese organisations established in the sixties lost their political orientation and focused primarily on social and sports activities. They provided a familiar social environment for the growing Surinamese community in Amsterdam. For instance, several Surinamese soccer associations were founded in this decade in which Surinamese immigrants could ‘feel at home’, as the jubilee issue of one of these associations states (Real Sranang 1990: 13). This cushioning function of immigrant organisations, which eases the shock of transition by offering a more familiar environment, has been discussed several times in the previous chapters and was also important for the Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam during this early period (Cottaar 2004).

In the seventies the immigration from Surinam to the Netherlands changed completely in terms of numbers, ethnicity, social-economic background and motivation. The pull factors that dominated immigration to the Netherlands until 1973 remained important, but push factors caused more and more Surinamese to leave their country. The economic situation in Surinam showed little progress and more people came to look for work in the Netherlands. The Netherlands was the most obvious destination for these immigrants, as they were familiar with the culture and language and possessed Dutch citizenship. These newcomers increasingly originated from the lower classes in Surinam, and the percentage from ethnic groups other than the Afro-Surinamese increased in this period. The approaching independence of Surinam in 1975 caused more economic and political uncertainty, which resulted in more people leaving the country. An exodus of more than fifty thousand took place in the years 1974 and 1975 (Vermeulen 1984: 35-36; Van Heelsum 1997: 6). More than ten thousand settled in Amsterdam in 1975 alone (Wintershoven 2000). Figure 6.1 illustrates how fast the Surinamese population in Amsterdam was growing in this period (the number of Turks is also shown to illustrate the difference in size of the two immigrant populations in Amsterdam).

The rapid increase in population in the early seventies caused serious social problems among the Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam.
dam, in housing, unemployment and increasing racism. The arrival of large numbers of low-skilled Surinamese workers after 1975 exacerbated the situation. The high level of unemployment sparked by the worsening Dutch economic situation was keenly felt in this group, which was less familiar with Dutch culture and language. Deviant or even criminal lifestyles took root among unemployed Surinamese youth (Sansone 1992) and the adverse media coverage reflected on the whole Afro-Surinamese population, associating it with drug crime and violence. Resistance to Surinamese immigrants, tension and discrimination within Dutch society became widespread in the 1970s (Van Niekerk 1994: 71). Authorities could no longer ignore the problems of Surinamese immigrants and strong policy measures were deemed necessary.

Social policy targeted specifically at the Surinamese community in Amsterdam got its start in 1974 when the city council issued a groundbreaking local memorandum. The memorandum acknowledged that social policy aimed at the Surinamese population was unavoidable and, more importantly, it assigned a crucial role to local Surinamese welfare organisations in implementing it. Surinamese immigrant organisations were designated to provide social services to deprived segments of the Surinamese community, with special attention to the drug-related problems of the youth (Gemeenteblad 1974: 2078-81). Because Afro-Surinamese organisations had historically been the most prominent Surinamese associations in the city, they seemed the best option.

Figure 6.1 *Surinamese and Turkish population in Amsterdam, 1960-2000*

![Surinamese and Turkish population in Amsterdam, 1960-2000](image)

Source: Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics (O+S)
for channelling social services to the community. The first Surinamese welfare organisation, *Welsuria*, was an initiative of Dutch and Afro-Surinamese individuals, mostly with religious backgrounds. It was assigned a leading role. Board members had good relations with local officials and could count on generous grants, which they further distributed to other Surinamese organisations in the city. However, within the Surinamese community Welsuria had the reputation as an elite, Dutch and colonial organisation, and this prompted the founding in 1968 of a new Afro-Surinamese welfare organisation called *BEST* (Building a Surinamese Home). It stemmed from the Surinamese nationalist movement and had a more pronounced Afro-Surinamese character than Welsuria. Although its relationship with local officials was certainly not as good as Welsuria’s, the city council nonetheless approved funding. BEST was a combined welfare organisation and pressure group. It published exposés on the many social problems plaguing the Surinamese community in the seventies (among them housing, police brutality, racial discrimination) and it provided social welfare services to Surinamese young people (Meerveld 2002).

In total, five Surinamese welfare organisations received municipal funding in 1974. A survey in 1977 found that twenty per cent of the local Surinamese population, or some 5,200 people, had visited one of these five organisations at least once during that year (Gooskens 1979: 27). Because some organisations also funded smaller groups, the total number of organisations receiving public money was actually much larger than five.

It was unusual in those days to delegate to immigrant associations such a critical role in social service delivery, which was normally the task of mainstream Dutch organisations. However, money for Surinamese organisations was no problem in the early seventies. This was even more remarkable in light of the difficult economic situation in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. The generosity of local government can be explained by the magnitude of the social problems plaguing the Surinamese population in Amsterdam, mainly because so many Surinamese had settled in the city in just a few years time, and the approaching independence of Surinam in 1975. The authorities seemed motivated by feelings of guilt over the colonial past and by a desire to preclude problems with the Surinamese minority. Mindful of the disastrous decolonisation process that had taken place in Indonesia, Dutch politicians, especially on the left, were determined to avoid similar mistakes (Jansen van Galen 2001; Buddingh’ 2001: 71). Surinam itself received a vast amount of Dutch foreign aid in the 1970s (Van Amersfoort 1987: 478), an expression of generous attitudes also at the national level. Figure 6.2 starkly illustrates the extreme open-handedness of Amsterdam local government toward Surinamese organisations after
1974, especially if we compare this with the support given to Turkish organisations. The gaping disparity between the amounts of public subsidy provided to Surinamese and to Turkish organisations is revealing of the inclusive policy pursued by the Dutch authorities toward colonial migrants in the seventies and eighties (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 28-29). The first local subsidy to a Surinamese organisation was given in Amsterdam in 1968 (to Welsuria). The golden age for Surinamese organisations was 1975-1984, a ten-year period in which they received over five million guilders a year.

The Amsterdam subsidy policy was to have far-reaching consequences, both positive and negative, for Surinamese organisations. The positive side was that many new Surinamese organisations could benefit from receiving subsidy, and a large number indeed sprang up after 1974. But the negative repercussions were tremendous. No clear conception underlay social policy for the Surinamese in the 1970s, either at the government level or within the organisations. Policy was characterised by ad hoc measures to keep the peace (Van der Burg 1990; 97) and little monitoring took place. One Afro-Surinamese organisation, SOSA, charged with providing welfare services to the youth, was notorious as a centre for drug trade, and was shut down after a few years. Another organisation founded in 1977 to support Surinamese drug addicts, Srefidensi, received millions of guilders of funding, but could not account for how the money was spent and went bankrupt shortly after-
ward (Reubsaet & Geerts 1983: 100-03). The supply of public money available to Surinamese organisations in the mid-1970s aroused high expectations in the Surinamese community. Up until 1978, enough money was available for all groups, but that was to suddenly change. So many groups were receiving money that new groups now had difficulty obtaining funding. New organisations did not accept this, because funding had been so readily available just a few years back. The suspicion grew that Welsuria and other large Afro-Surinamese organisations were withholding money (Reubsaet & Geerts 1983: 79-81). The offices of Welsuria and BEST were occupied dozens of times in protest during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Another big problem for Welsuria was how to deal with the ethnic diversity in the Surinamese population. The main welfare organisations were predominantly Afro-Surinamese organisations (Van der Burg 1990: 96-97) as were most Surinamese organisations that received money in Amsterdam. Indo-Surinamese organisations also began to demand financial support from the Amsterdam authorities. This could only be channelled through Welsuria, which had been assigned to distribute subsidies among Surinamese organisations. So in 1977 Welsuria became involved in establishing an Indo-Surinamese Cultural Centre. It was difficult to find the right building and internal fights between Indo-Hindu and Indo-Muslim groups frustrated the search even more. When an adequate facility was found, additional money was needed to renovate the building. Finally in 1982 the money was found and the building was officially opened two years later, seven years after the initiative had started. Shortly after the opening the building was occupied by Afro-Surinamese organisations, protesting the fact that so much subsidy had been given to an Indo-Surinamese organisation. The occupiers flooded the building, after which renovations had to start all over again (Meerveld 2002: 59). This example, along with many other failed Surinamese organisations in this period, illustrates the extremely difficult situation Welsuria and other Surinamese welfare organisations faced at the time.

By the end of the 1970s, the situation had deteriorated and Surinamese associations were plagued by increasing distrust and rivalry. Instability was aggravated by the fact that most organisations were structured around informal leaders. Informal leaders were successful and tolerated as long as they could raise sufficient revenues for their organisations and constituencies. To secure funding and a substantial constituency, an informal leader had to be as highly profiled as possible, and the Dutch media had a predilection for anti-colonial, anti-Dutch pronouncements. This created another paradox whereby the most radically anti-Dutch voices received the most attention, and subsequently
the most government funding for their organisations (Van Amersfoort 1974: 158-62; Reubsaet & Geerts 1983).

For Surinamese immigrants this ambiguous situation was quite familiar as it was similar to the manner in which voluntary organisations operated in Surinam. The Dutch colonial administration had always blocked the development of a democratic political system under which civil society might have matured. The first general election in Surinam was not held until 1949, and the political mobilisation that then emerged developed exclusively along ethnic lines (Buddingh’ 1995: 279-80; Ramsoedh 2001). Most voluntary organisations in Surinam were linked to political parties or religions, and they were differentiated by ethnicity. Because both organisational leaders and the Dutch colonial administration used such associations to their own benefit, voluntary organisations were highly distrusted by the Surinamese population (Reubsaet, Kropman & Van Mulier 1982: 219-20). In the years leading up to independence in 1975, clientelism was rife throughout the political system. Fake government jobs were provided by Surinamese politicians to their ethnic constituencies (Van Amersfoort 1987: 479). In other words, a situation in which voluntary organisations were not a symbol of trust and stability, but rather a vehicle to jobs, influence and personal benefit, was rather familiar to Surinamese newcomers in Amsterdam. In this sense, the colonial history of Surinam played an important role in the development of Surinamese immigrant organisations in Amsterdam in the 1970s.

The Amsterdam city government breached this continuity in 1983 by severely curtailing the stream of subsidies to Surinamese welfare organisations, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. Social policy for the Surinamese was henceforth to be carried out by mainstream Dutch organisations. Surinamese organisations now became part of the general minority policy framework, in which Turkish organisations were also included. The introduction of Dutch minority policy had several contradictory effects on the Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam, as the new policy meant less money and less political influence, but more stability and eventually a more secure environment.

The political opportunity structure for Surinamese organisations became in many ways more negative after 1983 (and therefore the political opportunity structure for Surinamese and Turkish organisations became more equal). In terms of financial support the introduction of Dutch minority policy clearly decreased the resources for Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. Figure 6.2 shows that the amount of subsidy was significantly lower after 1985 than before. It continued to decrease in the nineties and by 1999 Surinamese organisations received even less money than the Turkish organisations in Amsterdam (although the size of the Surinamese group was more than two times
larger than the Turkish group). The introduction of the new policy also meant that Surinamese organisations became less powerful in political terms as they lost the function of providing welfare to the Surinamese population. On the other hand, the political position for Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam did improve somewhat after the introduction of immigrant voting rights in 1985. Nothing changed formally, since the Surinamese had always possessed Dutch citizenship and already had the vote, but local Surinamese politicians profited from the greater attention paid by Dutch political parties to immigrant constituencies in Amsterdam after 1985. This gave Surinamese politicians greater access to the parties and influential positions.

There was another positive side to the introduction of Dutch minority policy in the early eighties. It meant an end to uncertainty. As described, the ad hoc policies for Surinamese organisations and the provision of large sums of money had created a disruptive and unstable environment for Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. With the minority policy, explicit policy goals were introduced and the procedures for receiving subsidy became more strict (Bloemberg 1995:61-62). In addition, immigrant organisations were granted a clear position within the policy framework. Three primary tasks were envisaged for Surinamese organisations, just as for the organisations of the other minority target groups: to promote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituencies and to serve as advocacy groups (Gemeenteblad 1985). Furthermore, local authorities now became directly responsible for providing money to Surinamese organisations. Before 1983 this had been the task of Welsuria. Local authorities used Welsuria as a buffer to avoid contact with difficult Surinamese organisations or groups and often refused any responsibility toward Surinamese organisations, either old or new. This frustrated many Surinamese organisers and increased internal competition (Meerveld 2002). Now the more direct relationship with the authorities provided opportunities for lots of new Surinamese organisations, which previously had been left aside. The total amount of subsidy for Surinamese organisations was less, but the number of Surinamese organisations eligible for subsidy increased.

To sum up, we can state that while the total amount of subsidy for Surinamese organisations decreased significantly, the overall political opportunity structure in the eighties improved, mainly because the new policy resulted in a less uncertain environment (which is very damaging for voluntary organisations in general). If we compare the Surinamese situation with that of the Turks, we see that the political opportunity structure in Amsterdam for both groups became more and more equal. The subsidy for Surinamese organisations in the nineties became comparable to that of the Turkish organisations and both groups
were confined to the same policy measures. This means that, just as for the Turks, the political opportunity structure in the nineties became more negative for Surinamese immigrant organisations.

The next section summarizes the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam in order to compare both organising processes better.

**Turkish organisations in Amsterdam**

In Chapters 4 and 5 we extensively described the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam. This section summarizes briefly the main elements of this development. First it discusses the differences between the Turkish and Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam, then it examines the most important elements in the Turkish organising process.

The main difference between the two immigrant groups is that the Surinamese are colonial immigrants and the Turks are guest worker immigrants, for whom the Netherlands was a completely unknown country. This difference in origin shaped the composition and character of both groups. For instance, the Turkish population in Amsterdam was originally largely male dominated. Family reunion changed this slowly after 1975. Within the Surinamese population the female-to-male ratios were reasonably steady (see Figure 6.6), as the Surinamese migrated to the Netherlands as families. In addition, the Surinamese were familiar with Dutch language and culture, which gave them more skills and abilities to settle in the host country. Turkish immigration, on the other hand, was highly transnational. Large groups of Turks settled in many Western European countries and transnational links soon emerged between these different Turkish communities (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000). In contrast, virtually all Surinamese migrants settled in the Netherlands. They maintained almost no transnational ties other than with Surinam.

The Turkish organising process in Amsterdam is strongly related to their guest worker position. The first Turkish organisations are mainly involved in protecting the interests of the Turkish workers and providing organisational activities suitable for this male-dominated immigrant group, such as social-cultural activities, religious associations and sporting facilities. In addition, the first phase of the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam (as in Berlin) is dominated by the unstable political situation in Turkey. The left-right polarisation is transplanted to Western Europe and proves to be highly influential in determining the establishment and activities of the first Turkish organisations. The developments in Turkey remained important for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam throughout the Turkish organising process. Consider, for example, the arrival of political refugees in the early eighties and the
heightened Turkish-Kurdish conflict in the nineties, which strongly increased Turkish organisational activities in Amsterdam after 1990.

The Turkish organising process in Amsterdam is, apart from these direct influences from the country of origin, predominantly a religious affair. The first Turkish Islamic organisations in Amsterdam were established in the seventies, but after 1980 Turkish organisers became actively engaged in establishing an entire Islamic organisational structure in the city. Again this is typical for the Turkish immigrant guest worker organising process, as we see the same development in Berlin in this period. The sizes of the Turkish communities in Western Europe grow due to the process of family reunion, and their stay becomes increasingly more structural as the second generation of Turkish immigrants emerges. These elements caused an increasing and shifting religious demand among Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam. We see a high number of Turkish Islamic organisations established after 1980. It is interesting to see the different Islamic denominations, which are at that time engaged in fierce competition in Turkey, temporarily join forces in Amsterdam to facilitate the establishment of so many new religious organisations in such a short period. By the end of the eighties an Islamic organisational structure in Amsterdam (and Berlin) is completed and the competition between the different Turkish religious denominations re-emerges.

A final important element in the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam is the motivation on the part of some Turkish leaders to overcome the divisions within the Turkish community, at least if these jeopardize their ability to represent the interests of the Turkish constituency. In the early eighties Turkish leaders started to think about establishing a national Turkish council in which different Turkish ideological movements would be represented. This wish for greater collaboration connected well with Dutch multicultural policy at the time, which encouraged coordination among immigrant institutions that could represent at least a majority of the immigrant population. On the national and local levels these coordinating councils were established in the second half of the eighties (the national IOT in 1985 and the TDM, the local Amsterdam Turkish council, in 1986). At first Turkish organisations on the local level remained fiercely opposed to one another, but within ten years the results of cooperation between the Turkish elite and the Dutch government became visible. Formal links were established in Amsterdam among almost all the different Turkish ideological movements.

The next sections focus on the number and type of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam in order to compare the organising processes of the two groups in these terms.
The number of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam

Figure 6.3 shows that the Surinamese organising process in Amsterdam is rather older than that of the Turks. The small Surinamese population in Amsterdam already had a relatively high number of organisations in 1960 (interest, cultural and sports organisations). The provision of the first subsidy to a Surinamese welfare organisation in 1968 and the arrival of more and more Surinamese after 1970 increased the number of Surinamese organisations significantly. The improved political opportunity structure for Surinamese organisations had the expected effect on the number of Surinamese organisations: they increased from 1.5 per 1000 Surinamese residents in 1968 to 3.4 in 1978. After 1978 the disruptive impact of ad hoc policies took its toll and the number of Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam dropped to the lowest since 1969 (2.2 in 1980).

Figure 6.3  Number of Surinamese and Turkish immigrant organisations per 1000 Surinamese and Turks in Amsterdam, 1960-2000

The Surinamese immigrants were the most actively organising immigrant group in the city until the second half of the nineties. Figure 6.3 shows that the difference compared to the number of Turkish organisations was especially high in the seventies, but remained visible as well in the eighties. In 1993 the Surinamese and Turks had a similar number of immigrant organisations. Unlike the Turkish pattern, the num-
ber of Surinamese organisations remained stable in the nineties, although the environment for Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam had become more uncertain as state subsidies decreased and the policy shifted from a multicultural approach to a more integrationist one (as described in Chapter 4). But this more negative opportunity structure did not have the expected decreasing influence on the number of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam. Ecological forces protected both the Surinamese and Turkish organisers from the changing political environment.

This leads to the conclusion that the period in which new policy is introduced is especially influential (as expected by the political opportunity structure model). Both in the early seventies and again in the eighties, when new policy was introduced, the number of Surinamese organisations increased significantly. After the first period of growth we did see the impact of the uncertain environment as a result of ad hoc policy (1977-1980). The Dutch minority policy of the eighties, however, provided Surinamese organisations with a more certain environment for a longer period of time. The policy shift of the nineties did not have the same impact as fifteen years earlier. Now the number of Surinamese organisations remained stable because the legitimacy of the organisational form had been firmly established. As for the Turkish pattern, it increased continuously between 1974 and 1997 with almost the same speed. By the end of the nineties the Turks reached their carrying capacity and the number of Turkish organisations started to decrease again.

Figure 6.3. further illustrates that the equal political opportunity structure for both groups after 1983 eventually resulted in an equal number of organisations, although the pattern of both groups over the years is clearly different. The introduction of Dutch minority policy resulted indeed in a more positive political opportunity structure for Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. The number of Surinamese organisations increased significantly after 1980, from 2.2 per 1000 in 1980 to 3.5 in 1989. It is interesting to see that the relative number of organisations for both groups shows a similar level in the nineties (except for the slightly higher number of Turkish organisations in 1993). It appears that the Amsterdam minority policy structure produces a rather similar number of organisations among the two immigrant groups (around 3.5 organisations per every 1000 immigrants).

Figure 6.4, displaying the number of newly founded Surinamese and Turkish organisations per year, strengthens the conclusion that the introduction of Dutch multicultural policy created a more stable environment for Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. The number of newly founded Surinamese organisations a year increases strongly after 1983. The figure further shows that the first two peaks of new Surinamese organisations (in 1970 and 1975) can be explained by the arrival
of large numbers of Surinamese immigrants in those years. The peaks in the eighties are explained by the introduction of Dutch minority policy, but they also confirm the expectation of the ecological model that states that as the total number of organisations increases it becomes easier for organisers to establish more new organisations (which is indeed the case throughout the eighties). In the next period resources become scarcer, as a result of increased internal competition and the shift in Dutch multicultural policy, and the number of newly founded Surinamese organisations becomes significantly lower in the nineties. The Surinamese organising process has reached its carrying capacity by the end of the eighties (around 3.5 organisations per every 1000 Surinamese), as illustrated in the previous figure.

**Figure 6.4** Number of newly founded Surinamese and Turkish organisations per year in Amsterdam, 1960-2000

As explained in Chapter 4, the Turkish pattern of newly founded organisations a year is better explained by the ecological than the political opportunity model, as the Turkish peak years are located in the period 1990-1995 when the local political opportunity structure indicates a rather more negative than positive development. Also the group-related factors, which were influential in the first phase of the Turkish organising process, appear to be less strong as the Turkish settlement process evolves (with the exception of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict).
In general we can state that the comparison between the number of Surinamese and Turkish organisations in Amsterdam provides more differences than similarities. This would suggest, as we are using a convergent comparison, that group-related factors are more important than the local political opportunity structure. However, the political situation for Surinamese and Turkish organisations was so different in Amsterdam until 1983 that this strongly distorts the comparison. The Surinamese organising process was by then already almost thirty years old and the Surinamese organisers had just ended a chaotic period of internal competition and uncertainty. The Turkish organisers, on the other hand, were still in the first phase of the organising process and were in the middle of establishing their organisational framework that would provide them with the needed associational activities.

Before we are able to conduct a comparison of the types of Surinamese and Turkish organisations we need first to elaborate on the large differences that exist within the population of Surinamese organisations. Afro-Surinamese and Indo-Surinamese people have established separate and different types of organisations. In the next section we explain that, in terms of numbers, we can analyse the population of Surinamese organisations as a whole, but this is not the case in terms of types of organisations.

**Types of Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam: Afro- and Indo-Surinamese**

The Surinamese population in Amsterdam consists of several different ethnic groups. The description of organisational developments in the seventies shows that these groups established separate organisations and that Afro- and Indo-Surinamese immigrants formulated different organisational demands. In fact, Afro- and Indo-Surinamese have seldom established organisations together (Bloemberg 1995: 50), and least of all in the first phase of the Surinamese organising process in Amsterdam. Indo-Surinamese have valued their own ethnic organisation, separated from other Surinamese groups. In Amsterdam, they did not feel adequately represented by the Afro-Surinamese organisations which had initiated the Surinamese organising process. This was mainly a continuation of the situation in Surinam in which they also felt unrepresented by the main Surinamese organisations, which were practically all Afro-Surinamese. Indo-Surinamese leaders harnessed this discontent to start their own organising process in Amsterdam (Van Amersfoort 1970: 134). Some seventeen Indo-Surinamese organi-
sations sprang up between 1970 and 1975, only six less than within the much larger Afro-Surinamese community.

In terms of types of Surinamese organisations it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the two main Surinamese groups. This is a welcome addition to this study as it enables us to conduct another convergent comparison: between the Afro-and Indo-Surinamese organisational types. The political opportunity structure has been equal for both groups, formally speaking.4

Afro- and Indo-Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam

The Afro- and Indo-Surinamese groups differ in many respects. The origins of such differences go back to the colonial history of Surinam, but have been reinforced by migration to the Netherlands. The most important distinction between them within the context of their organising process concerns their types of social networks and their religious affiliations.

In general Afro-Surinamese networks can be characterised as more open than Indo-Surinamese ones. The Indo-Surinamese family structures are much tighter and less individualistic. Because Indo-Surinamese networks often include parents and children, social control and cohesion is far stronger than among the Afro-Surinamese (Van Niekerk 2000: 181-190). Mixed marriages with ethnic Dutch people are much more common for the Afro-Surinamese than for Indo-Surinamese.

In terms of their religious beliefs there is a strong distinction between the Christian Afro-Surinamese and the Hindu or Islamic Indo-Surinamese. At first the Afro-Surinamese immigrants did not establish their own religious organisations but joined those European institutions that they had been familiar with in Surinam (Cottaar 2004: 61), for example the protestant Evangelische Broedergemeente (EBG). Many Surinamese immigrants joined the Dutch section of the EBG, basically changing it into an Afro-Surinamese organisation with their own Afro-Surinamese religious school. In the nineties the Pentecostal movement gained popularity among some Afro-Surinamese groups (Van Heelsum & Voorthuysen 2002: 11-12), increasing the percentage of religious organisations among Afro-Surinamese organisations in that decade (see Table 6.2).

The Indo-Surinamese can be divided into a large Hindu group and a smaller Islamic one, each with their own separate organisations. Although the number of religious Hindu organisations is relatively high, they have struggled among themselves over the establishment of Hindu temples, mainly due to contradictory interests within the Surinamese-Hindu community (Van der Burg 1990: 105). The Indo-Surinamese in the Netherlands are often characterised as a homogeneous
group; they are however far more heterogenic than often presumed, not only in a religious sense but also in cultural terms (Gowricharn 1990: 9-10). What is indeed true, however, is that the Indo-Surinamese as a group places a lot of emphasis on preserving their religious and cultural traditions in the Netherlands. In that sense, the Indo-Surinamese are more engaged in maintaining a sense of ethnic community than the Afro-Surinamese (Van Niekerk 1994: 64).

The Surinamese population in Amsterdam consists predominantly of Afro-Surinamese. The Indo-Surinamese form a majority in other Surinamese populations in the Netherlands, mainly in The Hague (Bloemberg 1995: 63). Table 6.1 illustrates the changing ethnic composition of the Surinamese population in Amsterdam since 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Afro-Surinamese (%)</th>
<th>Indo-Surinamese (%)</th>
<th>Other ethnic Surinamese groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Van Amersfoort 1970: 113; Gooskens 1979: 15; Martens and Verweij 1997: 10

At first the Surinamese immigrants in Amsterdam were overwhelmingly Afro-Surinamese, but the proportion of Indo-Surinamese grew after 1974, although always remaining a minority. This shows that the character of the Surinamese immigration to Amsterdam changed especially during the years around Surinamese independence. Many Indo-Surinamese left Surinam for the Netherlands in fear of Afro-Surinamese domination after independence. These Indo-Surinamese immigrants came as families, which explains the sudden increase of Indo-Surinamese people in Amsterdam between 1970 and 1977. As the figures are estimates and no precise yearly numbers are available we cannot display the relative number of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisations as was done for the Turkish groups or for the entire Surinamese population in Amsterdam.

**Types of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisations**

The literature has characterised Indo-Surinamese organisations as highly religious and explicitly concerned with strengthening their ethnic and religious community (Bloemberg 1995). Afro-Surinamese organisations, on the other hand, have been characterised as concerned
with promoting unity among the Surinamese in the Netherlands. They tend to highly value an on-going relationship with people in Surinam and emphasise the importance of knowledge of the country’s history, in particular its colonial past. Afro-Surinamese immigrants, in stark contrast to the Indo-Surinamese, have founded many organisations whose activities focus directly on Surinam. Table 6.2, showing the distribution of types of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisations, illustrates this along with other differences between the two ethnic groups. A large proportion of the Afro-Surinamese organisations have been directly involved in the country of origin, supporting developments or projects in Surinam such as schools and hospitals. Especially in the seventies these were core activities of the Afro-Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam, when this type of activity constituted the second largest goal for Afro-Surinamese organisations. Very few Indo-Surinamese organisations have been established that aim at improving the situation in Surinam. The Indo-Surinamese community is much more interested in its ‘real’ motherland, either India or Pakistan (if it concerns Islamic Indo-Surinamese). Indian culture (either from India itself or from the large Indian community in Britain) has proved a significant influence on the Indo-Surinamese youth in the Netherlands (Van Niekerk 1994: 67).

Table 6.2 further illustrates that the Indo-Surinamese organisations have been indeed overwhelmingly religious in nature. Throughout the Indo-Surinamese settlement process the vast majority of organisations of this group have been involved in religious or sociocultural activities. Religion has been the most obvious organisational principal for Indo-Surinamese for several reasons. Indo-Surinamese immigration to the Netherlands was a family migration. Complete families came as a group causing a sudden demand for religious Indo-Surinamese institutions (mainly Hindu but also Islamic) in Amsterdam in the seventies. The family migration also resulted in the transplantation of almost complete family networks. Because of this, the social function of the Indo-Surinamese organisations was less in demand, at least in the sense that networks did not need to be reconstructed, which can be an important function for the first organisations of recently arrived immigrant groups. Instead, Indo-Surinamese organisations could fully focus on the cultural and religious aspects of their community. Maintaining Indo-Surinamese culture and religion became the prime focus of the organisations, as well as incorporating the second generation into the ethnic community as much as possible (Bloemberg 1995: 201). One of the practical reasons that so many Indo-Surinamese organisations were established was the strong competition between different types of Hindu movements within the Indo-Surinamese community (Bloemberg 1995: 51).
The distribution of Afro-Surinamese organisational activities displays a more diverse picture. Afro-Surinamese had already a wide diversity of organisational types to choose from in the 1970s, as their organisational history had begun long before that. We see also in the seventies a number of Afro-Surinamese women’s organisations, which was unusual in this period. Among other immigrant groups women had not yet founded separate organisations. This relatively early existence of women’s organisations can be attributed mainly to the high level of female representation in the Surinamese population as compared to other groups. Figure 6.5 shows that the female-to-male ratios in the Surinamese population have been reasonably steady since the early seventies, with women slightly surpassing men from 1976 onwards. This contrasts sharply with the male-dominated guest worker groups of Turkish immigrants. Especially within the Afro-Surinamese community women play an active role in society, as seen for instance in their high rate of participation in the labour market (Van Niekerk 2002: 97-98). Also in terms of the organising process these women have been very important. Afro-Surinamese women have functioned as intermediates between the Afro-Surinamese constituency and the leaders of the Afro-Surinamese formal organisations (Van Wetering 1986: 243-244).

**Table 6.2** Percentage distributions of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese immigrant organisations in Amsterdam by the activities of the organisations, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Afro %</th>
<th>Indo %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>'70s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest representation</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocultural</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>129.1</td>
<td>140.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N. of associations =</strong></td>
<td>196</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dutch National Archive; Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce
Comparing the Afro- and Indo-Surinamese and Turkish types of organisations

In Chapter 4 we discussed the distribution of Turkish organisational types (Table 4.1 on page 98) and found clear results in terms of development over time. We focused on three possible developments: the differentiation process, the influence of an external shift (for instance a changing policy or a different demographic composition) and the influence of ecological factors. It appeared that the differentiation process applied to both the Turks in Amsterdam and in Berlin. In other words, as the Turkish settlement process evolved, the number of different types of Turkish organisational activities increased, indicating that larger immigrant populations are able to sustain different fractions within the Turkish community and achieve a more institutionally complete status. This differentiation process was not so much directly related to the different Turkish political and religious movements, but more to the different types of organisational demands within an immigrant community (for instance, a small immigrant population cannot sustain a specific organisation for the education of its children, but a larger immigrant population can).

For the Afro- and Indo-Surinamese we see a similar development. Table 6.2 shows that for both groups a process of differentiation has taken place. The growth of the Surinamese population in Amsterdam
has resulted in a more diversified organisational field. Even among the Indo-Surinamese, who are often characterised as an example of a more inflexible ethnic community, we see a more varied organisational structure emerging in the nineties.

Looking again at the Turkish settlement processes in Amsterdam and Berlin (Table 4.1), perhaps more surprising than the differentiation process is the fact that external shifts had very little effect on the distribution into types of Turkish organisations. This result provides strong evidence for the ecological model which foresees a continuation of organisational activities over time. Ecologists state that once the structure of any organisational field is established, fundamental changes are very difficult to bring about. In the founding phase organisers are looking for successful forms of activities. The more numerous specific organisational activities are (and therefore the more common), the more these types of organisations will be accepted as legitimate means of organising (by the organisers themselves and by others). Others will copy these successful activities, which results in a continuation of the organisational structure of the form in later phases. Once the structure of the organisational field is established, external forces (such as changes in the political environment, or shifts in the demographic structure of the immigrant population) are less consequential for the development of the organisational form; the legitimate organisational template has already been established and it is difficult to deviate from this. In other words, the density of the organisational activity protects organisers and the overall organisational structure from external shifts.

If we now look at the distribution of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisational activities we see again strong evidence for the ecological model. Especially the Indo-Surinamese development follows the ecological pattern, but also the Afro-Surinamese organisational activities are better characterised by continuation than by strong change. We will describe the development of both groups separately.

Table 6.2 illustrates that the distribution of Indo-Surinamese organisational activities displays an almost completely continuous picture; the differences between the decades are minimal (except for interest representation and sociocultural). Considering the fact that the Indo-Surinamese community in Amsterdam closely resembles the typical strong ethnic community in which the second generation is included and the demographic composition has remained very stable over the years, we would not expect to see dramatic shifts in the distribution. However, the degree of continuity over thirty years in terms of the distribution of activities is so strong that we can indeed conclude that the first Indo-Surinamese organisers in the seventies established an organisational template that has been widely used by succeeding organisers. The continuation is not due to the fact that the Indo-Surinamese
organisational field has not changed at all since the seventies. Fifty new Indo-Surinamese organisations were founded in the eighties and twenty-four organisations in the nineties; two Indo-Surinamese organisations were dissolved in the seventies and twenty in the eighties. These numbers illustrate the fact that there were a lot of changes in terms of individual organisations coming and leaving, however this did not change anything about the overall Indo-Surinamese organisational structure, as new organisers followed in the footsteps of their predecessors.

For the Afro-Surinamese we would expect to see more influence exerted by the changing local political opportunity structure, because their organisations have been the subject of government policy frameworks ever since the early seventies. We have seen the introduction of subsidies for Afro-Surinamese welfare organisations in 1974 and a significant decrease in the amount of subsidies for the same type of organisation in the second half of the eighties. We would expect this external shift to have had a strong influence on the percentage of Afro-Surinamese welfare organisations in the nineties. In addition, the Afro-Surinamese organisations are characterised as strongly focused on the country of origin and Afro-Surinamese culture. According to the literature these types of organisations, which relate directly to the situation before immigration, are expected to decrease in importance as the immigrants slowly lose their connection with the country of origin.

Table 6.2 illustrates that there are some interesting changes in the types of organisations that were most influenced by the external shifts described above (social welfare and country of origin) but that it is the continuation in distribution that is more pronounced (especially considering the fact that seventy-six new Afro-Surinamese organisations were founded in the eighties and sixty-nine in the nineties, four Afro-Surinamese organisations dissolved in the seventies and thirty-two in the eighties). Since the turnover rate was high in this group (the highest of all groups described in this study) we can conclude that new organisers have predominantly reproduced the most successful Afro-Surinamese forms, otherwise we would not see this rather stable structure of organisational activities. The external shifts have been influential on two accounts, but not as significant as expected. The number of Afro-Surinamese welfare organisations has always been high according to Table 6.2, which has undoubtedly been influenced by the Amsterdam political opportunity structure of the seventies. Although the number of welfare organisations decreased in the nineties, it still remains the third most important organisational activity among the Afro-Surinamese. This shows that in spite of the diminishing amount of subsidy (Surinamese welfare organisations were almost entirely ineligible for
subsidy in this period), new Afro-Surinamese organisers still engaged in providing social services to their community.

In terms of organisations related directly to a project in the country of origin we do see a decreasing importance over time as expected, but more than a dozen Afro-Surinamese organisations were still active in this field in the nineties (much more than among the other researched groups). This can be taken to mean that Afro-Surinamese organisations are still rather active in establishing projects in Surinam. The continued strong link with Surinam is also seen in other studies on Surinamese transnational relationships (Gowricharn and Schüster, 2001).

Summary

The comparison of the three immigrant groups in Amsterdam (Turks, Afro-Surinamese and Indo-Surinamese) in this chapter shows again that group-related factors determine the first phase of the three immigrant organising processes. The numbers of immigrant organisations as well as the types of immigrant organisational activities are predominantly influenced by factors related to the immigrants themselves.

There are several factors related to the immigrant group which have had a significant influence on the emergence and development of the first immigrant Turkish and Surinamese organisations. First, the increasing size of the immigrant group causes an increasing organisational demand, resulting in a higher number of Turkish and Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. Secondly, the immigration process itself is important. It causes disorder and uncertainty in the lives of the immigrant newcomers, for which some of the first Turkish and Surinamese organisations provide a solution by recreating a familiar environment (the cushioning function). Thirdly, there is the influence from the country of origin, which can be a direct organisational influence as was the case for the Turkish organisations or a more indirect influence as was the case for the Afro- and Indo-Surinamese.

Turkish ideological movements actively engaged in establishing Turkish immigrant organisations in Western Europe, thereby directly influencing the number and type of the first Turkish organisations in Amsterdam. The colonial Surinamese society had a more indirect influence on Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam. The Surinamese were used to the idea of civic organisations existing mainly as vehicles for personal interest. This was also the case for many of the Surinamese immigrant organisations in Amsterdam in the seventies. In addition, the different ethnic groups organised separately in Surinam, and
they continued to do so in the first phase of the Surinamese immigrant organising process.

Finally, religion appears to be an important group-related factor in the first phase of the Surinamese and Turkish organising processes. For the Turks and Indo-Surinamese religion was the most important reason to establish separate immigrant organisations, as their religion was completely dissimilar from that found in Dutch society. Both groups established their own religious institutions separate from other immigrant groups immediately upon arrival in Amsterdam. For the Afro-Surinamese this was less important, as indicated by a low percentage of Afro-Surinamese religious organisations. They could join Dutch religious institutions, which diminished their demand for separate religious immigrant organisations. The Afro-Surinamese displayed a more varied need for organisational activities (interest representation, welfare, sociocultural and country of origin). These types reflected the uncertain situation in which many Afro-Surinamese newcomers found themselves just after their arrival in Amsterdam in the early seventies.

The political opportunity structure is most influential in the second phase of the organising process of immigrants in Amsterdam. It determines to a large extent the number of newly founded organisations and the total number of existing organisations. The period in which new policy is introduced is especially influential. Immigrants use this opening in the political opportunity structure to step up associational behaviour. For the Surinamese we see an increase in organisational behaviour around 1975 and 1983, both periods in which local authorities implemented new policy for Surinamese organisations. For the Turkish organisations we see a similar response around 1983 when the introduction of Dutch minority policy provided new opportunities and external resources.

Ecological forces determine the third phase of the three organising processes in Amsterdam, as they protected prevailing structures (numbers and types of activities) from external changes. The number of Turkish and Surinamese organisations does not change significantly in this third phase. The types of organisational activities remain remarkably similar for all groups. Just as would be expected according to the ecology model, successful organisational activities are copied by new organisations, which leaves the general structure of the organisational population intact although individual organisations may come and go.
Introduction

This study has focused on the emergence and persistence of immigrant organisations in host societies. The relevance of immigrant organisations for both the host society and the immigrants themselves has been effectively demonstrated in many different studies. However, the question why immigrant organisations emerge and why they often persist over a long period is not adequately answered. What are the main factors explaining the emergence and persistence of immigrant associations? And how does the influence of these factors change over time? One of the main reasons why we do not have good answers to these questions is the lack of comparative research. Few studies have analysed the associational behaviour of more than one immigrant group and even fewer studies consider the associational behaviour of immigrants in more than one city. Because of this lack of comparative research, it is difficult to move beyond the individual cases and distinguish the common and the specific traits among the associational behaviour of immigrants. In this study a comparative approach is used to reveal the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process.

The immigrant organising process consists of various elements, such as the number of organisations, the members of the organisations and the leaders of the organisations. As it is not feasible to consider all characteristics of immigrant organising in the scope of one study, we concentrate on three important elements: the number of formal immigrant organisations, the type of formal immigrant organisations and the interorganisational relationships between the organisations.

The goal of this study is threefold. First, we try to identify the main factors that influence the immigrant organising process. Secondly, we analyse how the influence of the main explanatory factors may shift over time. And lastly, we compare the organising processes of three different immigrant groups over a period of forty years. To identify and understand the influence of the explanatory factors involved, we have formulated a model. In this model the main explanatory factors of the immigrant organising process are included, derived from the existing
immigration literature. The model allows for a comparison between the immigrant organising processes of Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin, and Surinamese in Amsterdam, for the period 1960-2000.

The model, described in Chapters 2 and 3, distinguishes three sets of explanatory factors that influence the emergence, persistence, and development of immigrant organisations in host societies. The first is group-related factors. These refer to characteristics of the immigrants themselves, such as the size of the population, their socio-cultural background and their relationship with the country of origin. The second set of factors relates to the political opportunity structure in the host society. The literature indicates a strong influence of the host society on the immigrant organising process. Many studies point out that the so-called political opportunity structure of the host society affects the associational behaviour of immigrants in a variety of ways. The third set of factors stems from internal dynamics between organisations, known as ecological factors. Organisational ecology literature emphasises that organisations, whatever their type or purpose, do not function autonomously but operate within a population of organisations. Within this population, individual associations strongly influence one another.

All three sets of factors are expected to have a specific influence on the emergence, persistence or development of the characteristics of the immigrant organising process: numbers, types and relationships. The literature provides different, sometimes contradictory, expectations concerning the influence of these explanatory factors. We will explain the three sets of factors further and look at their expected influence on the different characteristics of the immigrant organising process. After that we will look at how their influence is expected to change as the settlement process evolves.

**Group-related factors**

The immigration literature expects group-related factors to strongly influence the immigrant organising process, especially when the transition from the country of origin to the country of settlement has just occurred. This transition has a significant, disruptive impact on the lives of the immigrants as they are trying to cope with their new environment. The emotional connection with the country of origin will be strong in this first period as many immigrants have not yet decided to settle permanently but expect to return home after a certain time. The process of immigration tends to intensify and sharpen the collective identities of immigrants based on their national or ethnic descent and causes immigrants to reconsider their own identity. Perceived threats to the immigrant population can further foment an increasing group
identity among immigrants. Especially those aspects of a group’s cultural origin that come into conflict with existing institutions of the host society can become issues around which ethnic institutions, consciousness and identities are formed. Religion is the most obvious example of this.

The main group-related factors are: (1) the immigration process itself, causing disruption in the lives of the immigrants and intensifying collective identities; (2) the demographic characteristic of the immigrant population, for instance the size of the immigrant population. The more immigrants there are in a settlement, the higher the demand for separate immigrant organisations; (3) the influence from the country of origin. Research has shown that immigrants coming from well-developed civic societies are likely to found many organisations in their new environment. In addition, the country of origin can produce a more direct influence by establishing or financing immigrant organisations abroad.

These three group-related factors increase the demand for separate immigrant organisations, which will then increase the number of immigrant organisations in the host society. The group-related factors also influence the type of immigrant organisations. The immigration literature expects immigrants to found organisations similar in type to the ones they are used to in the country of origin. The most important will usually be religious organisations, as these are often absent in the host society.

Group-related factors can also influence interorganisational relationships between immigrant organisations in a settlement. Coalitions and polarisations are imported from the country of origin and often reappear in the host society. This means that organisations with similar ideological backgrounds tend to support affiliated organisations, which enhances formal relationships between these organisations. In a similar way, organisational competition and conflicts between ideological movements will be brought from the country of origin, which will decrease the number of formal relationships and increase polarisation in the immigrant community.

**The political opportunity structure (POS)**

The political opportunity structure model emphasises the importance of external resources to the organising process of immigrant groups. Political opportunities are strongly related to the extent to which host state authorities are receptive to the specific demands of immigrants. The political opportunity model predicts that the level of group mobilisation and organisation will be a direct outcome of the structure of political institutions in a given society. Changes in external opportunities
can spur or inhibit group action, as changes in the external political opportunity structure provide external incentives for people to create or dissolve an organisation. These external incentives directly affect the expectations for success or failure among people and this will either increase or decrease their associational behaviour.

As the receptivity of the authorities toward mobilising groups is strongly related to the political opportunity structure it is important to consider the attitude of the host state authorities toward immigrants and their organisations. The host state authorities can display a receptive attitude toward immigrant groups by providing easy access to citizenship, offering financial support to immigrant organisations and including immigrant organisations in the policy-making process. Within this pluralistic approach a high degree of organisational activity is expected. The Netherlands is often seen as an example of this type of policy regime. Or, in contrast, the host state authorities can display an unreceptive, or even hostile, attitude toward immigrant groups. This attitude is reflected in an absence of immigrant policy and an indifferent attitude toward immigrant organisations. This approach is expected to have a negative effect on the organisational behaviour of immigrants. Germany is often considered an example of such an exclusive approach.

According to the POS model organisations are created to take advantage of political and institutional opportunities. If powerful groups change their attitude toward politically marginal groups and become more receptive to their claims, the marginal groups will respond to this opportunity by stepping up group action and founding more organisations. Or the other way around, if powerful groups become less receptive to the claims of marginal groups fewer organisations will be founded. A strong increase in the number of immigrant organisations is expected right after positive policy changes by the host state authorities have been introduced. The implementation of Dutch minority policy in the early eighties is a good example of such a positive policy shift. Political theorists would expect right after the implementation of this new policy a strong increase in the number of immigrant organisations.

In terms of types of immigrant organisations, the political opportunity structure in the host society is expected to influence those types of organisations that are most legitimate in the host society. So, for instance, if in the host society youth organisations are frequently present, this may also increase the number of immigrant youth organisations.

When immigrant organisations exist within a positive environment, as is the case for Turkish organisations in Amsterdam (compared to the situation in Berlin), a larger number of interorganisational relationships are expected by the political opportunity structure model. The
POS model argues that when resources are more available, organisations are better able and more inclined to express their ideological distinctiveness and look for formal collaboration with similar organisations. A positive political opportunity structure is therefore expected to increase the number of formal interorganisational relationships among immigrant organisations.

The organisational ecology model

The organisational ecology model focuses primarily on the dynamics within groups of organisations rather than on external conditions. This model claims that internal dynamics will be present in any organisational population and that these dynamics will govern the founding rate of future organisations. Important in this respect is the concept of ‘density’, defined in this model as the total number of organisations of a similar type. Density has implications for legitimacy, one of the critical resources for creating an organisation. If few organisations of a given type exist (low density), then new organisations of a similar type will have to struggle for legitimacy, because the society is not yet familiar with them. New organisations foster the legitimacy of the entire group of organisations. Once the number of organisations increases, the struggle for legitimacy will drop, opening the way for more organisations of this type. Organisational ecologists believe that the founding rate of new organisations is strongly related to the total number of existing organisations (density). At the same time, growth in the number of organisations will eventually intensify competition, thereby slowing founding rates and increasing dissolution rates.

The organisational ecology model expects that internal dynamics will influence the types of immigrant organisations. In the founding phase, organisers are looking for successful forms of activities. The more numerous specific organisational activities are, and therefore the more common, the more these types of organisations will be accepted as legitimate means of organisation, both by the organisers themselves and by members of the public. Other organisers will copy these successful activities, which results in a continuation of the organisational structure of the form. Once the structure of the organisational field is established, external forces (such as changes in the political environment, or shifts in the demographic structure of the immigrant population) are less consequential for the development of the organisational form, simply because legitimacy already exists.

The organisational ecology model further expects that interorganisational relationships will increase as the population of organisations develops. Interorganisational relationships normally function as a route through which successful and legitimate routines are transferred from
one organisation to the other. Within an expanding organisational population more interorganisational relationships will be found. The increase in interorganisational relationships will continue until the population reaches its carrying capacity; from this moment on a period of increased competition sets in. This will decrease the number of interorganisational relationships among immigrant organisations, as the more powerful organisations in the population are expected to reduce their interlocks and focus only on those interorganisational relations that are most important to them.

Not only do the three sets of explanatory factors – group-related, POS and ecological – have a specific influence on the number, type and interorganisational relationships of immigrant organisations in host societies, their influence is also expected to shift over time. The next section briefly looks at the expected shifts in influence of the three sets of explanatory factors.

**Shifting influence over time**

Considering the shifting influence of the explanatory factors over time is a difficult task. It assumes that we can indicate moments in time when the influence of certain factors increases or declines. In this study we have divided the settlement process into three phases. We assume that these phases also indicate different periods in the immigrant organising process, with each phase lasting for about ten to fifteen years. Since there are no clear definitions of phases in the immigrant settlement process, we will provide a short description of the characteristics of each phase.

The first phase can best be described as a period of orientation and adjustment. In this phase the immigrants familiarise themselves with the host society and are for the most part engaged in meeting the basic necessities of life, such as work and housing. In this phase the majority of the immigrants are confident that they will return home after a certain period of earning money. Often the rest of the family still lives in the country of origin during this phase.

The second phase can best be described as a period of increased adaptation. Although many immigrant hope to return home some day, this becomes increasingly more difficult in this period as their lives become more and more entangled with the host society. In this phase the process of family reunion often emerges, increasing the number of women and children in the immigrant population. In addition, second-generation immigrants are born and raised in the host society.
In the third phase the adaptation becomes more permanent as the first generation grows older and the second generation reaches maturity. Generally speaking, the immigrant community slowly loses its link with the country of origin, although not completely. The immigrant community and their organisations become more focused on the country of settlement as most issues important to them are by now related to the host society. It also becomes more difficult to speak of an immigrant population in this period as an increasing portion of the group have been born and raised in the host society and are therefore no longer immigrants.

We now briefly describe the expected shifting influence of the three sets of factors as the settlement process evolves.

**Group-related factors**

As the settlement process evolves and the point of immigration lies further back, the influence of the group-related factors on the immigrant organising process is expected to weaken and to change. The connection with the country of origin becomes weaker, the collective identity of the immigrant group fades and the emergence of the second generation constitutes a different, less ethnically based organisational demand. In other words, the demand for separate immigrant organisations is expected to decrease over time. As a result, fewer immigrant organisations will be established and more immigrant organisations will disappear. In terms of types of organisations the immigration literature expects to see more and more immigrant organisations directly engaged in matters concerning the host society and a declining number of immigrant organisations involved in matters in the country of origin.

**The political opportunity structure in host society**

We expect the local opportunity structure to be most influential in the second phase of the organising process. At first, immigrants and host state authorities tend to avoid each other as much as possible and only communicate on the basic issues that need urgent solutions, such as bad housing or working conditions. In the second phase this ambiguous and noncommittal attitude on the part of the host state authorities is no longer feasible. Socio-political issues arise, for which a political response needs to be formulated. It depends on the approach of host state authorities toward these socio-political issues whether in this second phase the political opportunity structure opens up or remains closed. In the Netherlands we see the emergence of multicultural policy in this phase (an inclusive approach), which increased the available
external resources for immigrant organisations and opened the local political opportunity structure in Amsterdam. The German authorities, on the other hand, were less inclusive toward immigrants in their solutions to certain socio-political issues.

**The organisational ecology model**

In the beginning of the organising process, the structure of an organisational population is decided by selection processes. The most successful organisations are used as a template for future organisations. Once the structure of the organisational population, in terms of number, types of organisations and interorganisational networks, is established it becomes very difficult to change the shape of the organisational population through the influences of external factors. This means that ecological forces are influential from the very beginning of the immigrant organising process, but their influence increases and the result of this influence becomes more visible in the third phase of the immigrant organising process.

Table 7.1 illustrates the expectations of the three explanatory factors for understanding the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group-related factors</th>
<th>Political opportunity structure host society</th>
<th>Ecological factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that in the second phase the three sets of explanatory factors are all influential. If in this phase one of the three is more influential than the other two within a particular context, this will have a determining effect on the future direction of the immigrant process. The table further illustrates that the influence of group-related factors is located in the beginning of the immigrant organising process, the influence of the host state’s political opportunity structure in the middle of the immigrant organising process, and the ecological factors are most determinative in the third phase.

The comparison between the Turkish organising processes in Amsterdam and Berlin and between the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes in Amsterdam has enabled us to assess the influence of
the three explanatory sets of factors on the different elements of the immigrant organising process over time.

**Immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin**

The three empirical chapters on the comparison of the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes provide interesting material to assess the changing influence of the explanatory factors. We specifically studied three different elements of the Turkish and Surinamese organising process: (1) the development in the number of Turkish (in Amsterdam and Berlin) and Surinamese (in Amsterdam) immigrant organisations, (2) the development in the distribution of types of Turkish and Surinamese immigrant organisations and (3) the internal networks of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin.

In general, the shifting influence of the explanatory factors on the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes was clearly detected and the shifts followed to a large extent the patterns predicted in Table 7.1. We will now look more closely at the different sets of factors.

**Group-related factors**

Group-related factors almost completely determine the emergence of an immigrant organising process by defining the level of demand for separate immigrant organisations in the first phase of the immigrant organising process. Just as predicted by the immigration literature, the number and the type of immigrant organisations in the first phase are strongly related to the main group-related characteristics: (1) the immigration process, (2) the character of the immigrant group and (3) the influence from the country of origin. The relative number and distribution in types of Turkish organisations was remarkably similar in Amsterdam and Berlin in the seventies, which indicates a strong influence exerted by group-related factors. Another example of the strong influence of the group-related factors on the first phase of the immigrant organising process can be found in the comparable development of Turkish interorganisational networks and Turkish ideological movements in Amsterdam and Berlin in the eighties. Although in this decade the Amsterdam and Berlin political opportunity structures were fundamentally different, we see in both cities a similar sequence in the development of ideological movements that were strongly influenced by the situation in Turkey. In addition, a similar establishment of an extended religious organisational infrastructure emerged in both Amsterdam and Berlin in this period. The increase in the number of Islamic organisations was strongly related to the increasing size of the Turkish im-
migrant population in both cities and the growing numbers of Turkish women and children, which intensified the demand for Turkish religious organisations.

The comparison between Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam also provides evidence that group-related factors are most influential in the emergence phase of the immigrant organising process, considering the completely different distribution in types of Afro- and Indo-Surinamese organisations in the seventies. As the two groups had different socio-cultural backgrounds and a different relationship with the country of origin, we would expect them to establish different types of organisations, which was indeed the case. A majority of the Indo-Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam had a clear religious purpose. A large number of the Afro-Surinamese organisations, on the other hand, were directly involved in the country of origin, supporting developments or projects in Surinam such as schools or hospitals. Religious organisations were much less common among this group.

**The political opportunity structure**

The political opportunity structure proved to have a significant influence on the number of immigrant organisations, especially in periods when new policy was being implemented. The Surinamese immigrants, for instance, established many new organisations just after 1974 when structural policy for this group was introduced by the local authorities. But it is the comparison between Amsterdam and Berlin that provides the best evidence that the opening of a political opportunity structure does indeed result in more immigrant organisations. As soon as the minority policy was introduced in Amsterdam in the early eighties the number of Turkish organisations increased substantially, whereas in Berlin the number increased only slightly in the same period. Turks in Amsterdam took advantage of the opening in the political opportunity structure, which occurred because the authorities changed their attitude toward immigrant groups in general and became more receptive to Turkish claims. Turks reacted to this new opportunity by stepping up group action and they established many new organisations after 1980.

The negative results of a closing opportunity structure were not much detected among the groups described in this study. The narrowing of the local opportunity structure in Amsterdam and Berlin in the nineties did not have the expected negative impact on the number of Turkish and Surinamese organisations. In terms of interorganisational networks the difference in political opportunity structure in Amsterdam and Berlin was most influential in the third phase of the Turkish
organising process. During the nineties the development of the Turkish interorganisational linkages in both cities suddenly diverged. In Amsterdam the effects of ten years of multicultural policy are clearly visible in the extensiveness of the formal interorganisational links that were established by the Turkish organisations. We see one extended Turkish network in which all different Turkish political and religious movements are interconnected. In Berlin, on the other hand, we see a much smaller network clustered around the two main umbrella organisations (one left-wing, the other conservative) and all other ideological movements are completely isolated in their own small component.

In general, we can state that the political opportunity structure has the most influence in the second phase of the immigrant organising process, except for the interorganisational networks between Turkish organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin in the nineties and the Afro-Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam in the early seventies. In the first phase, group-related factors are more influential and in later phases ecological factors protect organisers from external shifts and significantly reduce the influence of the political opportunity structure. Also the political opportunity structure has far less influence on the types of organisations than on the number and networks of organisations. It seems that a positive political opportunity structure increases both the external resources (wealth) and the socio-political legitimacy of the organisations of immigrant groups. These vital resources are used to establish new organisations and new interorganisational relationships but have less effect on the activities that immigrant organisations produce.

The organisational ecology model

The comparisons between the different groups found that ecological factors were especially strong in the third phase of the immigrant organising process. All groups described in this study displayed a similarly strong influence of internal organisational dynamics as the settlement process evolved. Gaining legitimacy proved to be a vital element for establishing the immigrant organisational population more firmly in the second phase, but the influence of the external factors (group-related or host society) was still stronger in this period (the eighties). Especially in terms of the distribution in types of immigrant organisations the predictions of the ecological model came true for all four groups compared in this study (Turks in Berlin, Turks in Amsterdam, and Afro-Surinamese and Indo-Surinamese in Amsterdam). External shifts had very little effect on the distribution in types of immigrant organisations as the settlement processes of the different groups evolved in both cities.
Ecologists state that once the structure of any organisational field is established, fundamental changes are very difficult to bring about. In the founding phase organisers are looking for successful forms of activities. The more numerous specific organisational activities are (and therefore the more common), the more these types of organisations will be accepted as legitimate means of organising, by the organisers themselves and by others. Others will copy these successful activities, which results in a continuation of the organisational structure of the form in later phases. Once the structure of the organisational field is established, external forces (such as changes in the political environment, or shifts in the demographic structure of the immigrant population) are less consequential for the development of the organisational form. The legitimate organisational template has already been established and it is difficult to deviate from this. In other words, the density of the organisational activity protects organisers and the overall organisational structure from external shifts. And although the founding and dissolving rates among the four immigrant groups were high, we did not detect any significant change in the distribution of organisational types. Because of this the influence from the group-related factors becomes all the more important, as they decide in the first phase which organisational types are the most legitimate. Once this legitimisation process has been set ecological forces ensure that the immigrant organisational population remains the same.

Also in terms of the number of immigrant organisations (and of interorganisational relationships) the ecological model provides interesting explanations, although the predicted ecological patterns plotted on the founding rates of organisations, as an upside down U, were much more detectable in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In Amsterdam, we see that the higher the total number of Turkish organisations in the city the more new Turkish organisations are founded per year, until the carrying capacity is reached and the founding rates decline. In Berlin, the founding rates seem to be independent from the total number of Turkish organisations (density) in the city and fluctuate over time.

The development in the number of Turkish interorganisational relationships in Amsterdam confirms the ecological model better than the development in Berlin. The number of interorganisational relationships increased during the eighties, as the second phase of the Turkish organising process set in. Interorganisational relationships were expected to further develop the Turkish organisational structure in both cities. In Amsterdam we did see an increase in the number of formal interorganisational relationships among Turkish organisations. This phase continued until 1995, after which the number of formal interorganisational relationships among Turkish organisations decreased, due to heightened competition. In Berlin, on the other hand, the process of
reallocating organisational routines (the interorganisational relationships that function as a route through which successful and legitimate routines are transferred from older organisations to new ones) did not result in a large increase of formal interorganisational relationships among Turkish organisations. According to the model used in this study, we expect that this is due to the fact that socio-political legitimacy plays a larger role in Amsterdam than in Berlin because of the active involvement of the Amsterdam authorities in the Turkish and Surinamese organising processes.

Table 7.2 summarizes the main conclusions of the two comparisons conducted in this study. It displays the elements on which the three sets of factors are most influential in the different phases of the organising process. If the element is coloured grey, it means that for this particular element in this particular phase the concerned set of explanatory factors is most influential.

### Table 7.2  Influence of the three main sets of explanatory factors on specific elements of the immigrant organising process over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Group-related factors</th>
<th>Political opportunity structure in host society</th>
<th>Ecological factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td></td>
<td>type networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>networks</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>number</td>
<td></td>
<td>type networks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>type</td>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>number</td>
<td></td>
<td>networks number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(grey area indicates that the set of factors is the strongest determinant on this element of the immigrant organising process in this phase)

The table shows again the determining influence of group-related factors on the immigrant organising process. In all three phases this set is influential and it dominates the first (most important) phase of the immigrant organising process. The political opportunity structure in host society is perhaps less influential overall than the group-related factors, but it is the determinative factor on two very important elements of the immigrant organising process, the number and networks, in two different phases. In terms of the number of immigrant organisations the political opportunity structure is the most influential factor of the three as it determines to a large extent the development of the total number of existing immigrant organisations in the second phase. Eco-
logical factors are influential in all three phases of the immigrant organising process, which makes it such an important factor.

We follow Debra Minkoff (1995) in her conclusion that density dependence is an important mechanism that drives the process of legitimacy when it comes to minority or immigrant organisations. Initial growth in the immigrant organisational population is the determining factor in establishing the legitimacy of the organisational form. This type of legitimacy is related to the visibility of the specific organisational forms. The more prevalent organisations are, the more likely they are to be noticed and accepted as valid actors (cognitive legitimacy). But legitimacy is also related to socio-political issues. In order to increase the socio-political legitimacy in Amsterdam and Berlin, Turkish organisers needed to find ways of adapting to existing norms and win the approval of the powerful groups. Turkish organisers in Amsterdam succeeded better in this than their colleagues in Berlin, as Dutch authorities were far more willing to collaborate with Turkish organisers and provide them with the essential organisational resources (wealth, power and legitimacy). As socio-political legitimacy is rarely won by new organisations acting on their own, Turkish organisers in both cities needed to cooperate with other Turkish organisations to increase the socio-political legitimacy of their organisational form. Again in Amsterdam, they were more successful in establishing collaborative networks that encompassed the entire Turkish community than in Berlin, where important parts of the Turkish community remained completely isolated.

Comparative method and contribution of this study

This study has used a comparative method as suggested by Nancy Green (1999). She distinguishes two types of comparisons: the divergent and convergent. The first type takes the group as constant and looks at similar immigrant groups in different places. In this type of comparison differences are found and explained at the level of the host environment (as the groups do not differ). The second type of comparison takes the host environment as constant and compares different immigrant groups in one place or city. This type of comparison implies that differences will be found (and explained) at the level of the immigrant groups themselves. Both types of comparisons were used.

The comparative method proved to be a productive tool for coming to a better understanding of the structural determinants of the immigrant organising process. It enabled us to move beyond the individual cases and distinguish the common and the more specific traits among the associational behaviour of different immigrant groups in a host so-
Nevertheless, the comparative method was not without complication, as the presumption that the host state can be taken as a constant for different groups turned out to be somewhat problematic. The host society is, as it happens, almost never identical for different immigrant groups. Some groups have a head start in a host society because they are more familiar with the culture (Surinamese compared to Turks in Amsterdam). Or the starting position of a certain immigrant group in the host society is better than other groups (because a majority of the immigrant group has certain educational or professional skills). Even for the different ethnic Surinamese groups in Amsterdam, who came from the same country and possessed a similar knowledge of Dutch culture and society, the environment was not completely similar. The Amsterdam authorities approached the Afro-Surinamese more inclusively than the Indo-Surinamese, for example, which then impacts their associational behaviour, although formally speaking the political opportunity structure for both Surinamese ethnic groups was similar.

This study has illustrated that a comparative and long-term approach to the associational behaviour of immigrants in a host society produces significant information that enables us to make better sense of the structural determinants of an immigrant organising process. It further has shown that an analysis of the immigrant organising process needs to distinguish three elements: (1) the different explanatory factors, (2) the different phases in the organising process and (3) the different elements within the immigrant organising process (numbers, types, networks, etc.). By combining the immigration model with more general organisational models, such as the political opportunity structure model and the organisational ecology model, this study was able to explain to what extent the associational behaviour of Turkish and Surinamese immigrants was general or was related to specific group-related factors. This combination of theoretical approaches has definitely contributed to the study’s ability to identify the main explanatory factors and to illustrate the influence of these factors in the different phases of the immigrant organising process.

This study has used a network analysis to explain the similarities and differences between the Turkish organising processes in Amsterdam and Berlin. The network approach proved to be another valuable instrument for explaining important mechanisms related to the organising process of Turkish immigrants in a host society. It provided information on two important issues. It not only illustrated that interorganisational links are an important aspect of the Turkish organising process in Amsterdam and Berlin, but also showed the way in which processes of legitimisation, competition, resource allocation and coalition building are functioning within the Turkish organisational popula-
tion. By establishing and maintaining interorganisational relationships, Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and Berlin have been able to develop and expand their organisational populations in both similar and different ways. In this regard, the distinction between a standard and a longitudinal network analysis of Turkish interorganisational relations proved to be indispensable. The combination of both analyses provided the information needed to understand the way in which Turkish immigrants have developed their own organisational structures in Amsterdam and Berlin, separate from the rest of society. Interorganisational relationships proved indeed to be the engine of an emerging and expanding immigrant organisational form.
### Appendix I Catchwords used to identify immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin

**Catchwords used to identify Turkish immigrant organisations in Amsterdam**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Word</th>
<th>English Word</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adalet</td>
<td>camii</td>
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<tr>
<td>alev</td>
<td>cemiyeti</td>
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<td>allochto</td>
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<td>anadolu</td>
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<td>anat</td>
<td>devlet</td>
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<td>ankara</td>
<td>fati</td>
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<td>armeen</td>
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<td>armeni</td>
<td>fikir</td>
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<tr>
<td>asyri</td>
<td>genc</td>
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<tr>
<td>ataturk</td>
<td>hicim</td>
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<td>ayasofia</td>
<td>halk(evi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>azadi</td>
<td>hilal</td>
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<td>birligi</td>
<td>hollandia</td>
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<td>birlik</td>
<td>hurriyet</td>
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<td>buyuk</td>
<td>islam</td>
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**Catchwords used to identify Turkish immigrant organisations in Berlin**

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Deze studie gaat over het ontstaan en voortbestaan van immigrantenorganisaties. Eerder onderzoek heeft inmiddels aangetoond dat zulke organisaties een relevante rol kunnen spelen, zowel voor de samenleving als voor immigranten zelf. Maar waarom deze organisaties ontstaan en waarom ze vaak over een lange periode blijven voortbestaan, is vooral onduidelijk. Met dit proefschrift wil ik aantonen dat de historische achtergrond van immigrantenorganisaties van groot belang kan zijn, alsook dat het zonder die achtergrond te kennen niet goed mogelijk is de rol van deze organisaties op waarde te schatten. Met andere woorden: de redenen van ontstaan en de wijze waarop organisaties zich hebben ontwikkeld, kunnen veel invloed hebben op het huidige en toekomstige functioneren van deze organisaties.

In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift geef ik een overzicht van literatuur over (het ontstaan van) immigrantenorganisaties. Daaruit blijkt dat er weliswaar veel is geschreven over de geschiedenis van migrantenorganisaties, maar dat er nog weinig bekend is over de structurele determinanten van het organisatieproces van immigranten. Een gebrek aan vergelijkende studies lijkt hierbij het grootste euvel: er is veel kennis over afzonderlijke groepen en organisaties, maar de vraag blijft in hoeverre die representatief zijn voor het algemene proces van organisatievorming onder immigranten. In deze studie tracht ik aan de hand van een vergelijkend, historisch onderzoek tussen verschillende immigrantengroepen in verschillende steden te achterhalen welke de meer algemeen verklarende factoren zijn in het organisatieproces van immigranten. Binnen dat perspectief kijk ik zowel naar twee groepen in één stad (Amsterdam), als naar één groep in twee steden (Amsterdam en Berlijn). Ik beperk me daarbij tot de periode 1960-2000 en ga in het bijzonder in op drie aspecten van dat proces: de ontwikkeling van het aantal organisaties, het type organisaties (bijvoorbeeld religieuze, sociaal-culturele of belangenorganisaties en dergelijke) en de formele relaties tussen de organisaties van een bepaalde immigrantengroep, het interne netwerk.

De studie is als volgt opgezet. In het eerste deel ga ik in op de belangrijkste factoren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het ontstaan en voortbestaan van immigrantenorganisaties. Ik doe dat aan de hand van
een ‘model van verklarende factoren’ dat is gebaseerd op eerder verricht onderzoek naar immigrantenorganisaties. In het tweede deel analyseer ik welke invloed die factoren door de tijd heen (1960-2000) hebben gehad door het organisatieproces van drie immigrantenpopulaties met elkaar te vergelijken: Turkse immigranten in Amsterdam en Berlijn, en Surinaamse en Turkse immigranten in Amsterdam.

In het model, dat wordt beschreven in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3, worden drie clusters van factoren onderscheiden die het ontstaan en voortbestaan en de ontwikkeling van immigrantenorganisaties kunnen verklaren: (1) groepsgerelateerde factoren, (2) factoren die voortvloeien uit de politieke gelegenheidsstructuur in de samenleving van vestiging en (3) ecologische factoren.

De eerste cluster omvat factoren die zijn gerelateerd aan de kenmerken en achtergrond van de betreffende immigrantengroep. De belangrijkste groepsgerelateerde factoren zijn: het immigratieproces, de grootte van de groep, haar sociaal-culturele karakteristieken en haar relatie met het land van herkomst. Groepsgerelateerde factoren worden geacht een grote invloed te hebben op het organisatieproces van immigranten, vooral in de eerste fase van dat proces. In het algemeen wordt ervan uitgegaan dat deze factoren de collectieve identiteit van een immigrantenpopulatie versterken, wat in veel gevallen organisatievorming kan bevorderen.

Wat betreft de politieke gelegenheidsstructuur, de tweede cluster, wijzen meerdere studies erop dat het organisatieproces van immigranten sterk is verbonden met de mogelijkheden die de samenleving van vestiging biedt om zich te organiseren. Volgens het ‘politieke gelegenheidsstructuurmodel’ (POS) hangt de mate waarin immigranten zich organiseren sterk samen met de structuur en (in)formele houding van de politieke instituties, en kunnen veranderingen in die structuur of houding een stimulerende of juist een ontmoedigende uitwerking hebben op het aantal en type organisaties. Vanuit het POS-model geredeneerd, verwachten we dat het aantal formele immigrantenorganisaties groter is naarmate politieke instituties zich positiever opstellen.

De derde cluster, de zogenaamde ecologische factoren, is gericht op de interne dynamiek tussen organisaties. Binnen het ‘ecologische model’, ontwikkeld in de Verenigde Staten, wordt ervan uitgegaan dat organisaties elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden. Deze onderlinge relatie heeft een sterke invloed op de verdere ontwikkeling van een bepaalde groep organisaties. In het ecologische model speelt het concept ‘dichtheid’ – gedefinieerd als het totale aantal organisaties van een bepaalde immigrantengroep in verhouding tot het aantal immigranten uit de desbetreffende groep – een belangrijke rol. Dichtheid bepaalt in hoge mate de legitimiteit van een bepaald type organisatie. Legitimiteit, op haar
beurt, is zeer belangrijk voor het ontstaan van organisaties (van welk type dan ook). Als er weinig organisaties van een bepaald type zijn, zal er, uitgaande van dit model, weinig legitimiteit voor dit soort organisaties zijn. Komen er nieuwe organisaties bij, dan zal die legitimiteit echter toenemen, voornamelijk omdat de samenleving beter bekend raakt met deze organisaties. Een toenemende legitimiteit vergemakkelijkt het oprichten van nieuwe organisaties, wat weer zal leiden tot een nieuwe verhoging van de legitimiteit voor dit type organisaties. Dit voortschrijdende proces zal aanhouden tot er een kritische grens is bereikt, de zogeheten *carrying capacity*, waarna de interne competitie tussen organisaties een grotere rol zal gaan spelen. Op dat moment wordt het juist weer moeilijker om een nieuwe organisatie op te richten en zal het aantal nieuwe organisaties geleidelijk weer afnemen.

De invloed van deze drie clusters van factoren op het organisatieproces van immigranten kan door de tijd heen veranderen. Bovendien hebben sommige verklarende factoren (op wisselende momenten) meer invloed op het aantal organisaties, andere meer op het type organisaties of op het interne netwerk. Om de invloed en verklaringskracht van deze factoren nader te kunnen bepalen, is in het tweede deel van deze studie (hoofdstuk 4 en met 6) het organisatieproces van drie immigrantengroepen in Amsterdam en Berlijn nader onderzocht.


In hoofdstuk 4 blijkt dat politieke instituties in Amsterdam een positieve houding hebben ingenomen jegens immigranten en hun organisaties, terwijl de Berlijnse instituties zich veeleer terughoudend hebben opgesteld. Hoewel deze constatering niet geheel recht doet aan de werkelijkheid (ook in Amsterdam zijn voorbeelden te vinden van een meer vijandige houding en ook in Berlijn zijn enkele immigrantenorganisaties actief gesteund), kan worden vastgesteld dat de Amsterdamse politieke gelegenheidsstructuur positiever is geweest dan de Berlijnse. Dat verschil in gelegenheidsstructuur blijkt voornamelijk te kunnen worden toegeschreven aan de invoering van het Nederlandse multiculturele beleid begin jaren tachtig. Vanaf dat moment konden Turkse organisaties

Het type Turkse organisaties is in beide steden nagenoeg identiek (gebleven). Dit duidt niet alleen op een sterke invloed van groepsgere lateerde factoren, maar, vooral in een latere fase van het organisatieproces, ook op het belang van ecologische factoren. De continuïteit in het type Turkse organisaties is in de tijd bezien namelijk opmerkelijk.

Nieuwe Turkse organisaties hebben in veel gevallen de meest succesvolle activiteiten van reeds bestaande organisaties gekopieerd en er zo voor gezorgd dat de structuur van het Turkse organisatieveld bleef ge handhaafd.

In hoofdstuk 5 is het interne netwerk van Turkse organisaties in beide steden vergeleken. De formele relaties zijn daarbij geanalyseerd op grond van het aantal bestuursleden dat in twee of meer van deze organisaties zitting heeft; het gaat hier dus om overlappende bestuursnetwerken. Vanuit deze invalshoek kijk ik ten eerste naar het totale aantal dubbelfuncties in de periode 1970-2000, ten tweede naar de aard van het netwerk: welke organisaties worden met elkaar verbonden, wat is hun ideologische of religieuze achtergrond?

De politieke gelegenheidsstructuur blijkt in beide steden niet zozeer invloed te hebben op het aantal dubbelfuncties, als wel op de aard van het netwerk. In Amsterdam is er sinds het begin van de jaren tachtig sterke nadruk gelegd dat Turkse organisaties met elkaar moesten samenwerken, terwijl dat in Berlijn niet het geval was. Het verschil in politieke gelegenheidsstructuur had aanvankelijk niet zoveel invloed op de aard van de interne netwerken, maar in de jaren negentig is in Amsterdam een uitgebreid netwerk ontstaan van Turkse organisaties met verschillende ideologische en religieuze achtergronden. In Berlijn zijn de ideologische en religieuze organisaties van elkaar gescheiden gebleven.

In hoofdstuk 6 beschrijf ik eerst de ontwikkeling in de relatie tussen de Amsterdamse overheid en Surinaamse organisaties in de stad. Surinaamse immigranten blijken met het oprichten van organisaties sterk te hebben gereageerd op het beleid dat vanaf 1974 werd toegepast, dat wil zeggen in eerste instantie actieve betrokkenheid bij en financiële ondersteuning van de lokale overheid, later minder intensieve over-
heidsbemoeienis. Het aantal Surinaamse organisaties liet namelijk in de jaren zeventig een sterke stijging zien; in de periode daarna bleef dat aantal redelijk stabiel.


Deze vergelijking laat in de eerste plaats zien dat het aantal Surinaamse organisaties na 1985 sterk overeenkomt met het aantal Turkse. Dit duidt op een sterke invloed van de Amsterdamse politieke gelegenheidsstructuur op het aantal immigrantenorganisaties. In de tweede plaats komt naar voren dat het type organisaties van beide groepen wel duidelijke verschillen vertoont. De verschillen in de groepsgerelateerde kenmerken (het verloop van het immigratieproces, de omvang, de sociaal-culturele kenmerken en de relatie met het herkomstland) van de Surinaamse en Turkse immigrantenpopulatie blijken hierbij van doorslaggevend belang te zijn.

In hoofdstuk 7, ten slotte, zijn de belangrijkste resultaten van deze studie weergegeven. Leidraad daarbij waren de volgende vragen: in hoeverre zijn de drie genoemde clusters van factoren van belang voor het organisatieproces van immigranten, op welke aspecten van het organisatieproces zijn ze van invloed en in hoeverre verandert hun invloed?

In grote lijnen kan worden gesteld dat de eerste cluster van factoren (groepsgerelateerde factoren) vooral van invloed is in de eerste fase van het organisatieproces. In deze fase wordt de basis gelegd voor de organisatiestructuur van de immigrantengemeenschap. De groepsgerelateerde factoren zijn in deze fase zowel bepalend voor het aantal en type organisaties, als voor de interne relaties tussen die organisaties. Naarmate het vestigingsproces vordert, wordt de invloed van deze cluster van factoren minder groot, hoewel sommige groepsgerelateerde factoren voor een langere periode van grote invloed kunnen zijn. Zo is de politieke situatie in Turkije tot in de jaren negentig van invloed geweest op Turkse organisaties in Amsterdam én Berlijn.

De politieke gelegenheidsstructuur speelt voornamelijk in de tweede fase een sterke rol. De overheid kan in deze fase organisatievorming onder immigranten stimuleren door speciaal beleid te formuleren en vervolgens te implementeren. Het verstrekken van subsidies is hierbij een belangrijke voedingsbodem voor een toename van het aantal organisaties. Overheidsinvloed is vooral zichtbaar als het gaat om het aantal organisaties, niet zozeer wat betreft het type organisaties. Op de lange termijn blijkt de politieke gelegenheidsstructuur ook een sterke invloed
te hebben op de aard van de interne netwerken tussen de organisaties van een bepaalde immigrantengroep.

De ecologische factoren zijn vooral bepalend in de derde fase van het organisatieproces van immigranten. Kort gezegd kan worden gesteld dat deze factoren voor continuïteit zorgen; de structuur van het organisatieveld fluctueert minder dan wellicht verwacht. Als een bepaalde immigrantengroep in de eerste fase bijvoorbeeld een groot aantal religieuze organisaties opricht, zorgen onder andere ecologische factoren ervoor dat dit hoge aantal voor een langere periode zal blijven bestaan.
Chapter 1

1 This study is part of a larger project entitled ‘De kwaliteit van de multiculturele democratie in Amsterdam en Berlijn,’ under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Meindert Fennema and Dr. Jean Tillie. The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) has financed this study (grant number 410042009). Lisa Chason has edited the text.

2 Some were political refugees, who founded the organisations with the explicit purpose of continuing their political activities.

3 The forthcoming article by Moya (2005) provides an excellent overview of the main historical studies on immigrant organisational activity around the world.

4 Green also describes a third type of comparison, the linear comparison, in which the situation of a particular immigrant group is compared before and after the migration process. We will leave this type of comparison aside.

5 I like to thank Eske Voorthuijsen for her assistance in helping me to gather the Surinamese catchwords.

6 The process of identifying Turkish and Surinamese organisations for this project was done during the year 2000. It is therefore possible that some of the Turkish and Surinamese organisations that were established in 2000 are not included in the historical database. For that reason we compare the two databases for the year 1999 to get a more accurate account of the number of missing organisations in the historical database.

7 Sleeping organisations are a larger problem in Berlin than in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce has been more active in monitoring whether voluntary organisations really still exist. The Berlin Chamber of Associations started to take a similar, more active approach at the end of the 1990s.

Chapter 4

1 For Amsterdam I arrived at a reliable estimate for 1960-73 (in collaboration with Theo Fonville [Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics O+S]) based on the following sources: the 1960 census; Statistische meeddelingen van het Bureau van Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam (sections entitled ‘Vestiging en vertrek naar herkomst en bestemming’ and ‘Aantal door de gemeente politie geregistreerde vreemdelingen’); Op grond van cijfers: beschouwingen naar aanleiding van statistische gegevens omtrent Amsterdam 1969/5 no. 2 p. 37 and 1973/9 no. 1 p. 19. For 1974-90 we used figures from the Amsterdam statistics bureau as published in Amsterdam: bevolkingsproejcties tot 1995 (Part 2 Etnisch-kulturele minderheden) (published in 1986 by the Afdeling Bestuursinformatie, Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening and Dienst Volkshuisvesting, Ge-
meente Amsterdam) and De Amsterdammers in zeven bevolkingscategorieën (published in 1980-2001 by the Afdeling Bestuursinformatie, Gemeente Amsterdam). For Berlin we used the statistical yearbooks of the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin for the period 1960-2000.

2 See the articles ‘Incident bekoelt verhouding buitenlanders en klein links’, Volkskrant, 3 May 1984; and ‘Viering 1 mei door klein links mislukt’, Parool, 2 May 1984.

3 The average is calculated by dividing the total amount of yearly subsidy for Turkish organisations by the total number of existing Turkish organisations that same year.

4 For the years 1977 and 1983 there is no data available.

5 It is also not certain that this subsidy was given only to Turkish organisations and not also to German organisations catering to Turkish immigrants.

6 For Berlin we have used only the subsidy for Turkish organisations from the Ausländerbeauftragte. For other forms of support it is too uncertain what the subsidy conditions were and whether German or Turkish organisations received this money. For Amsterdam we use only the subsidy provided by the city council and not the subsidies of the city districts.

7 However this also means that there have not been any serious conflicts between local authorities and Turkish religious organisations. Lindo (1999) illustrates that these conflicts can be fierce and long lasting.

8 Relative total number means the total number of formal organisations divided by the size of the immigrant group. This allows for a comparison between immigrant groups (10 formal organisations for an immigrant group that has 100 members is completely different from 10 formal organisations for an immigrant group that has 10,000 members).

9 The decade of the sixties is not included in this comparison because the total number of formal Turkish organisations in both cities was still low at that time and the Turkish immigrant groups were small. Because of this there is not enough information for an adequate comparison for this period.

10 There are two ways in which the relative number of available ethnic organisations can grow: either by a low dissolving rate or by a high founding rate (or of course by a combination of both). In the first case we will see a population of organisations that is characterised by stability, old organisations that last relatively long and a few new entries every year. In the second case the population of organisations can be characterised as dynamic, with a lot of new entries per year causing an increase in the total number of organisations. The pattern in Berlin is best characterised by the first description (low dissolving rates) while the Amsterdam pattern is more influenced by high founding rates. The Turkish organisations in Berlin are older than those in Amsterdam and last longer (regardless of the fact that the Turkish organising process started earlier in Berlin than in Amsterdam). If we look at all the dissolved Turkish organisations in both cities we see that the Turkish organisations in Berlin end their activities after an average of 10.7 years, in Amsterdam after an average of 5.8 years. In Amsterdam there are three organisations that dissolved in the same year as their founding, thirteen organisations ended their activities after only one year and six after two years. In Berlin the most unsuccessful organisations still lasted for three years. The fact that the relative number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam is higher than in Berlin is therefore completely the result of the high founding rates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam.

11 As mentioned, almost all Turkish organisations have a political character. The type ‘political’ in this table refers only to those organisations that have a clear political name or political goal in their mission statement.

12 Most voluntary associations provide a variety of different activities. Many Turkish religious organisations for instance have founded specific associations for women in
order to provide sports or educational activities. Do we characterise these organisations as religious, sports, educational or women's organisations? Or is this an organisation with four different types of purposes? We have chosen for the latter option, in which organisations can be categorized by more than one. The organisations can have up to three different purposes: some associations are classified under one type, and other organisations are classified under two or three different types. Therefore the total percentage of all types is more than 100 percent (see also Koopmans & Statham 2003: 220). The classification is carried out using the name of the organisation, its mission statement (if available), and the characterisation given by the Chamber of Commerce/Associations (if available).

Other research on Turkish organisations in the Netherlands has also found remarkable continuation over time in the fields in which Turkish organisations were active during the eighties and early nineties (Van Zuthem 1994: 30-31).

For the Netherlands research has found also low numbers of women active on the boards of Turkish organisations (Van Zuthem 1994: 28).

Chapter 5

1. By using a longitudinal network analysis we can state the number of interlocks present within a certain period, but cannot illustrate how the number has evolved over the successive years. This is possible if we conduct a standard network analysis for several successive years.

2. We will not go into the background of his murder. It is a complicated matter and opinions on why it occurred strongly differ to this date.

3. For some of these it is questionable whether they ever actually functioned as genuine organisations. It has been suggested that the large number of different organisations was an attempt to conceal illegal activities of the Grey Wolves (Braam & Ulger 1997: 99). In 2000 judicial investigations were started to prosecute several of these organisations (Parool 2000).

4. This is the national organisation of the TGB; interestingly they have not established an interlocking directorate with the TGB but with the TBB.

5. For the method of gathering information on the size of immigrant population in Amsterdam, see note 1 Chapter 4.

6. One guilder is about 0.46 euro.

7. Except for relatively few Surinamese who went to the United States or the Netherlands Antilles (Van Niekerk 1994: 47).

8. Although even for this convergent comparison the political opportunity structure has not been completely similar since Afro-Surinamese organisations had a more powerful political position in the seventies than the Indo-Surinamese. Again, the introduction of Dutch minority policy changed this situation and caused the political opportunity structure to become more equal.


10. Although no objective criteria are available for identifying Afro-Surinamese associations, a reliable categorisation can be made by taking an organisation's name in conjunction with the names of its board members (van Heelsum and Voorthuysen 2002: 10).

11. Most voluntary associations provide a variety of different activities. The Afro and Indo organisations can have up to three different purposes. Some associations are classified under one type, and other organisations are classified under two or three different types. The total percentage of all types is therefore more than 100 percent.
The classification is carried out using the name of the organisation, its mission statement (if available), and the characterisation given by the Chamber of Commerce (if available).

There are two ways in which the relative number of available ethnic organisations can grow: either by a low dissolving rate or by a high founding rate (or of course by a combination of both). In the first case we will see a population of organisations that is characterised by stability, old organisations that last relatively long and a few new entries every year. In the second case the population of organisations can be characterised as dynamic, with a lot of new entries per year causing an increase in the total number of organisations. The pattern in Berlin is best characterised by the first description (low dissolving rates) while the Amsterdam pattern is more influenced by high founding rates. The Turkish organisations in Berlin are older than those in Amsterdam and last longer (regardless of the fact that the Turkish organising process started earlier in Berlin than in Amsterdam). If we look at all the dissolved Turkish organisations in both cities we see that the Turkish organisations in Berlin end their activities after an average of 10.7 years, in Amsterdam after an average of 5.8 years. In Amsterdam there are three organisations that dissolved in the same year as their founding, thirteen organisations ended their activities after only one year and six after two years. In Berlin the most unsuccessful organisations still lasted for three years. The fact that the relative number of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam is higher than in Berlin is therefore completely the result of the high founding rates of Turkish organisations in Amsterdam.