Abstract
In public debates over multiculturalism in Europe, Islamic values and ways of life are commonly represented as incompatible with Western rights and liberties. Against this background, Muslim minorities have developed generally strong and stable religious identities. This paper asks when and how multicultural cities and ethnic communities give rise to strong and stable religion. Taking an approach from religious boundary making as a heuristic framework, we bring together a series of five studies on the religious identities of Muslim minorities. The studies compare religious group boundaries and replicate boundary making processes (cf. Wimmer, 2008) across ethnic communities and multicultural cities as comparative cases. Drawing on several large-scale surveys of Muslim minorities, our comparative findings illuminate the making and unmaking of religious boundaries. We conclude that strong religion is ‘made in Europe’ as institutional rigidities and social inequalities enforce religious boundary making through social closure and cultural maintenance within ethnic communities.

Keywords: boundary making, religion, Islam, Europe, second generation, cultural maintenance

1. Introduction
The unprecedented scale of continuing immigration from majority Muslim sending countries into the North-West of Europe has transformed the religious landscape of the historically Christian and highly secularised European cities. Majority attitudes towards this new religious diversity have been mixed and they have become increasingly and overtly anti-Muslim in
the aftermath of September 11th (Pew Forum, 2011). In public debates over immigrant integration and multiculturalism, Islamic faith traditions and ways of life are often represented as incompatible with Western cultural values, rights and liberties (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In the eyes of the majority, the religiosity of Muslim minorities is a barrier which stands in the way of their societal integration (Foner & Alba, 2008). From the perspective of Muslim minorities, in contrast, their religious identity is a highly valued source of cultural continuity and social support (Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman, 2010). Against this background, Muslim minorities in Europe have generally developed strong religious identities, which have been effectively transmitted to the next generation (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012). In the Netherlands, for instance, the second generation of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims report high levels of dietary practice and prayer; and their mosque attendance is on the rise with attendance rates approaching those of the first generation (Maliepaard, Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2012; Maliepaard & Gijsberts 2012). From the perspective of Muslim youth, their religion is a central part of their minority identity and a source of collective self-worth in the face of public hostility (Martinovic & Verkuyten 2012; Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman, 2010).

Looking beyond these well-established facts, the present paper asks the question when and how religious boundary making processes give rise to strong and stable religious identities. Using boundary making processes as a heuristic framework, we compare multicultural cities and ethnic communities as the proximal integration contexts that set the stage for strong religious identities. Specifically, the paper integrates five separate studies among Turkish and Moroccan Muslim minority groups in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden.

A rich qualitative research literature documents how religion shapes the identity construals of Muslim minority youngsters in particular countries (e.g., De Koning, 2008 in the Netherlands; Dassetto, 1996 in Belgium; Khosrokhavar, 1997 in France; Raj, 2000; Werbner, 2000 in Britain; Schiffauer, 2000 in Germany; Schmidt, 2011 in Denmark; Eid, 2007 in Canada). Looking across countries, however, comparative case studies of religious diversity have mostly privileged top-down perspectives from national institutions and policy regimes (cf. Bader, 2007). Though there have been some recent quantitative cross-nationally comparative studies of religion which have focused on the micro-level (e.g. Connor, 2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, 2011; Connor and Koenig, 2013), these have largely neglected the European-born Muslims. Our research supplements the above literatures with quantitative comparative strategies. The five studies in this paper exploit micro-level
comparative data on the religious identities of Muslim minorities from several large-scale surveys in the Netherlands and across European cities in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Sweden. It should be acknowledged that the advantage of comparative scope is offset by inherent restrictions in quantitative measures of religion. These measures cannot fully capture the multiple meanings and situated performances of ‘thick’ religious identities. Yet, our analyses improve on earlier quantitative research by including multiple indicators of religious identification and behavioural practices among self-identified Muslims. Moreover, our studies validate religious constructs across gender, ethnic groups, and cities by way of multi-group measurement models; and comparisons of religious identity are controlled for generally low levels of (parental) education or socio-economic status of Muslim minorities in Europe (Heath, Rothon & Kilpi, 2008).

We start by introducing our theoretical framework on religious boundary making. In a second part of the paper, we address our first research question when religious boundaries are more salient, by comparing religious identities of Muslim minorities across cities in studies 1 and 2. In a final third part of the paper, to answer the how question, we focus on the micro-processes of social closure and cultural maintenance within ethnic communities (Studies 3, 4 and 5).

2. Religious boundary making: a heuristic framework

Our comparative strategies and findings are theoretically informed by an integrative approach from religious group boundaries. The boundary framework originates in Barth’s (1969) classic ‘Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of cultural difference’, where he pioneered a constructivist approach of ethnicity as a social process rather than a cultural given. Looking beyond ethnicity proper, Lamont and Molnár (2002) define boundaries as evaluative distinctions between groups, such as social classes or races, which are anchored in societal institutions and enacted in daily practices and interactions. The framework was introduced into comparative migration studies by (among others) Bauböck (1998), Lamont (2000) and Alba (2005). Applying a historical-institutional approach of group boundaries to religion, for instance, Alba (2005) argued that religion in Germany and France marks a bright boundary separating (mainly Muslim) immigrants from the mainstream, much like race in the United States. For our purposes, we will draw on Wimmer’s (2008) multi-level process model of ethnic boundaries, which bridges the original conception of boundaries
as micro-social processes with macro-level institutionalist approaches. Our main interest is in contextualising religion and not in testing a comprehensive model, so we focus on the crux of the model as it applies to religious boundary making, and emphasise particularly the minority perspective. More precisely, our comparative data and designs loosely correspond to Wimmer’s conceptualisation of interlocking macro-constraints and micro-processes of boundary making. Figure 1 gives an overview of our heuristic framework and how the five studies are located within this framework.

In a nutshell, different institutional orders and power hierarchies in society constitute varying macro-level constraints on group boundaries. As applied to religious boundaries, in the absence of accommodation (institutional orders) and with increasing degrees of inequality (power hierarchies) along religious lines, more salient religious boundaries will define strong religious identities (see Figure 1). Salience refers to the degree of ‘groupness’ associated with a particular boundary (Wimmer, 2008). When religious boundaries are more salient, for instance, being a member of a religious group is more consequential, not only for religious involvement but also for one’s social life. Thus, reasoning from institutional constraints, religious boundaries should be more salient in cities where Islam as a minority religion is less accommodated institutionally. Likewise, power hierarchies differ between
cities, with more inequality and hence more salient boundaries in cities where religious minority status coincides with socio-economic disadvantage. In those cities, the religious identification of the second generation will have more pervasive implications for religious practice and for their societal integration. Conversely, there should be more leeway for selective and ultimately private or ‘symbolic’ forms of religion (cf. Gans, 1994) in more inclusive city contexts. Moreover, in the latter cities, religious identification would not impede the societal integration of the second generation. To address our first question when religious boundaries are more salient, the first part of this paper compares the religious identities of Muslim minorities across cities with varying degrees of institutional accommodation and ethnic inequality (Studies 1 and 2).

Our comparative design focuses on cities, rather than countries, because multicultural cities constitute the proximal context of integration for immigrants and their children. Thus, we do not assume that processes of religious boundary making are unfolding mainly at the national level, but rather focus on multicultural cities as comparative cases because they represent strategic research sites where local, national and transnational forces intersect. As centres of public debate and political decision making, they are most proximal places where national institutions are designed, represented and contested.

In this paper, we reason that institutional arrangements may not coincide with grand national philosophies of integration; yet they have developed in a path-dependent way from existing institutions which are reinvented to accommodate (or not) new forms of diversity. While liberal-democratic states do not – and should not – shape the religious life of their citizens in a deterministic fashion, institutional regulations nevertheless impose real constraints on the development of religious organisations and institutions by immigrant communities (Koenig, 2007, Bader, 2007, Fetzer and Soper, 2005). From a comparative perspective, therefore, we expect a long-term impact of distinct institutional patterns on patterns of integration and religiosity in the next generation, over and above variation as a function of local specificities and more short-term changes in public sentiments and policy responses.

Comparisons across multicultural cities take a top-down approach of religious boundaries from the institutions and structures that are in place and that afford strong religion. But they leave unanswered the question how boundaries are made salient. To answer the how question, the second part of this paper focuses on the micro-processes of social closure and cultural maintenance within ethnic communities (Studies 3, 4 and 5).
In his multi-level model of boundary making, Wimmer proposed social closure and cultural maintenance as key processes connecting macro-level constraints to the making (and unmaking) of group boundaries. Applying these notions to religious boundaries, we argue that religious boundary making is enforced from the bottom up through binding social ties (social closure) and shared cultural preferences (cultural maintenance) among fellow Muslims (see Figure 1).

3. Comparing religious boundaries across multicultural cities

Taking an approach from religious boundary making as a heuristic framework, this paper sets out to illuminate when and how multicultural cities and ethnic communities give rise to strong religious identities. We will now address the when question.

To empirically ground our comparative approach, we will discuss the main findings from two cross-national studies of the Turkish second generation in up to seven cities in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012; Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojčić, 2012). The cities in these four countries were selected because they represent different national histories of church-state relations, which have been extended to incorporate the new religious diversity (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). Moreover, the cities differ in the placement of Muslim minorities in local power hierarchies.

Our main aim is to examine the differential salience of religious group boundaries in different cities. Study 1 compares the different configurations of religious identity and various religious practices across multicultural cities (Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojčić, 2012). Study 2 focuses on the coupling or uncoupling of religious identity and social integration in mainstream society (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2012). Before discussing the findings of studies 1 and 2, we start by discussing differences between national and local contexts in terms of institutional orders and power hierarchies.

3.1. Institutional orders

European cities represent institutional orders which differ in the degree of accommodation of religious diversity and Islam in particular (see Figure 1). City differences are tied up – though not synonymous – with national philosophies of integration, with countries like Sweden, Great Britain, and (until recently) the Netherlands granting some degree of multicultural
recognition of minority cultures, whereas countries like Germany, France or Switzerland put more emphasis on cultural assimilation. In particular, the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion has followed from historically established patterns of church-state relations in each country (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). As we will describe below, distinct institutional pathways come with varying degrees of religious accommodation: they may grant or withhold formal recognition of Islam; and they may facilitate or restrict the establishment of Islamic organisations (Statham et al., 2005). In spite of an abundant literature on cross-national differences in the recognition and accommodation of minority religious traditions across Europe (cf. Maussen, 2007 for a review), there is relatively little empirical research into the consequences of different degrees of institutional accommodation for the ways in which Muslim minorities are defining and performing their religious identities (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012).

From an institutional perspective then, the accommodation of Islam has been least complete in Germany, more complete in Belgium and Sweden, and most complete in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet 2012). In Germany, Islamic organisations remain disadvantaged relative to established churches both legally and financially. Due to their formal status as corporations of public law, Christian churches profit from taxes collected by the German state. Lacking a centralised organisational structure similar to that of the Christian churches, German Muslims have been denied the same legal status by the German authorities (Fetzer and Soper, 2005).

In Belgium, the status of Islam is formally equal to that of the historically dominant Catholic Church. Yet, in order to receive the state funding for religious services to which they are legally entitled, Muslim communities were required to set up a nationally representative Islamic council as a partner for the Belgian state (Foblets and Overbeeke, 2002). Such a council has been established only recently upon the initiative of the Belgian authorities. Because of the delayed implementation of the recognition of Islam, Islamic organisational structures are less fully developed in Belgium than they are in e.g. the Netherlands.

In Sweden Islam enjoys the same legal status as other religions; and Islamic organisations are entitled to state funding proportionally to the size of their membership. However, Sweden has historically known a state church, which still counts more than 80 per cent of the Swedish population as its members (Alwall, 2000). Although the privileged position of the Swedish Lutheran Church has been dismantled in the second half of the twentieth century, the legacy of the state church system implies that Islam occupies a relatively marginal position.
Due to the Dutch history of ‘pillarisation’ (Lijphart, 1968) and despite increasing secularisation among the majority population, pluralist church-state relations created opportunities for Muslims to develop their own institutions (Rath et al., 1996). Thus, Dutch Muslims have established numerous local mosque associations, as well as state-funded Islamic broadcasting networks and Islamic schools (Doomernik, 1995). From an institutional perspective then, Dutch Muslims were granted formal equality with Christian and other religious groups from the early 1980s onwards; and they made the most of the opportunities offered by the Dutch system.

3.2. Power hierarchies
Looking beyond formal institutions, Wimmer (2008) defines power hierarchies in terms of degrees of inequality between groups in society. As comparative indicators of inequality, we rely on educational attainment, as well as the degree of residential segregation of Muslims. Power hierarchies derive from – and perpetuate – objective group differences in access to resources. Whereas lower educational qualifications reflect restricted resources in immigrant families, higher qualifications are a prerequisite for the second generation to gain access to stable and well-paid jobs. Moreover, at higher levels of ethnic segregation in neighbourhoods and schools, the second generation has less access to the mainstream cultural and social resources that are typically valued in school and in the labour market. Our study compares across cities in four countries that differ in their placement of Muslim minorities towards the bottom end of relatively enduring power hierarchies.

The German cities represent the most exclusionary end with very high degrees of educational inequality and residential segregation (Crul, Schneider & Lelie, 2012). In contrast, Stockholm clearly represents the more inclusive end, with relatively low degrees of inequality and segregation, and with significant numbers of the second generation enrolled in higher education and present in majority neighbourhoods. Finally, Dutch and Belgian multicultural cities fall in between these two ends, with small portions of the second generation entering higher education and moving into majority neighbourhoods. Importantly, city-level comparisons allow further distinctions within countries between the capital cities of Berlin, Amsterdam and Brussels and the cities of Frankfurt, Rotterdam and Antwerp respectively. Especially the industrial economies of Rotterdam and Antwerp represent more uneven integration contexts for the second generation than Amsterdam and Brussels due to their more polarised labour market as well the more restrictive public opinion climate due to the greater
success of right-wing political movements in the harbour cities. From a boundary approach, we reason that religious practice will be most strict (Study 1) and religious identity least compatible with societal integration (Study 2) in cities where Islam is less accommodated institutionally and where Muslim minorities are more socially disadvantaged.

3.3. Private, selective and strict religious identities
In Study 1, Phalet, Fleischmann and Stojčić (2012) examined the salience of religious group boundaries among the Turkish second generation. We operationalised the differential salience of religious boundaries between the cities in terms of the coupling (or uncoupling) of religious identity with behavioural involvement in religious practices. To compare differential salience across cities, we asked how the European-born children of Turkish immigrants identified with, and practiced, their Islamic religion. We reasoned that strict forms of religious identity mark salient group boundaries between religious in-group members and outsiders. Where group boundaries are less salient and more fuzzy, therefore, selective or private forms of religious identity should be more common.

Study 1 draws on large-scale surveys among random samples of second-generation Turks in seven European cities, using the cross-national TIES surveys (‘The Integration of the European Second generation’; Crul et al, 2012). Parallel surveys were conducted in Germany (IMIS 2008), Belgium (CeSo-CSCP 2008), the Netherlands (IMES-NIDI 2007-2008) and Sweden (CEIFO 2008). Because religion questions were only asked of participants who self-identified as Muslims, the analyses did not include secular or Christian Turkish participants. Most Turkish second-generation participants in the Belgian and Dutch cities were self-identified (mostly Sunni) Muslims (over 75 per cent). In the German cities close to 70 per cent, and in Stockholm over 40 per cent self-identified as Muslim, excluding secular Turks and Turkish Christians. This resulted in comparison samples of Turkish Muslims in Berlin (N=156), Frankfurt (N=185), Antwerp (N=330), Brussels (N=194), Rotterdam (N=205), Amsterdam (N=166) and Stockholm (N=118). It should be acknowledged that the data have a number of limitations, including the differential selection of Muslims from ethnically defined Turkish samples and the cross-sectional nature of the data (cf. Crul et al, 2012 for more details on data constraints). Nevertheless, Turkish Muslim participants were roughly comparable across cities, with most immigrant parents being highly religious and less qualified immigrant workers from less developed rural regions in Turkey (yet somewhat more secular and qualified immigrants in Brussels and Amsterdam; see Table 1).
Looking beyond institutional accommodation, we found that cities differ in the degrees of ethnic segregation and inequality (see Table 1). Thus, self-reported residential segregation was highest in Berlin and Brussels, with over 50 per cent of the participants living in majority-Turkish neighbourhoods. Self-reported segregation was also quite high in Frankfurt (40 per cent), with moderate segregation in Antwerp and Rotterdam (35 per cent), and the lowest levels in Amsterdam and Stockholm (30 per cent). Similarly, participants’ educational qualifications document city differences in the degree of persistent disadvantage. These differences are all the more remarkable against the background of similarly low qualifications of Turkish immigrant parents across the cities (see Table 1). Specifically, Turkish-Muslim participants with higher (tertiary) qualifications were most absent in Berlin and Frankfurt (3 and 5 per cent resp.) and most present in Stockholm (31 per cent); with intermediate rates of higher qualifications in the other cities (ranging from 15 to 20 per cent).

To establish different types of religious identity within each city, K-means cluster analysis was conducted separately in each comparison sample, using a reliable four-item measure of religious identification (e.g. “Being a Muslim is an important part of my self”) as well as frequencies of religious practices, including ritual practices such as prayer and attending religious

Table 1  Turkish Muslim minorities in seven cities: Immigrant selectivity, institutional order and power hierarchy, and the distribution of types of religious identities

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Frankfurt</th>
<th>Antwerp</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Rotterdam</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
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<td>- Qualified father</td>
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<td>Some</td>
<td>Few</td>
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<td>Institutional order:</td>
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<td>accommodation</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>- % other ethnic neighbours</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very low</td>
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<td>Types of religious identity:</td>
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<td>- % Private Muslims</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<td>- % Selective Muslims</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<td>- % Strict Muslims</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
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gatherings, and dietary practices such as fasting and observing the rules of consumption ("halal"). Across all seven comparative contexts, the same three clusters could be replicated and were labelled as “private”, “selective” and “strict” types of religious identity, with most religious practice among strict Muslims, less (mainly dietary) practice among selective, and least among private Muslims.

While the same three types of religious identity could be distinguished in each city, the distribution of participants over the religious types differed considerably between the cities (see Table 1). In line with our expectations, strict forms of religious identity were more prevalent in cities that were less accommodating of Islam and where Muslims occupied a lower position in the local power hierarchy. At the most exclusionary end (second generation in Berlin), strict Muslims were the largest subgroup and private Muslims the smallest subgroup of Turkish Muslims. Similarly in Frankfurt, private Muslims were least frequent, yet strict and selective types of Muslims were roughly equally numerous. Note that significant portions of secular Turkish participants in German cities (around 30%) suggest polarisation between strong religion and secularism. At the multiculturalist end of the spectrum, in contrast, more than half of the Turkish Muslim participants in Stockholm were counted as private Muslims, while the other half was split evenly between selective and strict types of religious identity. Note that Stockholm also counts significant numbers of Christian Turks (who were not included in this analysis). Findings from the Belgian and Dutch cities were somewhere in between, with selective Muslims being the most prevalent type in Brussels and Amsterdam, and strict Muslims prevailing in Antwerp and Rotterdam. Interestingly, these findings highlight city differences within the same countries, with higher degrees of inequality and more salient religious boundaries in both port cities alike than in the capital cities.

To sum up, the patterning of different types of religious identities across the seven cities reveals meaningful city differences in the salience of religious boundaries. Moreover, the overall pattern is in line with different macro-constraints on group boundaries in the different cities. We conclude that the national accommodation of Islam interacts with local power hierarchies to afford more selective or private types of religious identity in some cities (like Stockholm, Amsterdam or Brussels) versus more strict religious identities in other cities (like Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Rotterdam).
3.4. Religion and social integration

Study 2 takes a somewhat different angle on the salience of religious group boundaries among the Turkish second generation. In this study, Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) operationalised the salience of religious boundaries in terms of the social consequences of religious identity. More specifically, the study examines the coupling of religious identity with social integration in other (non-religious) life domains. We used the same cross-national TIES surveys (cf. supra) to compare second-generation Turkish Muslims in the capital cities of the four countries under study. The main aim of the study was to test the association (or dissociation) of Islamic religiosity and the social integration of Muslims into the wider society. Where religious boundaries are more salient, religious identities will have more pervasive social consequences in the lives of individuals and in the organisation of society (Wimmer, 2008). We reasoned that the enhanced ‘groupness’ of Muslim minorities in cities with salient religious boundaries would impede the societal integration of religious Muslims. As indicators of social integration, the study included educational attainment, labour market participation, and interethnic marriage. To assess religious identities, four cross-culturally valid dimensions of religion were distinguished in multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: religious identification, worship, dietary practice and public assertion (such as wearing the headscarf). The associations of religiosity with the social integration of the Turkish second generation was compared across the four capital cities of Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam and Stockholm.

Extending the above argument about the differential salience of religious boundaries from institutional orders and power hierarchies in cities, we expect (most) negative associations between religious identity and societal integration in cities like Berlin, with low degrees of accommodation (institutional order) and high inequality (power hierarchy). In cities like Stockholm, on the other hand, where Islam is formally accommodated and where Muslims are less socially disadvantaged, religious boundaries are less salient and religious identity should be more compatible with societal integration. Accordingly, structural equation models relating religious identification, practices and assertion on social integration reveal an inverse relation in Berlin. In the German capital, the most religious members of the Turkish second generation had the lowest levels of education and were most likely to have co-ethnic, rather than interethnic, close ties. Conversely, in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, second-generation religious identity was decoupled from social integration in mainstream society. No significant associations were found between religious identity and any indicator of
societal integration. In spite of varying degrees of accommodation between Brussels (least), Stockholm and Amsterdam (most), the three cities have in common the significant (though varying) degree of institutional accommodation of Islam, relative to the German capital.

We conclude that the comparative findings from both studies suggest less salient religious boundaries in Brussels, Amsterdam and Stockholm than in Berlin. In the former cities, second-generation Turkish Muslims more often prefer selective or private types of religious identity, which are compatible with social integration into mainstream society. In Berlin, in contrast, where religious boundaries are highly salient, the Turkish second generation more often adopts strict ways of being Muslim, which stand in the way of their societal integration.

4. Religious boundary making within ethnic communities

We have seen that the salience of religious boundaries is related to the institutional and societal context in which Muslims are embedded. In this part of the paper we complement these cross-national comparisons with bottom-up perspectives from boundary making processes within Turkish and Moroccan communities (the how question). Drawing on Wimmer’s framework we propose a bottom-up approach of religious boundary making. More precisely, we relate the religious identities of Muslim minorities to the micro-processes of cultural maintenance and social closure in different ethnic communities. Specifically, Study 3 asks whether religious boundaries are more stable in community contexts with higher levels of closure and maintenance (Maliepaard & Lubbers, 2013). The differential stability of religious boundaries is operationalised here as the more or less effective transmission of religion to the next generation. Study 4 replicates differential stability across communities and tests whether stability is explained by enhanced culture maintenance orientation among highly religious Muslims (Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet, 2011). Finally, Study 5 focuses on the process of social closure as it relates to the salience of religious boundaries across ethnic communities. We argue that Muslims with more co-ethnic social ties will show stronger religious identities, especially in the more close-knit Turkish community context (Maliepaard & Phalet, 2012).
4.1. Comparing ethnic communities

Some degree of social closure has been associated with sustained religiosity in immigrant minorities. For instance, close-knit kinship ties and dense ethnic networks are reliably related to immigrant religiosity in the US (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000). Also in European societies, as generally less religious receiving contexts than the US, co-ethnic ties predict sustained religiosity among immigrants (Van Tubergen & Sindradóttir, 2011). Ethnic communities differ in their degree of social closure. In the European migration context, Turkish and Moroccan minorities represent major Muslim minority populations with a predominantly Sunni Islamic background (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012). Both groups have in common their migration histories as guest workers; and their current living conditions are characterised by high overall segregation levels, persistent disadvantage, and pervasive discrimination (Heath et al., 2008). At the same time, they constitute distinct ethnic community contexts for the second generation, with generally higher levels of cultural maintenance and social closure in Turkish than in Moroccan communities. For instance, strong family values and strict parental control are the rule in Turkish immigrant families (De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007). Likewise, Turkish immigrant communities show more residential concentration around ethnic business or industrial niches, more dense ethnic associations, and higher levels of ethnic language and media use as compared to Moroccan communities (Phalet & Heath, 2010). Hence, we expect more religious boundary making in most culturally rooted and socially bounded Turkish (vs. Moroccan) communities. To test this expectation, we will discuss three studies which develop cross-ethnic comparative perspectives on religious boundary formation.

Immigrant families instil religion in their children as part of a more general orientation towards the heritage culture (Regnerus, Smith & Smith, 2004). There is much evidence of the purposeful and effective transmission of heritage cultural values and norms in immigrant families. For instance, Turkish and Moroccan immigrant parents tend to transmit their conservative family values and gender role values to the next generation; and value transmission has been related to parenting practices that stress restrictive control and conformity goals (Kwak, 2003; Phalet & Güngör, 2009). Along similar lines, acculturation research shows the continued importance of the heritage culture and identity among the European second generation, and among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in particular. Typically, they combine a strong orientation towards cultural maintenance with simultaneous orientations towards the mainstream culture (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder, 2006).
A separate strand of research in religious studies shows the key role of families in the religious socialisation of children (Myers, 1996; King, Furrow & Roth, 2002). Little is known, however, about the transmission of religious identities to the second generation of Muslims, which underlies stable religious boundaries in European societies. Focusing on boundary making within ethnic communities, the three studies in this section examine the family socialisation of religion through parental role modelling (Studies 3 and 4), as well as community-based religious education (Study 4), and social control in co-ethnic peer networks (Study 5).

4.2. Cultural maintenance

The stability of religious group boundaries is premised on the successful transmission of religion across generations. Cultural transmission from one generation to the next takes place through goal-directed and explicit socialisation and through more implicit daily routines and social role models which instil norm-congruent behaviours (King, Furrow, & Roth, 2002). In the religious domain, parental religious practices, such as parents’ mosque visits, serve as social models of desired religious behaviours in children and imply the habitual involvement of the parents in the religious life of their community. In addition, early enrolment in Koran lessons exposes Muslim children to formal religious teaching and implies purposeful parental and communal investments in children’s religious socialisation. In Study 3 Maliepaard and Lubbers (2013) compared parent-child dyads of self-identified Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands, using subsamples from periodic large-scale minorities surveys by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SPVA 1998 (Martens, 1999); SPVA 2002 (Groeneveld & Weijers-Martens, 2003)). As expected, immigrant parents transmitted Islamic religious practices and attitudes to their children, so that the children of more religious parents were themselves more religious later in life, thus securing the stability of religious boundaries separating the second generation from the mainstream society. For instance, regular mosque attendance by immigrant parents strongly predicts regular attendance in their children. Similarly, Muslim youngsters tended to endorse the religious attitudes of their parents, such as the preference for a Muslim marriage partner. Finally, when religious transmission was compared across Turkish and Moroccan minorities as different community contexts, the parental socialisation of religious practice, but not of religious attitudes, was most effective in most culturally bounded Turkish immigrant communities. These findings suggest that high levels of cultural maintenance and social closure at the
community level afford the making of religious boundaries through the social control of religious behaviour within the ethnic community.

Study 4 follows up on the differential stability of religious boundaries between ethnic communities; and asks the question how religious socialisation and cultural maintenance interact to produce stable boundaries (Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet, 2011). In a cross-ethnic comparative study of self-identified Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Belgium, we used retrospective data on the religious socialisation of children from the Belgian TIES surveys (‘The Integration of the European Second generation’; Swyngedouw et al, 2008). Religiosity was reliably assessed in terms of religious identification, worship and dietary practices, and belief or orthodoxy (such as literal interpretation of the Qur’an). Combining family- and community-based religious transmission, religious socialisation was assessed by retrospective questions about the frequency of parents’ mosque visits (family-based transmission) and the attendance of Qur’an lessons during childhood (community-based transmission). The study examines the stability of religious boundaries by relating religious socialisation in childhood to the adult religious life of second-generation Muslims. First, we replicate and extend the cross-ethnic comparison of religious transmission in Study 3, by testing how religious transmission differs between Turkish and Moroccan Muslim communities. In addition, we examine whether individual differences in cultural maintenance orientation mediate religious stability across community contexts.

As expected, multi-group structural equation modelling across ethnic community contexts revealed stronger religious identities, in terms of their religious identification, beliefs and practices, for adult Muslims whose parents had visited a mosque regularly and who had attended Qur’an lessons in their childhood. While both forms of religious transmission uniquely predicted religious identification and behavioural involvement, only religious education predicted orthodox religious beliefs. The latter finding suggests that community-based religious instruction is crucial for the stability of religious beliefs as an explicitly cognised component of religiosity. Moreover, and in line with the previous study, in the Turkish community context with its high level of cultural maintenance and social closure, religious transmission is most effective. Religious boundaries were thus most stable among Turkish than among Moroccan Belgian Muslims. Last but not least, childhood religious socialisation predicts stable religious identities into early adulthood through enhanced cultural maintenance orientations among Muslim youth.
4.3. Social closure
In Study 5 Maliepaard and Phalet (2012) used large random samples of self-identified Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims from the 2006 Survey Integration Minorities (SIM) by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Dagevos, Gijsberts, Kappelhof & Vervoort, 2007). In this paper we shifted focus from cultural maintenance to social closure as a key boundary making process within the ethnic community. And we predicted the salience of religious identities, in terms of their consequences for religious practices. Replicating contextual differences between Turkish and Moroccan communities, we also tested whether religious boundaries are most effectively enforced in most densely networked Turkish communities.

To assess social closure, participants reported the frequency of co-ethnic social contacts with Turkish or Moroccan friends and neighbours, as well as their cross-ethnic contacts with Dutch friends and neighbours. As a measure of salience, religious identification was related to religious practice (such as praying and fasting) and public assertion (such as wearing the headscarf) as distinct forms of behavioural involvement in the religious domain. In accordance with our expectations, multi-group structural equation models showed significant net effects of co-ethnic peer networks (controlling for cross-ethnic ties). Muslims who were more embedded in ethnic networks were also more strongly identified with their religion, more ready to endorse public recognition and accommodation, and engaged more often in religious practices. Thus, religious boundaries are more salient in the lives of Muslims who are embedded in ethnic networks. Moreover, ethnic peer networks were most influential in most culturally bounded Turkish communities, as evident from the differential impact of co-ethnic peers on the religious practice of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims. Ethnic differences were significant only for religious practice, however. This latter finding is in line with the previous two studies and suggests that religious boundary making operates through the social control of religious behaviour in densely networked ethnic communities.

Conclusion
The starting point of our comparative research on the religious identities of European-born Muslims is a combination of two well-documented facts. First, there is converging evidence of sustained and strong religion among second-generation Muslims in Europe. Second, Muslim minorities face real ethnic discrimination and increased public hostility against Islam in
European societies. This raises the question how the religious identities of Muslim youngsters are jointly shaped by social forces within ethnic communities and in the wider society. Taking a heuristic approach from religious group boundaries, we addressed the question when and how multicultural cities and ethnic communities give rise to strong and stable religious identities. We developed comparative arguments and discussed comparative findings with a view to contextualise religious identity and to articulate the underlying processes of religious boundary making. Drawing on central aspects of Wimmer's (2008) integrative multi-level process account of ethnic boundaries, our studies supplement a comparative approach from the macro-level of institutional and structural constraints in multicultural cities with a bottom-up approach from micro-processes of boundary making within ethnic communities. Taken together, the studies develop a twofold comparative approach across multicultural cities and across ethnic communities as proximal integration contexts, emphasising boundary formation from a minority perspective.

First, cross-national comparisons across the cities in the first two studies speak to the question when religious boundaries are made salient. The cities were selected so as to cover a range of different institutional orders and power hierarchies along religious lines. As expected from macro-constraints on group boundaries, our findings provide evidence of more strict forms of religious identity in cities where institutional rigidities and social disadvantages define highly salient boundaries. Strict Muslims combine religious identification with the full range of dietary and ritual practices, whereas the religious identities of selective and private Muslims are partly or totally uncoupled from behavioural involvement in the religious domain. Comparing across German, Belgian, Dutch and Swedish cities, the religious identities of local-born Turkish Muslims reflect the differential salience of religious boundaries between cities. Thus, more strict forms of religiosity prevail in cities like Berlin, where a lack of institutional accommodation conspires with relatively high degrees of ethnic segregation and inequality to define salient group boundaries. In contrast, more private and selective forms of religious identity come to the fore in cities like Stockholm or Amsterdam, which offer some degree of accommodation and where some degree of social mixing and upward mobility amount to the unmaking of religious boundaries. Moreover, we find more salient religious boundaries in the industrial cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam than in the respective capital cities, in line with our focus on cities rather than countries as comparative cases. Also in line with the differential salience of religious boundaries between cities, the religious identities of Muslim minorities
were detached from social consequences in terms of their societal integration in cities like Amsterdam, Stockholm or Brussels, which grant some degree of institutional accommodation of Islam as a minority religion. The exception to the rule was Berlin, where religious involvement was inversely related to societal integration, as indicated by the lower education of more religious Muslims for instance.

Second, cross-ethnic comparisons in the last three studies address the question how boundary making processes give rise to more or less stable and salient boundaries. Specifically, comparisons between Turkish and Moroccan community contexts highlight the key role of boundary making processes at the micro-level of Muslim families and communities. In support of most stable religious boundaries in community contexts where cultural maintenance and social closure are generally high, we find most effective religious transmission from immigrant parents to their children in Turkish (vs. Moroccan) communities in the Netherlands and Belgium. Religious identity is passed on to children through family socialisation, as evident from the long-term impact of parental role models of religious practice in childhood, as well as through community-based religious teaching. In support of cultural maintenance as a key boundary making process within ethnic communities, religious socialisation is part and parcel of the maintenance of the heritage culture and identity. Across the communities, Muslims who were more oriented towards cultural maintenance were also more involved in religion later in life. Finally, our last study provides evidence of religious boundary making through social closure in co-ethnic networks with fellow Muslims. Thus, Muslims with more co-ethnic ties not only reported higher levels of religious identification but also more behavioural involvement in the religious domain. Again, co-ethnic ties best predicted religious practice in most densely networked Turkish communities.

To conclude, we should acknowledge some limitations of the present studies, as large-scale surveys cannot fully capture the situated meanings of religious identities. Moreover, cross-sectional data are ill-suited to reveal the dynamic and changing nature of religious identities. In spite of clear limitations, however, the studies jointly illustrate the importance of theory-informed comparative migration research. Strategic comparisons allow us to challenge common sense notions of Islam as an inherently strong religion which is incompatible with European cultures. Instead, our comparative findings foreground different cities and communities as local integration contexts which can make and unmake religious group boundaries.
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